Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Manzano

The final determination of just compensation is strictly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Court, and the determination of just compensation is a judicial function that cannot be curtailed or limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule. The Special Agrarian Court is legally mandated to take due consideration of the factors in Republic Act No. 6657, Section 17 and the formula in administrative issuances, but these are not the sole bases for arriving at just compensation; courts may deviate from strict application of the formulas provided the departure is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record.

Landbank is a government financial institution created by Republic Act No. 3844, and is one of the implementing agencies and the duly designated financial intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, as well as the custodian of the Agrarian Reform Fund. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is the lead agency implementing the government's agrarian reform program, and under Republic Act No. 6657, Section 49, DAR has the power to issue rules and regulations, such as administrative orders and memorandum circulars, to implement the statutory provisions. The respondents were owners of four parcels of agricultural land planted with rubber trees, situated at (Latuan) Baluno, Isabela, Basilan Province, with a total land area of 88.5667 hectares.

Respondents were the owners of four parcels of agricultural land planted with rubber trees: the Heirs of Pilar T. Manzano owned Lot No. 426-B measuring 20.9506 hectares, Raul T. Manzano owned Lot No. 426-C at 22.1179 hectares, Jose R. Jugo owned Lot No. 426-D at 23.5788 hectares, and Ramon H. Manzano owned Lot No. 426-A at 21.9194 hectares. These lands, situated at (Latuan) Baluno, Isabela, Basilan Province, had a total land area of 88.5667 hectares. On January 12, 1998, respondents voluntarily offered their landholdings for agrarian reform, proposing a selling price of P100,000.00 per hectare, later lowering their offer to P83,346.76 per hectare. On April 15, 1998, DAR issued Administrative Order No. 05-98, which provided the formula for computing just compensation for rubber lands under Republic Act No. 6657, taking into consideration the factors laid down in Section 17 of the law.

DAR endorsed the matter of land valuation to Landbank, which gave a lower counteroffer ranging from P26,412.61 to P66,118.06 per hectare, totaling P3,196,757.54, on the ground that the lands were planted with more than 30-year-old rubber trees that were no longer productive. Respondents refused to accept the counteroffer, and on March 4, 1999, the matter was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board for preliminary determination of just compensation. On April 15, 1999, DAR and Landbank issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 07-99, providing for different valuation procedures for lands planted with rubber trees. Administrative cases for land valuation were filed by respondents against Landbank and DAR, and these were endorsed to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Isabela, Basilan Province for summary administrative proceedings.

During the summary administrative proceedings, respondents moved for revaluation of their properties, and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator directed Landbank to conduct a revaluation survey. Landbank's revaluation yielded an increase in valuation for Lot Nos. 426-B, 426-C, and 426-D, and a decrease for Lot No. 426-A, but the total land value posted a net decrease from P3,196,757.54 to P2,943,797.26. Respondents rejected the new valuation for being "too low and unreasonable." In its September 15, 1999 Decision, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board adopted Landbank and DAR's revaluation, fixing the aggregate amount of P2,944,797.26 as just compensation, and ruled that should respondents disagree, they may bring the matter to the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Agrarian Court.

On November 25, 1999, respondents filed separate complaints for judicial determination and payment of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court, arguing that just compensation should not be less than P2,000,000.00 for each of the properties. The Regional Trial Court consolidated the complaints and, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, Section 58, appointed three commissioners to examine and ascertain the valuation of the properties. Meanwhile, Landbank deposited the judgment award through cash and Landbank bonds as provisional compensation, which respondents later withdrew. The commissioners conducted ocular inspections, interviewed occupants, tenants, and other owners of rubber lands in neighboring areas, and gathered that rubber lands in Isabela City generally ranged from P120,000.00 to P150,000.00 per hectare if productive, and P80,000.00 to P110,000.00 per hectare if unproductive. The commissioners found that Landbank's valuation did not represent the fair market value of the properties and recommended just compensation totaling P9,100,711.00.

Landbank filed its Comment to the Consolidated Commissioners' Report, arguing that just compensation should not be more than respondents' sworn valuation as shown in their tax declarations. The Regional Trial Court set the matter for hearing, but during the hearing, Landbank admitted that it intended to present all documentary evidence already incorporated in its Comment. Thus, in its January 28, 2003 Order, the Regional Trial Court dispensed with the presentation of witnesses and considered the Consolidated Commissioners' Report submitted for resolution. In its February 12, 2003 Order, the Regional Trial Court substantially adopted the Consolidated Commissioners' Report, fixing just compensation at P9,100,711.00. On June 3, 2003, Landbank filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals, and on May 9, 2003, respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion on June 27, 2003, finding good reasons: the properties had been taken in 1999, respondents were deprived of beneficial use and enjoyment, payment made was only initial or preliminary, and 65% of the payment was in bonds maturing only after 10 years. The same Order amended the dispositive portion to add 6% legal interest. The Regional Trial Court later found Landbank liable for indirect contempt for failing to comply with the writ of execution pending appeal. The Court of Appeals denied Landbank's appeal, and Landbank elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

• Lack of Hearing: Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in accepting the commissioners' recommendation without conducting a hearing, which would have allowed it to cross-examine the commissioners and verify the correctness of just compensation.
• Mandatory Application of Formulas: Petitioner argued that the commissioners disregarded the applicability of Republic Act No. 6657, Administrative Order No. 05-98, and Joint Memorandum Circular No. 07-99, and that the Special Agrarian Court is mandated to apply the factors laid down in Section 17 in relation to these issuances, citing Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Banal, Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Lim, and Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Kumassie.
• Legal Interest: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in directing DAR and Landbank to pay 6% legal interest.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion for execution pending appeal without good reasons, and that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the June 27, 2003 Order considering that an appeal was already pending before the Court of Appeals, violating judicial courtesy.

• Due Process: Respondents asserted that petitioner was given the opportunity to ventilate its objections to the Consolidated Commissioners' Report, having been allowed to submit its position paper and incorporate its comments or objections, and to file its Comment to the Consolidated Commissioners' Report.
• Consideration of Statutory Factors: Respondents argued that the Consolidated Commissioners' Report considered the factors mentioned by Republic Act No. 6657 in relation to Administrative Order No. 05-98.
• Finality of the June 27, 2003 Order: Respondents added that the Regional Trial Court June 27, 2003 Order directing the payment of 6% legal interest and granting execution pending appeal was already resolved by the Court of Appeals, and since Landbank failed to appeal this Order within the reglementary period, it has become final and executory.

• Due Process: Whether petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines was afforded due process.
• Determination of Just Compensation: In determining just compensation, whether the Regional Trial Court can simply adopt the Consolidated Commissioners' Report, and whether it is mandated to follow the formula prescribed under Republic Act No. 6657, Section 17 in relation to Administrative Order No. 05-98 and Joint Memorandum Circular No. 07-99.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Whether there may be execution pending appeal.
• Legal Interest: Whether the 6% legal interest should be imposed.

• Due Process: Yes. Petitioner was not deprived of due process since it was given every reasonable opportunity to ventilate its claims and objections, having submitted its position paper, dispensed with the need for further hearing, and filed its Comment to the Consolidated Commissioners' Report.
• Determination of Just Compensation: Yes, with qualification. The Regional Trial Court has full discretion to make a binding decision on the value of the properties, and the final determination of just compensation is strictly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Court. While the Special Agrarian Court is required to consider the factors in Section 17 and the formula in administrative issuances, these are not the sole bases for arriving at just compensation.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Yes. The Court of Appeals properly upheld the Regional Trial Court's issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, as good reasons existed: respondents were deprived of their land since 1999, the just compensation was not wholly payable in cash, and respondents indicated willingness to return any amount in the event the just compensation is modified on appeal.
• Legal Interest: Yes. The Regional Trial Court June 27, 2003 Order, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the payment of legal interest on the just compensation award, as petitioner's delay in payment makes it liable for legal interest by way of damages, with the rate modified to 12% per annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.

