Laurel vs. Vardeleon

Dismissal for failure to prosecute under Section 3, Rule 17 requires a showing that the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence or unwillingness to proceed with reasonable promptitude; such dismissal is improper where the plaintiff appears with counsel and witness, seeks postponement based on honest belief that pending motions must first be resolved, and acts within the three-setting schedule agreed upon during pre-trial, provided the suit appears meritorious and no prejudice results to the defendant.

Petitioner Alicia Y. Laurel instituted an action to recover possession and ownership of a 20,306-square meter island in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan, which respondent Ferdinand M. Vardeleon claimed to have purchased from a predecessor-in-interest in 1973. During pre-trial, the parties agreed to a schedule granting petitioner three separate dates to present her evidence.

• The Complaint: On July 23, 2004, eighty-one-year-old petitioner Alicia Y. Laurel filed a Complaint against respondent Ferdinand M. Vardeleon for recovery of possession and ownership and/or quieting of title over a 20,306-square meter island located in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan. Respondent denied the allegations, asserting he acquired the island from Avelina Casimero in 1973 and claiming petitioner was guilty of laches.
• Pre-Trial Agreement: In the Pre-Trial Order dated July 6, 2005, the RTC scheduled petitioner to present her evidence on three separate dates: September 7, 2005; October 12, 2005; and November 23, 2005.
• Procedural Maneuvers: On August 1, 2005, respondent moved to correct the Pre-Trial Order to reflect petitioner's alleged admission that she knew of his possession since 1975. The RTC denied this motion on August 19, 2005; respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending. Meanwhile, on September 2, 2005, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the September 7 hearing to October 12, 2005. The RTC granted the motion in its September 7, 2005 Order but required petitioner to defray the transportation expenses and appearance fee of respondent's counsel. Petitioner moved to reconsider this condition; the RTC did not act on this motion prior to the next hearing.
• The October 12, 2005 Hearing: On the scheduled October 12, 2005 hearing, petitioner appeared with substitute counsel, Atty. Roy Villa, and her first witness. She orally moved to postpone trial on two grounds: (1) the pending motions for reconsideration (respondent's regarding the Pre-Trial Order and her own regarding the payment of fees) had yet to be resolved, and (2) the substitute counsel had not conferred with the witness because petitioner's original counsel, Atty. Maria Theresa Diaz-dela Vega, who had interviewed the witness, was absent due to illness (though no medical certificate under oath was presented).
• Dismissal: The RTC denied the oral motion to postpone and, on its own motion, dismissed Civil Case No. 7249 for failure to prosecute pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also denied the pending motions for reconsideration. The RTC subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order on January 31, 2006, noting that for two settings (September 7 and October 12), petitioner failed to present evidence.

• Absence of Failure to Prosecute: Petitioner maintained that she was not unwilling to prosecute; she appeared at the October 12, 2005 hearing with counsel and witness, and her failure to commence trial stemmed from an honest belief that the pending motions for reconsideration—which had a direct bearing on the trial—needed resolution first.
• Pre-Trial Agreement: She argued that the Pre-Trial Order controlled the course of trial, and since she was granted three scheduled hearings, the dismissal after only the second setting violated this agreement and constituted manifest injustice.
• Meritorious Case: Petitioner asserted that she had a strong case, having purchased the property from a seller with a valid tax declaration, whereas respondent admitted his predecessor-in-interest had no supporting documents.
• Procedural Leniency: She contended that the power to dismiss for failure to prosecute must be exercised with care and vigilance, considering surrounding circumstances to ensure technicality does not prevail over substantial justice, especially given her advanced age (eighty-one years old at the time of filing).

• Lack of Diligence: Respondent countered that petitioner's insistence on resolving pending motions and waiting for the third scheduled hearing demonstrated a complacent attitude and lack of interest in prosecuting her case, violating his right to a speedy trial.
• Preparedness: He argued that if petitioner were keen on pursuing the case, her substitute counsel should have been prepared to proceed on October 12, 2005, regardless of the pending motions.
• Due Process: Respondent claimed that petitioner was accorded due process and ample opportunity to present her case, rendering the dismissal proper.

• Failure to Prosecute: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint for failure to prosecute under Section 3, Rule 17 despite petitioner appearing with counsel and witness and having one remaining scheduled hearing date.
• Pre-Trial Order Binding Effect: Whether the trial court violated the pre-trial agreement by dismissing the case after only two of the three agreed-upon hearing settings.

• Failure to Prosecute: The dismissal was improper. The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude, equating to unwillingness to prosecute. Petitioner, despite her advanced age, demonstrated diligence by appearing with counsel and witness. The delay sought—a postponement to the next agreed date of November 23, 2005—was not unreasonable, as it fell within the pre-trial schedule and caused no prejudice to respondent.
• Pre-Trial Order Binding Effect: The trial court erred in disregarding the pre-trial agreement granting three hearing settings. Having agreed to this schedule, respondent was expected to honor it and await his turn; dismissal after only the second setting violated this procedural compact.
• Duty to Resolve Pending Motions: The trial court was remiss in summarily denying the pending motions for reconsideration without granting the parties opportunity to comment, contributing to the confusion that justified petitioner's request for postponement.

• Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute (Non Prosequitur): Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal requires a showing that the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude, or that the plaintiff is unwilling to prosecute. Courts must exercise this power soundly, considering mitigating circumstances; dismissal is improper where the suit appears meritorious, the plaintiff is not culpably negligent, and no injury results to the defendant.
• Pre-Trial Order as Controlling: Agreements reached during pre-trial and embodied in the pre-trial order control the subsequent course of trial and should not be disturbed unless manifest injustice would result.
• Duty to Dispose on the Merits: Trial courts have a duty to dispose of controversies after trial on the merits whenever possible; it constitutes grave abuse of discretion to enter a dismissal not warranted by the specific circumstances of the case.

• "The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute."
• "While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or a scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, x x x courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss."
• "If facts obtain that serve as mitigating circumstances for the delay, the same should be considered and dismissal denied or set aside... especially where the suit appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably negligent and no injury results to defendant."
• "While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be made with care. The repressive or restraining effect of the rule amounting to adjudication upon the merits may cut short a case even before it is fully litigated... Hence, sound discretion demands vigilance in duly recognizing the circumstances surrounding the case to the end that technicality shall not prevail over substantial justice."

• Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, June 20, 2012 — Cited for the fundamental test for non prosequitur (want of due diligence/unwillingness to prosecute).
• Padua v. Hon. Ericta, 244 Phil. 479 (1988) — Controlling precedent establishing that trial courts must dispose of controversies on the merits whenever possible and that dismissal is improper where mitigating circumstances exist, the suit is meritorious, and plaintiff is not culpably negligent.
• Gapoy v. Judge Adil, 171 Phil. 652 (1978) — Cited for the definition of failure to prosecute as requiring unwillingness to proceed.
• Dy, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97130, June 19, 1991 — Cited by petitioner regarding the binding effect of pre-trial orders.

• Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs dismissal due to fault of the plaintiff for failure to appear, prosecute for an unreasonable length of time, or comply with rules or court orders.
• Section 4, Rule 30 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Referenced regarding the requirement of a medical certificate under oath for postponement due to illness of counsel.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ.