Lantaco vs. Llamas

A judge who acquits an accused on grounds that contradict clear statutory mandates and long-settled jurisprudence exhibits gross ignorance of the law warranting dismissal from the service, and the arbitrary refusal to furnish parties copies of a promulgated decision constitutes grave abuse of authority, especially where the decision is already part of the public record to which citizens have a constitutional right of access.

Four jeepney drivers — Martin Lantaco, Sr., Esteban del Barrio, Rosalito Alamag, and Borromeo Vitaliano — all residents of Pasay City, filed a verified letter-complaint dated August 7, 1975 against City Judge Francisco R. Llamas of the Pasay City Court, charging him with "Backsliding and Grave Abuse of Discretion." The complaint was originally addressed to the President of the Philippines and referred to the Supreme Court by the Office of the President pursuant to Section 7, Article X of the Constitution. The underlying criminal cases involved estafa charges against Ricardo Paredes, an officer of PASCAMASCON, an association of jeepney operators, for non-remittance of SSS contribution premiums deducted from jeepney drivers.

On January 8, 1975, an investigating special counsel of the Pasay City Fiscal's Office filed Criminal Cases Nos. 95647, 95648, 95649, and 95650, all for estafa, against Ricardo Paredes, an officer of PASCAMASCON, an association of jeepney operators, for non-remittance of SSS contribution premiums. These cases were assigned to respondent City Judge Francisco R. Llamas of the Pasay City Court. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense moved to dismiss all four criminal cases on the ground that the evidence presented was insufficient to convict the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution opposed the motion.

Respondent set the promulgation of his decision on July 22, 1975, postponed it to July 30, and again to July 31, 1975. On that morning, at about 9:45, respondent's clerk of court read the dispositive portion acquitting the accused in all four estafa cases on the ground of reasonable doubt. After the reading, a recess was declared, and the complainants requested a copy of the decision. Respondent told them there were no more copies available. When the complainants offered to have the original xeroxed, respondent replied that xerox copies were not permitted and instructed a steno-typist to type another copy, telling the complainants to return on Monday, August 4. They did, but the steno-typist failed to furnish the copy and asked them to return the next day, August 5. They returned, but again failed to obtain a copy.

On August 6, 1975, complainant Esteban del Barrio and Ceferino F. Ginete, president of the complainants' labor union, went to respondent's office to secure a copy. The steno-typist went inside respondent's room and returned to inform them that the folder was at respondent's house because the judge was making "corrections." This sequence of events was narrated by the complainants and was never denied or rebutted by respondent.

The Supreme Court required respondent to comment on the complaint. When respondent failed to comply, the Court sent follow-up and tracer letters, which the Bureau of Posts certified as delivered and received by respondent's office. Respondent's comment was finally received on March 8, 1976, dated December 3, 1975. In it, he maintained that the four criminal cases were validly and properly decided, that the resolution of acquittal was the decision itself validly promulgated in the presence of all parties, and that no better answer could be made except by submitting a copy of the decision for thorough reading. Upon examination of the decision, the Court found that respondent committed several errors bordering on gross ignorance of the law: he erroneously required proof of demand as a condition precedent for the employer's statutory duty to remit SSS contributions, disregarded the employer's legal obligation to deduct employee contributions, and found no employer-employee relationship between jeepney operators and drivers under the boundary system — a doctrine settled since 1956.

• Backsliding and Grave Abuse of Discretion: Complainants charged respondent with "backsliding" for refusing to furnish them copies of his decision acquitting the accused, and "grave abuse of discretion" for rendering a verdict of acquittal despite what they characterized as strong evidence against the accused.
• Refusal to Furnish Copy of Decision: Complainants contended that respondent arbitrarily denied them access to public records by refusing to provide a copy of the promulgated decision, giving them "the run-around," which was oppressive and arbitrary.
• Review of the Acquittal: Complainants prayed that respondent's decision be reviewed to obviate any miscarriage of justice, considering the adverse effects on thousands of jeepney drivers and to prevent other jeepney operators from using the decision for their own benefit.

