Lasam vs. Philippine National Bank

A petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with the twin reglementary periods under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court: (1) sixty days from the time the petitioner acquires knowledge of the judgment, final order, or proceeding sought to be set aside, and (2) six months from the entry of such judgment, order, or proceeding; these periods are jurisdictional, must concur, and are neither extendible nor subject to interruption.

Dr. Fe Lasam filed a Complaint for Annulment of Mortgage against Philippine National Bank (PNB) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union in 2003. During the initial reception of evidence on February 23, 2010, Lasam was present but her counsel failed to appear, prompting the RTC to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. Counsel subsequently filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion explaining the failure to attend, which the RTC denied on April 29, 2010 as not seasonably filed. A motion for reconsideration filed on May 24, 2010 was denied on July 7, 2010 for being in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. Counsel then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 116446), which was dismissed, followed by a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 199846), which was denied on February 22, 2012 and entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on May 3, 2012.

• The Underlying Action: On January 14, 2003, Lasam instituted a Complaint for Annulment of Mortgage against PNB, docketed as Civil Case No. 6778, before the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 66.
• The Dismissal: On February 23, 2010, the RTC conducted a hearing for the initial reception of evidence. Lasam was admittedly present, but her former counsel failed to appear. The RTC issued an Order on the same day dismissing the civil case for failure to prosecute and for failure of counsel to appear.
• Post-Dismissal Proceedings: On February 23, 2010, counsel filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion explaining the failure to attend the hearing. The RTC denied this motion on April 29, 2010 for not being seasonably filed. On May 24, 2010, counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 23, 2010 Order, which the RTC denied on July 7, 2010 on the ground that it was in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration.
• Appellate Remedies: Counsel filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 116446), which was dismissed. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. This prompted the filing of a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 199846), which was denied in a Resolution dated February 22, 2012. An Entry of Judgment was issued on May 3, 2012, recording the finality of the Resolution.
• The Petition for Relief: Lasam claimed she only learned of the finality of the February 23, 2010 Order after consulting a different lawyer. On January 22, 2013, she filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Order, or Other Proceedings before the RTC, alleging that the gross negligence and ignorance of her former counsel deprived her of the right to present her case.
• RTC Orders Assailed: In its March 18, 2013 Order, the RTC dismissed the petition for relief outright, ruling that the 60-day period commenced when Lasam, through her former counsel, received a copy of the April 29, 2010 Order (or alternatively from February 23, 2010), and that the petition was also filed beyond the six-month period from the entry of judgment on May 3, 2012. The RTC denied Lasam's motion for reconsideration in its May 28, 2013 Order.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Lasam impliedly justified direct recourse to the Supreme Court by alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, though she failed to specify special and important reasons to bypass the Court of Appeals.
• Gross Negligence of Counsel: Lasam maintained that the general rule binding clients to the negligence of their counsel should not apply where, as alleged, former counsel was guilty of gross negligence and ignorance causing the dismissal of her complaint; counsel failed to appear at the hearing, failed to file the motion for reconsideration on time, and availed of the wrong remedy by filing a second motion for reconsideration.
• Timeliness of Petition for Relief: Lasam argued that the petition for relief was filed within 60 days from the time she learned of the finality of the February 23, 2010 Order after consulting a different lawyer, not from the time of the dismissal itself.

