Laxamana vs. Baltazar

A prior special statute governing a particular subject is not repealed by a subsequent general statute broad enough to encompass the same subject, absent a manifest legislative intent to repeal. Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, which specifically provides that the vice-mayor automatically discharges the mayor's duties upon the latter's absence, suspension, or temporary disability, was not repealed by Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code, which generally governs temporary vacancies in elective municipal offices by appointment.

Under the Revised Administrative Code, two provisions governed vacancies in municipal offices: Section 2195, which specifically addressed the temporary disability of the mayor by providing that the vice-mayor — or, failing that, the highest-vote-getting councilor — would automatically discharge the mayor's duties without need of appointment; and Section 2180, which addressed temporary vacancies in municipal offices generally by authorizing appointment by the provincial governor with the consent of the provincial board. Section 2180(a) was later carried into the Revised Election Code (R.A. 180) as Section 21(a), governing temporary vacancies in elective local offices. The parties — petitioner Laxamana, the gubernatorial appointee, and respondent Baltazar, the vice-mayor who assumed office by operation of law — contested which provision controlled when the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended.

In July 1952, the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended from office. The vice-mayor, Jose T. Baltazar, thereupon assumed the duties of mayor by virtue of Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides that upon the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the vice-mayor — or, if there be no vice-mayor, by the councilor who received the highest number of votes at the last general election. No formal appointment was necessary for this automatic succession.

The provincial governor, however, acting under Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code (R.A. 180) and with the consent of the provincial board, appointed Jose L. Laxamana as mayor of Sexmoan. Laxamana immediately took the corresponding official oath and assumed the position. The governor had allegedly also offered the appointment to Baltazar, who rejected it — a fact the Court later deemed immaterial, since under Section 2195 no appointment was needed for the vice-mayor to act.

The resulting conflict over who was entitled to hold the office of mayor produced the instant quo warranto proceeding, filed by Laxamana against Baltazar. The petition was based solely on the proposition that Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed by the subsequent enactment of Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code, such that the governor's power of appointment governed temporary vacancies in the office of mayor and displaced the vice-mayor's automatic succession.

• Implied Repeal: Petitioner argued that Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code (R.A. 180), which authorizes the provincial governor to fill temporary vacancies in elective municipal offices by appointment, had repealed Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides for automatic succession by the vice-mayor upon the mayor's temporary disability. The petition rested entirely on this single proposition of implied repeal.

• Implied Repeal: Whether Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, providing for automatic succession by the vice-mayor upon the mayor's temporary disability, was repealed by Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code, which generally authorizes appointment to fill temporary vacancies in elective municipal offices.

• Implied Repeal: No. Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code was not repealed by Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code. A prior special statute is not repealed by a subsequent general statute absent manifest legislative intent to repeal; the special provision prevails as an exception to the general.

• Implied Repeal: The Court examined the statutory lineage of the two provisions. Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code was derived from Section 2180(a) of the Revised Administrative Code, which governed temporary vacancies in municipal offices generally. Under the Administrative Code, Sections 2180 and 2195 were understood as supplementing each other: Section 2180(a) applied to municipal offices other than that of the municipal president (now mayor), while Section 2195 specifically governed the temporary disability of the mayor by providing for automatic succession by the vice-mayor. This division of labor was confirmed by contemporaneous opinions of the Attorney General and the Insular Auditor, both of which construed Section 2195 as controlling the temporary vacancy in the office of municipal president and Section 2180(a) as covering only other municipal offices.

The incorporation of Section 2180(a) into the Revised Election Code as Section 21(a) could not reasonably be presumed to have enlarged its scope to supersede or repeal Section 2195, given the presumption against implied repeals. The Court invoked the principle that where a statute has received a contemporaneous and practical interpretation and is re-enacted, that interpretation is presumed correct and is accorded greater weight, the legislature being presumed acquainted with it and to have adopted it. Even apart from their common origin, the two provisions could be harmonized under the canon of statutory construction that when a general and a particular provision conflict, the latter prevails — codified in Section 288 of Act 190. Section 2195, dealing specifically with vacancy in the office of mayor, thus operated as an exception to or qualification of the general terms of Section 21(a). The Court further noted that even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, the Department of the Interior and the Office of the Executive Secretary had consistently held that the vice-mayor assumes the mayor's office by operation of law during the mayor's suspension or temporary disability, a contemporaneous executive construction deserving great weight. The alleged offer of appointment to Baltazar, which he rejected, was immaterial because under Section 2195 no appointment was needed.