• Due Process: A party cannot invoke deprivation of due process if he or she was given the opportunity of a hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings, and the hearing does not have to be a trial-type proceeding in all situations. Petitioner submitted its position paper before the commissioners and dispensed with the need for further hearing, and after the commissioners submitted their findings, petitioner filed its Comment to the Consolidated Commissioners' Report and objected to the recommendations. During the hearing set by the Regional Trial Court, petitioner opted to present documentary evidence already incorporated in its position paper, making it unnecessary and repetitive for the trial court to receive the same pieces of evidence. Citing National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Chiong, the Court noted that petitioner could have filed a motion raising all possible grounds for objecting to the findings and recommendations of the commissioners, or moved to remand the report, but failed to seize the opportunity.

• Determination of Just Compensation: Under Rule 67, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, the Regional Trial Court may accept the Consolidated Commissioners' Report, recommit it to the same commissioners for further report, set it aside and appoint new commissioners, or accept only a part of it and reject the other parts. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be curtailed or limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule, citing Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay. Republic Act No. 6657, Section 57 gives to the Special Agrarian Courts the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the use of the word "final" in Section 16(f) should not be construed to mean that the Special Agrarian Court serves as an appellate court that must wait for the administrative agencies to finish their valuation. There is no need to exhaust administrative remedies before a party can go to the Special Agrarian Court, and any attempt to convert its original jurisdiction into an appellate jurisdiction is contrary to the explicit provisions of the law, citing Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Montalvan. The Court clarified the doctrine in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform: what the law contemplates is not a review of the determination made by DAR, but an original determination as a lawful exercise of the Special Agrarian Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction. The amount of just compensation must be determined based on the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking, which is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. While Section 17 requires due consideration of the formula prescribed by DAR, the determination of just compensation is still subject to the final decision of the proper court, and courts may deviate from strict application of the formulas provided the departure is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record, citing Alfonso vs. Land Bank. The Court found that petitioner failed to show compliance with Section 17 itself, as it merely considered the value appearing in the tax declaration and salvage values of the rubber trees but failed to consider other factors such as the current value of the properties, their nature, actual use and income, and sworn valuation by the owner. The factual antecedents of the cases petitioner cited were not on all fours with this case, as in Banal the Special Agrarian Court relied solely on submitted memoranda without commissioners, in Lim the valuation was random and arbitrary, and in Kumassie the court ignored the statutory factors.

• Execution Pending Appeal: Under Rule 39, Section 2(a), a judgment appealed before the Court of Appeals may still be executed by the Regional Trial Court provided there are good reasons for the judgment's execution, which consist of compelling or superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or damages suffered should the losing party secure a reversal. The Regional Trial Court found that respondents have been deprived of their land since 1999, dispossessed of the beneficial use, fruits, and income of their properties, and that denial of execution pending appeal would infringe on their constitutional right against taking of private property without compensation. The just compensation is not wholly payable in cash, as 65% is in bonds maturing only after 10 years, by which time the monetary value of the properties would no longer be the same. Respondents indicated their willingness to return any amount in the event the just compensation is modified by the appellate court, which addressed petitioner's sole objection against execution pending appeal. Citing Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Orilla, the Court noted that the expropriation of private property under Republic Act No. 6657 is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, being a means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the farmers, and the landowner, not the government, is in a situation where the odds are practically against him.

• Legal Interest: Citing Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Lajom, the Court noted that the Regional Trial Court may impose interest on the just compensation award as may be justified by the circumstances of the case, and the Court has previously allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there was delay in the payment of just compensation, deeming the same to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. This incremental interest is not granted on the computed just compensation; rather, it is a penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay in its payment. Citing Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Orilla, the Court held that just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid but also payment within a reasonable time from its taking, and it encompasses the payment in full of the just compensation as finally determined by the courts. Citing Apo Fruits vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, the Court held that when property is taken, full compensation of its value must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential income lost, and if full compensation is not paid, the State must make up for the shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to the taking. While petitioner already gave provisional compensation in cash and bonds, these deposits cannot be claimed as amounts that would excuse the payment of interest on the unpaid balance of the compensation due, as there is no prompt payment if the payment is only partial. The legal interest must be applied on the unpaid balance of the compensation due, and the amounts already received by respondents should be subtracted from the total judgment. In view of Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, the Court modified the rate of legal interest to 12% per annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.

• Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of Special Agrarian Courts over Just Compensation — Under Republic Act No. 6657, Section 57, Special Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. The use of the word "final" in Section 16(f) does not mean the Special Agrarian Court serves as an appellate court that must wait for administrative agencies to finish their valuation; there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies before going to the Special Agrarian Court. The Court clarified that what the law contemplates is not a review of the determination made by DAR, but an original determination as a lawful exercise of the Special Agrarian Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction.

• Just Compensation as a Judicial Function — The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function that cannot be curtailed or limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule. No statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. The various agrarian reform laws and administrative issuances are merely recommendatory to the trial court in determining just compensation.

• Consideration of Statutory Factors and Administrative Formulas — While the Special Agrarian Court is legally mandated to take due consideration of the factors in Republic Act No. 6657, Section 17 and the formula in administrative issuances, these are not the sole bases for arriving at just compensation. Courts may deviate or depart from strict application of the formulas if a strict application is not warranted under the specific circumstances of the case, provided that the departure or deviation is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record.

• Fair Market Value as the Measure of Just Compensation — Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, measured not by the taker's gain but by the owner's loss. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. It is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee, though these values may serve as factors to be considered.

• Execution Pending Appeal in Agrarian Expropriation — Under Rule 39, Section 2(a), execution of a judgment pending appeal is discretionary and may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. "Good reasons" consist of compelling or superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages suffered should the losing party secure a reversal. In agrarian expropriation cases, good reasons exist where the land has long been taken by the government, the landowner has been deprived of beneficial use and income, the compensation is not wholly payable in cash, and the landowner indicates willingness to return any amount in the event the just compensation is modified on appeal.

• Legal Interest as Damages for Delay in Payment of Just Compensation — Legal interest may be imposed on the just compensation award where there is delay in its payment, as a penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay. This interest is not granted on the computed just compensation but is applied on the unpaid balance of the compensation due, with amounts already received by the landowner subtracted from the total judgment. The rate is 12% per annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid, conformably with Nacar vs. Gallery Frames.

• "The determination of 'just compensation' in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the 'just-ness' of the decreed compensation." — This passage from Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay, quoted in the decision, articulates the foundational principle that just compensation determination is an inherently judicial function that cannot be curtailed by legislation or administrative rules.

• "What the law contemplates that the trial court should undertake is not a review of the determination made by DAR, but an original determination as a lawful exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction." — This clarifies the doctrine in Association of Small Landowners, establishing that the Special Agrarian Court exercises original, not appellate, jurisdiction in determining just compensation.

• "Out of regard for the DAR's expertise as the concerned implementing agency, courts should henceforth consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the applicable DAR formulas in their determination of just compensation for the properties covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of said formulas is not warranted under the specific circumstances of the case before them, they may deviate or depart therefrom, provided that this departure or deviation is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record." — This passage from Alfonso vs. Land Bank, quoted in the decision, establishes the standard for when courts may deviate from DAR formulas in determining just compensation.

• "The owner's loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential income lost. The just compensation is made available to the property owner so that he may derive income from this compensation, in the same manner that he would have derived income from his expropriated property." — This passage from Apo Fruits vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, quoted in the decision, explains the rationale for imposing legal interest on unpaid just compensation as compliance with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain.

• Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay, 233 Phil. 313 (1987) — Controlling precedent establishing that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function that cannot be curtailed or limited by legislation, decree, or executive order.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Montalvan, 689 Phil. 641 (2012) — Followed in clarifying that the Special Agrarian Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for determination of just compensation, and that direct resort to the Special Agrarian Court is valid even without prior administrative proceedings.
• Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777 (1989) — Clarified by the Court in this case: the determination made by DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties, and the Special Agrarian Court undertakes an original determination, not a review of DAR's determination.
• Alfonso vs. Land Bank, G.R. Nos. 181912 & 183347, November 29, 2016 — Followed in establishing that courts should consider the factors in Section 17 as translated into DAR formulas, but may deviate if strict application is not warranted, provided the departure is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Orilla, 578 Phil. 663 (2008) — Followed in identifying good reasons for execution pending appeal in agrarian expropriation cases, including the long deprivation of property and the need to avoid prolonging the landowner's suffering.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Lajom, 741 Phil. 655 (2014) — Followed in allowing the imposition of legal interest on just compensation awards where there is delay in payment, as a penalty for damages incurred by the landowner.
• Apo Fruits Corporation vs. Land Bank, 647 Phil. 251 (2010) — Followed in holding that Section 17 provides guideposts for valuation but does not preclude courts from considering other factors, and that interest on unpaid compensation becomes due as compliance with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain.
• Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Followed in modifying the rate of legal interest to 12% per annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.
• National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Chiong, 452 Phil. 649 (2003) — Followed in holding that a formal hearing or trial is not required for a party to avail of its opportunity to object and oppose the commissioners' report.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Wycoco, 464 Phil. 83 (2004) — Followed in holding that interest should be awarded to the landowner if there is no prompt and valid payment, and that the imposition of legal interest is in the nature of damages for delay in payment.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 433 Phil. 106 (2002) — Followed in holding that if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited, the final compensation must include interests on its just value computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Banal, 478 Phil. 701 (2004) — Distinguished; the Special Agrarian Court in that case relied solely on submitted memoranda without commissioners, notice, hearing, or participation from all parties.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Lim, 555 Phil. 831 (2007) — Distinguished; the valuation in that case was random and arbitrary, being based on the price petitioner previously paid for the land of respondent's brother.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Kumassie, 608 Phil. 523 (2009) — Distinguished; the Special Agrarian Court in that case ignored the statutory factors and relied on bases not among those mentioned in Section 17.

• Article III, Section 9, 1987 Constitution — Provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; applied in determining that the amount of just compensation must be based on the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking.
• Section 2, Republic Act No. 6657 — Declares the policy of the State to pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, with the welfare of landless farmers and farmworkers receiving the highest consideration to promote social justice.
• Section 16(f), Republic Act No. 6657 — Provides that any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation; interpreted to mean the Special Agrarian Court undertakes an original determination, not a review of DAR's determination.
• Section 17, Republic Act No. 6657 — Lists the factors to be considered in determining just compensation, including the cost of acquisition, current value of the property, nature and actual use, income, sworn valuation by the owner, tax declarations, and assessment; applied in holding that the Special Agrarian Court must take due consideration of these factors but is not limited to them.
• Section 49, Republic Act No. 6657 — Gives DAR the power to issue rules and regulations, such as administrative orders and memorandum circulars, to implement the statutory provisions.
• Section 57, Republic Act No. 6657 — Gives Special Agrarian Courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners; applied in holding that the final determination of just compensation lies solely with the Special Agrarian Court.
• Section 58, Republic Act No. 6657 — Authorizes the Special Agrarian Court to appoint commissioners to examine and ascertain the valuation of properties; applied in the appointment of three commissioners in this case.
• Rule 39, Section 2(a), Rules of Court — Governs discretionary execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal, requiring good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing; applied in upholding the Regional Trial Court's grant of execution pending appeal.
• Rule 67, Section 7, Rules of Court — Governs the report by commissioners and judgment thereupon, allowing interested parties ten days to file objections to the findings of the report; applied in Landbank's filing of its Comment to the Consolidated Commissioners' Report.
• Rule 67, Section 8, Rules of Court — Allows the Regional Trial Court to accept the commissioners' report, recommit it, set it aside and appoint new commissioners, or accept only a part of it; applied in upholding the trial court's adoption of the Consolidated Commissioners' Report.
• Administrative Order No. 05-98 — DAR issuance providing the formula for computing just compensation for rubber lands under Republic Act No. 6657; held to be recommendatory, not mandatory, upon the Special Agrarian Court.
• Joint Memorandum Circular No. 07-99 — DAR and Landbank issuance providing for different valuation procedures for lands planted with rubber trees; held to be recommendatory, not mandatory, upon the Special Agrarian Court.

• Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson) — Concurred in the decision.
• Bersamin — Concurred in the decision.
• Gesmundo — Concurred in the decision.
• Martires — On official leave, as per Letter dated January 18, 2018.