Laurel V vs. Civil Service Commission

The prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of Presidential Decree No. 807 covers designations as well as appointments to career service positions, and a position is “primarily confidential” only when its nature — not merely an executive declaration — so qualifies.

Upon assuming office as Governor of Batangas on 3 March 1980, petitioner Jose P. Laurel V appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant, a non-career, primarily confidential position. When the position of Provincial Administrator fell vacant on 31 December 1980, petitioner designated Benjamin as Acting Provincial Administrator effective 2 January 1981, to serve until a regular appointment was made. Petitioner subsequently issued Benjamin a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer, another primarily confidential post. Private respondent Lorenzo Sangalang wrote to the CSC in January 1983, calling attention to the “appointment” of the brother to a career position in alleged violation of civil service rules and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

• Initial Appointments: On 3 March 1980, petitioner Governor Jose P. Laurel V appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor — a non-career, primarily confidential position under Section 6 of P.D. No. 807.
• Designation as Acting Provincial Administrator: The position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas became vacant on 31 December 1980 due to the resignation of Felimon C. Salcedo III. Alleging a lack of qualified applicants and to avoid prejudice to operations, petitioner designated Benjamin Laurel as Acting Provincial Administrator effective 2 January 1981, to continue until a regular appointment or earlier revocation.
• Subsequent Promotional Appointment: On 28 April 1981, petitioner issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer, another position classified as “primarily confidential” under P.D. No. 868.
• Sangalang’s Complaint: On 10 January 1983, private respondent Lorenzo Sangalang wrote the CSC, calling attention to the “appointment” of Benjamin as Provincial Administrator by his brother. Sangalang alleged: (1) the position is a career position; (2) the appointment violates civil service rules on nepotism; and (3) the grant of representation allowance to the appointee violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He requested an investigation.
• Petitioner’s Response: Through the Acting Provincial Attorney, petitioner informed the CSC that no nepotism occurred. With respect to Senior Executive Assistant and Civil Security Officer, both were primarily confidential and thus exempt. As to Provincial Administrator, petitioner admitted the position is a career civil service position but argued he merely “designated” — not appointed — his brother. Designation, he maintained, is temporary and distinct from appointment; therefore, Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 did not apply.
• CSC Resolutions: In Resolution No. 83-358 (12 July 1983), the CSC revoked the designation as “nepotic.” It held that the nepotism prohibition covers designation because “what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly,” and that Section 24(f) of R.A. No. 2260 bars a person holding a non-competitive (non-career) position from performing duties properly belonging to a competitive (career) position. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration — which newly argued that the position is primarily confidential — was denied in Resolution No. 85-271 (3 July 1985). The CSC reiterated that the position is not primarily confidential, as its duties involve general planning, direction and control of administrative and personnel services, and it does not belong to the Governor’s personal staff.
• Petition to the Supreme Court: Petitioner filed the instant certiorari petition, raising grave abuse of discretion on the grounds: (A) the position is primarily confidential, contrary to the CSC ruling; (B) the CSC has no power to review a designation; (C) the CSC exceeded jurisdiction in entertaining Sangalang’s complaint.

• Primarily Confidential Character: Petitioner argued that the duties, functions and responsibilities of the Provincial Administrator render the position primarily confidential in nature, as they require close intimacy between appointee and appointing power, ensuring freedom of intercourse without embarrassment. Petitioner relied on Salazar vs. Mathay and Piñero vs. Hechanova, insisting that the nature of the position, not the absence of a presidential declaration, controls classification.
• Designation Distinguished from Appointment: Petitioner maintained that he merely designated his brother as Acting Provincial Administrator; designation is the imposition of additional duties on an already appointed officer, is temporary, and does not create an official relation. Section 49 of P.D. No. 807, he argued, prohibits only appointments of relatives to career positions, not designations.
• Lack of CSC Jurisdiction Over Designation: Petitioner invoked Section 2077 of the Revised Administrative Code, contending that the CSC acted without jurisdiction when it reviewed a mere designation made by him as governor.
• Improper Cognizance of Sangalang’s Complaint: Petitioner argued that the CSC exceeded its jurisdiction in giving due course to a complaint filed by a private citizen who claimed no better right to the position.

