Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Federico Suntay, et al.

A complaint for revival of judgment is a new and independent action whose sole requisites are that the judgment sought to be revived has already attained finality, is not yet fully executed, and is not yet barred by the statute of limitations; the transferees of property subject of the judgment are not indispensable parties to such a suit, and the ten-year prescriptive period under Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code runs from the finality of the judgment.

The dispute traces to the expropriation by the Department of Agrarian Reform of land owned by Federico Suntay under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, where Land Bank of the Philippines acts as administrator of the Agrarian Reform Fund from which just compensation is drawn. Because the parties could not agree on the value of the expropriated property, the determination of just compensation proceeded initially before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Region IV, DARAB, and later reached the courts, generating a long line of related proceedings including G.R. No. 157903 and G.R. No. 188376. The present controversy concerns the enforcement of the judgment rendered in the latter case, which had attained finality and had been partially executed.

The case traces to the expropriation by the Department of Agrarian Reform of land owned by Federico Suntay under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Because the parties could not agree on the value of the expropriated property, Federico filed a petition for the determination of just compensation before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Region IV, DARAB, RARAD Conchita Miñas, who rendered a decision fixing just compensation at PHP 157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Land Bank then filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation with the RTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, impleading Federico and the RARAD. Upon Federico's motion, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that RARAD Miñas' decision had already become final and executory because the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period of appeal. The case reached the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 157903, where the Court ruled that judicial determination of just compensation is an original action, not an appeal subject to the 15-day reglementary period, and ordered the RTC to proceed with the determination.

While G.R. No. 157903 was pending, RARAD Miñas issued an alias writ of execution upon Federico's ex-parte motion, and DARAB sheriffs issued several notices of the writ to Land Bank in September 2005. Land Bank sought a temporary restraining order from the Court, which was granted in October 2005. On the same day the TRO was issued, however, the public auction of Land Bank's shares of stock in the Philippine Long Distance Company and MERALCO proceeded, and Josefina Lubrica was declared the lone and highest bidder. Upon learning of the TRO the next day, RARAD Miñas recalled the alias writ of execution and quashed all acts done pursuant to it.

In October 2008, Federico filed an urgent ex-parte manifestation and motion to resume the interrupted execution before RARAD Miñas, citing Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Martinez, where the Court clarified that the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period to assail it before the courts pursuant to the DARAB Rules. RARAD Miñas immediately granted the motion, and execution proceeded. Land Bank questioned the action through a petition for certiorari with application for TRO before the Court of Appeals. Before the CA could act on the TRO application, MERALCO cancelled Land Bank's 42,002,750 shares of stock and issued new stock certificates in Josefina's name; a TRO was thereafter issued.

The DARAB administratively charged and preventively suspended RARAD Miñas for ordering the transfer of the stocks, and a new RARAD, Marivic Casabar, was assigned to the case. RARAD Casabar recalled the order to proceed with the transfer of the shares of stock, directed MERALCO to cancel the stock certificates issued to Josefina and to any of her transferees or assignees, and to restore ownership of the shares to Land Bank and record the restoration in MERALCO's stock and transfer book. Because of this development, the CA dismissed Land Bank's certiorari petition as moot. Land Bank elevated the matter to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 188376 (the 2011 Land Bank Case), where the Court emphasized that original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation pertains to the RTC, not the DARAB, and settled that MERALCO should restore Land Bank's unlawfully auctioned shares. The Decision attained finality on September 11, 2012. A writ of execution was issued in 2013 upon Land Bank's motion. In compliance, MERALCO delivered to Land Bank a total of 38,635,950 MERALCO shares of stock, including cash and property dividends accruing to those shares. MERALCO, however, has been unable to restore the remaining 3,366,800 MERALCO shares because they had already been traded and transferred to new owners following the public auction.

