Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence that cannot be invoked where direct evidence establishes the precise cause of the accident; once the actual cause is established, no presumption of negligence arises. An employer sued under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180(5) of the Civil Code remains solidarily liable for the negligence of his employee unless he proves the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of both his driver and his mechanic.

Pedro T. Layugan and Godofredo Isidro were the plaintiff and defendant in an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident involving Isidro's truck, which was driven by Daniel Serrano. Isidro impleaded his insurer, Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation, under Insurance Policy No. 11723, seeking contribution, indemnity, and subrogation. The dispute implicated the Civil Code's quasi-delict provisions, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180(5), governing liability for negligence and the vicarious liability of employers for the acts of their employees.

On May 15, 1979, at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, Pedro T. Layugan and a companion were repairing the tire of a cargo truck with Plate No. SU-730, which was parked along the right side of the National Highway. A truck owned by Godofredo Isidro, bearing Plate No. PW-583 and driven by Daniel Serrano, bumped Layugan. The collision dislodged the jack from the parked truck and pinned Layugan to the ground. He sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot, and his left leg from below the knee was later amputated when gangrene set in, rendering him incapacitated for work. Layugan, a married man with one child, was employed as a security guard in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, with a salary of P600.00 a month; when off-duty, he worked as a truck helper earning P200.00 to P300.00 monthly at P100.00 per trip. He claimed P10,000.00 in expenses, future expenses, a lifetime income loss of P70,000.00, and P10,000.00 in attorney's fees.

Isidro admitted ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. He countered that Layugan was merely a bystander, not a truck helper, and was the brother-in-law of the driver of the parked truck. According to Isidro, the parked truck occupied almost half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after a curve; the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck to install an early warning device; the driver of the parked truck should be liable for damages to Isidro's truck in the amount of more than P20,000.00; and Layugan, as a mere bystander and hitchhiker, must suffer his own damages. Isidro also filed a counterclaim for P5,000.00 in attorney's fees, P200.00 per court appearance, and P30,000.00 for sleepless nights, humiliation, and wounded feelings. On May 29, 1981, Isidro filed a third-party complaint against his insurer, Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation, claiming contribution, indemnity, and subrogation under Insurance Policy No. 11723, which covered liability for damages arising from death, bodily injuries, and damage to property. Travellers answered that even assuming coverage, its liability would not exceed the policy limits; that the complaint was premature because no claim had been submitted as prescribed under the Insurance Code; that the accident was caused by the carelessness and gross negligence of Layugan; and that it incurred P3,000.00 in attorney's fees.

Isidro testified that his truck was insured with Travellers under vehicle policy No. 11723 dated May 30, 1978, covering own damage and third-party liability; after he filed an insurance claim, the insurer paid him P18,000.00 for damages to his truck but not for third-party liability. Serrano declared that he gave a statement before the municipal police of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, on May 16, 1979; that he knew the responsibilities of a driver; that he checked the truck before leaving; and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He stated that he bumped the truck being repaired by Layugan while it was at a stop position. In his statement, Serrano narrated that at about 10:40 p.m. on May 15, 1979, while driving the Isuzu truck at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, and at KM 285, he met another vehicle which did not dim its lights, causing him to be blinded by the intense glare; that he did not notice a parked truck repairing a front flat tire; that when he was a few meters away, he saw the truck loaded with round logs; that he stepped on the brakes but they did not function; and that he later found that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut, which was why the brakes did not function.

The trial court found that the injuries sustained by Layugan were caused by Serrano; that the police report confirmed Layugan's allegation and Serrano admitted it on cross-examination; that the collision dislodged the jack from the parked truck and pinned Layugan; and that a warning device in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp had been installed three to four meters from the rear of the parked truck. The appellate court, by contrast, found that the parked truck was loaded with ten big round logs and inferred that because of its weight the truck could not have been driven to the shoulder of the road and was parked on a portion of the road at the time of the accident.

• Reversal of Complaint: Petitioner argued that the Intermediate Appellate Court acted incorrectly in reversing and setting aside the trial court's decision and in dismissing the complaint.
• Res Ipsa Loquitur: Petitioner maintained that the Intermediate Appellate Court acted incorrectly in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without proper jurisprudential basis.
• Negligence of the Driver: Petitioner argued that the evidence on record, including the police report and the admission of Daniel Serrano, established that Serrano was negligent in driving the truck that bumped the parked truck.
• Warning Device: Petitioner contended that a lighted kerosene lamp had been placed three to four meters from the rear of the parked truck, which was sufficient warning to approaching vehicles.

