Lanot vs. COMELEC

A candidate who files a certificate of candidacy before the campaign period is not liable for premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code because, under RA 8436, one is deemed a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots only on the last day of filing certificates of candidacy under the law prior to RA 8436.

Lanot and other candidates filed a petition to disqualify Eusebio, a mayoral candidate in Pasig City, for engaging in partisan political activities before the start of the campaign period. The COMELEC First Division disqualified Eusebio five days before the elections. Eusebio filed a motion for reconsideration, prompting the COMELEC Chairman to enjoin implementation of the disqualification. Eusebio won and was proclaimed. The COMELEC En Banc subsequently set aside the disqualification resolution and referred the case to the Law Department for preliminary investigation.

• The Disqualification Petition: Lanot and other candidates filed a petition against Eusebio under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for campaigning outside the designated campaign period, including delivering speeches, publishing surveys, installing billboards, and distributing shoes.
• COMELEC First Division Ruling: Director Ladra recommended disqualification, which the COMELEC First Division adopted on May 5, 2004, ordering the deletion of Eusebio's name from the candidate list and the non-canvassing of his votes.
• Intervention of Chairman Abalos: Eusebio filed a motion for reconsideration on May 9, 2004. On election day, May 10, 2004, Chairman Abalos issued a memorandum enjoining the implementation of the First Division resolution due to the pending motion.
• Proclamation of Eusebio: The COMELEC En Banc initially suspended Eusebio's proclamation on May 11, 2004, but lifted the suspension on May 21, 2004, citing the need to expedite the canvass. Eusebio was proclaimed on May 23, 2004.
• Referral to the Law Department: On August 20, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc set aside the First Division resolution and referred the case to the Law Department to determine if the acts were actually committed, invoking COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.
• Substitution and Intervention: Lanot was assassinated during the pendency of the Supreme Court petition. Raymundo, a registered voter, substituted for Lanot. Benavides, the third placer, intervened.

• Grave Abuse in Dismissal of Electoral Aspect: The COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the First Division resolution and referring the case to the Law Department, erroneously applying Resolution No. 2050 and violating Resolution No. 6452 and Section 6 of RA 6646.
• Grave Abuse in Lifting Suspension: The COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse in lifting the suspension of proclamation despite strong evidence of guilt.
• Usurpation of Adjudicatory Power: Chairman Abalos committed grave abuse by unilaterally enjoining the implementation of the First Division resolution, usurping the exclusive adjudicatory power of the En Banc.
• Preponderance of Evidence: The evidence on record warrants the disqualification of Eusebio.
• Right to be Proclaimed: If Eusebio is disqualified, Lanot (or Benavides, in view of Lanot's death) should be proclaimed as the winning candidate.

• COMELEC Prerogative: The COMELEC has the discretion to refer the disqualification case to the Law Department, and such pendency is a continuation of the COMELEC's deliberations.
• Estoppel and Forum-Shopping: Lanot is in estoppel and abandoned the petition by participating in the Law Department proceedings, and is guilty of forum-shopping.
• Exculpation under RA 8436: Section 11 of RA 8436 provides that unlawful acts applicable to a candidate take effect only upon the start of the campaign period; thus, acts committed before the campaign period are not unlawful.
• Supreme Court as Trier of Facts: The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and cannot review factual findings of the COMELEC.

• Validity of August 20 Resolution: Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the disqualification resolution and referring the case to the Law Department.
• Validity of May 21 Resolution: Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in lifting the suspension of Eusebio's proclamation.
• Validity of Chairman's Advisory: Whether Chairman Abalos committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the implementation of the First Division resolution.
• Liability under Section 80: Whether Eusebio is liable for premature campaigning under Section 80 of the OEC despite filing his certificate of candidacy before the campaign period under RA 8436.
• Effect of Disqualification on Second Placer: Whether the candidate with the second highest number of votes can be proclaimed if the winning candidate is disqualified.

