Layugan vs. Agonoy

In amparo proceedings, the relaxed admissibility and totality-of-evidence standard allows courts to consider all evidence, including hearsay consistent with admissible evidence, in determining whether substantial evidence proves the elements of enforced disappearance; such proceedings do not determine guilt and do not violate the right against self-incrimination.

Petitioners PMAJ Lorvinn A. Layugan, PSSG Anthony Aquino, and PCpl Pat James Ada-ol are officers of the Philippine National Police; respondents Delia A. Agonoy and Verna Riza A. Agonoy are the mother and wife, respectively, of Police Senior Master Sergeant Antonino A. Agonoy of the Cabatuan Police Station. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, provides a remedy for violations or threats to the right to life, liberty, and security, confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, while Republic Act No. 10353 defines and penalizes enforced or involuntary disappearance. The case concerns the disappearance of PSMS Agonoy after he was last seen with petitioners at a police safehouse.

Police Senior Master Sergeant Antonino A. Agonoy was a member of the Cabatuan Police Station. Petitioners PMAJ Lorvinn A. Layugan, PSSG Anthony Aquino, and PCpl Pat James Ada-ol were PNP officers; PMAJ Layugan was the chief of police of Cabatuan Police Station. On June 3, 2022, at about 3:00 a.m., PSMS Agonoy went to the Police Regional Office 2 in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, for his annual physical examination. Later that day, Verna, wife of PSMS Agonoy, testified that her husband sent her a screenshot of a Viber group conversation stating that PMAJ Layugan called for a meeting at a safehouse owned by Giovanie Guillermo located at Purok 2, Saranay, Cabatuan, Isabela.

At about 5:20 p.m. of the same day, PSMS Agonoy’s friend and asset Crisanto Guevarra, alias “Estong,” saw PSMS Agonoy on board his NMAX motorcycle at the Petron Gasoline Station at Cabatuan market while following a black Fortuner without a plate number driven by PSSg Aquino. PSSg Aquino, PSMS Agonoy, PCpl Pat Ada-ol, and Marnix Baquiran attended the meeting with PMAJ Layugan as the presiding officer. Thereafter, they decided to have a drinking session. PSMS Agonoy asked permission to leave to get pulutan from Marlon Pabro. Upon arrival at the house of Marlon, PSMS Agonoy relayed to him that he only had one shot of liquor but already felt dizzy. Marlon suggested that PSMS Agonoy not go back to the safehouse because some of the Intels were jealous of him, particularly PCpl Baquiran. PSMS Agonoy insisted on returning to the safehouse, but after bringing the pulutan, he allegedly left immediately because his tonsils were aching. PMAJ Layugan averred that he left and returned to Cabatuan Police Station at around 8:00 p.m., while PCpl Pat Ada-ol left at around 8:10 p.m. PCpl Baquiran died later after the disappearance of PSMS Agonoy.

The following day, June 4, 2022, Verna tried to contact her husband through his cellular phone but to no avail; she presumed that PSMS Agonoy was on field duty. On June 5, 2022, Verna asked the companions of PSMS Agonoy at the Cabatuan Police Station regarding his whereabouts, but none of them were able to point out his location. When Delia inquired with PMAJ Layugan about the whereabouts of her son, PMAJ Layugan told her that PSMS Agonoy probably left to visit his friends or his paramour. Given the prolonged and unexplained absence of PSMS Agonoy, respondents reported the matter to the San Mateo Police Station and the Cabatuan Police Station. At about 6:30 p.m., respondents, assisted by personnel of the Cabatuan Police Station led by Police Lieutenant Vineous O. Paragas, headed to the CCTV Monitoring Center to backtrack the possible path of PSMS Agonoy. They also proceeded to the safehouse of the intelligence personnel. When they arrived at the safehouse, PMAJ Layugan, who was then in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, instructed Patrolman Kelvin Medina through a phone call not to open the safehouse and told Pat Medina that the key thereto was in the former’s possession. PMAJ Layugan insisted on opening it upon his arrival on June 6, 2022.

On June 6, 2022, at about 1:30 p.m., the Cauayan City Police Station received a report from Barangay Kagawad Habrito about an abandoned motorcycle at Cauayan City Sports Complex. When they proceeded to the place, personnel of the Cauayan City Police Station saw a black Yamaha NMAX 155 without a plate number. Upon further verification, they found that the motorcycle bore engine number G3E4E-1486714, the same engine number formerly reported and placed on alarm as missing by the Cabatuan Police Station. According to Barangay Kagawad Habrito, the motorcycle was sighted thereat three days ago. The cellular phone of PSMS Agonoy was also recovered from the motorcycle’s compartment. Meanwhile, the CCTV footage revealed that at exactly 5:28 p.m. of June 3, 2022, PSMS Agonoy was onboard a Yamaha NMAX traversing towards the location of the safehouse. However, the CCTV footage failed to reveal the recordings from 7:02 to 7:35 p.m. because of a scheduled power interruption.

