Lapid vs. Court of Appeals

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of suspension for one year is not immediately executory pending appeal, because Section 27 of R.A. 6770 expressly classifies only decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary as final and unappealable; by operation of the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, all other penalties remain appealable and a timely appeal stays their execution.

Petitioner Manuel M. Lapid was the Governor of Pampanga, charged administratively before the Office of the Ombudsman for misconduct arising from alleged illegal quarrying fee collections. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. 6770) governs administrative disciplinary proceedings before that office, while the Local Government Code and the Administrative Code of 1987 contain separate provisions on execution pending appeal applicable to decisions of the Office of the President/Sanggunian and the Civil Service Commission, respectively. The interplay among these statutes—and the effect of Fabian vs. Desierto, which redirected appeals from the Ombudsman to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43—frames the dispute over whether the Ombudsman's decision against Lapid could be enforced before his appeal was resolved.

On July 20, 1998, an unsigned letter allegedly from the "Mga Mamamayan ng Lalawigan ng Pampanga" was sent to the National Bureau of Investigation, prompting an open probe into alleged illegal quarrying and exaction of exorbitant fees in Pampanga, purportedly perpetrated with the connivance of high-ranking government officials. The NBI Report was endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and docketed as OMB-1-98-2067.

On October 26, 1998, a complaint was filed charging petitioner Governor Manuel M. Lapid, Vice-Governor Clayton Olalia, Provincial Administrator Enrico Quiambao, Provincial Treasurer Jovito Sabado, Mabalacat Municipal Mayor Marino Morales, and Senior Police Officer 4 Nestor Tadeo with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The charge arose from their alleged conspiracy in demanding and collecting from quarrying operators a control fee of ₱120.00 per truckload of sand or other quarry material without a duly enacted provincial ordinance and without issuing receipts, as well as giving unwarranted benefits to Tadeo, Rodrigo "Rudy" Fernandez, and Conrado Pangilinan—neither government officials nor quarry operators—by allowing them to collect amounts above the ₱40.00 prescribed under the existing provincial ordinance and to sell pre-stamped official receipt booklets.

On January 13, 1999, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order against Lapid and the other respondents for six months without pay pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. 6770. The DILG implemented the suspension on January 19, 1999. On November 22, 1999, the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding Lapid, Olalia, Sabado, and Tadeo guilty of misconduct and imposing one-year suspension without pay under Section 25(2) of R.A. 6770; Morales was exonerated, and the complaint against Quiambao was dismissed due to his resignation.

Counsel for petitioner received the decision on November 25, 1999 and filed a motion for reconsideration on November 29, 1999, which the Ombudsman denied on January 12, 2000. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on January 18, 2000, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, which was issued on January 19, 2000. When the TRO lapsed on March 19, 2000 without the Court of Appeals resolving the injunction prayer, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Supreme Court on March 20, 2000. The Court of Appeals denied the injunction prayer on March 22, 2000, and the DILG implemented the Ombudsman's decision the following day, with Provincial Board Member Edna David taking her oath as OIC-Governor. After oral arguments on April 5, 2000, the Supreme Court's Third Division issued a Resolution ordering petitioner's immediate reinstatement and remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for resolution on the merits. The OSG and the Office of the Ombudsman filed motions for reconsideration, giving rise to the present Resolution.

• Premature Implementation: Petitioner argued that the Ombudsman's decision had not yet become final and that the writs of prohibition and mandamus could be issued against the DILG for prematurely implementing the assailed decision.
• Court of Appeals Pre-judgment: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction by apparently pre-judging the case on the merits in its resolution denying the prayer for preliminary injunction.
• Non-executory Character: Petitioner maintained that the Ombudsman's decision imposing one-year suspension was not immediately executory pending appeal, as Section 27 of R.A. 6770 did not categorize such penalty as final and unappealable.

