Lamsen vs. People of the Philippines

A conviction for falsification of public documents cannot rest on expert handwriting testimony based on mere photocopies of the questioned document where the expert's own report expressly states that no definite conclusion can be rendered due to the nature of photocopies, and the prosecution has failed to prove the unavailability of the original under the best evidence rule. Corroborating circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence; circumstances that are immaterial or legally irrelevant to the act of falsification cannot sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Aniceta dela Cruz owned a parcel of land in Barrio Malabo, Valenzuela City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-16641, registered under the name "Aniceta dela Cruz, married to Nestor Tandas." Petitioner Hilario Lamsen was a nephew of Nestor Tandas and had been renting the property from the spouses. Upon Aniceta's death in September 2001, her surviving heirs—nieces Teresita dela Cruz Lao and Carmelita Lao Lee—sought to settle her estate and discovered that a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 21, 1993 purported to transfer the property to Lamsen for ₱150,000.00. The heirs suspected forgery and initiated criminal proceedings for falsification of public documents under Article 172(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

Aniceta dela Cruz owned a parcel of land of approximately forty-three square meters in Barrio Malabo, Valenzuela City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-16641 and registered in her name as "Aniceta dela Cruz, married to Nestor Tandas." Petitioner Hilario Lamsen, a nephew of Nestor Tandas, had been renting the property from the spouses. On September 7, 2001, Aniceta passed away, leaving as her surviving heirs her nieces Teresita dela Cruz Lao and Carmelita Lao Lee.

After Aniceta's death, Teresita went to the deceased's house to look for the owner's duplicate title of the property but could not find it. She executed an affidavit of loss, which was annotated on the title on file with the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela City on October 19, 2001. Teresita and Carmelita concurrently executed an extrajudicial settlement of Aniceta's estate. Teresita also filed a petition for the issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 75, but the petition was dismissed upon opposition by Lamsen, who claimed the original copy was in his possession.

On May 9, 2002, the Registry of Deeds informed Teresita that someone had requested registration of a deed of sale involving the subject property. She proceeded to the Registry of Deeds but was informed that the requesting party had withdrawn all papers. She photocopied the withdrawal entry from the Registry's book and then went to the Notarial Section of Manila to obtain a certified true copy of the deed, but was given only a photocopy since the original was no longer on file. She submitted this photocopy to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for examination, as the signatures of Aniceta and Nestor Tandas on the deed appeared to be forged. Document Examiner II Alex Batiles examined the photocopy and found dissimilarities between the questioned and standard signatures, indicating they were not written by the same person, though he noted that no definite conclusion could be rendered because the questioned signatures were photocopies.

Lamsen maintained that he had validly purchased the property from spouses Tandas in 1993 for ₱150,000.00 while renting the place from his uncle Nestor. He claimed the deed was executed, signed, and notarized by the spouses in the presence of witnesses at the GSIS Office in Manila, and that he left a photocopy with the notary public and took the original with him. He stated he did not inform Aniceta's relatives of the sale because they already had a strained relationship. The lower courts found Lamsen guilty, relying on Batiles's testimony and circumstantial evidence including the place of notarization, delayed registration after Aniceta's death, belated tax payments, and Lamsen's failure to produce the original deed during trial.

• Prescription: Lamsen argued that the offense had already prescribed, contending that the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the time the Notary Public submitted the Notarial Report with the Office of the Clerk of Court of Manila in April 1993, rather than from the discovery of the alleged forgery.
• Denial and Valid Purchase: Lamsen maintained that he validly bought and acquired the subject property from spouses Tandas in 1993 for ₱150,000.00, that the deed was duly executed, signed, and notarized in the presence of witnesses, and that the signatures on the deed were genuine.
• Newly Discovered Evidence: Lamsen sought a new trial before the CA, arguing that the original copy of the subject deed constituted newly discovered evidence that would exculpate him.

• Elements of Falsification: The prosecution argued that all elements of the crime of falsification of public documents under Article 172(1) of the RPC were present, as Lamsen was a private individual who caused the falsification of a notarized public document.
• Forgery Established: The prosecution contended that the expert testimony of Batiles established that the signatures of spouses Tandas on the subject deed were forged, as there were dissimilarities between the questioned and standard signatures.
• Circumstantial Evidence: The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence—place of notarization, delayed registration, belated tax payments, and non-production of the original deed—to corroborate the finding of falsification.

• Sufficiency of Expert Evidence: Whether the expert handwriting testimony based on mere photocopies of the questioned document is sufficient to establish forgery beyond reasonable doubt.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the lower courts is sufficient to sustain a conviction for falsification of public documents.
• Ultimate Issue: Whether Lamsen's conviction for falsification of public documents under Article 172(1) of the RPC should be upheld.

• Sufficiency of Expert Evidence: No. The expert witness's declaration was unreliable and inconclusive because it was inconsistent with his own Questioned Document Report, which expressly stated that no definite conclusion could be rendered due to the fact that the questioned signatures were mere photocopies.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: No. The circumstantial evidence was too insignificant and unconvincing to produce moral certainty of guilt, as the circumstances were either immaterial or legally irrelevant to the act of falsification.
• Ultimate Issue: No. Lamsen was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, the prosecution having failed to establish his guilt through competent and conclusive evidence.

