Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Barbara Sampaga Poblete

A bank dealing with a registered land is not a mortgagee in good faith where it processes and approves the loan despite the fact that the applicant is not the registered owner of the property offered as collateral, fails to verify the actual ownership and occupants of the premises, and acts with haste in constituting the mortgage. The rule that a mortgagee may rely on the face of a Torrens title does not apply to banks, which are required to observe a higher standard of diligence; where the mortgagor's title is void because it was procured through a forged deed of sale, the real estate mortgage constituted over the property is likewise void.

Land Bank of the Philippines is a banking institution organized under Philippine laws, while Barbara Sampaga Poblete is the registered owner of Lot No. 29, a 455-square-meter parcel in Buenavista, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-12026. Poblete had obtained a ₱300,000.00 loan from the Kabalikat ng Pamayanan ng Nagnanais Tumulong at Yumaman Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Kapantay) and mortgaged Lot No. 29 to the cooperative, which in turn used OCT No. P-12026 as collateral for its own Loan Account No. 97-CC-013 with the Land Bank-Sablayan Branch. The dispute thus arose within a chain of secured transactions in which the same registered title successively served as collateral for the cooperative's obligation to Land Bank and, later, for a loan extended directly by Land Bank to a buyer of the property. The case turns on the application of the Torrens system's protection of innocent mortgagees for value and on the higher diligence exacted of banking institutions in approving loans secured by registered land.

Land Bank of the Philippines is a banking institution organized and existing under Philippine laws, while Barbara Sampaga Poblete is the registered owner of Lot No. 29, a parcel of land with an area of 455 square meters located in Buenavista, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-12026. In October 1997, Poblete obtained a ₱300,000.00 loan from the Kabalikat ng Pamayanan ng Nagnanais Tumulong at Yumaman Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Kapantay) and mortgaged Lot No. 29 to the cooperative to guarantee payment. Kapantay, in turn, used OCT No. P-12026 as collateral under its own Loan Account No. 97-CC-013 with the Land Bank-Sablayan Branch.

In November 1998, Poblete decided to sell Lot No. 29 in order to pay her loan and instructed her son-in-law Domingo Balen to look for a buyer. Balen referred Angelito Joseph Maniego to her. According to Poblete, Maniego agreed to buy the lot for ₱900,000.00 but suggested that a deed of absolute sale for ₱300,000.00 be executed instead in order to reduce the taxes; Poblete thus executed the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 9 November 1998, stating ₱300,000.00 as the consideration and describing herself in the instrument as a "widow." She then asked Balen to deliver the deed to Maniego and to receive the payment in her behalf. Balen testified that he delivered the Deed dated 9 November 1998 to Maniego but did not receive from him the agreed purchase price, Maniego having told him that he would pay upon his return from the United States. In an Affidavit dated 19 November 1998, Poblete stated that she had agreed to have the payment deposited in her Land Bank Savings Account.

Based on a Certification issued on 20 August 1999 by Land Bank-Sablayan Branch Department Manager Marcelino Pulayan, Maniego paid Kapantay's Loan Account No. 97-CC-013 in the amount of ₱448,202.08. On 8 June 2000, Maniego applied for a ₱1,000,000.00 loan with Land Bank, using OCT No. P-12026 as collateral. Land Bank alleged that, as a condition for the approval of the loan, the title of the collateral should first be transferred to Maniego. On 14 August 2000, pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 11 August 2000, the Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20151 in Maniego's name. The following day, 15 August 2000, Maniego and Land Bank executed a Credit Line Agreement and a Real Estate Mortgage over TCT No. T-20151, and Land Bank released the ₱1,000,000.00 loan proceeds to Maniego. Maniego subsequently failed to pay the loan, and on 4 November 2002 Land Bank filed an Application for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage, stating that Maniego's total indebtedness amounted to ₱1,154,388.88.

