Lagman vs. City of Manila

A city ordinance regulating the entry and routes of provincial public utility vehicles within the city is a valid exercise of the city's police power under its charter, and such power prevails over the administrative authority of the Director of Public Works and the Public Service Commission. The city's charter, being a special law of later enactment, is deemed an exception to general laws on traffic regulation and public service regulation, and the ordinance does not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission so long as it does not prevent or unreasonably interfere with the utility's operation under its certificate.

Petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman, doing business as "Marco Transit," was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public Service Commission to operate fifteen auto trucks for public service along a fixed route from Bocaue (Bulacan) to Parañaque (Rizal), passing through various points within the City of Manila. Respondent City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4986 pursuant to Section 18, paragraph (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which empowered the Municipal Board to "prohibit and regulate the entrance of provincial utility vehicles into the city, except those passing thru the city." The ordinance was enacted as a measure to relieve critical traffic congestion in the city.

Petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman, doing business under the firm name and style "Marco Transit," was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public Service Commission on 20 March 1963 in PSC Case No. 61-7383, authorizing him to operate fifteen auto trucks for public service with fixed routes and regular terminals for the transportation of passengers and freight on the line Bocaue (Bulacan) — Parañaque (Rizal), passing through various municipalities and, within Manila, through Rizal Avenue, Plaza Goiti, McArthur Bridge, Plaza Lawton, P. Burgos, Taft Avenue, and Taft Avenue Extension. Pursuant to this certificate, petitioner began operating twelve passenger buses along his authorized line.

On 17 June 1964, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, in pursuance to Section 18, paragraph (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila), enacted Ordinance No. 4986, entitled "An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic On Roads and Streets Within The City of Manila, and For Other Purposes," which the City Mayor approved on 13 July 1964, effective upon approval. The ordinance defined "provincial passenger buses" as those whose route lines come from or go to points beyond Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Quezon City, Caloocan City, and Navotas. It provided specific entry points and routes for provincial passenger buses entering Manila, allowed only from 6:30 A.M. to 8:30 P.M. every day except Sundays and holidays, and established a flexible shuttle bus service system under which provincial bus operators could be allowed shuttle buses to transport passengers from entry control points, with no shuttle bus permitted to load or unload passengers along the way except at designated places. Violations of the ordinance were punishable by a fine of not less than P20.00 nor more than P200.00, or imprisonment of not less than five days nor more than six months, or both.

On 17 August 1964, the Mayor of the City of Manila, through its police agencies, began actual enforcement of the ordinance and prevented petitioner from operating his buses, except two "shuttle" buses, along the line specified in his certificate of public convenience. Petitioner claimed that the enactment and enforcement of the ordinance was unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void, contending that the routes within Manila through which he was authorized to operate were national roads or streets, the regulation and control of which were vested under Commonwealth Act No. 548 in the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. He also contended that the power conferred upon the City under Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409 did not include the right to enact an ordinance that had the effect of amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted by the Public Service Commission, since any amendment or modification of such certificate was solely vested by law in the Commission and only after notice and hearing. He further contended that the enforcement of the ordinance was arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable because the city streets from which he was prevented from operating were the cream of his business, and that even assuming the ordinance was valid, only the Public Service Commission could require compliance with its provisions under Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act. In his memorandum, petitioner added that although his buses fell within the definition of "provincial passenger buses" under the ordinance, they merely "pass thru the city," and thus his operation was covered within the saving clause of Section 18(hh).

Respondent City of Manila maintained that its power to "prohibit and regulate the entrance of provincial public utility vehicles into the City, except those passing thru the City" was an explicit delegation of police power that was paramount and superior both to the administrative power of the Director of Public Works under Commonwealth Act No. 548 and to the administrative authority of the Public Service Commission under Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act. It also maintained that the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 had been repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 917, and that even assuming no repeal, Republic Act No. 409, being a special law of later enactment, prevailed over Commonwealth Act No. 548. Respondent further argued that Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act imposed a duty on the Public Service Commission to require any public service to comply with any ordinance relating thereto, and that since petitioner admittedly engaged in business within the city limits by picking up passengers therein, his buses did not merely pass thru the city and were not covered within the saving clause.