• Factual Issues Not Reviewable: Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation stressed that the issues raised in the petition were factual and therefore not reviewable by the Supreme Court in a petition for review by certiorari.
• Late Filing: Travellers argued that the petition was filed out of time.
• Res Ipsa Loquitur and Burden Shifting: Isidro posited that an immobile object along the highway, such as a parked truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the highway; that it was incumbent upon the driver of the parked truck and Layugan to exercise extreme care to forewarn motorists; that the burden of proving care and diligence shifted to Layugan; and that absent proof of an early warning device, res ipsa loquitur evoked a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked truck and Layugan.
• Employer's Diligence: Isidro stressed that the negligence of his employee was overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.
• Prematurity and Liability Limit: Travellers answered that even assuming the subject matter was covered by a valid insurance policy, its liability would not exceed the limit defined in the policy; that the complaint was premature because no claim had been submitted as prescribed under the Insurance Code; and that the accident was caused by the carelessness and gross negligence of Layugan.

• Review of Factual Findings: Whether the factual issues raised in the petition are reviewable by the Supreme Court despite the general rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect.
• Timeliness: Whether the petition should be dismissed on the ground that it was filed out of time.
• Reversal of Complaint: Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court acted correctly in reversing and setting aside and dismissing the plaintiff-appellee's complaint.
• Res Ipsa Loquitur: Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court acted correctly in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur with proper jurisprudential basis.
• Negligence: Whether, if res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable, Godofredo Isidro or his driver Daniel Serrano was negligent.
• Employer Liability: Whether Isidro failed to prove the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees so as to exculpate him from liability under Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code.

• Review of Factual Findings: Yes. Although the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally respected, review is warranted under the established exceptions, and exceptions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9 obtain in this case.
• Timeliness: No. The petition should not be dismissed as late; Travellers raised the issue only in its comment after three months, Isidro did not raise it, and exacting the objection at that late stage would cause a grave miscarriage of justice.
• Reversal of Complaint: No. The Intermediate Appellate Court erred in reversing and dismissing the complaint, because the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano was established by clear and convincing evidence.
• Res Ipsa Loquitur: No. The doctrine is inapplicable because direct evidence established the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant to it.
• Negligence: Daniel Serrano, the driver of Isidro's truck, was negligent; he failed to check the vehicle before driving it, drove despite a cut brake fluid pipe, and bumped the parked truck despite the warning device.
• Employer Liability: Yes. Isidro is liable, having failed to prove the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver and mechanic, and the presumption of employer negligence under Article 2180(5) was not rebutted.

• Review of Factual Findings: The general rule that the Court of Appeals' findings of fact are entitled to great respect is not inflexible. The Court identified exceptions, including when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, or conjecture; when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence; and when the findings are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record. Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9 obtained. The appellate court inferred from the weight of the parked truck that it could not have been driven to the shoulder and concluded that it was parked on a portion of the road, then inferred that the mishap was due to the negligence of the driver of the parked truck. This inference was manifestly erroneous and grounded on speculation, because the record showed that a lighted kerosene lamp was installed three to four meters from the rear of the parked truck. The appellate court also refused to give imprimatur to the trial court's finding that Serrano was negligent without citing specific evidence, merely adverting to unspecified "scanty evidence on record."

• Timeliness: A motion for extension dated March 19, 1986, erroneously filed with the respondent court, requested 30 days from March 20, 1986, to file the necessary petition before the Supreme Court. On April 1, 1986, an appearance of a new lawyer for the petitioner before the Supreme Court, with motion, was filed erroneously with the Court of Appeals, requesting 20 days extension to file the petition for review on certiorari; a similar motion was filed with the Supreme Court also on April 1, 1986. The petition for review was filed on April 17, 1986. Travellers raised the issue of tardiness only on August 1, 1986, in its comment, after three months. It should not have waited in ambush before the comment was required and before due course was given. To exact the objection at that late stage would cause a grave miscarriage of justice. Isidro did not raise the issue of late filing.

• Reversal of Complaint: The evidence on record disclosed that three or four meters from the rear of the parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed. Serrano admitted in his statement that while driving at about 10:40 p.m. on May 15, 1979, he met another vehicle which did not dim its lights, causing him to be blinded; that he did not notice the parked truck repairing a front flat tire; that when he was a few meters away, he saw the truck loaded with round logs; that he stepped on the brakes but they did not function; and that he later found that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut, which was why the brakes did not function. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder was of no moment given the warning device. Despite the warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence, Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot, and his left leg was later amputated from below the knee when gangrene set in. The absence or want of care of Serrano was established by clear and convincing evidence.

