Lazatin vs. The House Electoral Tribunal

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive power to prescribe the period within which election protests may be filed before it, and this rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, which prescribed a ten-day period for filing election contests before the COMELEC, ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution with respect to contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa, as the Batasang Pambansa was abolished and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests of Members of the House of Representatives was vested in the HRET.

Petitioner and private respondent were rival candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga in the May 11, 1987 elections. The 1987 Constitution restored the Electoral Tribunal system, vesting in the Senate and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals the exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. This marked a return to the pre-1973 constitutional arrangement, as the 1973 Constitution had vested such jurisdiction in the COMELEC. The Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) was enacted under the 1973 Constitution and contained provisions governing election contests before the COMELEC, including Section 250 which prescribed the period for filing such contests.

Petitioner Carmelo F. Lazatin and private respondent Lorenzo G. Timbol were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of votes, private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. Since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect.

Private respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition, so petitioner was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC resolution before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on January 25, 1988, the Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's proclamation.

On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed an election protest with the HRET, docketed as Case No. 46. Petitioner moved to dismiss the protest on the ground that it had been filed late, citing Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code. The HRET found that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Section 9 of the HRET Rules, which provided that election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed within fifteen days from the effectivity of the Rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation had been made prior to the effectivity of the Rules. The HRET reasoned that the COMELEC's September 15, 1987 resolution nullifying the proclamation had the effect of suspending the running of the period, and the proclamation was not reinstated until private respondent received a copy of the Supreme Court's decision annulling the COMELEC Resolution on January 28, 1988. The protest was filed eleven days after January 28, well within the fifteen-day period. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 29, 1988.

Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest. Private respondent, in his counter/cross petition, sought to have the Court annul and set aside the HRET resolutions deferring action on his prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner from discharging his functions as Representative.

• Applicability of Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code: Petitioner argued that Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code governs the period for filing election protests, requiring that a sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial, or city official be filed with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
• Computation of the Period: Petitioner argued that even assuming the period was suspended by the pendency of the petition to annul his proclamation, the protest was still filed out of time. He was proclaimed on May 27, 1987, so private respondent had until June 6, 1987 to file a protest. Private respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation on May 28, 1987, suspending the period, which began to run again on January 28, 1988 when private respondent was served with a copy of the decision in G.R. No. 80007. Private respondent thus had only nine days left, or until February 6, 1988, but filed his protest only on February 8, 1988.
• Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code to Congressional Elections: Petitioner made much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the conduct of the election were generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, implying that all its provisions should apply to every aspect of that electoral exercise.

• Applicability of Section 9 of the HRET Rules: The HRET, through the Solicitor General, argued that the protest was filed on time pursuant to Section 9 of the HRET Rules, which provided that election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed within fifteen days from the effectivity of the Rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation had been made prior to the effectivity of the Rules.
• Suspension of the Period: The HRET ruled that the COMELEC's September 15, 1987 resolution declaring the proclamation void ab initio had the effect of nullifying the proclamation, and such proclamation was not reinstated until private respondent received a copy of the Supreme Court's decision annulling the COMELEC Resolution on January 28, 1988. The fifteen-day period was thus reckoned from that date, and the protest filed on February 8, 1988 was well within the reglementary period.
• Provisional Relief: Private respondent sought to have the Court annul and set aside the HRET resolutions deferring action on his prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, on the premise that the grounds therefor were too evident to be doubted.

• Jurisdiction of the HRET: Whether the HRET acquired jurisdiction over the election protest filed by private respondent, or whether the protest was filed out of time under Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• Provisional Relief: Whether the Court should annul and set aside the HRET resolutions deferring action on private respondent's prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

• Jurisdiction of the HRET: No. The protest was timely filed, and the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it. Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution insofar as it applied to contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa, and the HRET has the exclusive power to prescribe the period for filing protests before it.
• Provisional Relief: No. The matter of whether to issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET, and no grave abuse of discretion was shown.

