Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan

When conspiracy is alleged not as a crime in itself but as the mode of committing the offense, the Information need not aver the individual participation of each accused in the conspiracy; it is sufficient that the Information alleges the ultimate facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged and the agreement or community of design among the accused in ordinary and concise language. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a manager of a government-owned or controlled corporation charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019, irrespective of whether the position carries Salary Grade 27 or higher.

The National Housing Authority (NHA), a government-owned or controlled corporation, awarded an infrastructure contract for the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C. Cruz Construction, funded by the World Bank under a Project Loan Agreement between the Philippine Government and the IBRD-World Bank. Petitioner Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. was the manager of the NHA Regional Projects Department and Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee, which undertook the inventory and final quantification of the contractor's accomplishments. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 penalizes public officers who cause undue injury to any party or give unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Republic Act No. 8249 defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by officials occupying specified positions, including managers of government-owned or controlled corporations.

In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the original contract for infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C. Cruz Construction, with a contract cost of ₱7,666,507.55, funded by the World Bank under a Project Loan Agreement forged on 10 June 1983. A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August 1990. In April 1991, complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr. was designated Project Engineer. A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works, prompting Arceo Cruz of A.C. Cruz Construction to submit the fourth billing and Report of Physical Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag, Jr. discovered deficiencies and issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring supporting documents, but the contractor failed to comply. Upon further verification, it was established that no actual excavation and road filling works had been undertaken. Fajutag, Jr. found that no topographic map was appended, no laboratory tests were conducted, no records of excavation existed, and the volume calculations were contrary to the contract's technical specifications, resulting in overestimation to the prejudice of the government.

In a Memorandum dated 27 June 1991, the Project Office recommended termination of the infrastructure contract. The Inventory and Acceptance Committee, in its Report dated 12 August 1991, determined the contractor's total accomplishment at 40.89%, representing ₱3,433,713.10 out of the total revised contract amount of ₱8,397,225.09 inclusive of Variation Order No. 1. On 29 August 1991, the NHA General Manager informed the contractor of the rescission of his contract. Despite the rescission, the contractor continued working intermittently until March 1992, when the NHA Board of Directors approved the mutual termination of the A.C. Cruz Construction contract and awarded the remaining work to Triad Construction and Development Corporation (Triad) for ₱9,554,837.32. Representatives from A.C. Cruz Construction, Triad, and NHA-Bacolod conducted a joint measurement, and as of 27 March 1992, Triad had issued checks totaling ₱1,000,000.00 in favor of A.C. Cruz Construction.

Triad subsequently discovered that certain work items listed in the inventory report as accomplished and acceptable were in fact non-existent. Fajutag, Jr. brought these irregularities to the attention of the Commission on Audit (COA), which conducted a special audit investigation and uncovered ghost activities — specifically the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works — as well as substandard, defective workmanship confirmed by laboratory tests. The COA further determined that while the fourth billing of A.C. Cruz Construction had not been paid, its accomplishments after the August 1991 inventory amounting to ₱896,177.08 were paid directly by Triad, resulting in an overpayment of ₱232,628.35.

Consequently, petitioner, as manager of the Regional Projects Department and Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee, and other NHA officials were charged in an Information dated 5 March 2001 with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information alleged that the accused public officers, conniving and confederating with accused Arceo C. Cruz, a private individual and General Manager of A.C. Cruz Construction, with deliberate intent, manifest partiality, and evident bad faith, caused to be paid to A.C. Construction public funds in the amount of ₱232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works despite the fact that no such works were undertaken, as revealed by the COA Special Audit, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Cruz Construction to the damage and prejudice of the government. On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash, which the Sandiganbayan denied on 2 March 2007. The Sandiganbayan also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on 18 October 2007.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Petitioner maintained that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense, as the Information failed to specify the individual participation of each accused in the alleged conspiracy, rendering it insufficient under the Constitution's requirement that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
• Conformity to Prescribed Form: Petitioner argued that the Information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, as it does not allege the ultimate facts with sufficient particularity to apprise him of the accusation.
• Unintelligibility of Residual Averments: Petitioner contended that the dismissal of charges against some of his co-accused rendered the remaining averments in the Information unintelligible, as the conspiracy allegation was undermined by the removal of key participants.
• Improper Use of Prosecution Memoranda: Petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan for using the Prosecution's Memoranda dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement the alleged inadequacies of the Information, arguing that matters aliunde should not be considered in resolving a motion to quash.
• Absence of Damage or Injury: Petitioner argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because no damage or injury had been made or caused to any party or to the government.
• Loss of Jurisdiction: Petitioner maintained that the Sandiganbayan lost jurisdiction over him upon the dismissal of charges against his co-accused, as the remaining accused are public officers whose salary grade is below 27.

