Lazatin vs. Campos, Jr.

A decree of adoption rendered by a competent court in accordance with the statutory procedure is the exclusive means of establishing the status of an adopted child; the fact of adoption is never presumed, and the proponent must affirmatively prove the existence of the adoption proceeding and the resulting decree. Parol evidence of a child’s treatment as an adopted child, family declarations, or reputation is insufficient to establish adoption without the judicial record. Secondary evidence of the decree may be admitted only if the proponent first proves the former existence, execution, and loss of the adoption papers.

Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate on January 13, 1974, leaving his wife Margarita de Asis and their two adopted daughters, Nora L. de Leon and Irma L. Veloso. Margarita commenced intestate proceedings for her husband’s estate. Margarita herself died on April 11, 1974, leaving a holographic will. Private respondents thereafter initiated probate proceedings for her estate. Over the following months, several individuals claiming heirship intervened in both proceedings. Petitioner Renato Lazatin initially intervened in Dr. Lazatin’s intestate estate as an admitted illegitimate child, and months afterwards moved to intervene in Margarita’s testate estate as her adopted son, anchoring his claim on a posthumous affidavit executed by a brother of the deceased Dr. Lazatin.

• Death of the Spouses and Initiation of Proceedings: Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate on January 13, 1974, survived by his wife Margarita de Asis and their adopted twin daughters, private respondents Nora L. de Leon and Irma L. Veloso. A month later, Margarita commenced intestate proceedings for his estate (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P) before the Court of First Instance of Pasay. Margarita herself died on April 11, 1974, leaving a holographic will dated May 29, 1970, which provided specific legacies to a granddaughter, a nephew, and Ramon Sta. Clara (the son of petitioner Renato Lazatin). Private respondents subsequently filed a petition to probate Margarita’s will (Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P).
• Petitioner’s Initial Intervention: On November 22, 1974, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara intervened for the first time—in the intestate estate of Dr. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P)—as an “admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.” Several other individuals claiming to be admitted illegitimate children of Dr. Lazatin likewise intervened in that proceeding.
• The Safety Deposit Box Incident: During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis maintained a safety deposit box at the People’s Bank and Trust Company, accessible by either herself or respondent Nora L. de Leon. Five days after Margarita’s death, Nora opened the box with her husband and removed its contents: shares of stock, the adoption papers of Nora and her sister Irma, and jewelry. Ramon Sta. Clara, petitioner’s son, later filed a motion in the probate court asserting the existence of a subsequent will and demanding production of the box contents. The probate court ordered the box opened on November 6, 1974, but it was found empty. The court subsequently directed Nora to deliver the removed items to the Clerk of Court. After Nora delivered only keys to a new safety deposit box, she was found guilty of contempt on September 29, 1975, along with her former counsel.
• Petitioner’s Intervention as an Adopted Child: On August 20, 1975, petitioner moved to intervene in the testate estate of Margarita de Asis (Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P) as her adopted child. The motion was based on an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Lazatin. The affidavit was initially executed on May 31, 1975, stating that petitioner was an illegitimate son of Dr. Lazatin who was subsequently “legally adopted as a son before the Court of First Instance of Manila sometime between the years 1928 and 1932.” It was later modified on August 19, 1975, to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and Margarita de Asis.
• Attempted Proof of Adoption: At the hearings on his motion to intervene, petitioner presented no decree of adoption. Instead, over private respondents’ objections, he attempted to prove adoption through the following evidence: (a) testimony that he had always recognized the Lazatin spouses as his parents and had been supported by them until their deaths; (b) his former use of the surname “Lazatin,” which he changed to “Sta. Clara” when the spouses withheld consent to his marriage; (c) his and his wife’s continuous residence at Mercy Hospital, a property owned by the spouses; (d) photographs purportedly showing familial relations, including a photograph of Irma Veloso addressing petitioner as her brother; and (e) a document indicating that his real name was “Renato Lazatin.” Petitioner also presented certifications: one from the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila stating that no record of his adoption was found among salvaged pre-war records, and another from the Local Civil Registrar of Manila declaring that pre-war records of CFI decisions were destroyed or burned during the liberation of Manila.
• Orders of the Probate Court: On November 14, 1975, after petitioner failed to adduce evidence of a judicial adoption, the probate court discontinued the hearing and directed the parties to file memoranda on the admissibility of petitioner’s evidence. On March 4, 1976, the court issued an order barring the introduction of petitioner’s evidence, finding that the proffered proofs did not tend to establish any judicial adoption proceeding and tended at most to show the status of a recognized natural child. On March 16, 1976, petitioner moved to declare the fact of adoption established as a sanction under Rule 29, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, arguing that the court’s earlier order to produce the safety deposit box items should be treated as a mode of discovery under Rule 27 and that Nora’s refusal justified the sanction. The motion was denied. Nora eventually deposited the box’s contents on April 26, 1976; the inventory yielded only jewelry and stock certificates—no adoption document. On June 3, 1976, the probate court ruled that petitioner had failed to establish his status as an adopted child and declared that reconsideration would not be entertained unless based on documentary proof.

