Lasam vs. Director of Lands

An applicant for registration of land who relies on a document evidencing title must prove not only the genuineness of the title but also the identity of the land referred to therein. If the applicant claims only a portion of what is included in the title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title. Furthermore, possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction, and mere nominal claim or the planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory.

Gabriel Lasam filed an application for registration of 152 parcels of land in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. The land was situated in the municipality of Solana, Province of Cagayan. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands, who claimed the land was public land, and by numerous private oppositors, including the Narag brothers (first cousins of the applicant), homesteaders, the Director of Forestry, and other individuals claiming exclusive ownership of portions of the land. The applicant's claim was based on an alleged document (Exhibit L) purporting to be an application dated June 27, 1873, addressed by Domingo Narag 1.º to the Alcalde Mayor, seeking admission of an informacion testifical.

Gabriel Lasam filed an application for registration of 152 parcels of land containing a total area of 24,723,436 square meters, situated in the municipality of Solana, Province of Cagayan. These parcels included parcel No. 9, which was the subject of the controversy. The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that it was not supported by any title fit for registration and that the land was public land. The Narag brothers, first cousins of the applicant, also filed opposition claiming ownership of parcel No. 9. Various other oppositions were filed by homesteaders, the Director of Forestry, and numerous individuals claiming portions of the land as their exclusive properties.

The applicant's claim was based on Exhibit L, an application dated June 27, 1873, addressed by Domingo Narag 1.º to the Alcalde Mayor, in which Narag stated he had been in possession of the land and asked that informacion testifical be admitted. The applicant theorized that Domingo Narag 1.º, the original owner of parcel No. 5 described in Exhibit L, owed him P1,000, which Narag needed for his candidacy as gobernadorcillo of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in 1880. The original of Exhibit L was allegedly turned over to the applicant's lawyer, Vicente Marasigan, who lost it, so only a certified copy was presented. The applicant claimed that the fifth parcel mentioned in Exhibit L is the parcel No. 9 described in the plan Exhibit K.

The land designated as the fifth parcel in Exhibit L was described with boundaries on the north as the sitios of Maasin and Calabbacao, on the east as the pueblo of Solana, on the west as estero Pangul, and on the south as the sitio of Atayao, with an area of seven thousand brazas. Parcel No. 9, as described in the plan Exhibit K, had different boundaries: on the north, the barrios of Iraga, Bauan, and Bangag; on the east, the Centro and the barrios of Basi, Natapian, and Lanna; on the south, the carretera provincial; and on the west, the barrios of Maguirig, Cagguban, and estero Pangul. The surveyor Jose Mallanao testified that he did not actually check the boundaries of parcel No. 5 as described in Exhibit L, and relied on hearsay in testifying that parcel No. 9 was smaller than parcel No. 5.

The applicant admitted that the parcel sought to be registered was much smaller than that described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit L. The surveyor calculated the area of the property described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit L on the basis of 7,000 square brazas as 15,695,500 hectares more or less, while the area claimed in the amended application was 24,723,437 square meters. According to the applicant, only about 2 hectares were cultivated at the time of his occupation of the land ceded by Domingo Narag 1.º. The property appeared to have been declared for taxation purposes with previous declarations of about 294 hectares, but the area not previously declared contained 1,685 hectares, and there were no tax receipts evidencing continuous payment of taxes from 1902.

The various oppositors based their claims on possession from time immemorial, acquisition by inheritance, purchase and donations propter nuptias and inter vivos, payment of land taxes, and acquisition "a titulo de composicion" with the State. They denied being tenants of the applicant. The lower court, however, found that none of the portions or lots claimed by the oppositors had been sufficiently identified by their evidence.

• Validity and Coverage of Exhibit L: The applicant argued that Exhibit L, the informacion testifical approved by the Judge of the Court of First Instance, was a valid title that conferred ownership, and that the fifth parcel mentioned therein corresponded to parcel No. 9 sought to be registered.
• Constructive Possession: The applicant invoked the doctrine of constructive possession, citing Ramos vs. Director of Lands, arguing that possession in the eyes of the law does not require a man to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
• Prior Adjudication: The applicant argued that the decision in Pamittan vs. Lasam and Mallonga was determinative of the ownership of the property, as the trial court in that case found that parcel No. 7, which was said to correspond to parcel No. 9, was the exclusive property of the husband Gabriel Lasam.

• Invalidity of Exhibit L: The Government contended that Exhibit L is not a valid title and does not confer ownership, and that even if it were valid, it does not cover so extensive an area as that appearing on the plan Exhibit K.
• Lack of Identity of Land: The Government argued that the applicant failed to prove the identity of the land referred to in Exhibit L with the land sought to be registered, given the discrepancies in boundaries and area.
• Insufficient Possession: The Government maintained that the applicant's possession was not sufficient to justify registration of the entire area, noting that only about 2 hectares were cultivated and that tax declarations and payments were inconsistent and incomplete.

• Identity of Land: Whether the applicant is entitled to registration of parcel No. 9 on the basis of the document presented as Exhibit L, considering the discrepancies in boundaries and area between the land described in the document and the land sought to be registered.
• Possession as Basis for Registration: Whether the applicant is entitled to registration on the basis of public, continuous, and adverse possession under a claim of ownership during the time prescribed by law.
• Rights of Oppositors: Whether the numerous oppositors, excluding the homesteaders, are entitled to the parcels which they allege are included in the controverted parcel No. 9.

• Identity of Land: No. The applicant failed to prove the identity of the land referred to in Exhibit L with the land sought to be registered. The discrepancies in boundaries and area between the two are material, and the applicant's own surveyor relied on hearsay in testifying that the parcels were the same.
• Possession as Basis for Registration: No. The applicant's possession was not sufficient to justify registration of the entire area sought. While there was evidence that the claimant might have possessed a portion of the parcel, the evidence lacked certainty as to the particular portion occupied and the extent thereof.
• Rights of Oppositors: No. The oppositors failed to sufficiently identify the portions or lots they claimed, either by oral or documentary evidence, and the lower court committed no error in dismissing their oppositions.

• Identity of Land: The Court held that an applicant for registration of land who relies on a document evidencing title must prove not only the genuineness of the title but also the identity of the land referred to therein. The document is either a basis of the claim for registration or not at all. If the applicant claims only a portion of what is included in the title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title. In this case, the boundaries of parcel No. 9 in Exhibit K did not match those of parcel No. 5 in Exhibit L. While there was partial identity as to boundaries on the east and west, such identity was lacking as to the boundaries on the north and south. The surveyor did not actually check the boundaries of parcel No. 5 and relied on hearsay. The area in Exhibit L was vaguely given as 7,000 brazas, and the applicant admitted that the parcel sought to be registered was much smaller than that described in Exhibit L. Even if full legal force were accorded to Exhibit L, it would not serve as a basis for the registration of 24,723,437 square meters.
• Possession as Basis for Registration: The Court examined the evidence on possession and found that while there was evidence showing that the claimant might have possessed a portion of the parcel, the evidence lacked certainty as to the particular portion occupied and the extent thereof. The Court invoked the doctrine in Ramos vs. Director of Lands but noted that the application of the doctrine of constructive possession is subject to certain qualifications, particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. The Court stated that possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. The Court noted that the applicant would be entitled under Exhibit L to more than 13,000 hectares based on the computation given at trial, although only 2,432 odd hectares were being sought for registration. The fact that the applicant was claiming only a portion of the land, that he had given up more than 1,000 hectares to the Bureau of Forestry, the discrepancies in boundaries, his tax declarations, and the existence of numerous homesteaders and claimants tended to show that his possession over the entire portion of the land sought to be registered was not such as to apprise the community and the world that the entire land was for his enjoyment.
• Rights of Oppositors: The Court noted that the grounds for opposition of the various oppositors were divergent and based on possession from time immemorial, acquisition by inheritance, purchase and donations propter nuptias and inter vivos, payment of land taxes, and acquisition "a titulo de composicion" with the State. After perusal of the evidence presented by them, the Court accepted the conclusion of the lower court that none of the portions or lots claimed by them had been sufficiently identified, either by oral or documentary evidence. In view of the insufficiency of the evidence presented, the lower court committed no error in dismissing their oppositions.

• Identity of Land in Registration Proceedings — An applicant for registration of land who relies on a document evidencing title must prove not only the genuineness of the title but also the identity of the land referred to therein. If the applicant claims only a portion of what is included in the title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title. In this case, the applicant failed to establish such identity due to material discrepancies in boundaries and area between the land described in Exhibit L and the land sought to be registered in Exhibit K.
• Constructive Possession and Its Qualifications — Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. The application of the doctrine of constructive possession is subject to qualifications, particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession must be such as to apprise the community and the world that the entire land was for the claimant's enjoyment.

• "An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title thereto, must prove not only the genuiness of his title but the indentity of the land therein referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for registration or not at all. If as in this case, he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title." — This passage articulates the core requirement of proving identity of land in registration proceedings, which was the central basis for reversing the lower court's decision.
• "The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction." — This passage defines the limits of constructive possession as a basis for acquiring ownership through registration, emphasizing that possession must be more than nominal.
• "Possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim." — This passage identifies the statutory basis for the possession requirement and clarifies that mere nominal claim is insufficient to establish the possession required for registration.

• Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175, 180 — Cited as the source of the doctrine of constructive possession, but the Court noted that its application is subject to qualifications, particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant.
• Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil., 302, 304 — Cited in support of the doctrine of constructive possession, subject to the same qualifications.
• Pamittan vs. Lasam and Mallonga, 60 Phil., 908 — Distinguished by the Court, which noted that the case did not pass upon the question of whether parcel No. 7 was the same as parcel No. 9 in the present proceedings, and that whatever was said in that case could not bind the oppositors who were not parties thereto.
• Fuster vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 40129, Dec. 29, 1934 — Cited by the Solicitor-General regarding the legal effect of the informacion testifical, but the Court found it unnecessary to pass upon this contention.
• Fernandez Hermanos vs. Director of Lands, 57 Phil., 929 — Cited by the Solicitor-General regarding the need to convert possession into registration of ownership in accordance with article 393 of the Mortgage Law, but the Court found it unnecessary to pass upon this contention.

• Paragraph 6, Section 54, Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of Section 45, Act No. 2874 — This provision concerns the possession required as a basis for registration of land. The Court applied this provision in holding that possession is not gained by mere nominal claim and that the applicant's possession over the entire portion of the land sought to be registered was not sufficient.
• Article 393, Mortgage Law — Cited by the Solicitor-General regarding the need to convert possession into registration of ownership, but the Court found it unnecessary to pass upon this contention.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concurred.