On 2 December 2002, Poblete filed a Complaint for Nullification of the Deed dated 11 August 2000 and TCT No. T-20151, Reconveyance of Title and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Maniego, Land Bank, the Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, and Elsa Z. Aguirre in her capacity as Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Poblete alleged that, despite her demands on Maniego, she never received the ₱900,000.00 consideration for Lot No. 29; that without her knowledge Maniego used the Deed dated 9 November 1998 to acquire OCT No. P-12026 from Kapantay; and that upon her verification with the Register of Deeds, the Deed dated 11 August 2000 had been used to obtain TCT No. T-20151. She claimed that the Deed dated 11 August 2000, which bore her and her deceased husband Primo Poblete's supposed signatures, was a forgery, and she presented as proof the Death Certificate dated 27 April 1996 of her husband and Report No. 294-502 of the Technical Services Department of the National Bureau of Investigation showing that the signatures in that deed were forgeries. She likewise filed a case for estafa through falsification of public document against Maniego and sought to enjoin the impending foreclosure proceeding.

Land Bank filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-claim on 7 January 2003, claiming that it was a mortgagee in good faith and that it had observed due diligence before approving the loan by verifying Maniego's title with the Office of the Register of Deeds; it interposed a cross-claim against Maniego for payment of the loan with interest, penalties, and other charges. Maniego, for his part, separately filed his Answer denying Poblete's allegations and claiming that it was Poblete who forged the Deed dated 11 August 2000; he alleged that he had paid the consideration of the sale and even Poblete's loans from Kapantay and Land Bank. Both the RTC and the CA found that the signatures of Poblete and her deceased husband in the Deed dated 11 August 2000 were forged by Maniego, and that the evidence was preponderant that Maniego did not pay the consideration for the sale; the RTC further found that Land Bank had failed to exercise the diligence required of banking institutions, since it would have known before approving the loan that the sale between Poblete and Maniego had not been consummated had it exercised due diligence.

• Validity of TCT No. T-20151: Land Bank argued that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's finding declaring TCT No. T-20151 null and void, contending that the appellate court misconstrued and misappreciated the evidence and the law in not finding the title registered in Maniego's name to be valid.
• Mortgagee in Good Faith: Land Bank maintained that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the evidence and the law in not finding it a mortgagee in good faith, asserting that it had verified Maniego's title with the Office of the Register of Deeds, conducted a credit investigation, and inspected Lot No. 29 prior to approving the loan.
• Pari Delicto: Land Bank contended that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the evidence and the law in not finding Poblete and Maniego in pari delicto.
• Estoppel and Laches: Land Bank argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the principles of estoppel or laches against Poblete, on the theory that the proximate cause of her loss was her own negligence in safeguarding her rights over the subject property, which enabled Maniego to mortgage the same with Land Bank.

• Validity of TCT No. T-20151: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the finding of the trial court declaring TCT No. T-20151 null and void, and in not finding the title registered in the name of Angelito Joseph Maniego to be valid.
• Mortgagee in Good Faith: Whether the Court of Appeals misconstrued the evidence and the law in not finding Land Bank a mortgagee in good faith.
• Pari Delicto: Whether the Court of Appeals misconstrued the evidence and the law in not finding Poblete and Angelito Joseph Maniego in pari delicto.
• Estoppel and Laches: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the principle of estoppel or laches against Poblete on the ground that the proximate cause of her loss was her negligence in safeguarding her rights over the subject property.

• Validity of TCT No. T-20151: No. The Deed dated 11 August 2000 was forged and unsupported by consideration, rendering it void ab initio; a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title, and the transfer certificate issued pursuant to it is likewise void.
• Mortgagee in Good Faith: No. Banks are required to observe a higher standard of diligence than private individuals, and Land Bank failed to verify the ownership of the property and the authority of the mortgagor despite the fact that the loan applicant was not the registered owner.
• Pari Delicto: No. The pari delicto rule applies only where two parties are equally at fault; the factual findings of the RTC and the CA establish that only Maniego was at fault.
• Estoppel and Laches: No. Estoppel and laches were not raised before the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as this would violate the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.

