Lavitoria vs. Judge of CFI of Tayabas

The time during which a court considers a motion for new trial is excluded from the period within which a judgment becomes final, so that a court retains jurisdiction to resolve a timely filed motion even if the total elapsed time from decision to resolution exceeds thirty days.

The Government of the Philippine Islands, through the Director of Lands and later the Attorney-General, sought registration of approximately 300 hectares of land in Candelaria, Province of Tayabas, under section 61 of Act No. 926. Several individuals — including Macario Lavitoria, Regino Lavitoria, Bernarda Lavitoria, Vidal Lavitoria, Ariston Lavarro, Sofia Lavarro, and Isidro Labares — claimed to be the absolute owners in common of the property and opposed the registration. The land registration proceedings were transferred from the Court of Land Registration to the Court of First Instance of Tayabas by virtue of Act No. 2347, enacted July 1, 1914.

On or about August 11, 1913, Charles H. Sleeper, as Director of Lands, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration on behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands, seeking registration of approximately 300 hectares of land located in the municipality of Candelaria, Province of Tayabas, pursuant to section 61 of Act No. 926. On March 2, 1914, the Attorney-General presented an identical petition, though no reason for the second filing appears of record. The cause was thereafter transferred from the Court of Land Registration to the Court of First Instance of Tayabas by virtue of Act No. 2347, enacted July 1, 1914.

On September 21, 1914, the clerk of the CFI issued a notice to the Director of Lands that the cause had been set for hearing in Lucena on November 23, 1914, at eight o'clock in the morning, in accordance with section 20 of Act No. 2347. A general notice was issued by the chief clerk of the General Land Registration Office on September 26, 1914, notifying all persons of the hearing date. On October 14, 1914, the sheriff of Tayabas posted certified copies of the notice on each parcel of the land and on the municipal building of Candelaria, as certified on October 17, 1914. On October 27, 1914, the chief of the General Land Registration Office certified compliance with section 32 of Act No. 496.

On October 2, 1914, several individuals — through counsel Reyes & Millar — filed an answer to the original petition, alleging that they were the only and absolute owners in common of the property and that no other person had any right or legitimate interest therein. On November 23, 1914, Judge Isidro Paredes entered an order of general default against all persons who had not appeared; the only persons who had appeared were Gregorio Suaverdes, Florentino Vensuela, Abdon Romulo, Cornelio de Guzman, Espiridion Dune, Macario Lavitoria, Regino Lavitoria, Bernarda Lavitoria, Vidal Lavitoria, Ariston Lavarro, Sofia Lavarro, and Isidro Labares. After hearing the parties, Judge Paredes rendered a decision on December 1, 1914, ordering the land registered in favor of Macario Lavitoria, Regino Lavitoria, Bernarda Lavitoria, Vidal Lavitoria, Ariston Lavarro, Sofia Lavarro, and Isidro Labares.

On December 8, 1914, Attorney-General Ramon Avanceña filed a motion for new trial, seeking to have the December 1 decision declared without effect on the ground that neither the Attorney-General nor the Director of Lands had received notice of the date fixed for trial. The motion was heard and granted by Judge Paredes on January 7, 1915. Within half an hour, counsel for the prevailing oppositors presented a verbal motion for reconsideration, which was denied the same day. The oppositors then commenced the present original action for prohibition in the Supreme Court on or about March 1, 1915, seeking to enjoin the lower court from proceeding with the new trial on the ground that the court had lost jurisdiction after the expiration of thirty days from the decision.

• Lack of Jurisdiction to Grant New Trial: Petitioners argued that the lower court was without jurisdiction to consider and decide the motion for new trial, or to grant a new trial, after the expiration of thirty days from notification of the decision, and that prohibition was therefore the proper remedy to prevent the lower court from proceeding.

• Jurisdiction to Grant New Trial: Whether the lower court lost jurisdiction to consider and grant a motion for new trial where more than thirty days had elapsed from the date of the decision to the date of the court's resolution of the motion.

• Jurisdiction to Grant New Trial: No. The lower court retained jurisdiction because the motion for new trial was filed within thirty days of the decision, and the time during which the court considers a motion for new trial is excluded from the period within which a judgment becomes final.

