Lam vs. Chua

An award of support in a nullity suit is void if rendered without proper amendment of the petition and without notice to the party obliged to give support, and if the amount is not supported by evidence of the child’s necessities and the parents’ resources or means. A prior compromise agreement providing for a common fund for the child’s benefit does not bar a subsequent judicial determination of support because a judgment for support never becomes final and may always be modified.

Jose Lam and Adriana Chua were married on January 13, 1984 and had one son, John Paul. Prior to any nullity proceeding, the spouses agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and contributed ₱250,000 each to a common fund for their child’s benefit, an arrangement approved by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati in a decision dated February 28, 1994. Shortly thereafter, Adriana filed a separate petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

• The Parties: Petitioner Jose Lam and respondent Adriana Chua were married on January 13, 1984 and had a son, John Paul Chua Lam.

• Prior Compromise Agreement: Before the nullity suit, the spouses filed a petition for voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. A compromise agreement was approved by the Makati RTC, under which each party contributed ₱250,000 to a common fund for the benefit of the child, subject to periodic accounting, and Adriana retained custody with visitation rights for Jose. The agreement was embodied in a decision dated February 28, 1994.

• Petition for Declaration of Nullity: On March 11, 1994, Adriana filed a petition before the Pasay RTC seeking a declaration of nullity of marriage solely on the ground of Jose’s psychological incapacity. The petition contained no prayer for child support.

• Proceedings Before the Trial Court: Jose was served with summons but filed no responsive pleading. The court directed the assistant city prosecutor to investigate and report on collusion; the report indicated no collusion. Trial was conducted on May 12, 1994, with Adriana as the lone witness. She testified that Jose seldom came home, did not work, and constantly asked for money to buy sports cars. After her testimony, Adriana formally offered her documentary evidence and submitted the case for decision. No evidence regarding the child’s support was presented.

• Motion to Reopen and Introduction of New Evidence: On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open, alleging she had secured new material evidence. The motion was granted. At the hearing on July 6, 1994, Adriana presented marriage contracts showing Jose had been previously married to Celia Santiago in 1977 and to Evan Lock in 1982. During the same hearing, Adriana’s counsel elicited testimony that she wanted the court to order Jose to support their child. In open court, the trial judge directed that a handwritten prayer for support be inserted into the petition.

• Trial Court Decision: On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC declared the marriage null and void for being bigamous and ordered Jose to pay ₱20,000 monthly support to John Paul. The RTC held that the compromise agreement approved by the Makati RTC was “of no moment” and could not limit the support ordered.

• Challenge to Support Award: Jose moved for reconsideration only insofar as the decision awarded support, arguing that the Makati RTC’s approved agreement already governed his obligation and that he had already contributed ₱500,000 to the common fund. The motion was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision.

• Procedural Irregularities Noted by the Supreme Court: The record did not show that Jose was notified of the July 6, 1994 hearing or that he received a copy of the order granting the motion to reopen. The petition was never formally amended to reflect the new ground of bigamy and the claim for support. The only evidence regarding support was Adriana’s bare statement that she wanted ₱20,000 to ₱25,000 per month; no proof was offered of the child’s actual needs or of the parents’ financial capacity.

• Bar by Prior Agreement: Petitioner Jose Lam maintained that the compromise agreement approved by the Makati RTC, which required him to contribute ₱250,000 to a common fund for the child’s benefit, barred the Pasay RTC from awarding additional monthly support. He contended that the support award effectively required him to pay twice for the same obligation.

• Modifiability of Support: Respondent Adriana Chua argued that a judgment for support is never final and may be modified according to the child’s needs and the parents’ capacity. The prior compromise agreement did not preclude a new judicial determination of support; the trial court could properly fix the amount in the nullity suit.

• Bar by Prior Compromise: Whether the compromise agreement approved by the Makati RTC, establishing a common fund for the child’s support, barred the Pasay RTC from awarding monthly support in the nullity of marriage case.

• Validity of Support Award: Whether the trial court’s award of ₱20,000 monthly support was valid, considering that it was rendered without proper amendment of the petition, without notice to petitioner, and without sufficient evidence of the child’s necessities and the parents’ means.

• Bar by Prior Compromise: The compromise agreement did not bar the subsequent award of support. A judgment for support never becomes final and is essentially provisional; it may be modified as the needs of the recipient and the means of the giver change. The prior arrangement for a common fund could not be treated as res judicata on the matter of support.

• Validity of Support Award: The award of ₱20,000 monthly support was void for lack of due process and for having been rendered without jurisdiction over the issue. The claim for support was not part of the original petition and was introduced only after the case had been submitted for decision, through a mere handwritten insertion made in open court without formal amendment or notice to the petitioner. Petitioner was not given the required opportunity to be present at the July 6, 1994 hearing and to refute the newly introduced claim. Even assuming the petition had been properly amended, the support award had no evidentiary foundation; the trial court fixed the amount solely on Adriana’s unsubstantiated statement, without any proof of the child’s actual monthly expenses or the parties’ respective financial capacities, as required by Articles 194, 201, and 202 of the Family Code. The trial court’s action exceeded the bounds of the pleadings and was therefore void for want of jurisdiction. The support award was consequently reversed, and the case was remanded for the proper reception of evidence and determination of support.

• Judgment for support is never final — A judgment ordering support does not attain finality and may be modified depending on the increased or decreased needs of the recipient and the means of the giver. Consequently, a prior compromise agreement on support does not constitute res judicata and cannot bar a subsequent claim for support.

• A court cannot render judgment beyond the pleadings — Any relief granted beyond the issues framed by the pleadings is coram non judice and void for want of jurisdiction. A judgment that exceeds the scope of the complaint or the allegations therein is a nullity and open to collateral attack.

• Estoppel may bar a jurisdictional challenge — Although a question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, a party who actively participated in the proceedings and failed to raise the jurisdictional defect at the earliest opportunity may be estopped from later questioning the court’s authority over the matter.

• Support must be proportionate to resources and needs — Under Articles 194, 201, and 202 of the Family Code, the amount of support is determined in proportion to the resources or means of the person obliged to give support and the necessities of the recipient. An award of support must be based on competent evidence establishing both the obligor’s capacity and the recipient’s actual requirements for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education, and transportation.

• “Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver.”

• “It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond them is coram non judice and void. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not merely irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to collateral attack.”

• “[A] jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this, however, admits of an exception where estoppel has supervened.”

• Advincula vs. Advincula, 10 SCRA 189 (1964) — Followed for the principle that a judgment for support never becomes final and may be modified as circumstances change.

• Asian Transmission Corporation vs. Canlubang Sugar Estates, G.R. No. 142383, August 29, 2003 — Applied for the rule that a court may not decide questions outside the pleadings and that a judgment beyond the issues is void for want of jurisdiction.

• TGL Sales Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 35 (2001) — Relied upon for the doctrine that estoppel may bar a party from questioning jurisdiction when the jurisdictional challenge was not timely raised.

• Family Code, Article 194 — Defines support as comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education, and transportation, in keeping with the family’s financial capacity. The trial court’s award of support had no factual basis linking the amount to these elements.

• Family Code, Articles 201 and 202 — Provide that support must be in proportion to the resources of the giver and the necessities of the recipient, and may be reduced or increased proportionately. The RTC did not receive evidence on these factors.

• Family Code, Article 48 — Prohibits defaults in annulment or declaration of nullity cases. Reinforces that the defendant is entitled to notice of all proceedings, including any substantial amendment of the petition.

• Revised Rules of Court, Rule 13, Section 9 — Requires that substantially amended or supplemental pleadings be served upon a party in default. The insertion of a new claim for support without proper service constituted a violation of this rule.

Quisumbing (Acting Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concurred. Puno, J. (Chairman), was on leave.