• Sufficiency of Averments: The Office of the Ombudsman countered that separate allegations of individual acts perpetrated by conspirators are not required in an Information, and that the fundamental test is whether the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime as defined by law, citing Ingco vs. Sandiganbayan.
• Ultimate Facts Sufficient: Relying on Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman argued that Informations need only state the ultimate facts, and that the reasons therefor are to be proved during trial; allegations regarding the nature and extent of petitioner's participation are evidentiary matters properly addressed during trial.
• Jurisdiction: The Ombudsman maintained that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner, arguing that it is of no moment that petitioner's position is classified as salary grade 26, as he is a manager within the legal contemplation of paragraph 1(g), Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 8249.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the Information sufficiently alleges the essential elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 so as to withstand a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
• Conspiracy Allegation: Whether the Information must detail the individual participation of each accused in the alleged conspiracy to satisfy the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
• Effect of Partial Dismissal: Whether the dismissal of charges against some co-accused rendered the residual averments in the Information unintelligible or deprived the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction.
• Use of Prosecution Memoranda: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion by relying on the Prosecution's Memoranda dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 in resolving the motion to quash.
• Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner, whose position as NHA department manager is classified below Salary Grade 27.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Yes. The Information sufficiently alleged the essential elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 — that petitioner was a public officer, that he acted in relation to his office, that he caused undue injury to the government by giving unwarranted benefits to A.C. Cruz Construction, and that he acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith.
• Conspiracy Allegation: No. The Information need not detail the individual participation of each accused when conspiracy is alleged as a mode of committing the crime, not as a crime in itself; it is sufficient that the agreement or community of design among the accused is alleged in ordinary and concise language.
• Effect of Partial Dismissal: No. The dismissal of charges against some co-accused did not render the remaining averments unintelligible; the Information sufficiently made out a case against petitioner and the remaining accused.
• Use of Prosecution Memoranda: No grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan's reference to the prosecution memoranda was part of its explanation for ordering reinvestigation and clarifying the participation of the accused, and did not constitute improper supplementation of the Information.
• Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction: Yes. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner because his position as manager of NHA, a government-owned or controlled corporation, falls within paragraph 1(g), Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 8249, regardless of salary grade.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The fundamental test in evaluating a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law; matters aliunde will not be considered. The essential elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are: (1) the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with him; (2) the public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of official duties or in relation to his public position; (3) he causes undue injury to any party; (4) such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference; and (5) the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Information specifically alleged that petitioner, Espinosa, and Lobrido were public officers of the NHA; that in such capacity and in conspiracy with Arceo C. Cruz, they acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith; and that they caused payment of ₱232,628.35 for non-existent excavation and road filling works, giving unwarranted benefits to A.C. Cruz Construction to the damage and prejudice of the government. These averments, if hypothetically admitted, sufficiently established all the essential elements of the offense.

• Conspiracy Allegation: Under Philippine law, conspiracy operates on two levels: it may be a mode of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the crime itself. Conspiracy is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission, such as conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion, or sedition. When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all elements thereof must be set forth in the Information. However, when conspiracy is alleged not as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime — as in this case — there is less necessity of reciting its particularities because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense. The conspiracy is significant only because it makes all accused answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation; the act of one is the act of all. Relying on People vs. Quitlong, the Court held that a conspiracy indictment need not aver all the components of conspiracy or allege the part that each party performed. It is enough that the Information contains a statement of facts constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, enabling a person of common understanding to know what is intended. The allegation of conspiracy should not be confused with the adequacy of evidence required to prove it; a statement of evidence on the conspiracy is not necessary in the Information.

• Effect of Partial Dismissal: The dismissal of charges against co-accused Balao, Angsico, and Dacalos did not render the remaining averments unintelligible. The Information still sufficiently alleged the ultimate facts constituting the offense against petitioner and the remaining accused (Espinosa, Lobrido, and Cruz), including their status as public officers, their conspiracy with Cruz, and the felonious act of causing payment for non-existent works. The residual averments remained coherent and intelligible notwithstanding the removal of certain accused from the case.

• Use of Prosecution Memoranda: The Sandiganbayan's reference to the prosecution's memoranda was adequately explained in its first assailed resolution. The Sandiganbayan had ordered a reinvestigation because the prosecution's earlier memorandum failed to clarify the participation of each accused. The memoranda were referenced not to supplement the Information but to explain the procedural context of the reinvestigation and the basis for dismissing charges against some accused while sustaining the case against others. The Sandiganbayan found the Information itself inadequate as to the participation of Balao, Angsico, and Dacalos — hence their dismissal — but found it sufficient as to petitioner and the remaining accused.

• Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction: Petitioner's position as department manager of NHA, a government-owned or controlled corporation, falls within the ambit of paragraph 1(g), Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 8249, which includes "Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations." Relying on Geduspan vs. People, the Court held that it is of no moment that petitioner's position is classified as Salary Grade 26; the second part of the jurisdictional provision specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Grade 27 or higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. It is the position that the accused holds — manager of a government-owned or controlled corporation — not the salary grade, that determines Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.

• Sufficiency of Information — Hypothetical Admission Test — The fundamental test in determining the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Matters aliunde will not be considered. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged, and the test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The purpose is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense and, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

• Conspiracy as a Mode of Committing a Crime vs. Conspiracy as a Crime — Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels: it can be a mode of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime in Philippine jurisdiction; it is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission (e.g., conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion, sedition). When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all elements must be set forth in the Information. But when conspiracy is alleged only as the mode of committing the crime, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all accused, making them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation; the act of one is the act of all. A conspiracy indictment need not aver all components of conspiracy or allege the part each party performed; it is enough that the Information contains a statement of facts in ordinary and concise language enabling a person of common understanding to know what is intended. The agreement, unity of purpose, or community of design must be conveyed either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms, or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the Information.

• Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Managers of GOCCs — Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by officials occupying specified positions, including "Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations." It is the position held — not the salary grade — that determines jurisdiction. A manager of a government-owned or controlled corporation falls under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction regardless of whether the position is classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher.

• Remedy for Denial of Motion to Quash — The denial of a motion to quash in a criminal case is not correctible by certiorari; the proper remedy is for the accused to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in the motion to quash. This rule avoids multiplicity of appeals in a single case. The exception is when the court, in denying the motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which case certiorari or prohibition lies.

• "When conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the distinction between conspiracy as a crime and conspiracy as a mode of committing a crime, and the corresponding pleading requirements for each.

• "A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy." — Quoted from People vs. Quitlong, this formulation is the canonical statement on the sufficiency of conspiracy allegations in an Information when conspiracy is a mode of committing the offense.

• "It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the above-quoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof 'specifically includes' other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court." — Quoted from Geduspan vs. People, this passage establishes that the position held, not the salary grade, determines Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over managers of government-owned or controlled corporations.

• "The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in law." — This states the controlling test for evaluating a motion to quash, frequently cited in subsequent criminal procedure jurisprudence.

• Ingco vs. Sandiganbayan, 338 Phil. 1061 (1997) — Cited by the Ombudsman for the proposition that the fundamental test in evaluating a motion to quash is the sufficiency of the averments in the Information — whether the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. Followed and applied.
• Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, 379 Phil. 708 (2000) — Cited for the proposition that Informations need only state the ultimate facts, and the reasons therefor are to be proved during trial. Followed and applied.
• People vs. Quitlong, 354 Phil. 372 (1998) — Cited as controlling authority on how conspiracy as a mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, including the rule that a conspiracy indictment need not aver all components or details of conspiracy. Followed and extensively quoted.
• Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 427 Phil. 820 (2002) — Cited for the distinction between conspiracy as a crime and conspiracy as a mode of committing a crime, and for the rule that the evidence to support conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof and that a statement of evidence on conspiracy is not necessary in the Information. Followed.
• Geduspan vs. People, G.R. No. 158187, 11 February 2005, 451 SCRA 187 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over managers of government-owned or controlled corporations regardless of salary grade. Followed and extensively quoted.
• Lacson vs. Executive Secretary — Cited within the Geduspan quotation for the requisites of Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. No. 8249. Followed.
• Cabrera vs. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 350 (2004) — Cited for the hypothetical admission test in motions to quash and for the essential elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Followed.
• Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 444 Phil. 499 (2003) — Cited for the rule that an Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged, and that the use of derivatives, synonyms, or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense is sufficient. Followed.
• Serana vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, 22 January 2008, 542 SCRA 224 — Cited for the rule that the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari and the exception when the court acts with grave abuse of discretion. Followed.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Penalizes public officers who cause undue injury to any party, including the Government, or give any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court applied this provision by examining whether the Information alleged its essential elements: that the accused is a public officer, that the prohibited acts were committed in relation to office, that undue injury was caused or unwarranted benefits given, and that the officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
• Section 4(a)(1)(g), Republic Act No. 8249 — Defines Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by officials occupying specified positions, including "Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations." The Court applied this provision to sustain Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over petitioner as department manager of NHA, a government-owned or controlled corporation, regardless of his Salary Grade 26 classification.
• Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides the requirements for sufficiency of a complaint or information: it must state the name of the accused, the designation of the offense, the acts or omissions complained of, the name of the offended party, the approximate time and place of the commission of the offense. The Court applied this provision to test whether the Information sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense charged.

Quisumbing, Acting C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, and Brion, JJ., concurred. Puno, C.J., was on official leave. Leonardo-De Castro and Peralta, JJ., took no part.