• Validity of TCT No. T-20151: A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that only questions of law may be raised, subject to exceptional circumstances which were not present in the case; hence, the factual findings of the trial court, especially if affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court. Both the RTC and the CA found that the signatures of Poblete and her deceased husband in the Deed dated 11 August 2000 were forged by Maniego, and the evidence was preponderant that Maniego did not pay the consideration for the sale. Since the issue on the genuineness of the Deed dated 11 August 2000 is essentially a question of fact, the Court was not duty-bound to analyze and weigh the evidence again. It is a well-entrenched rule that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title; moreover, where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is void ab initio for lack of consideration. Since the Deed dated 11 August 2000 is void, the corresponding TCT No. T-20151 issued pursuant to the same deed is likewise void. In Yu Bun Guan vs. Ong, the Court ruled that there was no legal basis for the issuance of the certificate of title and the CA correctly cancelled the same when the deed of absolute sale was completely simulated, void, and without effect. In Ereña vs. Querrer-Kauffman, the Court held that when the instrument presented for registration is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the mortgagee acquire any right or title to the property; in such a case, the mortgagee under the forged instrument is not a mortgagee protected by law. The issue on the nullity of Maniego's title had already been foreclosed when the Court denied Maniego's petition for review in the Resolution dated 13 July 2011, which became final and executory on 19 January 2012; a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, whether made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. This is without prejudice, however, to the right of Maniego to recover from Poblete what he paid to Kapantay for the account of Poblete, otherwise there will be unjust enrichment by Poblete.

• Mortgagee in Good Faith: Since TCT No. T-20151 had been declared void by final judgment, the Real Estate Mortgage constituted over it is also void; in a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged, otherwise the mortgage is void under Article 2085 of the Civil Code. Land Bank insisted that it was a mortgagee in good faith since it verified Maniego's title, did a credit investigation, and inspected Lot No. 29, but the issue of being a mortgagee in good faith is a factual matter which cannot be raised in a petition under Rule 45. Nevertheless, the Court examined the records to determine whether Land Bank was a mortgagee in good faith. There is indeed a situation where, despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy — the doctrine of the "mortgagee in good faith" based on the rule that buyers or mortgagees dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. However, it has been consistently held that this rule does not apply to banks, which are required to observe a higher standard of diligence; a bank whose business is impressed with public interest is expected to exercise more care and prudence in its dealings than a private individual, even in cases involving registered lands, and cannot assume that, simply because the title offered as security is on its face free of any encumbrance or lien, it is relieved of the responsibility of taking further steps to verify the title and inspect the properties to be mortgaged. Good faith, or the lack of it, is a question of intention, and in ascertaining intention courts are necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone the inward motive may, with safety, be determined. Based on the evidence, Land Bank processed Maniego's loan application upon his presentation of OCT No. P-12026, which was still under the name of Poblete, and Land Bank even ignored the fact that Kapantay had previously used Poblete's title as collateral in its loan account with Land Bank. In Bank of Commerce vs. San Pablo, Jr., the Court held that when the person applying for the loan is other than the registered owner of the real property being mortgaged, such fact should have already raised a red flag and should have induced the bank to make inquiries into and confirm the applicant's authority to mortgage; a person who deliberately ignores a significant fact that could create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable person is not an innocent purchaser for value. The records did not even show that Land Bank investigated and inspected the property to ascertain its actual occupants, Land Bank having merely mentioned that it inspected Lot No. 29 to appraise its value; the Court took judicial notice of the standard practice of banks, before approving a loan, to send representatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral to investigate its real owners. In Prudential Bank vs. Kim Hyeun Soon, the Court held that the bank failed to exercise due diligence although its representative conducted an ocular inspection, because the representative concentrated only on the appraisal of the property and failed to inquire as to who were the then occupants of the property. Land Bank claimed that it conditioned the approval of the loan upon the transfer of title to Maniego but admitted processing the loan based on Maniego's assurances that title would soon be his; thus, only one day after Maniego obtained TCT No. T-20151 in his name, Land Bank and Maniego executed a Credit Line Agreement and a Real Estate Mortgage. Because of Land Bank's haste in granting the loan, it appeared that Maniego's loan was already completely processed while the collateral was still in the name of Poblete, a conclusion supported by the testimony of Land Bank Customer Assistant Andresito Osano. Where the mortgagee acted with haste in granting the mortgage loan and did not ascertain the ownership of the land being mortgaged, as well as the authority of the supposed agent executing the mortgage, it cannot be considered an innocent mortgagee. Since Land Bank is not a mortgagee in good faith, it is not entitled to protection; the injunction against the foreclosure proceeding should be made permanent. Since Lot No. 29 has not been transferred to a third person who is an innocent purchaser for value, ownership of the lot remains with Poblete, without prejudice to the right of either party to proceed against Maniego.