In view of the circumstances, respondents filed with the RTC the Amparo Petition against petitioners. Respondents insisted that petitioners caused the disappearance of PSMS Agonoy because sometime in April 2022, Guevarra heard PMAJ Layugan say to PSMS Agonoy, “gusto mo at papatayin ko kayong dalawa ni Estong.” Further, before PSMS Agonoy disappeared, he often complained to his mother, Delia, that PMAJ Layugan constantly scolded him. He also told Delia that PMAJ Layugan suspected that it was he, PSMS Agonoy, who reported the illegal activities of PMAJ Layugan. The RTC found that, considering the totality of the evidence, respondents had sufficiently proven their case through substantial evidence, and concluded that all the pieces of evidence of the witnesses were parallel in the chronological line of events that happened before the disappearance of PSMS Agonoy.

• Insufficiency of Substantial Evidence: Petitioners insisted that respondents failed to present substantial evidence to support the allegations in their Amparo Petition; respondents merely presented testimonial evidence and were only able to establish that petitioners were the last companions of PSMS Agonoy, which could not prove that petitioners had a hand in his disappearance.
• Inconsistencies and Fabrication: Petitioners maintained that the inconsistencies in the statements of respondents in their Amparo Petition and Verified Motion for the Issuance of Joint Inspection Order, and the testimony of Delia on how her son was killed, clearly show that she was lying; Delia simply made up allegations that prejudiced the rights of petitioners.
• Self-Incrimination: Petitioners alleged that respondents utilized their Amparo Petition to furnish evidence against them, which is supposedly tantamount to a violation of their right against self-incrimination.

• Elements of Enforced Disappearance: Respondents asserted that all the elements of enforced disappearance are present; the third element was met because the last seen companions of PSMS Agonoy before his disappearance were the petitioners, who are members of the Philippine National Police, a law-enforcing body of the State.
• No Self-Incrimination: Respondents asserted that their Amparo Petition did not violate petitioners’ right against self-incrimination; amparo proceedings do not involve a compulsion for petitioners to admit their guilt, but merely require them to present proof of their efforts to locate a person suspected to be a victim of enforced disappearance.

• Substantial Evidence and Elements of Enforced Disappearance: Whether respondents were able to prove by substantial evidence their entitlement to the privilege of a writ of amparo.
• Right Against Self-Incrimination: Whether the Amparo Petition and proceedings violated petitioners’ right against self-incrimination.

• Substantial Evidence and Elements of Enforced Disappearance: Yes. Respondents proved all elements of enforced disappearance by substantial evidence under the relaxed admissibility and totality-of-evidence standard; the RTC’s grant of the writ of amparo and permanent protection order was affirmed.
• Right Against Self-Incrimination: No. Amparo proceedings do not determine guilt or impose penal sanctions; the return required of public officials does not require an admission of guilt.

