Latasa vs. COMELEC

A municipal mayor who has served three consecutive terms is disqualified from running for mayor of the newly created city if the city comprises the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants, as the office of the city mayor is essentially the same local government post for purposes of the constitutional three-term limit.

Arsenio A. Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur, in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections. During his third term, Republic Act No. 8798 converted the municipality into a component city, a conversion ratified by plebiscite on September 8, 2000. Under Section 53 of the City Charter, Latasa continued to exercise his powers and functions in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the newly created City of Digos.

• Three Consecutive Terms: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms: 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001.
• Conversion to City: During Latasa's third term, Republic Act No. 8798 converted the Municipality of Digos into the City of Digos. A plebiscite ratified the charter on September 8, 2000. The territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants of the new city remained exactly the same as those of the municipality.
• Hold-over Capacity: Under Section 53 of the City Charter, Latasa continued to exercise the powers and functions of the mayor in a hold-over capacity for the new city. He took his oath as city mayor and never ceased acting as the chief executive of the jurisdiction.
• Certificate of Candidacy: On February 28, 2001, Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. He indicated he was eligible but inserted a footnote disclosing he had served three terms as municipal mayor and was running for the first time as city mayor.
• Disqualification Petition: On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo Sunga, also a mayoral candidate, filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify Latasa or cancel his certificate of candidacy, alleging a false representation of eligibility due to the three-term limit.
• Election and Proclamation: Despite the pending disqualification case and private respondent's motion for a temporary restraining order, Latasa won the election with 25,335 votes against Sunga's 13,650 votes. He was proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001, and assumed office on July 1, 2001.

• Juridical Personality: Petitioner argued that a city and a municipality possess separate and distinct juridical personalities. Therefore, the office of the city mayor is a different local government post from that of the municipal mayor, and the three-term limit for the latter does not bar him from running for the former.
• No False Representation: Petitioner maintained that he made no false representation in his certificate of candidacy because he fully disclosed his prior three terms as municipal mayor, demonstrating good faith regarding his eligibility to run for the new position of city mayor.

• Three-Term Limit Violation: Private respondent countered that petitioner falsely represented his eligibility, having already been elected to and served three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001, thereby violating the constitutional three-term limit.
• Succession by Second Placer: Private respondent argued that, applying the principle in Labo v. COMELEC, he should be deemed the winning candidate entitled to proclamation, having garnered the highest number of votes among the eligible candidates.

• Three-Term Limit Applicability: Whether a municipal mayor who has served three consecutive terms is disqualified from running for mayor of the newly converted city covering the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants.
• Effect of Disqualification on Runner-up: Whether the disqualification of the winning candidate entitles the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be proclaimed the winner.

• Three-Term Limit Applicability: Disqualification was affirmed. The constitutional three-term limit applies when the official has been elected and fully served three consecutive terms in the same local government post. Although the conversion of the municipality into a city created a new corporate existence, the territorial jurisdiction and the inhabitants remained identical. Petitioner never ceased acting as the chief executive over this constituency; the instant he vacated the office of municipal mayor, he assumed the office of city mayor. Allowing another three consecutive terms would permit petitioner to hold office as chief executive over the same territory for eighteen consecutive years, which is the exact scenario the constitutional framers sought to prevent: the monopolization of power and the development of a proprietary interest in the position.
• Effect of Disqualification on Runner-up: The second-placer is not entitled to proclamation. The disqualification of a winning candidate does not entitle the candidate with the second highest number of votes to be declared elected; it merely nullifies the winning candidate's election and creates a permanent vacancy to be filled by succession. The Labo doctrine requiring the electorate's notorious awareness of the disqualification to warrant a waiver of votes was inapplicable here.

• Three-Term Limit Rule — An elective local official is barred from running for the same local government post if two conditions concur: (1) the official has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and (2) the official has fully served three consecutive terms. The rule applies even if the local government unit is converted from a municipality to a city, provided the territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants remain the same and the official never ceased exercising chief executive powers over them.
• Doctrine on Second Placers — The fact that a plurality or majority of votes are cast for an ineligible candidate does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared elected. The votes cast for the disqualified candidate are nullified, and the resulting permanent vacancy is filled by succession.

• "An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms."
• "This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is later declared to be disqualified to hold office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidate’s election a nullity."

• Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC — Distinguished. Held that a vice-mayor who succeeded to the mayorship by operation of law was not considered to have served a full term for purposes of the limit. Distinguished because the vice-mayor held wholly different responsibilities, whereas Latasa continuously served as chief executive.
• Lonzanida v. COMELEC — Distinguished. Held that an official who involuntarily relinquished office due to an election protest did not fully serve the term. Distinguished because Latasa never stepped down or ceased acting as chief executive.
• Adormeo v. COMELEC — Distinguished. Held that an official who lost a regular election and won a subsequent recall election had an interruption in service. Distinguished because Latasa had no break in his tenure as chief executive.
• Socrates v. COMELEC — Distinguished. Held that a break in consecutiveness occurred when an official did not run in the immediately following regular elections. Distinguished because Latasa sought to run immediately for the same jurisdiction without a rest period.
• Labo v. COMELEC — Clarified. The obiter suggesting a second placer could be proclaimed if the electorate notoriously misapplied their franchise was not applicable to the present facts.

• Article X, Section 8, 1987 Constitution — Limits the term of office of elective local officials to three years, with a maximum of three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation does not interrupt the continuity of service. Applied to disqualify the petitioner from extending his consecutive tenure over the same jurisdiction.
• Section 450, Local Government Code of 1991 — Prescribes the requisites for converting a municipality into a component city (income, territory, population). Cited to explain the substantial differences between a municipality and a city, which were ultimately deemed insufficient to circumvent the term limit.
• Section 7, Local Government Code of 1991 — Provides that the creation or conversion of a local government unit is based on verifiable indicators of viability. Cited to contextualize the conversion of Digos.
• Sections 2 and 53, R.A. 8798 (Charter of the City of Digos) — Section 2 defines the territorial jurisdiction of the city as identical to the municipality. Section 53 mandates the hold-over of municipal officials. Applied to establish that the jurisdiction and the petitioner's exercise of executive power remained continuous and uninterrupted.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.