Lagrosa vs. People

An accused who perfects an appeal from a judgment of conviction is barred from applying for probation under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, even if the appellate court later reduces the penalty to a probationable range. The bar is not avoided by a claim that the application was made at the first opportunity where the appeal challenged the merits of the conviction and not solely the penalty.

Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin were the accused in Criminal Case No. 8243 before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, charged with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for possession of forest products without the requisite permits. The governing statute is P.D. No. 968, the Probation Law, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, which permits probation only in specified cases and, under Section 9(a), disqualifies offenders sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years. The controversy concerns the statutory interplay between the grant of probation and the accused’s perfection of an appeal from conviction.

Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin were the accused in Criminal Case No. 8243 before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2. On October 29, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision finding them guilty of violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for having in their possession forest products without the requisite permits. The trial court sentenced them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the trial court denied the motion on November 21, 1996. They appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20632. In their appellant’s brief, petitioners assigned two errors: first, that the lower court erred in finding both accused guilty because the evidence against them lacked moral certainty; and second, that if they were guilty, the lower court erred in imposing the proper penalty as provided by law. On March 14, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum. The decision became final and executory on April 12, 2000.

On August 29, 2001, petitioners filed an Application for Probation with the trial court. The trial court denied the application, and it likewise denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67308. On January 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the questioned resolutions of the trial court. Petitioners thus filed the present petition for review.

Petitioners contended that Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, is absurd and illogical because they were not given the opportunity to apply for probation when they were convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2; the penalty imposed by that court was more than six years and therefore non-probationable. They asserted that their first opportunity to apply for probation arose only when the Court of Appeals modified the sentence to a probationable range. They also claimed that what prompted them to appeal was the erroneous penalty imposed by the trial court. The Office of the Solicitor General reiterated the express provision of P.D. No. 968 prohibiting the grant of probation to those who have appealed their convictions and argued that the law makes no distinction even if the appeal was for the purpose of reducing an incorrect penalty.

The record showed that petitioners appealed from the decision of the trial court and applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed their conviction. Their appellant’s brief put the merits of their conviction in issue, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and asserting guiltlessness, rather than raising the impropriety of the penalty as the sole issue. On that record, the denial of probation was affirmed.

• Statutory Absurdity and First Opportunity: Petitioners argued that Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, is absurd and illogical because they were not given the opportunity to apply for probation when convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, since the penalty imposed was more than six years and therefore non-probationable; their first opportunity to apply arose only when the Court of Appeals modified the sentence to a probationable range.
• Inapplicability of Francisco vs. CA: Petitioners maintained that Francisco vs. CA is not applicable because in that case the accused could apply for probation since the penalty imposed by the lower court was already probationable, but the accused instead appealed; here, petitioners could not apply for probation when convicted because the penalty imposed was more than six years and non-probationable.
• Contrary to Purpose of Probation Law: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed is contrary to the purpose of the Probation Law.
• First Opportunity Under P.D. No. 1990: Petitioners invoked the fourth “whereas” clause of P.D. No. 1990, asserting that they applied for probation at the first opportunity and that their appeal was prompted by the erroneous penalty imposed by the trial court.

• Express Prohibition: The Office of the Solicitor General reiterated the express provision of P.D. No. 968 prohibiting the grant of probation to those who have appealed their convictions.
• No Distinction for Incorrect Penalty: The Office of the Solicitor General argued that even if petitioners appealed for the purpose of reducing an incorrect penalty, this fact does not remove them from the prohibition in Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, because the law makes no such distinction.

• Probation After Appeal: Whether petitioners may apply for probation after perfecting an appeal from the trial court’s judgment of conviction, when the Court of Appeals later reduced the penalty to a probationable range.
• First Opportunity Exception: Whether petitioners’ claim that they applied for probation at the “first opportunity” because their appeal was prompted by an erroneous penalty exempts them from the statutory bar on probation for those who appealed.
• Equitable Exception for Penalty-Only Appeals: Whether an appeal taken solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit should be considered an exception to the bar on probation.
• Applicability of Francisco vs. CA: Whether Francisco vs. CA applies to petitioners, who could not have applied for probation at the trial court because the penalty imposed was non-probationable.

• Probation After Appeal: No. Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. Petitioners perfected an appeal and applied only after the Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction.
• First Opportunity Exception: No. The “first opportunity” clause does not excuse the statutory bar; petitioners’ appeal challenged the merits of their conviction, not solely the penalty, so they did not appeal merely to reduce the penalty to a probationable range.
• Equitable Exception for Penalty-Only Appeals: No, not under the circumstances. The Court was not prepared to accept the suggested proposition that an appeal solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit should not bar probation, especially given petitioners’ factual circumstances.
• Applicability of Francisco vs. CA: Francisco vs. CA does not aid petitioners. The Court cited it for the principle that perfecting an appeal relinquishes the alternative remedy of probation and to prevent speculation or opportunism; petitioners’ appeal was not solely to correct the penalty.