• Admissibility of Secondary Evidence and Parol Proof: Petitioner argued that the adoption decree was lost or destroyed, and therefore secondary evidence—including testimonial declarations of family members regarding his adoption and his treatment as a child of the spouses—was admissible and sufficient to prove his adoption. He maintained that the evidence of his lifestyle, recognition by the family, and reputation was competent proof under the rules on pedigree declarations.
• Application of Rule 29 Sanction: Petitioner contended that the probate court’s order to respondent Nora L. de Leon to produce the contents of the safety deposit box constituted an order for production and inspection of documents under Rule 27 of the Rules of Court. He argued that her contemptuous refusal to comply warranted applying the sanction under Rule 29, Section 3, to treat the fact of his adoption as established.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner claimed that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in barring his evidence, denying his motion to declare adoption established, and ultimately refusing his intervention, given the compelling circumstantial proof of his filiation.

• Insufficiency of Parol Evidence to Prove Adoption: Private respondents maintained that adoption is a strictly statutory proceeding that must be proven by the judicial decree itself. They argued that evidence of recognition, treatment, or family reputation cannot substitute for the adoption record, and that the certifications showing the absence or destruction of records did not give rise to a presumption of adoption.
• No Basis for Rule 29 Sanction: Respondents countered that the order to produce the safety deposit box items was not a proper mode of discovery under Rule 27, but a court order to preserve estate property. They further argued that there was no proof that any adoption document was in Nora’s possession or even existed, and the eventual surrender of the box contents confirmed this. Thus, the sanction of deeming a fact established could not apply.
• Inconsistency of Petitioner’s Claims: Respondents pointed out that petitioner had first intervened in the other estate as an admitted illegitimate child, a position inconsistent with his present claim of being an adopted child, and that he had failed to discharge the burden of proving adoption.

• Proof of Adoption: Whether petitioner could establish the fact of adoption through parol evidence—such as evidence of his treatment as an adopted child, family declarations, and reputation—in the absence of a judicial decree and without first proving the former existence and loss of the adoption record.
• Application of Rule 29: Whether the probate court’s order directing respondent Nora L. de Leon to produce the contents of the safety deposit box could be treated as an order for production and inspection of documents under Rule 27, and whether her non-compliance justified applying the sanction under Rule 29, Section 3, to deem the fact of adoption established.
• Right to Intervene: Whether petitioner, having failed to present a decree of adoption, could properly intervene in the testate estate proceedings of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child.

• Proof of Adoption: Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, wholly and entirely a creature of statute. Only an adoption made through the court, or in strict pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, is valid in this jurisdiction. The fact of adoption is never presumed; it must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The primary evidence of adoption is the court record containing the decree. While secondary evidence is admissible where the original adoption records have been lost or destroyed, the proponent must first establish the former existence, execution, and loss of the instrument in the correct order of proof: existence, execution, loss, and then contents. Petitioner failed to discharge this predicate. His certifications showed only an absence of records, which does not create a presumption that adoption took place; on the contrary, the absence of a record gives rise to a presumption of its non-existence. Evidence that a child lived with, was treated as a child by, or was recognized as an adopted child by the deceased spouses—and even declarations of family members to that effect—does not constitute competent proof of adoption. “The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence.” Nor do declarations of a deceased relative regarding pedigree suffice when better proof—the judicial decree—should be available. The probate court therefore committed no error in barring petitioner’s proffered evidence.
• Application of Rule 29: The probate court’s order directing Nora de Leon to produce the items from the safety deposit box was a motu proprio order issued to safeguard assets of the estate, not a mode of discovery under Rule 27. Moreover, the threshold condition for applying Rule 29—that the fact sought to be established has some independent evidentiary support and that the document is in the possession of the party—was absent. The very fact of adoption had not been established; there was no proof that an adoption document existed or was in Nora’s custody; and the eventual inventory of the deposited items revealed no adoption paper. Consequently, the sanction of deeming adoption established could not be invoked.
• Right to Intervene: Intervention in an estate proceeding requires an interest in the estate as an heir or a creditor. A child by adoption acquires no rights of inheritance unless the adoption has been accomplished in strict accord with the statute. The burden of proving adoption lies on the claimant. Because petitioner failed to submit the requisite proof of a judicial adoption, his intervention was properly denied; no error or abuse of discretion attended the probate court’s refusal.