• Jurisdiction to Grant New Trial: The decision was rendered on December 1, 1914, and the motion for new trial was filed on December 8, 1914 — seven days later, well within the thirty-day reglementary period. Although the court did not resolve the motion until January 7, 1915, more than thirty days from the date of the decision, the Court held that the time during which a motion for new trial is pending before the court is not counted in the period within which a decision becomes final. This rule had been established in numerous prior cases and was specifically applied to decisions of the Court of Land Registration notwithstanding the provisions of Act No. 1484. Because the motion was filed before the decision became final, the lower court had jurisdiction to consider and grant it. Moreover, parties have a right to be present at the trial of their causes and to receive reasonable notice of the time fixed for trial; if the court discovers that a party was not notified, it may grant a new trial even on its own motion. The record disclosed that neither the Attorney-General nor the Director of Lands had received notice of the hearing date, furnishing sufficient justification for the grant of a new trial.

• Exclusion of motion for new trial period from finality of judgments — The time during which a court considers a motion for new trial is not counted or included in the period within which a decision becomes final. Applied here to hold that the lower court retained jurisdiction to grant the motion, even though more than thirty days elapsed from the date of the decision to the date of the court's resolution, because the motion itself was filed within thirty days of the decision. The rule was specifically applied to land registration decisions notwithstanding Act No. 1484.

• Right to notice and presence at trial — Parties have a right to be present at the trial of their causes, either by themselves or by their attorneys, and are entitled to reasonable notice of the time fixed for trial. If the court discovers that either party has not been notified of the trial, it may, on its own motion, grant a new trial. Applied here to justify the lower court's grant of a new trial where neither the Attorney-General nor the Director of Lands had received notice of the hearing date.

• "the time during which the court considers a motion for a new trial is not counted nor included in the time within which a decision of the Court of First Instance becomes final." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, stating the canonical rule that the pendency of a motion for new trial tolls the period for finality of judgment.

• "The rule that the time during which the judge is considering a motion for a new trial shall not count against the time within which the judgment shall become final has been specifically applied to decisions in the Court of Land Registration, notwithstanding the provisions of Act No. 1484." — Extends the exclusion rule to land registration proceedings, ensuring that the special finality provisions for such cases do not override the general procedural principle.

• "Parties have a right to be present at the trial of their causes, either by themselves or by their attorneys. They are also entitled to reasonable notice of the time fixed for the trial. If the court discovers that either of the parties to the action has not been notified of the trial, he may, on his own motion, grant a new trial." — Articulates the procedural due process principle underlying the grant of new trial for lack of notice, independent of any party motion.

• Garcia vs. Ambler and Sweeney, 4 Phil. Rep. 81 — Followed; supports the rule that the time during which a court considers a motion for new trial is excluded from the period within which a judgment becomes final.

• De la Cruz vs. Garcia, 4 Phil. Rep. 680 — Followed; cited for the same exclusion rule.

• Santos vs. Vallafuerte, 5 Phil. Rep. 739 — Followed; cited for the same exclusion rule.

• Paez vs. Berenguer, 6 Phil. Rep. 521 — Followed; specifically applied the exclusion rule to decisions in the Court of Land Registration, notwithstanding the provisions of Act No. 1484.

• Muerteguy & Aboitiz vs. Delgado, 22 Phil. Rep. 109 — Followed; supports the principle that a court may grant a new trial on its own motion when a party was not notified of the trial date.

• Section 61, Act No. 926 — Authorized the Director of Lands to file a petition for registration of public land on behalf of the Government; the original petition was filed under this provision.

• Act No. 2347 (July 1, 1914) — Transferred land registration cases from the Court of Land Registration to the Court of First Instance; section 20 thereof governed the clerk's issuance of notice of hearing.

• Section 32, Act No. 496 (Land Registration Law) — Required the chief of the General Land Registration Office to certify compliance with notice requirements; compliance was certified on October 27, 1914.

• Act No. 1484 — Referenced in connection with the finality of land registration decisions; the Court held that the exclusion of the motion-for-new-trial period from the finality computation applies notwithstanding this Act.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concurred.