Landingin vs. Republic of the Philippines

The written consent of the biological parent is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption, and its absence cannot be excused by claims of abandonment unless the abandonment is shown to have existed at the time of adoption and is proven by conduct evincing a settled purpose to forego all parental duties.

Petitioner Diwata Ramos Landingin is a U.S. citizen of Filipino parentage residing in Guam, employed as a restaurant server. She sought to adopt the three minor children of her deceased brother, Manuel Ramos, and his wife Amelia Ramos. Manuel died on May 19, 1990, after which Amelia left for Italy to work, remarried, and had two children by her second marriage. The minors were initially placed in the care of their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos, who died on November 23, 2000. The proceedings are governed by Republic Act No. 8552, the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, which was already in effect when the petition was filed on February 4, 2002.

On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a 57-year-old U.S. citizen of Filipino parentage residing in Guam, filed a petition for adoption of three minors — Elaine Dizon Ramos (born August 31, 1986), Elma Dizon Ramos (born September 7, 1987), and Eugene Dizon Ramos (born August 5, 1989). The minors are the natural children of petitioner's deceased brother, Manuel Ramos, and his wife Amelia Ramos. Manuel died on May 19, 1990, after which Amelia left for Italy, remarried, and had two children by her second marriage. The minors were left in the care of their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos, who died on November 23, 2000. Petitioner alleged that she and her children and relatives abroad financially supported the minors, that Amelia had ceased communication with the children and her in-laws, and that the minors had given their written consent to the adoption. Petitioner, a widow with adult married children, lived alone in her own home in Guam and worked as a restaurant server. She presented an Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis, and Ricfel Branitley Landingin, notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA. Her brother, Mariano Ramos, signified willingness to support the minors while in petitioner's custody.

On March 5, 2002, the trial court ordered the DSWD to conduct a case study. Social Welfare Officer II Elizabeth Pagbilao submitted a Child Study Report on May 24, 2002, recommending that the minors be declared eligible for adoption. Pagbilao reported that she had interviewed Amelia Ramos, who arrived in the Philippines in May 2002 with her son John Mario for a three-week vacation, and that Amelia voluntarily consented to the adoption. However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as a witness, failed to offer in evidence the written consent of Amelia Ramos, and failed to present any documentary evidence proving Amelia's assent. Petitioner testified that Amelia left for Italy on November 20, 1990, never communicated with the family or the children, and that she did not know where in Italy Amelia resided. Elaine, the eldest minor, corroborated that her mother left after their father died and never communicated with them.

The DSWD's Home Study Report, however, revealed a different picture. Amelia had left for Italy due to financial constraints — her parents were undergoing maintenance medication and had mortgaged their farmland to fund her trip. While working in Italy, Amelia met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac, with whom she became a live-in partner and had a son, John Mario. Amelia continued to send financial support ranging from ₱10,000 to ₱15,000 monthly through her parents, who shared ₱3,000 to ₱5,000 with the children. Elaine herself testified that she consulted her mother Amelia for serious personal problems. The report also noted that petitioner had limited income, was employed part-time as a waitress earning $5.15 per hour plus tips of around $1,000 monthly, was 57 years old, and was still amortizing her house in Guam. Petitioner's main intention was to bring the children to Guam, USA.

On November 23, 2002, the RTC granted the petition, dispensing with trial custody and ordering the minors' surnames changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin." The OSG appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC on April 29, 2004, finding that petitioner failed to adduce the written consent of the biological mother, that the affidavit of consent of petitioner's children was not properly authenticated under Act No. 2103, and that petitioner was not financially stable enough to support the children. The CA denied reconsideration on August 12, 2004, prompting the present petition.

• Abandonment as Excuse for Consent: Petitioner argued that the written consent of the biological mother was no longer necessary because when Amelia's husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back, effectively abandoning the children. Petitioner contended that it was by twist of fate that Amelia was on vacation in the Philippines while the petition was pending, and that Amelia had intimated to the DSWD social worker her conformity to the adoption.
• Financial Capability: Petitioner maintained that she was financially capable, having worked in Guam for 14 years, possessing savings and a house, and currently earning $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000 a month, with additional financial backing from her children and siblings.
• Misapplication of Facts: Petitioner assigned error to the CA for overlooking and misapplying facts and circumstances of weight and importance which, if considered, would have affected the result, and for erroneously concluding that she was not financially capable of supporting the three children.