• Validity of the Acquittal: Respondent maintained that the four criminal cases were validly and properly decided, and that the resolution of acquittal was the decision itself, validly promulgated in the presence of the accused, the prosecuting fiscal, and all complaining parties.
• Adequacy of the Decision as Response: Respondent submitted that no better answer could be made on the details of the proceedings and the evidence presented except by submitting a copy of the decision, and that the complaint may best be answered by a thorough reading of the decision.

• Access to Public Records: Whether respondent committed grave abuse of authority in refusing to furnish the complainants a copy of his promulgated decision.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Demand as Condition Precedent: Whether respondent erred in concluding that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused, despite repeated demands, refused to remit collected SSS contributions, and that estafa could not prosper absent proof of demand.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Deduction of Contributions: Whether respondent erred in concluding that there was no forced daily deduction or exaction of ₱0.50 as SSS premium contributions.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Employer-Employee Relationship: Whether respondent erred in finding that no employer-employee relationship existed between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system arrangement.
• Administrative Liability for Erroneous Rulings: Whether respondent's errors in the acquittal amounted to gross ignorance of the law warranting administrative sanction, or were merely errors of judgment.

• Access to Public Records: Yes. Respondent committed grave abuse of authority in refusing to give complainants a copy of his decision, as the decision was already promulgated and part of the public record to which citizens have a constitutional right of access.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Demand as Condition Precedent: Yes. Respondent erred; the Social Security Act imposes on the employer a legal obligation to remit contributions without need of demand by the employee, making demand not a condition precedent for remittance.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Deduction of Contributions: Yes. Respondent erred; Section 18 of the Social Security Act places on the employer the legal obligation to deduct and withhold the employee's contribution from salary, rendering his disbelief in forced daily deductions legally untenable.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Employer-Employee Relationship: Yes. Respondent erred; settled jurisprudence since 1956 establishes that an employer-employee relationship exists between jeepney owners/operators and drivers under the boundary system arrangement.
• Administrative Liability for Erroneous Rulings: Yes (majority). Respondent's errors bordered on gross ignorance of the law, warranting dismissal from the service. The concurring and dissenting opinion of Melencio-Herrera, J., however, would impose only three months' suspension, treating the acquittal as an error of judgment rather than gross ignorance.

• Access to Public Records: The complainants were the complaining witnesses in the four criminal cases and were understandably interested in securing a copy of the decision. The request was made during office hours, relayed personally to respondent, and the decision was already promulgated with copies already furnished counsel for both sides. The decision was part of the public record which a citizen has the right to scrutinize. When respondent claimed there were "no more copies," the complainants were amenable to a xerox copy of the original on file, which as part of court records is allowed to be given to interested parties upon request, duly certified as a true copy. Respondent's refusal, without just cause, denied complainants access to public records and gave them "the run-around," which was oppressive and arbitrary. The Court relied on Baldoza vs. Dimaano, which emphasized the importance of access to public records predicated on the constitutional right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern, and on Article IV, Section 6 of the then Constitution expressly recognizing that right.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Demand as Condition Precedent: The uniform allegation in all four informations that the accused "despite repeated demands, refused and still refuses to remit" need not be proved by the prosecution, because the Social Security Act of 1954 makes it the duty of the employer to remit contributions without need of any demand by the employee. Section 22(a), (b), (c), and (d) of the Act requires every employer to remit within the first seven days of the month the contributions of the employee and the employer to the SSS, failing which a penalty of three percent is imposed. With this statutory mandate, demand by the employee before the employer remits contributions is not a condition precedent. The SSS can collect contributions in the same manner as taxes are collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code. To prove remittance, the employer can submit records or a certification from the SSS.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Deduction of Contributions: Section 18 of the Social Security Act governing employees' contributions provides that the employer shall deduct and withhold from the employee's monthly salary the employee's contribution in an amount corresponding to his earnings. With this legal obligation placed on the employer's shoulders, respondent's "reasonable belief" that there was or could be no forced daily deductions or exaction of ₱0.50 had no legal basis or support.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Employer-Employee Relationship: As early as March 23, 1956, in National Labor Union vs. Dinglasan, the Court ruled that an employer-employee relationship exists between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system arrangement. The features characterizing the boundary system — that the driver receives no fixed wage but only the excess of fares collected over the boundary amount, and that gasoline is for the driver's account — are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship from that of employer and employee, because the owner exercises supervision and control over the drivers. This doctrine was reiterated in Magboo vs. Bernardo on April 30, 1963. Considering that approximately nineteen years before respondent rendered his decision, this was already settled doctrine, respondent was obviously ignorant of it. Respondent mistakenly relied on SSS vs. Court of Appeals and Shriro and SSS vs. Court of Appeals and Manila Jockey Club, which involved commission sales agents and jockeys respectively, and had no bearing on the relationship between jeepney owners/operators and drivers. Decisions of the Supreme Court need not be proved as they are matters of judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Ignorance of the law excuses no one, and judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law are part of the legal system under Article 8 of the Civil Code.