• Probation After Appeal: Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, provides that the trial court may grant probation after conviction and sentence upon application within the period for perfecting an appeal, but “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.” The filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, making probation and appeal alternative remedies. Petitioners appealed from the trial court’s judgment and applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed their conviction. This fact alone merited denial. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law. The purpose of the rule is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation but does so only after failing in the appeal. The Court also noted that before P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D. No. 1990, an accused was allowed to apply for probation even after filing an appeal, as long as he had not begun serving his sentence, but the amendment changed that rule.
• First Opportunity Exception: Petitioners invoked the fourth “whereas” clause of P.D. No. 1990, which states that probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated. They claimed that their appeal was prompted by the erroneous penalty imposed by the trial court. The Court found them not candid. In their appellant’s brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 20632, they assigned as errors that the lower court erred in finding both accused guilty because the evidence lacked moral certainty and, if ever they were guilty, that the lower court erred in imposing the proper penalty. By putting the merits of their conviction in issue, they belied their claim that the appeal was prompted only by an incorrect penalty. Their protestations connoted a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and did not simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed. They never manifested that they were appealing only to correct a wrong penalty to reduce it within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting their innocence, they were precluded from seeking probation.
• Equitable Exception for Penalty-Only Appeals: The Court acknowledged that it had been suggested that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable. However, the Court was not yet prepared to accept this proposition, especially given the factual circumstances of the case. Had petitioners’ appeal from the decision of the trial court raised the impropriety of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole issue, perhaps the Court would have been more sympathetic to their plight. Because their misrepresentation led to their own undoing, the suggested exception did not apply.
• Applicability of Francisco vs. CA: Petitioners argued that Francisco vs. CA was not applicable because in that case the accused could apply for probation since the penalty imposed by the lower court was already probationable, but the accused instead appealed; here, petitioners could not apply for probation when convicted because the penalty imposed was more than six years and non-probationable. The Court nevertheless relied on the principle from Francisco vs. CA that by perfecting an appeal, petitioners ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is to prevent speculation or opportunism. The Court also cited Francisco vs. CA in noting the suggested equitable exception for penalty-only appeals, but declined to accept it in this case. Under Section 9(a) of the Probation Law, offenders sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years are disqualified; the trial court’s original maximum of eight years was beyond coverage, and petitioners became eligible only after the Court of Appeals reduced the penalty, but the appeal bar still precluded probation.

• Probation and Appeal as Alternative Remedies — Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, probation may be granted only upon application filed within the period for perfecting an appeal, and the filing of such application is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Conversely, no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. The Court applied this rule to hold that petitioners, who appealed and applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction, were clearly precluded from probation.
• Perfection of Appeal Relinquishes Probation Remedy — By perfecting an appeal, an accused ipso facto relinquishes the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law. The rationale is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation but does so only after failing in the appeal. The Court applied this doctrine to petitioners, who appealed their conviction and only later sought probation.
• “First Opportunity” Clause Does Not Excuse Appeal Bar — The fourth “whereas” clause of P.D. No. 1990 states that probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated. This clause does not override the statutory bar where the accused perfected an appeal and challenged the merits of the conviction rather than solely the penalty. The Court rejected petitioners’ invocation of the clause because their appellant’s brief assailed the sufficiency of the evidence and asserted guiltlessness.
• Probation Eligibility and Six-Year Disqualification — Section 9(a) of the Probation Law disqualifies offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years. The trial court’s original sentence of eight years maximum was non-probationable; the Court of Appeals later reduced the maximum to one year, eight months and twenty-one days, but the appeal bar still prevented petitioners from applying for probation.
• No Accepted Equitable Exception for Penalty-Only Appeals — The Court was not prepared to accept the proposition that an appeal should not bar probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit. It declined to apply such an exception given the factual circumstances, noting that had the impropriety of the penalty been the sole issue, it might have been more sympathetic. This doctrine is stated as of this case.

• "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." — This is the statutory bar in Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, and is the controlling rule that defeated petitioners’ application.
• "By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for denying probation after appeal and explains the anti-opportunism rationale.
• "Had the petitioners’ appeal from the decision of the trial court raised the impropriety of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole issue, perhaps this Court would have been more sympathetic to their plight. Unfortunately, their misrepresentation has led to their own undoing." — This passage shows the Court’s refusal to apply the suggested equitable exception in light of petitioners’ challenge to the merits of their conviction.
• "WHEREAS, probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated; x x x." — This is the fourth “whereas” clause of P.D. No. 1990 that petitioners invoked and that the Court construed against them.

• People vs. Evangelista, 324 Phil. 80 (1996) — Cited to note that before P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D. No. 1990, an accused was allowed to apply for probation even after filing an appeal, as long as he had not begun serving his sentence; also cited for the proposition that having appealed from the judgment of the trial court merits denial of probation.
• Francisco vs. CA, 313 Phil. 241 (1995) — Cited by petitioners as inapplicable and relied upon by the Court for the principle that perfecting an appeal relinquishes the alternative remedy of probation and to prevent speculation or opportunism; also cited in connection with the suggested equitable exception for appeals solely to reduce the penalty to a probationable limit.
• Francisco vs. CA, 243 SCRA 384, 399 — Cited by Justice Vitug in his separate opinion, in which he reiterated his dissenting opinion in that case. The provided text does not elaborate on its reasoning.

• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990 — Provides that the trial court may grant probation after conviction and sentence upon application by the defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal; that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction; that probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes imprisonment or a fine only; that the application shall be filed with the trial court; that filing the application is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal; and that an order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. Applied: because petitioners perfected an appeal, their later application for probation was barred.
• Section 9(a), Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law) — Disqualifies offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years from seeking probation. Applied: the trial court’s original maximum of eight years was non-probationable, and although the Court of Appeals reduced the maximum to one year, eight months and twenty-one days, the appeal bar still precluded probation.
• Section 68, Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended (The Revised Forestry Code) — The provision under which petitioners were convicted for having in their possession forest products without the requisite permits. Applied: the conviction and sentence triggered the probation issue.
• Fourth “whereas” clause, Presidential Decree No. 1990 — States that probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated. Applied: petitioners invoked this clause, but the Court rejected their claim because they appealed and challenged the merits of their conviction.

Chief Justice Davide, Jr., and Justices Carpio and Azcuna concurred.

• Justice Vitug — He stated: “I reiterate my separate (dissenting) opinion in Francisco vs. CA (243 SCRA 384, 399).” The provided text does not contain further elaboration of his reasons.