On September 8, 2022, Land Bank filed a Complaint for revival of the partially executed 2011 Land Bank Case judgment before the RTC of Manila, including MERALCO as a defendant. MERALCO filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counterclaims, raising as an affirmative defense that it cannot be made a party to the revival case because it was not a party in the 2011 Land Bank Case, and pointing out Land Bank's failure to implead the current stockholders of the remaining unrestored shares, who it claimed were indispensable parties. The RTC directed Land Bank to implead the current stockholders in an Order dated January 23, 2023. To comply, Land Bank filed an omnibus motion asking the RTC to direct MERALCO to produce specific documents and to permit Land Bank to inspect, copy, and photograph them to identify the shareholders it was directed to implead. MERALCO filed an Opposition with Motion to Dismiss, claiming that Land Bank did not show good cause to warrant the reliefs prayed for and that impleading the shareholders would entail the filing of an amended complaint, which could no longer be allowed because it would be beyond the 10-year prescriptive period for enforcing a judgment through an action. The RTC granted MERALCO's motion and dismissed Land Bank's complaint, ruling that Land Bank had acquiesced to MERALCO's position that the current stockholders were indispensable parties because it did not seek reconsideration of the order to implead them, and concluding that Land Bank's cause of action had already prescribed since it had no more time to amend its complaint to include indispensable parties. Land Bank sought reconsideration, but the motion was denied in an Order dated June 26, 2023.

• Hierarchy of Courts / Pure Questions of Law: Land Bank argued that the Petition raises pure questions of law and may therefore be filed directly with the Supreme Court via Rule 45.
• Prescription: Land Bank argued that prescription does not lie against the State, especially because the levy of its MERALCO shares was void and ineffectual as held with finality in the 2011 Land Bank Case.
• Interruption of Prescriptive Period: Land Bank posited that its extrajudicial demand upon MERALCO to comply with its judgment obligation interrupted the prescriptive period.
• Indispensable Parties: Land Bank contended that its failure to move for reconsideration of the RTC's directive to implead the third-party stockholders should not be interpreted as acquiescence to MERALCO's position that those transferees are indispensable parties.
• Modes of Service: Land Bank postulated that the RTC should have allowed it to resort to other modes of service of summons to the transferees instead of dismissing the case altogether.

• Hierarchy of Courts: MERALCO contended that Land Bank violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when it resorted to a direct recourse to the Supreme Court from the RTC Orders.
• Prescription: MERALCO asserted that the 10-year prescriptive period applies to Land Bank despite it being a government-owned and controlled corporation, because it acquired the subject shares in the exercise of its proprietary function.
• Indispensable Parties: MERALCO maintained that the transferees are indispensable parties because the revival of judgment case is a new and independent action, different from the 2011 Land Bank Case.
• Modes of Service: MERALCO argued that Land Bank cannot blame the RTC for not allowing it to resort to other modes of service of summons, as its cause of action had already prescribed and the indispensable parties had not yet been impleaded.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether the Petition is dismissible for being filed directly with the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals.
• Indispensable Parties: Whether the transferees of Land Bank's MERALCO shares of stock are indispensable parties in the revival of judgment case.
• Prescription: Whether Land Bank's complaint for revival of judgment is dismissible on the ground of prescription.

• Hierarchy of Courts: No. The Petition raises pure questions of law, which fall within the recognized exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, and may be filed directly with the Supreme Court via Rule 45.
• Indispensable Parties: No. The transferees of the shares are not indispensable parties, since the propriety of reviving the judgment can be determined with finality without their participation, the cause of action being the final and executory judgment itself.
• Prescription: No. The complaint for revival of judgment was filed on September 8, 2022, within the ten-year prescriptive period counted from the finality of the judgment on September 11, 2012, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Articles 1144(3) and 1152 of the Civil Code.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The doctrine of hierarchy of courts, under which RTC decisions are generally appealable to the Court of Appeals through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 or a petition for review under Rule 42, is not absolute. Parties may resort directly to the Supreme Court when there are compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition, or when what is raised is a pure question of law. A question of law exists when doubts or differences arise as to what the law provides on a certain state of facts, and a question of fact when the doubt pertains to the truth or falsity of alleged facts; for a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence. The determination of whether prescription has set in does not require the Court to look into evidentiary matters, and ascertaining whether the transferees of the shares are indispensable parties simply calls for the application of the rules on joinder or non-joinder of parties. Land Bank therefore did not err in filing the Petition directly with the Court.