• Hierarchy of Courts: PNB countered that direct recourse to the Supreme Court is improper as the petitioner failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts; no special and important reasons were alleged to justify bypassing the Court of Appeals.
• Absence of Gross Negligence: PNB argued that Lasam was not unduly deprived of her right to present her case as her former counsel actively participated by filing motions for reconsideration and petitions for certiorari before the RTC, CA, and Supreme Court; no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence existed to justify relief.
• Prescription: PNB maintained that the petition for relief was filed out of time. The 60-day period should be reckoned from knowledge of the February 23, 2010 Order (which Lasam had on February 23, 2010 or at the latest on July 23, 2010 when she signed the verification for the CA petition), not from knowledge of finality. Furthermore, the six-month period expired on May 3, 2012 (date of Entry of Judgment), but the petition was filed only on January 22, 2013, or more than eight months later.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether direct recourse to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari is proper despite the absence of special and important reasons.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing outright the petition for relief from judgment and denying the motion for reconsideration.
• Reglementary Periods: Whether the petition for relief from judgment was filed within the 60-day period from knowledge of the order and the 6-month period from entry of judgment under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Direct recourse to the Supreme Court was improperly resorted to and the petition must be dismissed. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition; the rationale being to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and to prevent overcrowding of the docket.
• Reglementary Periods (60-Day Period): The petition for relief was filed out of time. The 60-day period under Section 3, Rule 38 is reckoned from the time the aggrieved party has knowledge of the judgment or order sought to be set aside, not knowledge of its finality. Lasam had knowledge of the February 23, 2010 Order on February 23, 2010 itself (when she was admittedly in attendance at the hearing) or at the latest on July 23, 2010 (when she signed the Verification and Certification for the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA). Filing on January 22, 2013 was almost three years from the time she acquired knowledge of the order.
• Reglementary Periods (6-Month Period): The petition was also filed beyond the six-month period from entry of judgment. The February 23, 2010 Order was entered on May 3, 2012 (when the Entry of Judgment in G.R. No. 199846 was recorded). The January 22, 2013 filing was more than eight months from the date of entry.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Strict compliance with the reglementary periods is jurisdictional; the periods must concur and cannot be extended or interrupted. At the time the petition was filed, the reglementary periods had already expired, and the RTC correctly lost jurisdiction to entertain the same.

• Hierarchy of Courts — While the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. Direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This policy prevents inordinate demands upon the Court's time and prevents overcrowding of the docket.
• Petition for Relief from Judgment — A petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings is an equitable remedy allowed only in exceptional circumstances where a party was unjustly deprived of a hearing, prevented from taking an appeal, or a judgment was entered because of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. As a final act of liberality on the part of the State, strict compliance with the applicable reglementary periods must be satisfactorily shown because the remedy cannot be allowed to erode the fundamental principle that a judgment must attain finality to put an end to litigation.
• Reckoning of the 60-Day Period — For purposes of Section 3, Rule 38, the 60-day period is reckoned from the time the aggrieved party has knowledge of the judgment or order sought to be set aside, not from knowledge of its finality.
• Jurisdictional Nature of Periods — The 60-day and 6-month periods under Section 3, Rule 38 must concur, are jurisdictional, and could not be extended and could never be interrupted. Failure to comply with these periods results in the loss of jurisdiction by the court to entertain the petition.

• "A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition." — Articulates the strict requirement for bypassing the hierarchy of courts in petitions for certiorari.
• "A petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings is an equitable remedy which is allowed only in exceptional circumstances." — Establishes the exceptional nature of the remedy.
• "As an equitable remedy, strict compliance with the applicable reglementary periods for its filing must be satisfactorily shown because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order, or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to litigation." — Explains the rationale for strict compliance with reglementary periods.
• "For purposes of the 60-day period under Rule 38, knowledge of the finality of the judgment or order is irrelevant." — Clarifies the reckoning point for the 60-day period.
• "These two periods must concur. Further, these periods could not be extended and could never be interrupted." — Emphasizes the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the twin periods.

• Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 635 Phil. 283 (2010) — Cited for the rationale of the hierarchy of courts and the policy against direct recourse to the Supreme Court.
• Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor, 495 Phil. 422 (2005) — Cited for the principle that concurrence of jurisdiction does not give unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
• Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, 507 Phil. 75 (2005) — Cited for the rule that the 60-day period is reckoned from knowledge of the judgment or order, not its finality, and that the periods cannot be extended or interrupted.
• Thomasites Center for International Studies v. Rodriguez, 779 Phil. 536 (2016) — Cited for the principle that strict compliance with reglementary periods is required because petition for relief is a final act of liberality.
• Pacific Importing and Exporting Co. v. Tinio, 85 Phil. 239 (1949) — Cited for the rule that courts lose jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief when reglementary periods expire.

• Section 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court — Prescribes the twin reglementary periods for filing a petition for relief from judgment (60 days from knowledge and 6 months from entry) and mandates that these periods concur and are not extendible.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for certiorari, which the petitioner invoked directly with the Supreme Court.
• Sections 1 and 2, Rule 38, Rules of Court — Define the grounds for petition for relief (fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence).

Peralta (Chairperson), Leonen, Gesmundo, and Hernando, JJ.