• Career Service Classification: The CSC and the Solicitor General maintained that the position of Provincial Administrator is not primarily confidential. The Manual of Position Descriptions prescribes a bachelor’s degree, experience, and a specific civil service eligibility; its functions involve general planning, direction and control of administrative services. These place it squarely in the career service under Section 5(1) of P.D. No. 807. It has never been declared primarily confidential by the President under P.D. No. 868.
• Nepotism Applies to Designations: Respondents countered that the prohibition on nepotism extends to designations, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Designation accomplishes the same purpose as an appointment and cannot be allowed to circumvent the law. Moreover, Section 24(f) of R.A. No. 2260 prevents a non-career appointee from performing career-service duties.
• CSC Authority to Review Designations: Under Section 2 of P.D. No. 807, the CSC has the power to enforce the laws and rules governing the selection, utilization, training and discipline of civil servants; this authority necessarily includes the review of designations that violate the civil service law.
• Citizen Standing: The Solicitor General invoked Benitez vs. Paredes and Tañada vs. Tuvera for the rule that where a question of public right is involved, any citizen is a real party in interest; Section 37 of P.D. No. 807 expressly allows a private citizen to file a complaint with the CSC.

• Primarily Confidential Nature: Whether the position of Provincial Administrator is primarily confidential and thus exempt from the rule on nepotism.
• Application of Nepotism to Designation: Whether the prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 applies to a designation, as distinguished from an appointment.
• Standing of Private Citizen: Whether a private citizen who does not claim any better right to a position may file a verified complaint with the Civil Service Commission to denounce a violation of the Civil Service Law and rules.

• Primarily Confidential Nature: The position of Provincial Administrator is not primarily confidential; it belongs to the career service. The qualifications prescribed — a bachelor’s degree, six years of progressively responsible experience, and civil service eligibility — and the functions defined in the Manual of Position Descriptions (top professional level management, administration, and organizational work) bring it within the career service under Section 5 of P.D. No. 807. The defining characteristic of a primarily confidential position is the nature of its functions, not an executive declaration. The rule in Piñero vs. Hechanova — that it is the nature of the position that finally determines its classification — stands despite the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 868, which vests in the President the power to declare positions primarily confidential; such a declaration is merely an initial determination subject to judicial review. Petitioner’s earlier admission that the position is a career service position also estops him from asserting otherwise.
• Application of Nepotism to Designation: The nepotism prohibition under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 applies to designations. The term “appointment” embraces designation; both involve naming a particular person to a specified public office. Borromeo vs. Mariano and Binamira vs. Garrucho confirm that designation is a form of appointment. Section 49 does not distinguish between appointment and designation, and to exempt designation would render the prohibition meaningless, as any appointing authority could circumvent it simply by designating a relative. Moreover, under Section 25 of P.D. No. 807, career service positions may be filled only by permanent or temporary appointment; a designation to fill a career vacancy is necessarily an appointment. The designation also ran afoul of Section 24(f) of R.A. No. 2260 because Benjamin Laurel, holding non-career (primarily confidential) positions, was made to perform the duties of a career position.
• Standing of Private Citizen: Sangalang’s complaint was validly given due course. Section 37 of P.D. No. 807 expressly permits a private citizen to file a complaint directly with the CSC against a government official or employee. The provision implements the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust and public officers must be accountable to the people. In matters of public right, the citizen acts as a relator, and the people are the real parties in interest, as recognized in Benitez vs. Paredes and Tañada vs. Tuvera. The vigilance of the citizenry is vital in a democracy.