• Lack of Biological Mother's Consent: Respondent argued that the trial court erred in granting the petition despite the lack of consent of the proposed adoptees' biological mother, Amelia Ramos.
• Defective Consent of Adopter's Children: Respondent contended that the trial court erred in granting the petition despite the lack of the written consent of petitioner's children as required by law, the affidavit having been executed in Guam without authentication before a Philippine consular office.
• Insufficient Financial Capacity: Respondent maintained that the trial court erred in granting the petition despite petitioner's failure to establish that she is in a position to support the proposed adoptees, as petitioner was only relying on the financial backing of her children and siblings.

• Consent of Biological Parent: Whether petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos.
• Authentication of Foreign Documents: Whether the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by petitioner's children in Guam sufficiently complies with the law.
• Financial Capacity: Whether petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

• Consent of Biological Parent: No. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption, and petitioner failed both to present Amelia's written consent and to prove abandonment sufficient to dispense with it.
• Authentication of Foreign Documents: No. The affidavit of consent executed in Guam was not authenticated before a Philippine consular office as required by Section 2 of Act No. 2103, rendering it inadmissible as a public document and, absent proof of authenticity, inadmissible even as a private document.
• Financial Capacity: No. The adopter must personally be in a position to support the adoptees in keeping with the means of the family; petitioner's part-time employment, limited income, and age made her financial capacity doubtful, and reliance on relatives' support is insufficient.

• Consent of Biological Parent: Section 9 of R.A. No. 8552 requires the written consent of the biological parents of the child. The general requirement protects the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference and ensures the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the proposed adoption. Petitioner failed to submit Amelia's written consent. While petitioner claimed Amelia had abandoned the children, the DSWD's own Home Study Report contradicted this: Amelia left for Italy due to financial constraints, continued sending financial support of ₱10,000–₱15,000 monthly through her parents, and Elaine herself consulted her mother for serious problems. Abandonment to justify dispensing with consent must be conduct evincing a settled purpose to forego all parental duties — neglect and refusal to perform filial and legal obligations of love and support — and must exist at the time of adoption. Mere permitting the child to remain in the care of others does not constitute abandonment. Moreover, if the biological parent's consent truly could not be obtained, Section 9 provides that the written consent of the legal guardian would suffice, which petitioner also failed to secure. Because adoption severs all legal ties between Amelia and the children under Section 16 of R.A. No. 8552, financial considerations alone cannot justify depriving a parent of parental authority. More proof was needed that Amelia had emotionally abandoned the children and that the latter would not miss her guidance and counsel.
• Authentication of Foreign Documents: Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that evidence be formally offered for a specified purpose; mere identification and marking do not confer probative weight. Petitioner failed to formally offer Pagbilao's Report and the Joint Affidavit of Consent. The affidavit was notarized in Guam on January 16, 2002, but was not authenticated before a Philippine consular officer as required by Section 2 of Act No. 2103. Without such authentication, the document cannot be treated as a public document. At best it is a private document whose authenticity must be proved by someone who witnessed its execution or by evidence of the genuineness of the signatures, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 132-B of the Rules of Court. No such proof was introduced, rendering the affidavit inadmissible in evidence.
• Financial Capacity: The best interest of the child is the paramount consideration in adoption, which includes careful evaluation of the prospective adopter's financial capacity. The adopter must personally be in a position to support the adoptees in keeping with the means of the family. According to the Adoption Home Study Report from the Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam, petitioner was employed part-time as a waitress earning $5.15 per hour and approximately $1,000 monthly in tips, was 57 years old, and was still amortizing her house. The ability to support is personal to the adopter, as adoption creates a legal relation only between adopter and adoptee. Reliance on the financial backing of children and siblings is insufficient, and the records do not prove that such relatives are financially able or willing to support the minors.