• Jurisdiction of the HRET: The Court held that Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is couched in unambiguous terms and applies only to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial, or city official. Section 250 should be read together with Section 249 of the same code, which provides that the COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial and city officials," reiterating Article XII-C, Section 2(2) of the 1973 Constitution. Under the 1973 Constitution, there was no provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC. The Court found that Section 250, as far as contests regarding the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals under Article VI, Section 17. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to elective regional, provincial, and city offices, and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices under Article IX-C, Section 2(2). The Court further held that the power of the HRET to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute, as its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. The Court cited the landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, where the Court declared that the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. The Court reviewed constitutional history, noting that except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted either to the legislative body itself or to an independent, impartial, and non-partisan body attached to the legislature. The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The Court concluded that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it, founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself. Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.

• Provisional Relief: The Court held that the relief prayed for in private respondent's counter/cross petition was not forthcoming. The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. The determination of whether or not there are indubitable grounds to support the prayer for ancillary remedies also lies within the HRET's sound judgment. The Court noted that private respondent's attempt to have the Court set aside the HRET's resolution to defer action on his prayer for provisional relief was premature, considering that the HRET had not yet taken any final action with regard to his prayer. The Court stated that so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. The power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear, and complete and "excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same." The Court may only interfere where there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and no such grave abuse was shown in the instant case.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals — Under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the HRET, not the COMELEC, has jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the House of Representatives, and that the HRET's rule-making power flows from this constitutional grant.

• Inherent Rule-Making Power of Electoral Tribunals — The power of the HRET to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. Where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Section 9 of the HRET Rules, not Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, governs the period for filing election protests before the HRET.

• Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Limited Judicial Review — The power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear, and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of the Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same. The judgment rendered by the Electoral Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Court may only interfere where there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

• "The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution." — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi of the case: the HRET's power to prescribe the period for filing election protests derives from its constitutional grant of exclusive jurisdiction, not from statute.

• "That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals." — This passage explains why the Omnibus Election Code provision relied upon by petitioner was inapplicable, marking the shift in jurisdiction from the COMELEC under the 1973 Constitution to the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.

• "The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred." — This passage defines the canonical interpretation of the term "sole judge" in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, emphasizing the exclusive nature of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction.

• Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this landmark case for the proposition that the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed, and that where a general power is conferred, every particular power necessary for its exercise is also conferred.

• Veloso vs. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919) — Cited for the characterization of the grant of power to the legislature to judge election contests as "full, clear and complete."

• Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948) — Cited for the proposition that under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power to judge election contests was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal.

• Lachica vs. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 1401 — Cited for the proposition that the power of the Electoral Tribunal remained as full, clear, and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission, and that this power "excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same."

• Morrero vs. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429 (1938) — Cited for the proposition that the judgment rendered by the Electoral Commission in the exercise of its acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law.

• Article VI, Section 17, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. The Court applied this provision in holding that the HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the House of Representatives.

• Article IX-C, Section 2(2), 1987 Constitution — Limits the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC to election contests pertaining to elective regional, provincial, and city offices, and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices. The Court applied this provision to show that the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests was trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution.

• Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Grants the Court the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The Court applied this provision in holding that it may only interfere with the HRET's judgment where grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown.

• Section 250, Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) — Provides that a sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial, or city official shall be filed with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The Court held that this provision ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution insofar as it applied to Members of the Batasang Pambansa.

• Section 249, Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) — Provides that the COMELEC shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial, and city officials. The Court read this provision together with Section 250 to show that both were based on the 1973 Constitution's vesting of jurisdiction in the COMELEC.

• Section 9, HRET Rules — Provides that election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed within fifteen days from the effectivity of the Rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of the Rules. The Court upheld the HRET's application of this rule in determining that the protest was timely filed.

Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concurred. Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Sarmiento, Cruz, and Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Narvasa, J., was on leave.