Layosa vs. Rodriguez

A court having jurisdiction over the offense acquires jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of the information, and an accused who appears through counsel at a pre-suspension hearing under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 and cross-examines the prosecution witness submits to the court's jurisdiction or waives any objection to jurisdiction over his person; no grave abuse of discretion attends the suspension order where the information is valid and due process is observed.

Dominador Layosa was the collector of customs of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City. Fernando M. Dilig was the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, and Jose P. Rodriguez was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Palawan. The controversy implicated Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, which governs the suspension pendente lite of public officers charged under that law. Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court dated July 1, 1975, which empowers the Executive Judge to act on interlocutory matters prior to the raffling of a case, was also invoked.

Dominador Layosa was the collector of customs of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City. Fernando M. Dilig was the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, and Jose P. Rodriguez was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Palawan. The case arose from a charge under Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law.

On March 17 (the text states 1947), the city fiscal charged Layosa before the Court of First Instance of Palawan with having violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law. The information was based on a complaint filed by the assistant director of the District Anti-Smuggling Action Center and was one of five cases against Layosa, aside from a malversation case. The charge alleged that, from April to December 1976, Layosa demanded and received from the patron of M/V Lady Angelita I, whenever that vessel docked at the Puerto Princesa wharf to unload and load cargoes of San Miguel Corporation, two to three cases of beer and soft drinks as consideration for giving the vessel preferential berthing facilities (Criminal Case No. 1778).

On the following day, March 18, the fiscal, acting pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, filed a motion for Layosa's suspension. A copy of that motion and of the orders setting it for hearing were furnished to Layosa. The motion was heard on March 25, 1977. At the hearing, Layosa's counsel cross-examined the prosecution's witness. Respondent Judge granted the motion in his order dated April 11, 1977 at Brooke's Point, finding that a valid information had been filed against Layosa.

On May 10, 1977, Layosa filed the instant petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, praying that the order of suspension be set aside. He contended that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because no warrant of arrest had as yet been issued when the hearing on his suspension was held and the case was not raffled to respondent Judge; that the Chief State Prosecutor, in a telegram to the fiscal dated March 24, 1977, directed that the record of the case be elevated for review; and that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the suspension order. Because Layosa defied the order of suspension, the lower court in its order of June 15, 1977 adjudged him in contempt of court and penalized him by imprisonment for three months and a fine of P500. Layosa appealed from that order to the Court of Appeals.

Respondent Judge explained in his comment that, to avoid delay, he acted on the motion for suspension because the case was filed after the raffling of the cases between the two branches of the court had been terminated; he was scheduled to hold sessions at Brooke's Point and the other Judge was to begin his one-month vacation. He pointed out that his action on the motion for suspension was sanctioned by Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court dated July 1, 1975, which empowers the Executive Judge to act on interlocutory matters prior to the raffling of a case. The case was eventually raffled to the sala of respondent Judge. Layosa posted a bail bond and was arraigned on October 4, 1977. He was replaced by Carlos Razo as collector of customs. On September 29, 1977, the Office of State Prosecutors sustained the filing of the information against Layosa. Layosa did not submit a memorandum; the respondent fiscal alleged in his memorandum that Layosa had abandoned his contention as to lack of jurisdiction over his person because the case had been scheduled for trial at Layosa's instance and he had manifested willingness to proceed with trial.

• Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person: Petitioner contended that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because no warrant of arrest had as yet been issued when the hearing on his suspension was held and the case was not raffled to respondent Judge.
• Chief State Prosecutor's Telegram: Petitioner invoked the Chief State Prosecutor's telegram to the fiscal dated March 24, 1977, which directed that the record of the case be elevated for review.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the suspension order.

• Authority to Act Before Raffling: Respondent Judge explained that, to avoid delay, he acted on the motion for suspension because the case was filed after the raffling of cases between the two branches of the court had been terminated; he was scheduled to hold sessions at Brooke's Point and the other Judge was to begin his one-month vacation.
• Administrative Order No. 6: Respondent Judge argued that his action on the motion for suspension was sanctioned by Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court dated July 1, 1975, which empowers the Executive Judge to act on interlocutory matters prior to the raffling of a case.
• Abandonment of Jurisdictional Objection: Respondent fiscal alleged that petitioner had abandoned his contention as to lack of jurisdiction over his person because the case had been scheduled for trial at petitioner's instance and petitioner had manifested his willingness to proceed with trial.

• Jurisdiction Over the Person and Waiver: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Layosa's person, or whether he waived any objection, despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and the lack of raffling before the pre-suspension hearing.
• Due Process in the Pre-Suspension Hearing: Whether the pre-suspension hearing satisfied due process.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the motion for suspension under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.

• Jurisdiction Over the Person and Waiver: Yes. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case upon filing of the information; Layosa's voluntary appearance through counsel at the pre-suspension hearing submitted him to the court's jurisdiction, and any objection to jurisdiction over his person was waived.
• Due Process in the Pre-Suspension Hearing: Yes. Layosa was notified of the hearing, his counsel participated, and cross-examined the prosecution witness; the law contemplates an expeditious hearing on suspension.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the suspension order, there being a valid information and compliance with due process.