• Best Interest of the Child in Adoption — Adoption statutes hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration, designed to provide homes, parental care, and education for unfortunate, needy, or orphaned children. However, the discretion to approve adoption is not anchored solely on the best interests of the child but likewise with due regard to the natural rights of parents over the child. The liberality with which the Court treats adoption matters should not be misconstrued as extending to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
• Indispensability of Parental Consent — The written consent of biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. The natural right of a parent to his child requires that consent be obtained before parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. The general requirement of consent and notice to natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers and to ensure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child.
• Abandonment as Ground to Dispense with Consent — Abandonment by a parent to justify adoption without consent is conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties — neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent in effect abandons the child. Mere permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. The abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
• Authentication of Foreign Documents under Act No. 2103 — An instrument or document acknowledged in a foreign country must comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103 to be considered authentic: acknowledgment must be made before a Philippine consular officer, or before a notary public duly authorized by the law of the country, with the notary's certificate subsequently authenticated by a Philippine consular officer. Without compliance, the document is at best a private document requiring proof of authenticity under Section 20, Rule 132-B of the Rules of Court.
• Formal Offer of Evidence — Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, and the purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. Mere identification of documents and the marking thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight unless formally offered and admitted by the court.

• "Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the indispensability of parental consent, anchoring the requirement in the natural right of a parent to his child.
• "Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties." — This defines the canonical formulation of abandonment in the context of dispensing with parental consent in adoption proceedings.
• "It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children." — This articulates the principle that financial incapacity alone does not warrant severance of parental rights, guarding against treating adoption as a wealth-transfer mechanism.
• "the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter." — This defines the principle that financial capacity must be personal to the adopter and cannot be delegated to relatives or third parties.

• Malkinson vs. Agrava, 153 Phil. 339 (1973) — Followed for the liberal concept that adoption statutes are humane and salutary, holding the interest and welfare of the child as paramount consideration, and that every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote the noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
• Cang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 128 — Followed for the principle that liberality in adoption should not extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law, and that the discretion to approve adoption must consider both the best interests of the child and the natural rights of parents. Also cited for the proposition that more proof of emotional abandonment is needed before depriving a parent of parental authority.
• Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 438 — Followed for the rule under Section 34, Rule 132 that courts shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, and that mere identification and marking of documents do not confer probative weight.

• Section 9, Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) — Enumerates the persons whose written consent is necessary for adoption: the adoptee if 10 years or over, the biological parents if known or the legal guardian or proper government instrumentality with legal custody, the legitimate and adopted children of the adopter 10 years or over, the illegitimate children of the adopter living with the adopter, and the spouse of the person adopting or to be adopted. Applied to require Amelia Ramos's written consent and, alternatively, the consent of the legal guardian if the biological parent's consent could not be obtained.
• Section 16, Republic Act No. 8552 — Provides that adoption severs all legal ties between the biological parent and the adoptee, vesting the same on the adopter. Cited to emphasize the gravity of dispensing with parental consent, as adoption would permanently sever Amelia's legal relationship with her children.
• Section 2, Act No. 2103 — Prescribes the requirements for acknowledgment and authentication of instruments or documents executed in foreign countries, requiring acknowledgment before a Philippine consular officer or a duly authorized notary public, with subsequent authentication by a Philippine consular officer. Applied to hold that the affidavit of consent executed in Guam was inadmissible for failure to comply.
• Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court — Provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, and that the purpose for which evidence is offered must be specified. Applied to hold that petitioner's failure to formally offer Pagbilao's Report and the Joint Affidavit of Consent rendered them barren of probative weight.
• Section 20, Rule 132-B of the Rules of Court — Provides that a private document's authenticity must be proved by anyone who saw the document executed or by evidence of the genuineness of the signatures. Applied as the fallback rule for the unauthenticated affidavit from Guam, which no proof of authenticity was offered to satisfy.
• Article 34, Presidential Decree No. 603 — Mandates the DSWD to conduct a case study in adoption proceedings. Cited as the basis for the trial court's order directing the DSWD to conduct a case study and submit a report.

Artemio V. Panganiban (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Minita V. Chico-Nazario.