• Substantial Evidence and Elements of Enforced Disappearance: A petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity. The writ is confined to instances of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. “Enforced or involuntary disappearance” is defined under Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 10353 as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty committed by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which places such person outside the protection of the law. Section 4(b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10353 enumerates the elements: (1) the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty; (2) committed by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State; and (3) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which places such person outside the protection of the law. The Court, in Mamba vs. Bueno, reiterated the definition taken from Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Under Section 18, in relation to Section 17, of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, a writ may issue only if the allegations are supported by substantial evidence. However, in Ladaga vs. Mapagu, citing Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, the Court declared that amparo courts must adopt a standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence and consider all pieces of evidence in their totality. This flexibility does not do away with the requirement of substantial evidence showing the State’s involvement; it merely permits, in the absence of hard-to-produce direct evidence, a closer look at the relevance and significance of every available evidence, including hearsay where the circumstances so require, and allows consideration of evidence in terms of consistency with the totality of the evidence. The Court found all three elements present. On the first element, respondents’ evidence established that PSMS Agonoy had been detained or otherwise deprived of liberty: petitioners admitted they were the companions of PSMS Agonoy when he was last seen on June 3, 2022, at the safehouse; Verna and Delia stated that PSMS Agonoy always came home after work, no matter how late; his motorcycle was discovered abandoned at Cauayan City Sports Complex and had been seen there for three days, or since June 3, 2022; and his cellular phone was found in the motorcycle’s compartment. The fact that his belongings, especially something as personal as a cellular phone, were left unattended further supported the conclusion that he was or is being detained or otherwise deprived of liberty. On the second element, it was undisputed that petitioners and PSMS Agonoy were members of the PNP at the time of the incident; the safehouse where PSMS Agonoy was last seen was operated by PNP Cabatuan, headed by PMAJ Layugan, who had the keys in his possession; the safehouse served as the meeting place of the police officers in relation to their operations; and the June 3, 2022 meeting among petitioners and PSMS Agonoy was held there to discuss the intelligence assets of PSMS Agonoy. Petitioners’ participation was bolstered by Guevarra’s Sinumpaang Salaysay that he heard PMAJ Layugan threaten to kill PSMS Agonoy sometime in April 2022, two months before the disappearance, with the words “gusto mo at papatayin ko kayong dalawa ni Estong.” Delia’s testimony that PMAJ Layugan suspected PSMS Agonoy of reporting his illegal activities and often berated him was hearsay, but the totality-of-evidence standard allowed its admission because it was consistent and dovetailed with Guevarra’s testimony and provided the motive behind the threats. When Delia and Cabatuan police officers proceeded to the safehouse to inspect it and locate PSMS Agonoy, PMAJ Layugan did not accede to the request because he already sensed that they suspected him and the other petitioners; if PSMS Agonoy had immediately left the safehouse after bringing pulutan, PMAJ Layugan would not have had any reason to refuse entry. At the very least, the circumstances showed that petitioners acquiesced to the deprivation of liberty of PSMS Agonoy by refusing entry to the Cabatuan police officers to verify his whereabouts, and PMAJ Layugan gave strict instructions not to open the safehouse. On the third element, petitioners refused to acknowledge the detention or deprivation of liberty of PSMS Agonoy and concealed his whereabouts, placing him outside the protection of the law. Respondents repeatedly went to PNP Cabatuan to inquire about his whereabouts, but no one answered them; family members were not allowed to immediately enter the safehouse and were able to get in only with the assistance of personnel from the PNP Regional Office because PMAJ Layugan gave strict instructions not to open it without him; and instead of recognizing the disappearance, PMAJ Layugan told Delia that PSMS Agonoy probably just went to visit his friends or his paramour. Because PSMS Agonoy’s whereabouts remained shrouded, his family had no way of knowing if his right to life or liberty had been violated, and they could not institute the necessary action against those responsible. In sum, after considering the totality of evidence and the relaxation of the evidentiary rule, respondents were entitled to the issuance of a writ of amparo and a permanent protection order, which is already a judgment by itself upon the grant of the privilege of the writ. Amparo proceedings are summary in nature; thus, the judgment rendered by the RTC, including the permanent protection order, is immediately executory, without prejudice to further appeals.
• Right Against Self-Incrimination: An amparo proceeding does not determine guilt or pinpoint criminal culpability for extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. The proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin to criminal prosecutions because the guilt or innocence of the respondents therein is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted out; they only endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty, or security. Following Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the court hearing the petition may grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate, enabling every act or move to prevent any violation of another person’s right to life, liberty, and security or to defeat any threat of such violation. Section 9(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that if the respondent is a public official or employee, they are required to state in the return the actions that have been or will still be taken: (1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; (3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance; (4) to determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; (5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and (6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. Nowhere in the required contents of the return is the respondent required to admit to guilt or criminal culpability for extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. Consequently, the right against self-incrimination finds no application to amparo proceedings.

• Writ of Amparo — A remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity; it is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. In this case, the Court affirmed the issuance of the writ and permanent protection order because respondents proved enforced disappearance by substantial evidence under relaxed standards.
• Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance — Defined under Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 10353 as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty committed by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which places such person outside the protection of the law. Its elements under Section 4(b) of the IRR are: (1) deprivation of liberty; (2) committed by State agents or persons acting with authorization, support or acquiescence of the State; and (3) refusal to acknowledge the deprivation or concealment of fate or whereabouts placing the person outside the protection of the law. The Court found all three present.
• Relaxed Admissibility and Totality of Evidence in Amparo — Courts must adopt a standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable amparo petitioners to meet the required amount of proof; they should consider all pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and any evidence otherwise inadmissible under usual rules may be considered if consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. This does not dispense with the requirement of substantial evidence showing the State’s involvement in the enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing, or threats thereof. The Court applied this to admit Delia’s hearsay statement because it was consistent with Guevarra’s testimony.
• Substantial Evidence in Amparo — Under Section 18, in relation to Section 17, of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, a writ may issue if the allegations in the petition are supported by substantial evidence. The respondent public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty, and cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. The Court found substantial evidence sufficient to grant the writ.
• Right Against Self-Incrimination Not Applicable to Amparo — Amparo proceedings do not determine guilt or pinpoint criminal culpability for extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats thereof; they are not akin to criminal prosecutions because guilt or innocence is not determined and no penal sanctions are meted out. The return required of a public official or employee under Section 9(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not require an admission of guilt or criminal culpability. Consequently, the right against self-incrimination finds no application to amparo proceedings.
• Permanent Protection Order and Immediate Executory Nature — Amparo proceedings are summary in nature; the judgment rendered by the RTC, including the permanent protection order issued upon the grant of the privilege of the writ, is immediately executory, without prejudice to further appeals. The Court reiterated the permanent protection order in favor of respondents.