• Jurisdiction Over the Person and Waiver: The lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of the information, and the offense charged was within its jurisdiction. Although Layosa was not yet arrested or taken into custody when the pre-suspension hearing was held, his voluntary appearance at that hearing through his counsel was a submission to the lower court's jurisdiction. In civil cases, a defendant's voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons. Where a court has jurisdiction of the offense or subject matter, the objection that it has no jurisdiction of the person of the accused may be waived. One who desires to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person must appear in court for that purpose only; if he raises other questions, he waives the objection. Layosa waived the objection when he appeared at the pre-suspension hearing and his counsel cross-examined the prosecution witness. The fiscal's memorandum also asserted abandonment because Layosa sought trial and manifested willingness to proceed.
• Due Process in the Pre-Suspension Hearing: Petitioner was notified of the pre-suspension hearing, and his counsel participated in that hearing. The requirements of due process were observed. The law contemplates an expeditious hearing on the suspension of the accused, and public interest demands a speedy determination of that question. The Court cited Sugay vs. Pamaran and the Luciano and Oliveros cases in support.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The petition was devoid of merit. The trial court found that a valid information had been filed against Layosa. It acted within the authority of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, and respondent Judge explained that his action on the motion before raffling was to avoid delay and was sanctioned by Administrative Order No. 6. No grave abuse of discretion was shown.

• Suspension Pendente Lite Under Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 — When a valid information is filed against a public officer under Republic Act No. 3019, the court may order suspension pendente lite. The law contemplates an expeditious hearing on the suspension, and public interest demands a speedy determination. In this case, the trial court found a valid information and granted the suspension; the Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion.
• Waiver of Objection to Jurisdiction Over the Person — Where a court has jurisdiction over the offense or subject matter, an objection that it has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived. Voluntary appearance through counsel at a pre-suspension hearing, coupled with cross-examination of the prosecution witness, constitutes submission to the court's jurisdiction. One who desires to object to jurisdiction over his person must appear for that purpose only; raising other questions waives the objection.
• Due Process in Pre-Suspension Hearings — Due process in suspension proceedings under Republic Act No. 3019 requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. It is satisfied where the accused is notified of the pre-suspension hearing, his counsel participates, and he cross-examines the prosecution witness. The hearing need not await arrest or custody.
• Executive Judge's Authority Prior to Raffling — Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court dated July 1, 1975 empowers the Executive Judge to act on interlocutory matters prior to the raffling of a case. Respondent Judge invoked this authority to act on the suspension motion before the case was raffled to him.

• "There is no question that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of the information. The offense charged is within its jurisdiction. The petitioner was notified of the pre-suspension hearing. His counsel participated in that hearing. The requirements of due process were observed." — This passage states the ratio on jurisdiction and due process, grounding the dismissal of the petition.
• "It is true that petitioner was not yet arrested or taken into custody when the pre-suspension hearing was held. However, his voluntary appearance at that hearing through his counsel was a submission to the lower court's jurisdiction." — This passage establishes that voluntary appearance through counsel may substitute for arrest or custody for purposes of submitting to the court's jurisdiction.
• "Where a court has jurisdiction of the offense or subject matter, the objection that it has no jurisdiction of the person of the accused may be waived. One who desires to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person must appear in court for that purpose only, and if he raises other questions, he waives the objection." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the waiver rule applied to Layosa.
• "The law contemplates an expeditious hearing on the suspension of the accused. Public interest demands a speedy determination of that question." — This passage defines the summary character of the pre-suspension hearing under Republic Act No. 3019.

• Sugay vs. Pamaran, L-33877-79, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 260 — Cited by the Court, together with the Luciano and Oliveros cases, in support of the rule that the law contemplates an expeditious hearing on the suspension of the accused and that public interest demands a speedy determination of that question.
• Luciano vs. Wilson, L-31347, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 638 — Cited in the same line of authority for the expeditious nature of the suspension hearing.
• Luciano vs. Mariano, L-23950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187 — Cited in the same line of authority for the expeditious nature of the suspension hearing.
• Oliveros vs. Villaluz, L-33362, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 327 — Cited in the same line of authority for the expeditious nature of the suspension hearing.
• Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, L-30306, June 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 517 — Cited in the same line of authority for the expeditious nature of the suspension hearing.

• Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 — The fiscal moved for Layosa's suspension pursuant to this section; the provision authorizes suspension of a public officer charged under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law. The Court found no grave abuse in the trial court's grant of the motion based on a valid information.
• Administrative Order No. 6, Supreme Court, dated July 1, 1975 — Respondent Judge invoked this order, which empowers the Executive Judge to act on interlocutory matters prior to the raffling of a case, to justify acting on the suspension motion before the case was raffled to him.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.