Lamsis vs. Dong-E

A jurisdictional objection based on the IPRA is barred by laches when raised for the first time before the Supreme Court after the party actively participated in trial and appellate proceedings despite being aware of the law's effect.

Respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E claimed ownership over an untitled parcel of land (Lot No. 1) in Baguio City, tracing her family's possession back to 1922 through her grandfather, Ap-ap. Petitioners, respondent's first cousins, occupied portions of the lot starting in the late 1970s with the permission of respondent's father. Upon expanding their occupation and selling portions of the lot to third parties, respondent filed an accion reivindicatoria to recover ownership and possession.

• Respondent's Claim of Ownership: Ap-ap's heirs obtained a survey plan and tax declaration in 1964. A Deed of Quitclaim was executed in favor of respondent's father, Gilbert Semon. Upon Gilbert's death, the property was extrajudicially partitioned to respondent, who paid realty taxes and occupied the property.
• Petitioners' Entry and Occupation: Between 1976 and 1978, Gilbert Semon allowed his in-laws (petitioners' parents) to stay on portions of Lot No. 1. Petitioners inherited the possession but later expanded their occupation and sold portions to co-petitioners Maynard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez.
• Evidence Presented: Respondent presented tax declarations, survey plans, the Deed of Quitclaim, and resolutions from the Land Management Office and the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL) favoring her claim. Petitioners claimed the land was owned by the heirs of Joaquin Smith, who permitted their parents to occupy it, and assailed the Deed of Quitclaim as a spurious, unauthenticated photocopy.

• Appreciation of Evidence: The CA erred in affirming the RTC; the Deed of Quitclaim is inadmissible under the best evidence rule as an unauthenticated photocopy, and tax declarations and survey plans are not indubitable proof of ownership.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Petitioners possessed the property publicly, peacefully, and exclusively for over 30 years; possession was not by mere tolerance.
• Jurisdiction under IPRA: The NCIP has exclusive jurisdiction over ancestral land disputes involving indigenous peoples, and customary laws should apply.
• Litis Pendentia and Primary Jurisdiction: The pending ancestral land claim before the NCIP should take precedence over the reivindicatory action to avoid conflicting decisions.

• Procedural Bar: The petition raises questions of fact, which are prohibited under Rule 45, and is a mere dilatory tactic.
• Laches on Jurisdiction: The jurisdictional objection was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court; petitioners are barred by laches from raising it after actively participating in lower court proceedings.
• No Litis Pendentia: The NCIP case (recognition of ancestral land claim) and the RTC case (accion reivindicatoria) involve different issues and rights; any judgment in the NCIP case would not amount to res judicata in the reivindicatory action.

• Factual Findings: Whether the CA disregarded material facts and circumstances in affirming the trial court's decision.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Whether petitioners acquired the subject property by prescription.
• Jurisdiction: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the IPRA.
• Litis Pendentia: Whether the ancestral land claim pending before the NCIP should take precedence over the reivindicatory action.

• Factual Findings: Factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are binding and not reviewable in a Rule 45 petition, which is limited to questions of law. Even without the Deed of Quitclaim, respondent's claim is adequately supported by other documentary and testimonial evidence spanning decades.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Acquisitive prescription did not set in. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and cannot ripen into ownership unless the juridical relation is expressly repudiated and communicated to the owner. Petitioners failed to prove any act of repudiation; the sale of portions in 1998, shortly before the filing of the case, did not satisfy the 30-year prescriptive period.
• Litis Pendentia: The pending ancestral land claim before the NCIP does not constitute litis pendentia. An ancestral land claim is akin to a registration proceeding that recognizes, but does not vest, ownership, and is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. The third element of litis pendentia—that a judgment in one case would amount to res judicata in the other—is absent. Consequently, there is no forum shopping.
• Jurisdiction: The jurisdictional objection based on the IPRA is barred by laches. While lack of jurisdiction can generally be raised at any time, a party who actively participates in trial and appellate proceedings despite being aware of a potential jurisdictional objection cannot raise it for the first time before the Supreme Court after receiving adverse decisions.

• Laches as a Bar to Jurisdictional Objections — While lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, laches will prevent a party from raising the objection if they fail to do so at the earliest opportunity, actively participate in the proceedings, and raise it only after receiving adverse judgments. This exception applies when a party is aware of the jurisdictional ground but neglects to invoke it through the trial and appellate levels.
• Possession by Tolerance and Acquisitive Prescription — Possession by mere tolerance of the owner is not adverse and does not start the running of the period for acquisitive prescription. To ripen into ownership, the possessor must expressly repudiate the tolerant possession and communicate such repudiation to the owner.
• Nature of Registration/Ancestral Land Titling Proceedings — The titling of ancestral lands, like registration under the Torrens system, does not create or vest title but merely recognizes ownership that has already vested by virtue of prior possession. It is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership and cannot be the basis for litis pendentia against an accion reivindicatoria.

• "There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the proceedings, of a possible jurisdictional objection, and has every opportunity to raise said objection, but fails to do so, even on appeal."
• "Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed, do not start the running of the period of prescription."
• "Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest’s possession of the property since time immemorial."

• Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 131 Phil. 556 (1968) — Followed. Established that laches bars a party from raising a court's lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal after actively participating in the proceedings.
• Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 114 (2004) — Followed. Held that registration does not create or vest title; certificates of title do not establish ownership.
• Esguerra v. Manantan, G.R. No. 158328, February 23, 2007 — Followed. Stated that possession by tolerance is not adverse and cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription without repudiation.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Applied to prohibit the review of factual issues in a petition for review on certiorari, the lower courts' factual findings being conclusive.
• Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA), Section 65, Chapter IX — Cited by petitioners to argue that customary laws should apply to disputes involving indigenous peoples; the Court did not rule on its applicability to jurisdiction, having barred the objection by laches.

Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Jose Portugal Perez.