• Special statute not repealed by general statute — A special and local statute providing for a particular case or class of cases is not repealed by a subsequent statute general in its terms, provisions, and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, even though the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. The fact that one statute is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special remains an exception to the general. Applied here to hold that Section 2195 (special, governing the mayor's temporary disability) survived Section 21(a) (general, governing temporary vacancies in municipal offices).

• General versus particular provision — When a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former, regardless of the sequence of enactment. This principle, codified in Section 288 of Act 190, was applied to treat Section 2195 as prevailing over the general terms of Section 21(a).

• Contemporaneous construction — A contemporaneous and practical interpretation placed upon a statute by executive officers charged with its execution, especially when the statute as interpreted is re-enacted, is presumptively the correct interpretation and deserves great weight in the courts. The long-standing executive construction that the vice-mayor automatically assumes the mayor's duties during temporary disability reinforced the Court's conclusion.

• Presumption against implied repeals — Implied repeals are disfavored; the incorporation of a prior provision into a new code does not enlarge its scope to supersede a separate, complementary provision absent manifest legislative intent.

• "It is well-settled that a special and local statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." — This passage states the controlling canon of statutory construction that formed the ratio decidendi, distinguishing special from general provisions and establishing the presumption against implied repeal.

• "Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general — the terms of the general brood enough to include the matter provided for in the special — the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case." — This formulation of the special-versus-general presumption is the analytical core of the decision and is frequently cited in subsequent Philippine statutory-construction jurisprudence.

• "Consequently it is our ruling that when the mayor of a municipality is suspended, absent or temporarily unable, his duties should be discharged by the vice-mayor in accordance with sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code." — This is the Court's dispositive holding on the merits, resolving the statutory conflict in favor of automatic vice-mayoral succession.

• Philippine Railway Co. vs. Collector of Int. Rev., 91 Phil. 35 — Cited as a recent decision in which the Court addressed a substantially similar situation — repeal of a prior special provision by a subsequent general provision — and applied the same canon that a special statute is not repealed by a later general statute absent manifest intent. Followed.

• Madrigal vs. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 414 — Cited for the proposition that contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers charged with its execution deserves great weight in the courts. Followed as supporting authority.

• Government vs. Mun. of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634 — Cited alongside Madrigal vs. Rafferty for the weight accorded to contemporaneous executive construction. Followed as supporting authority.

• Section 2195, Revised Administrative Code — Provides that upon the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the vice-mayor, or if there be no vice-mayor, by the councilor who received the highest number of votes at the last general election. Held to remain in force as the special provision governing temporary vacancy in the office of mayor, not repealed by the later general provision.

• Section 21(a), Revised Election Code (R.A. 180) — Provides that whenever a temporary vacancy in any elective local office occurs, the same shall be filled by appointment by the President (for provincial or city offices) or by the provincial governor with the consent of the provincial board (for municipal offices). Held to be a general provision that did not repeal the special rule in Section 2195.

• Section 2180, Revised Administrative Code — The antecedent of Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code, governing vacancies in municipal offices. Paragraph (a) covered temporary vacancies by appointment; paragraph (b) covered permanent vacancies, with the vice-president stepping into the office of municipal president. Analyzed to show that Sections 2180 and 2195 were designed to supplement each other, with Section 2195 specifically governing temporary disability of the mayor.

• Section 288, Act 190 — Codifies the principle that when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. Applied to harmonize Sections 2195 and 21(a), treating the former as the particular provision prevailing over the latter's general terms.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concurred.