• Pari Delicto: The principle was found inapplicable. The pari delicto rule provides that when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. The Court adopted the factual finding of the RTC and the CA that only Maniego was at fault.

• Estoppel and Laches: These issues were not raised before the trial court, and the Court therefore could not rule upon them. It is settled that an issue which was neither alleged in the complaint nor raised during the trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as such a recourse would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process, since the opposing party would be deprived of the opportunity to introduce evidence rebutting such new issue.

• Forged or fraudulent deed conveys no title — A forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. The Court applied this rule to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 11 August 2000, the signatures in which were found by both the RTC and the CA to have been forged by Maniego, and held that the corresponding TCT No. T-20151 issued pursuant to that deed was likewise void.
• Void ab initio deed of sale for lack of consideration — Where a deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is void ab initio for lack of consideration. The Court applied this rule to the same deed, the evidence being preponderant that Maniego did not pay the consideration for the sale.
• Effect of a forged instrument on registration — When the instrument presented for registration is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the mortgagee acquire any right or title to the property; the mortgagee under the forged instrument is not a mortgagee protected by law. The Court relied on this rule in sustaining the nullity of TCT No. T-20151 and of the real estate mortgage constituted over it.
• Requisites of pledge and mortgage — Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, it is essential to a contract of pledge or mortgage that the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged and that the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, or, in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose. Because TCT No. T-20151 had been declared void by final judgment, Maniego was not the absolute owner of the mortgaged property, and the Real Estate Mortgage constituted in favor of Land Bank was void.
• Mortgagee in good faith — The doctrine holds that, despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy, based on the rule that buyers or mortgagees dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. The Court recognized the doctrine but held that it did not apply to Land Bank.
• Higher standard of diligence for banks — The rule protecting mortgagees who rely on the face of a Torrens title does not apply to banks, which are required to observe a higher standard of diligence. A bank whose business is impressed with public interest is expected to exercise more care and prudence in its dealings than a private individual, even in cases involving registered lands, and cannot assume that, simply because the title offered as security is on its face free of any encumbrance or lien, it is relieved of the responsibility of taking further steps to verify the title and inspect the properties to be mortgaged. Requisites or circumstances that should have raised a red flag include: (a) the person applying for the loan is other than the registered owner of the real property being mortgaged; and (b) the bank's representative conducted only an appraisal of the property without inquiring as to who were its then occupants.
• Good faith as a question of intention — Good faith, or the lack of it, is a question of intention; in ascertaining intention, courts are necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone the inward motive may, with safety, be determined. The Court used this principle to evaluate Land Bank's processing of Maniego's loan application, its disregard of the fact that the title was still in Poblete's name, and its haste in executing the mortgage one day after Maniego obtained TCT No. T-20151.
• Haste in granting a mortgage loan — Where the mortgagee acted with haste in granting the mortgage loan and did not ascertain the ownership of the land being mortgaged, as well as the authority of the supposed agent executing the mortgage, it cannot be considered an innocent mortgagee.
• Pari delicto — The pari delicto rule provides that when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. The Court held the rule inapplicable because the factual findings of the RTC and the CA established that only Maniego was at fault.
• Finality of judgment — A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The Court applied this doctrine to the Resolution dated 13 July 2011 denying Maniego's petition, which became final and executory on 19 January 2012, thereby foreclosing the issue of the nullity of Maniego's title.
• Questions of law under Rule 45 — A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that only questions of law may be raised, subject to exceptional circumstances; hence, factual findings of the trial court, especially if affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court. The Court applied this rule in declining to re-examine the findings of forgery, non-payment of consideration, and lack of good faith on the part of Land Bank.
• Issues not raised below cannot be raised on appeal — An issue which was neither alleged in the complaint nor raised during the trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as such a recourse would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process, since the opposing party would be deprived of the opportunity to introduce evidence rebutting such new issue. The Court applied this rule to bar Land Bank's belated invocation of estoppel and laches.