• Adoption as a Purely Statutory Proceeding — Adoption is wholly a creature of statute, not of natural law. It creates a relationship akin to legitimate paternity and filiation only when accomplished through a court proceeding in strict compliance with the statutory requirements under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. Without such compliance, the supposed adoption is an absolute nullity.
• Adoption Never Presumed; Burden on Claimant — The fact of adoption is never presumed. The person claiming the status of an adopted child bears the affirmative burden of proving that a judicial decree of adoption was issued by a competent court. The destruction or absence of records does not give rise to a presumption that an adoption occurred; on the contrary, the absence of a record gives rise to a presumption of its non-existence.
• Insufficiency of Parol and Pedigree Evidence — Parol evidence that a child lived with, was supported and treated as an adopted child by, or was recognized as such by the alleged adopter is insufficient to establish adoption. Even declarations of a deceased person respecting pedigree (Rule 130, Section 33) are not a substitute for the judicial decree because a better form of proof—the court record—is available. Declarations of pedigree may be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule only when the proponent first establishes the declarant’s relationship to the family and the unavailability of direct evidence; they cannot supplant the statutory requirement of a decree.
• Secondary Evidence of Adoption: Order of Proof — When an adoption decree is alleged to have been lost or destroyed, secondary evidence of its contents may be admitted only if the proponent first proves the former existence, due execution, and loss of the instrument. The correct order of proof is: existence, execution, loss, and then contents. The trial court retains discretion to determine whether the foundational proof is sufficient under the circumstances.

• “Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction.”
• “The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. … [T]he absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence.”
• “The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption.”
• “Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.”
• “In proving an adoption, there is a better proof available and it should be produced. The whereabouts of the child’s family and circulation of the jurisdiction in which they resided and investigation in those courts where adoption are usually granted would surely produce an adoption order, if indeed there was an order.”

• In re: Adoption of Resaba Santos Yñigo v. Republic, 94 Phil. 244 (1954) — Relied upon for the principle that an adoption not made through a court proceeding is void; only a judicial decree of adoption is valid in this jurisdiction.
• Coombs v. Cook, 129 P. 698; Haworth v. Haworth, 100 S.W. 531; Wohlgemuth v. Browning, 384 S.W. 2d 820 — Cited collectively for the rule that parol evidence of treatment and recognition is insufficient to establish adoption.
• Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 167 (1955) — Applied for the requirement that secondary evidence of a document is admissible only upon proof of its former existence and loss.
• Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, G.R. No. L-17091, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 116 — Cited for the rule that to intervene in an estate proceeding, a person must have an interest in the estate as an heir or creditor.
• Lamagan v. De la Cruz, 40 SCRA 101 (1971) — Referenced for the principle that interlocutory rulings on evidence are not separately reviewable by certiorari and that trial courts should be liberal in receiving proffered evidence to allow its elevation on appeal.

• Rule 99, Rules of Court (Adoption) — The provisions on judicial adoption, including the requirements of a verified petition, consent of specified parties (Section 3), and publication of the petition (Section 4), were applied. Compliance with these statutory requirements is indispensable for a valid adoption.
• Section 33, Rule 130, Rules of Court (Pedigree Declarations) — This hearsay exception permits the admission of a deceased person’s declaration regarding the pedigree of a relative, provided the relationship is shown by independent evidence. The decision clarified that such evidence cannot substitute for the adoption decree when direct proof of the decree is available.
• Rule 27, Rules of Court (Production and Inspection of Documents) — The mode of discovery was deemed inapplicable to the probate court’s order for Nora de Leon to produce the contents of the safety deposit box, as the order was issued to preserve estate assets, not as a discovery measure.
• Rule 29, Section 3, Rules of Court (Sanctions for Refusal to Comply with Discovery) — The provision allowing a court to deem a fact established as a sanction for a party’s non-compliance with a discovery order was held not to apply, given the absence of proof that the fact of adoption had been established or that the adoption document existed and was in the party’s possession.

Justices Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera concurred. Justice De Castro took no part.