Lahom vs. Sibulo

The right of an adopter to rescind a decree of adoption is a mere statutory privilege, not a vested right, and is governed by the law in force at the time the action is filed; accordingly, a petition for rescission filed after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, which withdrew the adopter's right to rescind, cannot prosper.

Spouses Dr. Diosdado and Isabelita Lahom took in Isabelita's two-year-old nephew, Jose Melvin Sibulo, and raised him as their own. In 1971, the spouses filed a petition for adoption, which was granted on May 5, 1972, resulting in the change of the child's name to Jose Melvin Lahom. Over time, the relationship between petitioner and the adoptee deteriorated. The adoptee continued to use his biological surname in his professional dealings, visited petitioner only once a year despite her medical ailments, and exhibited jealousy toward petitioner's other relatives who visited her. The adoptee also filed a civil case for partition against petitioner, which she claimed demonstrated his motive for the adoption was purely material gain.

• The Adoption: Spouses Dr. Diosdado and Isabelita Lahom adopted petitioner's nephew, Jose Melvin Sibulo, when he was two years old. The adoption decree was granted on May 5, 1972, and the child's name was changed to Jose Melvin Lahom.
• Post-Adoption Estrangement: Respondent refused to use the surname Lahom, continuing to use Sibulo in his professional records with the Professional Regulation Commission since 1978. Petitioner, a widow living alone with leg ailments requiring frequent medical check-ups, received minimal care and visits from respondent, who saw her only once a year. Respondent also displayed jealousy toward petitioner's nieces and nephews, accusing them of seeking material benefits.
• Petition for Rescission: In December 1999, petitioner filed a petition to rescind the adoption decree. She alleged that respondent's indifference, his continued use of his biological surname, and his filing of a civil case for partition against her demonstrated a definite repudiation of the adoption, eroding her love and affection and negating the legal basis for the adoption's existence.

• Retroactivity of R.A. No. 8552: Petitioner argued that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552, which withdrew the adopter's right to rescind, should not apply retroactively to cases where the ground for rescission vested under the regime of the Civil Code and the Family Code.
• Vested Right: Petitioner maintained that her right to rescind the adoption, having been acquired under prior laws, constituted a vested right that the new statute could not impair, nor could it deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the action.

• Lack of Cause of Action: Respondent countered that petitioner had no cause of action under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552, which explicitly deleted the right of an adopter to rescind a decree of adoption.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Respondent argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the petition in light of the new adoption law.

• Rescission of Adoption: Whether an adoption decreed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 may still be rescinded by an adopter after the new law has taken effect.
• Prescription: Whether the adopter's action to rescind the adoption has prescribed.

• Rescission of Adoption: The action for rescission cannot be pursued. The right to rescind an adoption is a mere statutory privilege, not a vested right, and is subject to the state's regulation in the best interest of the child. Consistent with the rule that jurisdiction and substantive rights are determined by the law in force at the time the action is commenced, the filing of the petition months after R.A. No. 8552 took effect subjects the action to the new law. Because R.A. No. 8552 withdrew the adopter's right to rescind, the petition must fail. A right of action given by statute may be taken away at any time before it is exercised.
• Prescription: Even assuming the right to rescind existed under prior laws, the action had already prescribed. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 100 of the Rules of Court, an adopter must file a petition to set aside an adoption within five years from the time the cause arose. Petitioner's own allegations demonstrated that the legal grounds for rescission were known to her for more than five years prior to filing the petition in December 1999.

• Vested Right Doctrine — A vested right is a present fixed interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect, which is protected against arbitrary state action under the constitutional guaranty of due process. It includes exemptions from new obligations created after the right has vested. The right to rescind an adoption does not qualify as a vested right because it is a mere statutory privilege, and an exercise of a right within a prescriptive period is a condition that does not fulfill the requirements of a vested right.
• Statutory Privilege of Adoption — Adoption is not a naturally innate or fundamental right, but a privilege created by statute and governed by the state's determination of what serves the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.

• "While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a 'right,' the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child." — Defines the nature of adoption as a statutory privilege rather than a natural right, justifying the state's authority to alter rescission rules.
• "A right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised." — Articulates the principle that statutory privileges, such as the right to rescind an adoption, can be withdrawn by subsequent legislation prior to their exercise.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92326, 24 January 1992 — Followed. Established that the jurisdiction of the court and the substantive right to adopt are determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
• Republic vs. Miller, G.R. No. 125932, 21 April 1999 — Followed. Reiterated that controversies in adoption cases should be resolved in light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.

• Section 19, Article VI, Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act) — Limits the rescission of adoption to the adoptee upon specific grounds (physical maltreatment, attempt on life, sexual assault, or abandonment), explicitly withdrawing the adopter's right to rescind. Applied to bar the petitioner's action, the petition having been filed after the law's effectivity.
• Article 348, Civil Code & Article 192, Family Code — Previously allowed adopters to petition for revocation or rescission of adoption on grounds such as attempt on the life of the adopter, abandonment, or definite repudiation. Repealed or modified by R.A. No. 8552 insofar as the adopter's right to rescind is concerned.
• Section 5, Rule 100, Rules of Court — Requires that an adopter must file a petition to set aside an adoption within five years from the time the cause arose. Applied to hold that, even under prior laws, the petitioner's action had prescribed.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.