• Administrative Liability for Erroneous Rulings: The majority found that respondent exhibited gross ignorance of the Social Security Act of 1954 — particularly the sections governing SSS compulsory coverage, employer-employee contributions, deduction of contributions, and remittance of contributions — and of settled jurisprudence on the employer-employee relationship under the boundary system. Alternatively, if respondent was aware of these rules, he deliberately refrained from applying them, which can never be excused. Respondent also repeatedly ignored the Court's directive to file his comment, necessitating two tracer letters, and his comment came only months later, constituting disrespect to the Court and aggravating the delay. The concurring and dissenting opinion of Melencio-Herrera, J., however, reasoned that the acquittal constituted at most an error of judgment in appraising evidence and applying doctrinal jurisprudence, for which a judge should not be held administratively liable and much less dismissed, absent evidence of bad faith, corruption, or improper considerations. That opinion would have imposed only three months' suspension for the refusal to furnish copies and the disrespect shown to the Court.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law as Administrative Offense — A judge who renders a decision contradicting clear statutory mandates and long-settled jurisprudence exhibits gross ignorance of the law warranting dismissal from the service. The Court applied this by finding that respondent erred on three distinct legal points — demand as a condition precedent, the employer's duty to deduct contributions, and the employer-employee relationship under the boundary system — each of which was governed by clear statutory text and settled doctrine dating back nineteen years before his decision. Alternatively, if the judge was aware of the law but deliberately refrained from applying it, such conduct is equally inexcusable.

• Right to Access Public Records — The constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern includes access to official records, documents of official acts, transactions, or decisions, subject to limitations imposed by law. While public officers in custody of public records have discretion to regulate the manner of inspection, examination, or copying, such discretion does not carry the authority to prohibit access. A promulgated court decision is part of the public record, and interested parties are entitled to copies upon request.

• Employer-Employee Relationship Under the Boundary System — The relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system arrangement is that of employer and employee. The features of the boundary system — no fixed wage but only the excess of fares over the boundary amount, and gasoline for the driver's account — are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship from employer-employee, because the owner exercises supervision and control over the drivers. This doctrine was established in National Labor Union vs. Dinglasan (1956) and reiterated in Magboo vs. Bernardo (1963).

• No Demand Required for SSS Remittance — Under the Social Security Act, the employer has a statutory duty to remit SSS contributions within the first seven days of the month without need of demand by the employee. Demand is not a condition precedent for remittance, and the SSS may collect contributions in the same manner as taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code.

• Judicial Decisions as Part of the Legal System — Decisions of the Supreme Court are matters of judicial notice and need not be proved. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the Philippines, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code. Ignorance of the law excuses no one, pursuant to Article 3 of the Civil Code.

• "The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law." — This passage, quoted from Baldoza vs. Dimaano, articulates the constitutional basis for the right of access to public records and defines the scope of the doctrine applied in holding respondent liable for refusing to furnish copies of his decision.

• "WE found that in sustaining the motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence after the prosecution rested its case, respondent committed several errors bordering on gross ignorance of the law." — This is the Court's threshold finding that elevates the respondent's errors from mere mistakes of judgment to administrative misconduct, establishing the ratio decidendi for the dismissal.

• "In the light of the above discussion, respondent gravely erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss the estafa cases by conveniently relying on the accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to gain conviction, for conviction can only rest upon the strength of the prosecution evidence, and, as a consequence, material and moral damages had been inflicted on the numerous complaining drivers whose rights to refile the criminal cases for estafa against the accused are now foreclosed by the rule on double jeopardy." — This passage highlights the practical consequences of the judge's gross ignorance: the complaining drivers' rights to refile are foreclosed by double jeopardy, aggravating the administrative liability.

• Baldoza vs. Honorable Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, A.M. No. 112-MJ, May 5, 1976 — Controlling precedent on access to public records. The Court relied on this case to emphasize the importance of access to public records, predicated on the constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern, and to hold that while officers may regulate the manner of access, they may not prohibit it.

• National Labor Union vs. Benedicto Dinglasan, L-7945, March 23, 1956, 98 Phil. 650 — Controlling precedent establishing that an employer-employee relationship exists between jeepney owners/operators and drivers under the boundary system. The Court found respondent grossly ignorant of this doctrine, which had been settled approximately nineteen years before his decision.

• Magboo vs. Bernando, L-16790, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 952 — Followed. Reiterated the doctrine from National Labor Union vs. Dinglasan on the employer-employee relationship under the boundary system, confirming its continued validity.

• Vda. de Zabala vs. Pamaran, A.C. No. 200-J, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 430 — Cited to define the scope of the Court's administrative review: limited to the text of the decision and the respondent's articulations on law and evidence, not a review on regular appeal to reverse or set aside the decision.

• SSS vs. Court of Appeals and Shriro, 37 SCRA 579 — Distinguished and rejected. Involved commission sales agents of a sewing machine distributor, not jeepney operators and drivers. Respondent's reliance on this case was misplaced.

• SSS vs. Court of Appeals and Manila Jockey Club, 30 SCRA 210 — Distinguished and rejected. Involved jockeys connected with racing clubs, not jeepney operators and drivers. Respondent's reliance on this case was misplaced.

• Pabalan vs. Guevarra, A.M. No. 333-CJ, 74 SCRA 53 (1976) — Cited in the concurring and dissenting opinion for the proposition that a judicial officer cannot be called to account in administrative actions for acts done in the exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous.

• Article IV, Section 6, 1973 Constitution — Recognizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern and access to official records, documents of official acts, transactions, or decisions. Applied as the constitutional basis for holding that respondent could not deny complainants access to his promulgated decision.

• Section 22(a), (b), (c), (d), Social Security Act of 1954 (R.A. No. 1161, as amended) — Governs remittance of contributions, requiring employers to remit within the first seven days of each calendar month, imposing a three percent penalty for non-remittance, and providing that the SSS may collect delinquent contributions in the same manner as taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code. Applied to hold that demand by the employee is not a condition precedent for the employer's duty to remit.

• Section 18, Social Security Act of 1954 — Governs employees' contributions, requiring the employer to deduct and withhold from the employee's monthly salary the employee's contribution. Applied to hold that respondent's disbelief in forced daily deductions had no legal basis.

• Section 9, Social Security Act of 1954 — Provides that SSS coverage shall be compulsory where an employer-employee relationship exists. Applied in conjunction with the finding that such a relationship subsists under the boundary system.

• Section 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court — Provides that courts shall take judicial notice of decisions of the Supreme Court. Applied to hold that respondent should have been aware of settled jurisprudence on the employer-employee relationship under the boundary system.

• Article 3, Civil Code — Provides that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Applied to hold respondent accountable for his failure to apply clear statutory and doctrinal rules.

• Article 8, Civil Code — Provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Applied to establish that Supreme Court jurisprudence on the boundary system was binding on respondent.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, and Abad Santos, JJ., concurred in the majority decision.

• Melencio-Herrera, J. (concurring and dissenting) — Concurred with the finding that respondent was not justified in refusing to furnish complainants a copy of the decision, for which administrative liability was warranted. Dissented from the majority's holding that the errors in the acquittal constituted gross ignorance of the law, reasoning instead that respondent could only be faulted with error of judgment in appraising the evidence and applying doctrinal jurisprudence. Citing Pabalan vs. Guevarra and Bartolome vs. de Borja, the opinion maintained that a judge cannot be held administratively liable for erroneous rulings absent evidence of bad faith, corruption, or improper considerations, and that to do so would constitute harassment and make the position unbearable. Voted to impose suspension for three months. Barredo and De Castro, JJ., concurred with this separate opinion.