• "It is a well-entrenched rule, as aptly applied by the CA, that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for the nullity of the Deed dated 11 August 2000 and, consequently, of TCT No. T-20151, and is the foundational rule on which the entire disposition rests.
• "However, it has been consistently held that this rule does not apply to banks, which are required to observe a higher standard of diligence." — This is the canonical formulation of the exception to the mortgagee-in-good-faith doctrine, distinguishing banks from ordinary mortgagees for value and supplying the controlling standard against which Land Bank's conduct was measured.
• "A bank cannot assume that, simply because the title offered as security is on its face free of any encumbrances or lien, it is relieved of the responsibility of taking further steps to verify the title and inspect the properties to be mortgaged." — This passage defines the scope of a bank's affirmative duty of verification and inspection, and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the diligence exacted of banking institutions in secured lending.
• "Where the mortgagee acted with haste in granting the mortgage loan and did not ascertain the ownership of the land being mortgaged, as well as the authority of the supposed agent executing the mortgage, it cannot be considered an innocent mortgagee." — This passage articulates the factual test applied to Land Bank, whose processing of Maniego's loan while the collateral remained in Poblete's name and whose execution of the mortgage one day after the transfer of title evidenced the haste that negated good faith.

• Yu Bun Guan vs. Ong, 419 Phil. 845 (2001) — Cited as authority for the rule that where a deed of absolute sale is completely simulated, void, and without effect, there is no legal basis for the issuance of the certificate of title and the certificate should be cancelled; also cited as the source of the pari delicto rule applied in the case.
• Ereña vs. Querrer-Kauffman, 525 Phil. 381 (2006) — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that when the instrument presented for registration is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not lose his title and the mortgagee acquires no right or title to the property, and that the mortgagee under the forged instrument is not protected by law.
• Bank of Commerce vs. San Pablo, Jr., G.R. No. 167848, 27 April 2007, 522 SCRA 713 — Cited for the rule that the fact that the person applying for the loan is other than the registered owner of the real property being mortgaged should already raise a red flag and induce the bank to inquire into and confirm the applicant's authority to mortgage, and that a person who deliberately ignores a significant fact that could create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable person is not an innocent purchaser for value.
• Prudential Bank vs. Kim Hyeun Soon, G.R. No. 149481, 24 October 2001 — Cited for the ruling that a bank failed to exercise due diligence although its representative conducted an ocular inspection, because the representative concentrated only on the appraisal of the property and failed to inquire as to who were the then occupants of the property.
• Cavite Development Bank vs. Lim, 381 Phil. 355 (2000) — Cited as the source of the doctrine of the mortgagee in good faith, based on the rule that buyers or mortgagees dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title.
• Montecillo vs. Reynes, 434 Phil. 456 (2002) — Cited for the rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is void ab initio for lack of consideration; also cited for the rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially if affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court.
• Catindig vs. Vda. De Meneses, G.R. No. 165851, 2 February 2011, 641 SCRA 350 — Cited for the doctrine of finality of judgment, that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, whether by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
• San Pedro vs. Ong, G.R. No. 177598, 17 October 2008, 569 SCRA 767 — Cited, together with Instrade, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, for the rule that where the mortgagee acted with haste in granting the mortgage loan and did not ascertain the ownership of the land being mortgaged, as well as the authority of the supposed agent executing the mortgage, it cannot be considered an innocent mortgagee.

• Article 2085, Civil Code — Enumerates the essential requisites of the contracts of pledge and mortgage, including that the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged and that the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property or, in the absence thereof, be legally authorized for the purpose. Because TCT No. T-20151 had been declared void by final judgment, Maniego was not the absolute owner of Lot No. 29, and the Real Estate Mortgage he executed in favor of Land Bank was void.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, subject to exceptional circumstances. The Court applied this rule in holding that the factual findings of the trial court, especially if affirmed by the CA, are binding, and in declining to re-examine the findings of forgery, non-payment of consideration, and absence of good faith on the part of Land Bank.
• Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, Rules of Court — Fixes the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari. This provision was cited in the Resolution dated 13 July 2011 denying Maniego's petition in G.R. No. 196807 for late filing, a denial that became final and executory on 19 January 2012 and foreclosed the issue of the nullity of Maniego's title.
• Section 13, Article VIII, Constitution — Requires the certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court in a decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. The certification accompanied the Decision, signed by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno upon the attestation of Justice Carpio as Division Chairperson.

• Mariano C. del Castillo
• Jose Portugal Perez
• Jose C. Mendoza (designated acting member per Special Order No. 1421 dated 20 February 2013)
• Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe