Largado vs. Masaganda

A justice of the peace court has no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian where Republic Act No. 2613, in amending Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, expressly excludes such appointments from the court's jurisdiction, and any alleged legislative oversight cannot be remedied by executive opinion but only by subsequent legislation, which cannot apply retroactively absent a saving clause.

Aquilina Largado is the mother of certain minors over whose persons and properties Angelo de los Reyes sought guardianship. The jurisdictional question arose from Republic Act No. 2613, enacted on August 1, 1959, which amended Section 88 of Republic Act No. 296 (the Judiciary Act of 1948) and, among other things, provided that the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts shall not extend to the appointment of guardians. The Secretary of Justice had issued an opinion in 1959 opining that the insertion of the term "guardian" was an oversight, but no curative legislation was enacted until Republic Act No. 3090 was approved on June 17, 1961, after the petition for guardianship had already been filed and acted upon.

On January 7, 1960, Angelo de los Reyes filed a petition before the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan, Quezon, praying that he be appointed guardian of the persons and properties of certain minors. The minors' mother, Aquilina Largado, opposed the petition. The petition was given due course and set for hearing on January 27, 1960. On that date, Largado's counsel failed to appear, and she was declared in default. Two hours later, counsel appeared and moved for reconsideration of the order of default, but the motion was denied. Thereupon, the justice of the peace court issued an order appointing de los Reyes as guardian as prayed for.

On February 17, 1960, Largado filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the justice of the peace court had no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian under Republic Act No. 2613, which had been enacted on August 1, 1959. This motion was denied. On the same date, Largado filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, praying for the nullification of the orders entered by the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, reiterating the same reasons advanced in her motion to dismiss. Acting on the petition, the CFI granted ex parte the writ prayed for. The respondents filed their answer justifying the appointment made by the Justice of the Peace Court, and after issues were joined, the CFI rendered a decision holding that the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan had no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian because the same was prohibited by Republic Act No. 2613. In due time, de los Reyes appealed to the Supreme Court.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Largado maintained that the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan had no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian because Republic Act No. 2613, enacted on August 1, 1959, expressly excluded such appointments from the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts by amending Section 88 of Republic Act No. 296 (the Judiciary Act of 1948).

• Legislative Oversight: De los Reyes argued, relying on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice in 1959, that the insertion of the term "guardian" in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 2613 was merely an oversight and did not reflect the intent of Congress, such that the justice of the peace court retained jurisdiction over guardian appointments.

• Jurisdiction of Justice of the Peace Court: Whether the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan had jurisdiction to appoint a guardian at the time the petition for guardianship was filed on January 7, 1960.

• Jurisdiction of Justice of the Peace Court: No. The Justice of the Peace Court had no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian because Republic Act No. 2613, enacted on August 1, 1959, expressly provided that the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts shall not extend to the appointment of guardians, and the statute's provisions were clear.

• Jurisdiction of Justice of the Peace Court: The jurisdictional question turned on the plain language of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 2613, which amended Section 88 of Republic Act No. 296 (the Judiciary Act of 1948) and expressly excluded the appointment of guardians from the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts. The statute was enacted on August 1, 1959, well before the petition for guardianship was filed on January 7, 1960, so its provisions were operative at the relevant time. The Secretary of Justice had opined in 1959 that the insertion of the term "guardian" was an oversight, and while the Court acknowledged that this contention "may have some basis, considering the intent of Congress in approving Republic Act 2613," it held that a legislative mistake cannot be corrected by executive fiat but only by legislation. Congress did in fact rectify the error when it approved Republic Act No. 3090 on June 17, 1961 (Section 5), restoring jurisdiction to justice of the peace courts over guardian appointments. However, because Republic Act No. 3090 contained no saving clause, its provisions could not be given retroactive effect. Accordingly, at the time the petition was filed and acted upon, the justice of the peace court was without jurisdiction, and all orders issued by it in connection with the guardianship appointment were void.

• Executive Fiat Cannot Cure Legislative Oversight — When a statute contains a provision that appears to have been inserted by mistake, the error cannot be corrected by an executive opinion or ruling, however well-founded the opinion may be as to legislative intent; the correction must come from the legislature itself through amendment. The Court applied this principle by refusing to give effect to the Secretary of Justice's 1959 opinion that the inclusion of "guardian" in Republic Act No. 2613 was an oversight, holding instead that only Congress could rectify the mistake, which it eventually did through Republic Act No. 3090.

• Curative Statutes Without Saving Clauses Are Not Retroactive — A curative or remedial statute enacted to correct a prior legislative error cannot operate retroactively absent an express saving clause providing for retroactive application. The Court applied this principle to Republic Act No. 3090, which restored jurisdiction over guardian appointments to justice of the peace courts but contained no saving clause, meaning the prior appointments made during the period when jurisdiction was absent could not be validated retroactively.

• "The contention that the insertion of the term 'guardian' in said Section 10 was only due to an oversight as opined by the Secretary of Justice may have some basis, considering the intent of Congress in approving Republic Act 2613; nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the mistake cannot be corrected by executive fiat, but by legislation." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi that legislative errors, even if demonstrably unintended, cannot be remedied by executive interpretation but only through corrective legislation.

• "However, since said Act does not contain any saving clause, its provisions cannot be given retroactive effect." — This sentence establishes the rule that curative statutes require an express saving clause to operate retroactively, a principle that barred validation of the guardianship appointment made during the jurisdictional gap.

• Section 10, Republic Act No. 2613 (amending Section 88, Republic Act No. 296, the Judiciary Act of 1948) — This provision expressly excluded the appointment of guardians from the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts. The Court applied it as the controlling statutory basis for holding that the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan lacked jurisdiction over the guardianship petition filed on January 7, 1960, since the law had been enacted on August 1, 1959.

• Section 5, Republic Act No. 3090 — This provision rectified the error in Republic Act No. 2613 by restoring jurisdiction over guardian appointments to justice of the peace courts. The Court noted that it was approved on June 17, 1961, but held that because the statute contained no saving clause, it could not be applied retroactively to validate appointments made during the intervening period.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concurred.