• Indispensable Parties: Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry, and after the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, by an action. A revival suit is a new action, separate and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived; its cause of action is the decision itself, not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced was rendered, and it is premised on the assumption that the decision sought to be revived is already final and executory and has not yet prescribed. As held in Philippine National Bank vs. Bondoc, the purpose of the revival of a judgment is to give a creditor a new right of enforcement from the date of revival, and the rule seeks to protect judgment creditors from debtors who conceal their assets and wait until the statute of limitations sets in. Under Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals, the judgment creditor need not prove the enforceability of the judgment in an action for revival; the plaintiff merely needs to prove that the judgment sought to be revived (1) already attained finality, (2) is not yet fully executed, and (3) is not yet barred by the statute of limitations. Because of the nature and purpose of a revival suit, matters relating to the interest of parties other than those in the original action are irrelevant and immaterial, and the action for revival is not the proper forum to address such matters. Applying the definition of indispensable parties in National Transmission Corp. vs. Untiveros, citing Heirs of Dela Corta, Sr. vs. Alag-Pitogo — parties whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary that the action cannot be finally determined without them because their interests in the matter and in the relief are so bound up with that of the other parties — the propriety of reviving the judgment in the 2011 Land Bank Case can be determined with finality without the participation of the current shareholders and MERALCO, because only the fact of finality, non-execution, and non-prescription need to be ascertained. The cause of action in the present case is the final and executory judgment in the 2011 Land Bank Case, not whether MERALCO and the current shareholders should return the auctioned shares to Land Bank, a matter already settled with finality in the 2011 Land Bank Case and which need not be revisited. The new owners of Land Bank's MERALCO shares are therefore not indispensable parties, and the RTC committed reversible error in requiring Land Bank to implead the current shareholders.

• Prescription: Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, read in conjunction with Articles 1144(3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, provides that a final and executory judgment may be enforced by instituting a complaint in a regular court within ten years from the time the judgment becomes final. Records show that the judgment sought to be revived became final on September 11, 2012, and Land Bank filed its Complaint for revival of judgment on September 8, 2022, still within the ten-year prescriptive period. Considering further that there was no need to implead the current shareholders, the RTC should have proceeded with the case; it was a patent error to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription. The judgment in the 2011 Land Bank Case being final and executory, not yet fully satisfied, and not barred by prescription, its revival is warranted.

• Revival of Judgment — A revival suit is a new action, separate and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived. Its cause of action is the decision itself, not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced was rendered, and it is premised on the assumption that the decision sought to be revived is already final and executory and has not yet prescribed. Its exclusive purpose is to enforce a judgment which could no longer be executed by mere motion under the Rules. The plaintiff in a revival suit must prove only three requisites: (1) the judgment sought to be revived already attained finality; (2) it is not yet fully executed; and (3) it is not yet barred by the statute of limitations. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the RTC erred in dismissing Land Bank's complaint, since all three requisites were present.

• Indispensable Parties — Indispensable parties are parties whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary that the action cannot be finally determined without them because their interests in the matter and in the relief are so bound up with that of the other parties. The Court held that the transferees of the auctioned MERALCO shares are not indispensable parties to the revival suit because the propriety of reviving the judgment can be determined with finality without their participation, only the facts of finality, non-execution, and non-prescription being in issue.

• Hierarchy of Courts — While RTC decisions are generally appealable to the Court of Appeals, the principle is not absolute; parties may resort directly to the Supreme Court when there are compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition, or when what is raised is a pure question of law. The Court applied this exception in holding that Land Bank properly filed its Petition directly with the Court.

• Question of Law vs. Question of Fact — A question of law exists when doubts or differences arise as to what the law provides on a certain state of facts; a question of fact exists when the doubt pertains to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and its resolution must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. The Court characterized the issues of prescription and indispensable parties as pure questions of law.

• Prescription of Actions Upon a Judgment — Under Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code, actions upon a judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues, and under Article 1152, the period of prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of an obligation declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final. The Court applied these provisions in holding that Land Bank's complaint, filed on September 8, 2022, was timely because the judgment became final on September 11, 2012.