• Nature-of-the-Position Test for Primarily Confidential Positions — Whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining, or highly technical is ultimately determined by the nature of its functions, not solely by an executive declaration. A presidential declaration under P.D. No. 868 is merely an initial determination, subject to judicial review; otherwise, the Executive could, by fiat, deny constitutional protection to officers. The Constitution refers to positions “which are” primarily confidential in nature, making the actual character of the duties dispositive.
• Nepotism Prohibition Encompasses Designations — The prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 covers both appointments and designations to career service positions. “Appointment” is understood to include designation; both involve the naming of a person to a public office. Because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly, a contrary interpretation would render the prohibition toothless and permit easy circumvention.
• Citizen Standing to Enforce Civil Service Laws — A private citizen may file a complaint with the Civil Service Commission against a government official or employee for violations of the Civil Service Law, even without claiming a personal right to the position. Section 37 of P.D. No. 807 expressly grants such standing, and the principle that a public office is a public trust supports the citizen’s role as relator in matters of public right.

• “It is plain that, at least since the enactment of the 1959 Civil Service Act (R.A. 2260), it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy determining or highly technical. Executive pronouncements can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict.” (Reiterating Piñero vs. Hechanova)
• “Designation is also defined as ‘an appointment or assignment to a particular office’; and ‘to designate’ means ‘to indicate, select, appoint or set apart for a purpose or duty.’” (Citing Black’s Law Dictionary)
• “The rule admits of no distinction between appointment and designation.”
• “If a designation is not to be deemed included in the term appointment under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807, then the prohibition on nepotism would be meaningless and toothless. Any appointing authority may circumvent it by merely designating, and not appointing, a relative within the prohibited degree to a vacant position in the career service. Indeed, as correctly stated by public respondent, ‘what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.’”

• Piñero vs. Hechanova, 18 SCRA 417 — Controlling precedent establishing that the nature of a position, not an executive pronouncement, determines whether it is primarily confidential, policy-determining, or highly technical. Applied to hold that the CSC classification was correct and that P.D. No. 868 did not alter this rule.
• Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 275 — Recognized two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (a) upon presidential declaration, and (b) when the nature of the functions creates a close intimacy between appointee and appointing power. Distinguished insofar as the nature test remains paramount; the Court clarified that executive declaration is only an initial determination.
• Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322 — Cited for the definition that the term “appoint” applies to the nomination or designation of an individual, supporting the conclusion that designation is included in the nepotism prohibition.
• Binamira vs. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154 — Adopted its statement that “designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office.”
• Benitez vs. Paredes, 52 Phil. 1; Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 — Applied the principle that in questions of public right, the people are the real parties in interest and a citizen-relator has standing to institute proceedings, sustaining Sangalang’s complaint.

• Section 49, Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) — The nepotism prohibition; applied to revoke the designation of petitioner’s brother because the position was a career service post and the relationship was within the third degree of consanguinity.
• Sections 5, 6, 7, and 25, Presidential Decree No. 807 — Defined the career and non-career services, the classes of positions, and the modes of filling career positions. Used to determine that the Provincial Administrator position is in the career service and must be filled by appointment, not a mere designation outside the prohibition.
• Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 807 — Declared the policy of the State to establish a career service and mandated the CSC to enforce civil service laws and rules.
• Section 37, Presidential Decree No. 807 — Allowed a private citizen to file a complaint directly with the CSC; served as the legal basis for Sangalang’s standing.
• Section 1, third paragraph, Presidential Decree No. 868 — Vested in the President the power to declare positions policy-determining, highly technical, or primarily confidential upon recommendation of certain agencies. Interpreted as an initial executive determination that does not foreclose judicial review based on the nature of the position.
• Section 24(f), Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) — Prohibited a person appointed to a non-competitive (non-career) position from performing duties properly belonging to a competitive (career) position; applied as an additional bar to the designation.
• Section 2, Article XII, 1973 Constitution; Section 2, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution — Constitutional provisions referring to positions “which are” policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, supporting the rule that the nature of the position is decisive.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Romero, JJ., concurred.

None filed.