• Res Ipsa Loquitur: The doctrine provides that where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. It is a rule of evidence peculiar to the law of negligence, recognizing that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishing a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is not a rule of substantive law but a mode of proof or procedural convenience. It does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence; it merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the plaintiff's burden of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. The presumption or inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where the plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury, or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions are involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely elucidated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence. In this case, direct evidence established the precise cause of the accident and the facts surrounding it, so the doctrine was inapplicable.

• Negligence: Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Under the test in Picart vs. Smith, the question is whether the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. The law adopts the standard of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. Serrano did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before taking it on the road. If he had checked, he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, could have repaired it, and the accident could have been avoided. The parked truck had a lighted kerosene lamp three to four meters from its rear, which was sufficient warning. Despite this, Serrano bumped the rear of the parked truck. His negligence was established by clear and convincing evidence.

• Employer Liability: The private respondent was sued under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. Under the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, a presumption of law arises that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. The presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and may be rebutted. If the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. Isidro stressed that the negligence of his employee was overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. This was not sufficient. The driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before taking it on the road. The fact that Isidro used to instruct his driver to be careful, that the driver was licensed, and that he had no record of any accident were not sufficient to destroy the trial court's finding of negligence. Isidro or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. Isidro failed to prove the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees. Even if diligence in supervising the driver were conceded, there was no evidence of the same diligence in supervising his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge of maintaining the roadworthiness of the truck. There was also paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his driver and mechanic. Accordingly, Isidro's responsibility as employer under Article 2180, paragraph 5, had not ceased.

• Res ipsa loquitur — A rule of evidence in negligence cases where the thing causing injury is under the management or exclusive control of the defendant, and the accident is such that in the ordinary course of things it does not happen if proper care is used; the accident affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that it arose from want of care. It is not substantive law but a mode of proof or procedural convenience that establishes prima facie negligence without direct proof. It may be invoked only when direct evidence is absent and not readily available. It cannot be availed of or is overcome where the plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence of the specific act of negligence, or where direct evidence establishes the precise cause of the accident and all attendant facts clearly appear. Once the actual cause is established beyond controversy, no presumption arises and the doctrine is inapplicable. In this case, the doctrine was inapplicable because direct evidence established Serrano's negligence and the warning device.

• Negligence — The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by considerations that ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The test is whether the defendant used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. The law adopts the standard of the discreet paterfamilias. Serrano failed to check his vehicle before driving, drove despite a cut brake fluid pipe, and bumped the parked truck despite a warning lamp, satisfying this standard of negligence.

• Vicarious liability of employers and the diligence of a good father of a family — Under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180(5) of the Civil Code, when injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, a presumption of law arises that the employer was negligent in the selection or supervision of the employee, or both. The presumption is juris tantum, not juris et de jure, and may be rebutted by proof that the employer exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selection and supervision. The employer must show diligence in the selection and supervision of both the driver and the mechanic, if any. Isidro failed to rebut the presumption; his driver's statement, the fact of instructions to be careful, the driver's license, and the absence of an accident record were insufficient.

• "The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available." — This states the threshold requirement for invoking res ipsa loquitur and is the basis for the holding that the doctrine was inapplicable because direct evidence of the accident's cause existed.
• "Finally, once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case." — This is the ratio for rejecting the appellate court's reliance on res ipsa loquitur; it states that once the actual cause is established, the doctrine ceases to operate.
• "It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence." — This is the Court's direct finding of negligence against Isidro's driver, which underpins the reinstatement of the trial court's award.
• "The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it." — This articulates the employer's duty of supervision and inspection and supports the holding that Isidro failed to prove the diligence of a good father of a family.

• Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809, 813 (1918) — The Court quoted this case as the still-sound test for negligence: whether the defendant used the reasonable care and caution of an ordinarily prudent person in the same situation.
• Africa et al. vs. Caltex, Inc., et al., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448 — Cited as a notable Philippine application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
• F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-52732, August 29, 1988 — Cited as the latest case applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
• Bahia vs. Litonpia and Leynes, No. L-9734, March 31, 1915, 30 Phils. 624 — Cited for the rule that the employer's presumption of negligence under Article 2180 is juris tantum and may be rebutted by proof of the diligence of a good father of a family.
• Director of Lands vs. CA, G.R. No. L-46068, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 346 — Cited for the exceptions to the general rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable.

• Article 2176, Civil Code — Establishes liability for damage caused by negligence, known as quasi-delict. The private respondent was sued under this provision in relation to Article 2180, paragraph 5.
• Article 2180, paragraph 5, Civil Code — Provides that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there arises a presumption of law that the employer was negligent either in the selection of the employee, in supervision over him, or both. The presumption is juris tantum and may be rebutted by proof of the diligence of a good father of a family. The Court found that Isidro failed to rebut this presumption, so his liability as employer remained.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concurred.