• "The writ is confined or limited to instances of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof." — This states the scope of the writ of amparo, limiting the remedy to the two categories recognized under the Rule and jurisprudence.
• "This measure of flexibility in the admissibility of evidence, however, does not do away with the requirement of substantial evidence in showing the State's involvement in the enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing or threats thereof. It merely permits, in the absence of hard-to-produce direct evidence, a closer look at the relevance and significance of every available evidence, including those that are, strictly speaking, hearsay where the circumstances of the case so require, and allows the consideration of the evidence adduced in terms of the consistency with the totality of the evidence." — This defines the relaxed admissibility and totality-of-evidence standard in amparo cases and its limits, a central ratio for the Court’s evidentiary ruling.
• "At the very least, the circumstances show that petitioners acquiesced to the deprivation of liberty of PSMS Agonoy by refusing the entry of the Cabatuan police officers into the safehouse to verify the whereabouts of PSMS Agonoy." — This applies the second element of enforced disappearance, showing how the Court treated refusal of entry as evidence of State-agent acquiescence.
• "Nowhere in the required contents of the return is the respondent required to admit to guilt or criminal culpability for extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. Consequently, the right against self-incrimination finds no application to amparo proceedings." — This is the Court’s holding on the self-incrimination argument, distinguishing amparo proceedings from criminal prosecutions.

• Mamba vs. Bueno, 805 Phil. 359 (2017) — Reiterated the Court’s definition of enforced disappearance taken from Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; cited in defining the offense.
• Ladaga vs. Mapagu, 698 Phil. 525 (2012) — Citing Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, declared that amparo courts must adopt relaxed admissibility of evidence and consider all evidence in totality; also cautioned that flexibility does not do away with substantial evidence of State involvement.
• Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536 (2009) — Source of the relaxed admissibility standard; also cited for the rule that amparo proceedings do not determine guilt or pinpoint criminal culpability.
• Bautista vs. Dannug-Salucon, 824 Phil. 293 (2018) — Cited to support admission of hearsay testimony in amparo under the totality-of-evidence standard, as with Delia’s statement.
• Castro vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 269249, October 24, 2023 — Cited for the totality-of-evidence standard and for the rule that a permanent protection order is a judgment by itself upon the grant of the privilege of the writ.
• Boac vs. Cadapan, 665 Phil. 84 (2011) — Cited for the summary nature of amparo proceedings and the immediate executory character of the judgment including the permanent protection order; also for the rule that amparo does not determine guilt.
• Balao vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 678 Phil. 532 (2011); Castillo vs. Cruz, 620 Phil. 654 (2009); Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1 (2008) — Cited for the confinement of the writ to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
• Morada vs. Rias, G.R. No. 222226, February 14, 2022 — Cited in relation to the elements of enforced disappearance.

• Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC), Section 1 — Defines the remedy as available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity; applied to affirm the remedy.
• Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Section 17 — Parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence; the respondent public official or employee must prove extraordinary diligence and cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability; basis for the burden of proof.
• Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Section 18 — The court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate if the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied; basis for granting the writ.
• Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Section 9(d) — The return of a public official or employee must state actions to verify the identity of the aggrieved party, recover and preserve evidence, identify witnesses, determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance, identify and apprehend persons involved, and bring suspected offenders before a competent court; no admission of guilt is required.
• Republic Act No. 10353, Section 3(b) — Defines enforced or involuntary disappearance; applied to the elements of the case.
• Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10353, Section 4(b) — Enumerates the elements of involuntary or enforced disappearance; applied to find all elements present.
• International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Article 2 — Definition of enforced disappearance as reiterated in Mamba vs. Bueno; used to define enforced disappearance.

Gesmundo, C.J.; Leonen, SAJ; Caguioa; Hernando; Lazaro-Javier; Zalameda; Gaerlan; Rosario; J. Lopez; Dimaampao; Marquez; Kho, Jr.; and Singh, JJ., concurred. M. Lopez, J., was on official leave.