• Section 12, Rule 43 Applicability: The Solicitor-General argued that the Ombudsman's decision is governed by Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which mandates the immediately executory character of the decision or order appealed from.
• Suppletory Application of Other Laws: The Office of the Ombudsman maintained that the Ombudsman Law and its implementing rules are silent on execution pending appeal, and that it had uniformly adopted provisions in the Local Government Code and the Administrative Code making decisions in administrative disciplinary cases immediately executory.
• Fabian vs. Desierto Effect: The Solicitor-General insisted that Fabian vs. Desierto voided Section 27 of R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, so that review of Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases is now governed by Rule 43, whose Section 12 mandates immediate execution.
• One-sided Protection: Respondents argued that the ruling against execution pending appeal grants one-sided protection to the offender, who could let the case drag on until the expiration of his office or reelection, rendering the case academic and leaving the government helpless against graft and corruption.
• Waiver of Issue: The Solicitor-General alleged that petitioner did not question the executory character of the Ombudsman's decision below and was raising this argument for the first time before the Supreme Court.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Ombudsman Decision: Whether the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing a penalty of one-year suspension without pay is immediately executory pending appeal.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Ombudsman Decision: No. The decision of the Ombudsman imposing one-year suspension is not immediately executory pending appeal, because Section 27 of R.A. 6770 expressly designates only decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary as final and unappealable; all other decisions are appealable and a timely appeal stays execution.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Ombudsman Decision: Section 27 of R.A. 6770 provides that all provisionary orders of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory, but expressly enumerates as final and unappealable only decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary. By the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of these penalties excludes all others; a penalty of one-year suspension is not among those enumerated and is therefore appealable. Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (the Ombudsman's own Rules of Procedure) confirms this, providing that in all cases other than those involving the enumerated light penalties, the decision becomes final only after ten days from receipt unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari (now petition for review under Rule 43) is filed. An appeal timely filed thus stays immediate implementation. The Solicitor-General's reliance on Fabian vs. Desierto was rejected because that ruling invalidated Section 27 only insofar as it provided for appeals to the Supreme Court; the only provision affected was the designation of the proper forum and mode of appeal, now the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. All other matters in Section 27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, remained unaffected. Section 12, Rule 43, which states that appeal shall not stay the award unless the Court of Appeals directs otherwise, was held not to mandate immediate execution of all quasi-judicial decisions; rather, it yields to contrary legislative direction. The Local Government Code (Section 68) and the Administrative Code of 1987 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Section 47(4)) expressly provide for execution pending appeal, but these provisions apply specifically to decisions of the Office of the President/Sanggunian and the Civil Service Commission, respectively, and cannot be applied suppletorily to the Ombudsman Act, which contains no such suppletory clause. The Court applied the principle that where two statutes apply to a particular case, the one specially designed for that case prevails. The argument that the ruling grants one-sided protection to offenders was dismissed as speculative, the Court noting that any remedy for inadequacy in the Ombudsman Act lies with legislative amendment.

• Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius — The express mention of one thing excludes others not mentioned. Applied in this case to Section 27 of R.A. 6770: because the statute expressly listed only decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary as final and unappealable, all other decisions—including those imposing one-year suspension—were excluded from the category of immediately executory decisions.
• Statute specially designed for a case prevails — Where two statutes apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other. The Ombudsman Act, not the Local Government Code or the Administrative Code, governed the administrative case against petitioner because he was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman.
• Courts may not enlarge the scope of a statute — Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers; an omission at the time of enactment cannot be judicially supplied. Applied to reject the suppletory application of the execution-pending-appeal provisions of the Local Government Code and Administrative Code to the Ombudsman Act.
• Finality of judgments and execution as a matter of right — A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law after the lapse of the reglementary period for appeal or after the appellate tribunal's judgment becomes final. Execution issues as a matter of right only upon a final and executory judgment; the right to appeal generally carries with it the stay of the decision pending appeal, otherwise the essential nature of appealable judgments would be rendered nugatory.

• "The express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi applying the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius to Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, establishing that penalties not expressly listed as final and unappealable remain appealable and stay execution.
• "Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise." — This passage clarifies the proper interpretation of Section 12, Rule 43: it does not impose a blanket rule of immediate executory status on all quasi-judicial decisions but defers to contrary legislative direction.
• "There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory application." — This passage establishes that execution-pending-appeal provisions from other statutes cannot be imported into the Ombudsman Act absent an express suppletory clause, reinforcing the principle against judicial enlargement of statutory scope.

• Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470 — The Court clarified that this ruling invalidated Section 27 of R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 only insofar as they provided for appeals to the Supreme Court; the ruling redirected appeals to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. All other matters in Section 27, including finality provisions, remained unaffected. This case was distinguished, not overturned.
• City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 362 — Cited for the proposition that a judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law.
• Morales vs. Subido, 26 SCRA 150 — Cited for the principle that courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers.
• Wil Wilhemsen, Inc. et al. vs. Baluyut, 83 SCRA 38 — Cited for the principle of statutory construction that where two statutes apply to a particular case, the one specially designed for that case must prevail.

• Section 27, R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Governs the effectivity and finality of Ombudsman decisions. Provides that all provisionary orders are immediately effective and executory; that decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary are final and unappealable; and that in all other administrative disciplinary cases, decisions may be appealed. Applied to determine that a one-year suspension penalty is not among those listed as final and unappealable, and thus a timely appeal stays execution.
• Section 7, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) — Mirrors Section 27 of R.A. 6770 in providing that decisions imposing penalties other than public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary become final only after ten days from receipt unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari is filed. Applied to confirm that the one-year suspension imposed on petitioner was not immediately executory.
• Section 12, Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals directs otherwise. Interpreted as yielding to contrary legislative direction, not as mandating immediate execution of all quasi-judicial decisions.
• Section 68, Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) — Expressly provides for execution pending appeal of decisions by the Office of the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government officials. Held inapplicable to Ombudsman decisions because it applies only to administrative cases before the Office of the President or Sanggunian.
• Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Section 47(4), Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292) — Provides that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory in administrative decisions of the Civil Service Commission. Held inapplicable to Ombudsman decisions because it applies specifically to Civil Service Commission cases.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concurred.