Latorre vs. Latorre

A complaint for declaration of nullity of a deed of absolute sale over real property, where the plaintiff asserts co-ownership and seeks to recover her share thereof, is a real action that must be commenced and tried in the court having territorial jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated. Direct resort to the Supreme Court is improper where resolution of the issues requires examination of the probative value of evidence, as such questions are not pure questions of law within Rule 45.

Petitioner Generosa Almeda Latorre and respondent Luis Esteban Latorre are mother and son. They were co-owners in equal shares of a 1,244-square-meter property at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmariñas Village, Makati City. On March 14, 1989, both executed deeds of donation conveying the property to The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc., resulting in TCT No. 161963 being issued in the Foundation's name. On September 2, 1994, they executed separate deeds of revocation and reconveyance, consented to by the Foundation through corporate resolutions, but these deeds were never registered, leaving title in the Foundation's name. Respondent was a former Opus Dei priest who left the congregation in 1987; petitioner lived with respondent and his family from 1988 to 2000.

Petitioner Generosa Almeda Latorre and respondent Luis Esteban Latorre, mother and son, were co-owners in equal shares of a 1,244-square-meter property at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmariñas Village, Makati City. On March 14, 1989, both executed deeds of donation conveying the property to The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc., and TCT No. 161963 was issued in the Foundation's name. On September 2, 1994, they executed separate deeds of revocation and reconveyance, with the Foundation's consent through corporate resolutions, but these deeds were never registered, so title remained in the Foundation's name. Respondent alleged that the donation was made to spare the property from the Opus Dei, which had divested the Latorre family of several real properties over nearly twenty years, and that the revocation was agreed upon in 1994 when respondent married and had a son.

On September 28, 1999, respondent, as lessor, entered into a contract of lease over the subject property with one Ifzal Ali, declaring himself the absolute and registered owner thereof. Petitioner asserted that this declaration was erroneous because they were co-owners in equal shares. She formally demanded from Ifzal the payment of her share of the rentals, which Ifzal refused. On or about August 16, 2000, petitioner discovered that respondent had caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT, claiming full ownership by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 21, 2000, allegedly executed by petitioner in his favor. Petitioner claimed the deed was falsified, her signature forged, and that she never received the ₱21 Million or any consideration stated therein.

Respondent countered that he and his wife had taken care of petitioner and provided for her needs, spending substantial sums, and that because the rentals from the property went to petitioner, both parties agreed she would convey her share to him, leading to the March 21, 2000 deed of sale. Sometime between March and May 2000, the mother-son relationship deteriorated. Petitioner left respondent's house, alleging that he and his wife had ignored, disrespected, and insulted her; respondent claimed she left because she detested his firing of their driver. In October 2000, petitioner filed her complaint for collection and declaration of nullity of the deed of absolute sale with application for injunction before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, conducted trial, but ultimately dismissed the case on April 29, 2008, finding it to be a real action that should have been filed in the RTC of Makati City.

• Venue vs. Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the RTC erred in treating venue as jurisdiction, contending that improper venue is not a jurisdictional defect and that the RTC should have adjudicated the case on the merits.
• Nature of the Action: Petitioner claimed that the RTC erred in treating her complaint as a real action, implying that the action was personal in nature and properly laid in Muntinlupa City.
• Waiver by Respondent: Petitioner asserted that respondent had waived his objections to improper venue.
• Relief Sought: In her Reply, petitioner prayed that the Supreme Court decide the case on the merits.

• Improper Venue: Respondent argued that while the complaint was denominated as one for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction, it was in truth a real action affecting title to and interest over the subject property, and that all of petitioner's claims were anchored on her claim of ownership over one-half of the property. Since the property is in Makati City, the case should have been filed before the RTC of Makati City.
• No Waiver: Respondent maintained that he did not waive his objection to improper venue, having filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to dismiss and reiterated the objection in his Answer Ad Cautelam.

• Nature of the Action and Venue: Whether the complaint for collection and declaration of nullity of deed of absolute sale is a real action requiring venue where the property is situated.
• Waiver of Objection to Venue: Whether respondent waived his objection to improper venue.
• Propriety of Direct Resort to the Supreme Court: Whether the petition was properly filed directly with the Supreme Court under Rule 45 on pure questions of law.

• Nature of the Action and Venue: Yes, the complaint is a real action. Venue was improperly laid in the RTC of Muntinlupa City; the proper venue is the RTC of Makati City where the property is situated, pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Waiver of Objection to Venue: No. Respondent did not waive his objection to improper venue, having filed a motion for reconsideration and reiterated the objection in his Answer Ad Cautelam.
• Propriety of Direct Resort to the Supreme Court: No. The petition was improperly filed directly with the Supreme Court, as deciding the case on the merits would require examination of the probative value of evidence, making it a question of fact rather than pure law, and violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

• Nature of the Action and Venue: The nature of an action—whether real or personal—is determined by the allegations in the complaint, not by its title or heading. What determines venue is the primary objective for filing the case. Petitioner's complaint sought nullification of the deed of absolute sale on two grounds: that she did not execute the deed and that she therefore still owned one-half of the subject property. These allegations indubitably make the complaint a real action involving recovery of the subject property on the basis of co-ownership. Under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4, real actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein must be commenced and tried in the proper court having territorial jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated. The subject property is located in Makati City; hence, the RTC of Muntinlupa City was not the proper venue. The RTC committed a procedural blunder in denying respondent's motion to dismiss and conducting trial, only to eventually dismiss for want of jurisdiction—though it plainly meant improper venue.