• "A revival suit is a new action, separate and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived. Its cause of action is the decision itself — not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. It is premised on the assumption that the decision sought to be revived is already final and executory and has not yet prescribed." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the nature of a revival suit, which grounds the Court's holdings on both indispensable parties and prescription.

• "In other words, an action for revival of judgment is simply an avenue to exercise the legal right to enforce a favorable judgment. As such, plaintiff merely needs to prove that the judgment sought to be revived or enforced: (1) already attained finality; (2) is not yet fully executed; and (3) is not yet barred by the statute of limitations." — This passage enumerates the three requisites of a revival suit, the controlling test applied by the Court in evaluating Land Bank's complaint.

• "Here, the propriety of reviving the judgment in the 2011 Land Bank Case can be determined with finality without the participation of the current shareholders and MERALCO because only the fact of finality, non-execution, and non-prescription need to be ascertained." — This passage articulates the Court's holding that the transferees of the auctioned shares are not indispensable parties to the revival suit.

• "Records show that the judgment sought to be revived became final on September 11, 2012. Land Bank filed its Complaint for revival of judgment on September 8, 2022—still within the 10-year prescriptive period." — This passage applies the ten-year prescriptive period under Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code to the facts and disposes of the prescription issue.

• Philippine National Bank vs. Bondoc, 122 Phil. 100 (1965) — Controlling precedent, cited by the Court En Banc, expounding on the sole purpose of a revival case: to give a creditor a new right of enforcement from the date of revival, and to protect judgment creditors from debtors who conceal assets until the statute of limitations sets in.
• Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 630 (2001) — Followed; held that the judgment creditor need not prove the enforceability of the judgment in an action for revival of judgment, and that the rule only requires proof of a final judgment which has not prescribed and has remained unexecuted after the lapse of five years but not more than ten years from its finality.
• National Transmission Corp. vs. Untiveros, G.R. No. 266880, May 15, 2024 — Followed; cited for the definition of indispensable parties applied by the Court.
• Heirs of Dela Corta, Sr. vs. Alag-Pitogo, 871 Phil. 356 (2020) — Followed; cited for the definition of indispensable parties as parties whose legal presence is so necessary that the action cannot be finally determined without them.
• Anama vs. Citibank N.A. (formerly First National City Bank), 822 Phil. 630 (2017) — Followed; cited for the nature of a revival suit as a new action whose cause of action is the decision itself.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Suntay, 678 Phil. 879 (2011) — The judgment sought to be revived (the 2011 Land Bank Case); held that original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation pertains to the RTC, not the DARAB, and directed MERALCO to restore Land Bank's unlawfully auctioned shares.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Suntay, 561 Phil. 711 (2007) — Prior related ruling in G.R. No. 157903, holding that judicial determination of just compensation is an original action, not an appeal subject to the 15-day reglementary period.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Martinez, 582 Phil. 739 (2008) — Cited in the factual antecedents; clarified that the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period to assail it before the courts pursuant to the DARAB Rules.
• Bases Conversion and Development Authority vs. City Government of Baguio City, G.R. No. 192694, February 23, 2023 — Cited for the rule on hierarchy of courts and its exceptions.
• Aala vs. Uy, 803 Phil. 36 (2017) — Cited for the exception allowing direct resort to the Supreme Court when a pure question of law is raised.
• Agbayani, Jr. vs. Director or Whoever is in Charge of the Manila City Jail, G.R. No. 268876, August 7, 2024 — Cited for the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact.
• Republic vs. Caraig, 887 Phil. 827 (2020) — Cited for the rule that a question of law must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence.

• Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry, and after the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, by an action; the revived judgment may likewise be enforced by motion within five years from its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. The Court relied on this provision in holding that a revival suit is a new and independent action and in defining its requisites.
• Article 1144(3), Civil Code — Provides that actions upon a judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. The Court applied this provision in holding that Land Bank's complaint for revival, filed on September 8, 2022, was filed within the ten-year prescriptive period.
• Article 1152, Civil Code — Provides that the period of prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of an obligation declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final. The Court applied this provision in counting the prescriptive period from the finality of the 2011 Land Bank Case on September 11, 2012.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred with the ponencia of Justice M. Lopez.