• Sufficiency of Expert Evidence: The elements of falsification of public documents under Article 172(1) of the RPC require that the offender be a private individual, that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171, and that the falsification was committed in a public document. The fact of falsification or forgery must be established by clear, positive, and convincing evidence and is never presumed; it can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic signature of the person whose signature was allegedly forged. Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, handwriting may be proved by a witness with personal knowledge or by comparison with writings admitted or proved genuine. Here, the prosecution presented expert witness Batiles, who testified on cross-examination that the questioned signatures were not written by the same person and that the deed was falsified. However, this declaration was inconsistent with his own Questioned Document Report No. 130-03, which expressly stated that "no definite conclusion can be rendered due to the fact the questioned signatures are photocopies (Xerox) wherein minute details are not clearly manifested." Batiles himself clarified that handwriting elements such as movement, line quality, and emphasis could not be determined from a photocopy. Because photocopies are secondary evidence admissible only upon proof that the original was lost, destroyed, or in the custody of the party against whom the evidence is offered—and the prosecution neither produced the original nor proved its unavailability—no valid comparison could be made, rendering the expert testimony inconclusive.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction only if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt, constituting an unbroken chain consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence. The five circumstances relied upon by the lower courts failed this test. First, the Notarial Law does not require parties to have a deed notarized in their place of residence, making the Manila notarization immaterial. Second, the date when witnesses signed the deed is immaterial because under Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a notarized document's certificate of acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of execution. Third, delayed registration with the Registry of Deeds does not necessarily imply forgery. Fourth, belated payment of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes has no relevance to the act of falsification. Fifth, while non-production of the original deed was noted, the prosecution itself failed to prove the original was in Lamsen's custody so as to trigger the secondary evidence exception. These circumstances, individually and collectively, were too insignificant to create moral certainty of guilt.

• Ultimate Issue: Because the expert evidence was inconclusive and the circumstantial evidence insufficient, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving Lamsen's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. An appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and the reviewing tribunal has the duty to correct errors in the appealed judgment. The constitutional presumption of innocence prevails where the evidence does not produce moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind.

• Best Evidence Rule Applied to Questioned Documents — Photocopies are secondary evidence and cannot be admitted absent proof that the original was lost, destroyed, or in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered. Where expert handwriting analysis is conducted on mere photocopies, the findings are inconclusive, especially where the expert's own report states that no definite conclusion can be rendered due to the limitations of photocopies in revealing minute handwriting details. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Batiles's testimony was unreliable because the prosecution neither produced the original deed nor proved its unavailability under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

• Presumption of Regularity vs. Allegations of Forgery — The presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. Expert witness testimony constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best, and is inferior to direct evidence from a witness who was physically present at the signing and has personal knowledge thereof. The Court invoked this principle to underscore that the prosecution's evidence—limited to expert testimony on photocopies—was insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity attaching to the notarized deed.

• Circumstantial Evidence Standard for Conviction — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain consistent with each other, consistent with the accused's guilt, and inconsistent with innocence. The Court found that the five circumstances relied upon by the lower courts failed this standard because they were immaterial, legally irrelevant, or too insignificant to produce moral certainty.

• Notarized Document as Prima Facie Evidence of Execution — Under Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a notarized document may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument. The Court applied this rule to reject the lower courts' reliance on the absence of evidence as to when the alleged witnesses signed the deed.

• "However, no definite conclusion can be rendered due to the fact the questioned signatures are photocopies (Xerox) wherein minute details are not clearly manifested." — This passage from the Questioned Document Report No. 130-03, quoted by the Court, was central to the ruling that the expert testimony was inconclusive and could not support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

• "Since mere photocopies of the subject deed were used to examine the questioned and standard signatures of spouses Tandas, no valid comparison can be had between them, thereby rendering Batiles' declaration inconclusive to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Lamsen." — This statement encapsulates the ratio decidendi on the insufficiency of expert evidence based on photocopies.

• "the circumstantial evidence which the courts a quo relied upon in this case did not sufficiently create moral certainty, since they appear to be too insignificant and unconvincing." — This passage articulates the Court's conclusion that the circumstantial evidence failed to meet the standard for conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

• People vs. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212 (2015) — Cited for the proposition that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and the reviewing tribunal has the duty to correct, cite, and appreciate errors whether assigned or unassigned.
• People vs. Comboy, G.R. No. 218399, March 2, 2016 — Cited for the principle that an appeal confers full jurisdiction on the appellate court to examine records, revise the judgment, increase the penalty, and cite the proper penal law provision.
• People vs. Claro y Mahinay, G.R. No. 199894, April 5, 2017 — Cited for the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
• Guillergan vs. People, 656 Phil. 527 (2011) — Cited for the elements of falsification by a private individual under Article 172(1) of the RPC.
• Ambray vs. Tsourous, G.R. No. 209264, July 5, 2016 — Cited for the rule that forgery must be established by clear, positive, and convincing evidence through comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic signature, and that the presumption of regularity prevails over allegations of forgery.
• Atienza vs. People, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014 — Cited for the standard governing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence for conviction.

• Article 172(1), Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes falsification by private individuals of public or official documents. The Court examined whether the elements of this offense—offender is a private individual, commission of any act of falsification enumerated in Article 171, and falsification committed in a public document—were established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Section 22, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Governs the manner of proving the genuineness of handwriting: (1) by a witness who believes it to be the handwriting of the person because he has seen the person write or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness acted; or (2) by comparison with writings admitted or treated as genuine. The Court applied this provision to evaluate the admissibility and weight of the expert testimony.
• Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Embodies the best evidence rule, under which photocopies are secondary evidence admissible only upon proof that the original was lost, destroyed, or in the custody of the party against whom the evidence is offered. The Court found that the prosecution failed to satisfy this condition.
• Section 30, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Provides that a notarized document may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of execution. The Court invoked this provision to reject the lower courts' reliance on the absence of evidence regarding when the witnesses signed the deed.
• Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Sets the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases. The Court applied this standard to conclude that the evidence presented was insufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta, and Andres B. Reyes, Jr. concurred. Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa was on official leave.