• Validity of August 20 Resolution: Grave abuse of discretion was committed. The COMELEC En Banc erred in dismissing the electoral aspect and referring the entire case to the Law Department. A disqualification case has two aspects—electoral and criminal—that proceed independently. The electoral aspect requires only preponderance of evidence and should continue to its conclusion; referral to the Law Department for preliminary investigation does not warrant the dismissal of the electoral aspect.
• Validity of May 21 Resolution: No grave abuse of discretion was committed. An order suspending the proclamation of a winning candidate is provisional in nature and may be lifted when warranted by evidence and the policy to expedite the canvass.
• Validity of Chairman's Advisory: No grave abuse of discretion was committed. The First Division resolution was not yet final and executory due to the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration; thus, it could not be implemented. The advisory was necessitated by the circumstances to prevent indirect implementation of a non-final resolution.
• Liability under Section 80: Eusebio is not liable. The essential elements for violation of Section 80 require that the person be a "candidate" who has filed a certificate of candidacy. Under RA 8436, the early filing deadline was intended solely for printing official ballots. Legislative intent shows that one who files early is not considered a candidate for other purposes until the last day of filing certificates of candidacy under the law prior to RA 8436. Eusebio's acts occurred before he was deemed a candidate; thus, no violation of Section 80 occurred.
• Effect of Disqualification on Second Placer: The second placer cannot be proclaimed. Votes cast for a disqualified candidate are presumed cast in the belief that the candidate was qualified. The exception—where voters are fully aware of the disqualification but vote nonetheless—was not proven. The Vice-Mayor succeeds by operation of law.

• Two Aspects of a Disqualification Case — A disqualification case has an electoral aspect (summary in character, requires preponderance of evidence, determines qualification to hold office) and a criminal aspect (preliminary investigation by the COMELEC Law Department, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, determines criminal liability). The two aspects proceed independently; referral to the Law Department does not warrant the dismissal of the electoral aspect.
• Deemed Filing of Certificate of Candidacy under RA 8436 — For purposes of printing official ballots, a candidate is deemed such upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy. For purposes of determining liability under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code (premature campaigning), a candidate who filed early under RA 8436 is deemed to have filed only on the last day of filing certificates of candidacy under the law prior to RA 8436.
• Rule on Second Placer — The candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed if the winning candidate is disqualified, unless it is proven that voters were fully aware of the disqualification and still voted for the ineligible candidate.

• "The essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period."
• "Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots."
• "The disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated because of the disqualification."

• Sunga v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 310 (1998) — Followed. Referral of a disqualification case to the Law Department is discretionary and does not mandate the dismissal of the electoral aspect.
• Bagatsing v. COMELEC, 378 Phil. 585 (1999) — Followed. Explained Sunga; referral to the Law Department is proper if acts also constitute a criminal offense, but the electoral aspect must continue.
• Mercado v. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132 (1999) — Followed. Intervention in a disqualification case is allowed even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered.
• Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 370 Phil. 625 (1999) — Followed. A disqualification case survives the election and proclamation of the winning candidate.
• Nolasco v. COMELEC, 341 Phil. 761 (1997) — Followed. An order suspending the proclamation of a winning candidate is provisional in nature.
• Kare v. COMELEC, G.R. 157526, 28 April 2004 — Followed. The second placer cannot be declared elected upon the disqualification of the winning candidate.

• Section 68, Omnibus Election Code — Enumerates grounds for disqualification of candidates, including violation of Section 80. Applied as the basis for the disqualification petition.
• Section 79, Omnibus Election Code — Defines "candidate," "election campaign," and "partisan political activity." Applied to determine the elements of premature campaigning.
• Section 80, Omnibus Election Code — Prohibits election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Applied to determine Eusebio's liability; no violation was found because Eusebio was not yet a "candidate" when the acts were committed.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 — Provides that votes cast for a candidate declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be counted, and allows the suspension of proclamation if evidence of guilt is strong. Applied to determine the effect of a disqualification case and the propriety of suspending proclamation.
• Section 11, Republic Act No. 8436 — Moved the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy to 120 days before election day. Applied to determine when a filer is deemed a "candidate" for purposes other than ballot printing.
• Section 44, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Provides for succession in local government offices. Applied to determine who succeeds a disqualified mayor.

Panganiban, C.J. (concurred in result), Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Azcuna, Tinga (concurred in result, dissented in part), Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco.

• Panganiban, C.J. — Concurred in the result but disagreed with the ponencia's interpretation that a candidate is deemed such only on the last day of filing COCs. Argued that RA 8436 is the prevailing law and liberal construction does not apply to the electoral aspect. However, concluded that the proviso in Section 11 of RA 8436 ("unlawful acts... shall take effect upon the start of the campaign period") impliedly repealed Section 80, making the election offense physically impossible to commit at any time.
• Tinga, J. — Concurred in the result but dissented on the merits, arguing the petition should be dismissed on the ground of mootness due to Lanot's death and the lack of standing of the intervenors/substitute after proclamation. Argued that allowing intervention after proclamation makes the disqualification process infinite. Also contended that resolving the case on the merits precluded further criminal investigation against Eusebio.