• Waiver of Objection to Venue: After the RTC denied his motion to dismiss, respondent could have filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition, as the denial was made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Despite not availing of this remedy, respondent did not waive his objection to improper venue. He filed a motion for reconsideration contesting the denial and, in his Answer Ad Cautelam, stood his ground that the case should be dismissed on the basis of improper venue. His consistent reiteration of the objection preserved it.

• Propriety of Direct Resort to the Supreme Court: Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, on alleged pure questions of law. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; a question of fact arises when the doubt concerns the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. Petitioner prayed that the Supreme Court decide the case on the merits, but doing so would require examination of the probative value of the evidence—especially since the RTC never adjudicated the controversy on the merits. The issue thus posed is one of fact, not pure law. Filing directly with the Supreme Court therefore violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which direct resort from lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. The Court is a court of last resort and must so remain.

• Nature of Action Determined by Allegations — The nature of an action, whether real or personal, is determined by the allegations in the complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. Applied here, petitioner's allegations that she did not execute the deed of sale and still owned one-half of the property made the complaint a real action, notwithstanding its denomination as one for "Collection and Declaration of Nullity."

• Venue of Real Actions (Situs Rule) — Under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having territorial jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated. All other actions (personal actions) shall be commenced where the plaintiff or defendant resides. The Court applied this rule to hold that the complaint should have been filed in the RTC of Makati City, where the subject property is located.

• Primary Objective Test for Venue — What determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case. Since petitioner's primary objective was to nullify the deed and recover her share of the property, venue was governed by the situs rule for real actions.

• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts — Direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort. Applied here, petitioner should have gone to the Court of Appeals, as the issues required evaluation of evidence and were not pure questions of law.

• Distinction Between Questions of Law and Fact — A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; a question of fact arises when the doubt concerns the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. If evaluation of evidence is required, the question is one of fact, and Rule 45 (limited to questions of law) is unavailable.

• "In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading." — This passage states the controlling rule for classifying actions as real or personal, which in turn determines the proper venue under Rule 4.

• "What determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case." — This formulation of the primary objective test is frequently cited in venue jurisprudence and directly governed the Court's classification of the complaint as a real action.

• "This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition." — This articulates the doctrinal basis for the hierarchy of courts, explaining why direct resort to the Supreme Court was improper.

• "The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact." — This canonical formulation, quoted from Velayo-Fong vs. Velayo, defines the operative test for distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact and is central to determining the availability of a Rule 45 petition.

• Cabutihan vs. Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation, 432 Phil. 927 (2002) — Cited for the distinction between venue of real actions and personal actions under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Emergency Loan Pawnshop Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 524 (2001) — Cited for the rule that real actions must be filed where the property is situated, and for the proposition that a party may seek certiorari when a motion to dismiss is denied with grave abuse of discretion.
• Gochan vs. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491 (2001) — Cited for the principle that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the complaint, not by its title.
• Olympic Mines and Development Corp. vs. Platinum Group Metals Corporation, G.R. Nos. 178188, 180674, 181141, and 183527, May 8, 2009 — Cited for the rule that the primary objective for filing the case determines venue.
• Murillo vs. Consul, Resolution in UDK-9748, March 1, 1990 — Cited for the doctrine classifying the three modes of appeal from RTC decisions, later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Velayo-Fong vs. Velayo, G.R. No. 155488, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 320 — Cited for the canonical test distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact, determinative of whether Rule 45 is available.
• Ouano vs. PGTT International Investment Corporation, 434 Phil. 28 (2002) — Cited for the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, barring direct resort to the Supreme Court when relief can be obtained in lower tribunals.

• Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Section 1 provides that real actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having territorial jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated. Section 2 provides that personal actions shall be commenced where the plaintiff or defendant resides. Applied to hold that the complaint, being a real action, should have been filed in the RTC of Makati City.
• Rule 41, Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs ordinary appeals from RTC decisions rendered in the exercise of original jurisdiction, brought to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. Referenced to distinguish the proper mode of appeal.
• Rule 45, Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs petitions for review to the Supreme Court, limited to questions of law. Applied to hold that the petition was improper because the issues required evaluation of evidence and were therefore questions of fact.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Pertains to the certification by the Acting Chief Justice that conclusions were reached in consultation before assignment of the opinion.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Acting Chairperson), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Diosdado M. Peralta, and Jose Catral Mendoza. No separate concurring opinions were written.