• Usurpation of Authority of Director of Public Works: Petitioner contended that the routes within Manila through which he was authorized to operate were national roads or streets, and the regulation and control of traffic on such roads were vested under Commonwealth Act No. 548 in the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; since the ordinance was not proposed nor approved by these executive officials, its enactment and enforcement was a usurpation of their functions and therefore unauthorized and illegal.

• Encroachment on Public Service Commission's Power: Petitioner argued that the power conferred upon the City under Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409 did not include the right to enact an ordinance that had the effect of amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted by the Public Service Commission, because any amendment or modification of such certificate was solely vested by law in the Commission and only after notice and hearing under Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act.

• Arbitrary and Oppressive Enforcement: Petitioner contended that the enforcement of the ordinance was arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable because the city streets from which he was prevented from operating his buses were the cream of his business.

• Exclusive Enforcement by Public Service Commission: Petitioner argued that even assuming Ordinance No. 4986 was valid, only the Public Service Commission could require compliance with its provisions under Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act, and since its implementation was without the sanction or approval of the Commission, its enforcement was unauthorized and illegal.

• Application of Saving Clause: Petitioner added in his memorandum that although his buses fell within the definition of "provincial passenger buses" under the ordinance, they merely "pass thru the city," and thus his operation was covered within the saving clause of Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409, and he should not have been prevented from operating his buses within the city streets specified in his certificate of public convenience.

• Delegation of Police Power: Respondent maintained that its power to "prohibit and regulate the entrance of provincial public utility vehicles into the City, except those passing thru the City" was an explicit delegation of police power that was paramount and superior both to the administrative power of the Director of Public Works under Commonwealth Act No. 548 and to the administrative authority of the Public Service Commission under Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act.

• Repeal of Commonwealth Act No. 548: Respondent maintained that the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 had been repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 917, and even assuming no repeal, Ordinance No. 4986 did not contravene Commonwealth Act No. 548 because Republic Act No. 409, being a special law of later enactment, prevailed over the former.

• Duty of Public Service Commission to Enforce Ordinances: Respondent argued that Republic Act No. 409 did not contravene Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act, since Section 17(j) of the latter Act imposed a duty on the Public Service Commission to require any public service to comply with any ordinance relating thereto.

• Inapplicability of Saving Clause: Respondent maintained in its reply memorandum that since petitioner admittedly engaged in business within the city limits by picking up passengers therein, his buses did not merely pass thru the city and were not covered within the saving clause of Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409.

• Validity of Ordinance Under Commonwealth Act No. 548: Whether Ordinance No. 4986 was invalid as a usurpation of the authority of the Director of Public Works to regulate traffic on national roads under Commonwealth Act No. 548.

• Encroachment on Public Service Commission's Jurisdiction: Whether the ordinance was invalid for having the effect of amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted by the Public Service Commission without the notice and hearing required by Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act.

• Arbitrariness and Oppressiveness of Enforcement: Whether the enforcement of the ordinance was arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable.

• Exclusive Enforcement by Public Service Commission: Whether the ordinance could only be enforced by the Public Service Commission under Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act.

• Application of Saving Clause: Whether petitioner's buses, which picked up passengers within the city, merely "pass thru the city" and were thus covered within the saving clause of Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409.

• Validity of Ordinance Under Commonwealth Act No. 548: No. Republic Act No. 409, being a special law of later enactment than Commonwealth Act No. 548, prevails over the latter to the extent of any necessary repugnancy, and Section 18(hh) of the Manila Charter is deemed an exception to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548.

• Encroachment on Public Service Commission's Jurisdiction: No. The power vested in the Public Service Commission under Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act is subordinate to the authority granted to the City under Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409, since the Public Service Act contains no provision vesting power in the Commission to superintend, regulate, or control the streets of the City or suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof.

• Arbitrariness and Oppressiveness of Enforcement: No. There was no evidence to substantiate the charge of arbitrariness, and petitioner was not totally banned from operating all his buses, having been allowed to operate two "shuttle" buses within the city limits.

• Exclusive Enforcement by Public Service Commission: No. Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act refers not only to ordinances but also to "the laws of the Philippines," and it is plainly absurd to assume that even laws relating to public services are to remain a dead letter without the placet of the Commission; the Commission's powers are merely supplementary to those of state organs upon which the enforcement of laws primarily rests.

• Application of Saving Clause: No. Petitioner admitted that his buses engaged in business within the city limits by picking up passengers therein; hence, they do not merely "pass thru the city" and cannot avail of the saving clause of Section 18(hh).

• Validity of Ordinance Under Commonwealth Act No. 548: The Court applied the familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage, citing Cassion vs. Banco Nacional Filipino, 89 Phil. 560, 561. The Court noted that Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority upon the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and traffic on national roads or streets. Because repeals by implication are not favored, a special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion, citing Baga vs. Philippine National Bank, 52 O.G. 6140, and City of Geneses vs. Illinois Northern Utility Co., 39 NE 2d, p. 26. Thus, Section 18(hh) of the Manila Charter is deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548.

• Encroachment on Public Service Commission's Jurisdiction: The Court reasoned that although the Public Service Commission is empowered under Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act to amend, modify, or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, there is no provision in that statute vesting power in the Commission to superintend, regulate, or control the streets of the City or suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. The Court cited the American case of Stuck vs. Town of Beech Grove, 163 N.E. 483; 166 N.E. 153, holding that ordinances designating the streets within a municipality upon which buses may operate, or prohibiting their operation in certain streets, do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission over motorbus common carriers, so long as the ordinances do not prevent or unreasonably interfere with the utility's operation under the certificate or franchise granted by that Commission. The Court further noted that Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act, which empowers the Commission to require any public service to comply with municipal ordinances relating thereto, makes evident that the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic in the streets subject to their control.

• Arbitrariness and Oppressiveness of Enforcement: The Court found that there was no evidence to substantiate the charge that the implementation of the ordinance was arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable. It was not disputed that petitioner had not been totally banned or prohibited from operating all his buses, as he was allowed to operate two "shuttle" buses within the city limits.

• Exclusive Enforcement by Public Service Commission: The Court rejected petitioner's contention that under Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act, the respective ordinances of the City could only be enforced by the Commission alone. The Court reasoned that subsection (j) refers not only to ordinances but also to "the laws of the Philippines," and it is plainly absurd to assume that even laws relating to public services are to remain a dead letter without the placet of the Commission. The section makes no distinction whatever between enforcement of laws and that of municipal ordinances. The very fact that the Commission is empowered, but not required, to demand compliance with apposite laws and ordinances proves that the Commission's powers are merely supplementary to those of state organs, such as the police, upon which the enforcement of laws primarily rests.

• Application of Saving Clause: The Court held that petitioner could not avail of the saving clause of Section 18(hh) because he admitted that his buses engaged in business within the city limits by picking up passengers therein; hence, they do not merely "pass thru the city."

• Special Law Prevails Over General Law — To the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage. The Court applied this rule to hold that Republic Act No. 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, being a special law of later enactment than Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Act, prevails over both general laws.

• Exception Grafted Upon General Law — Because repeals by implication are not favored, a special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Where a special act is repugnant to or inconsistent with a prior general act, a partial repeal of the latter act will be implied or an exception grafted upon the general act. The Court applied this principle to deem Section 18(hh) of the Manila Charter an exception to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548.

• Municipal Police Power Over Streets vs. Public Service Commission Jurisdiction — Ordinances designating the streets within a municipality upon which buses may operate, or prohibiting their operation in certain streets, do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission over motorbus common carriers, so long as the ordinances do not prevent or unreasonably interfere with the utility's operation under the certificate or franchise granted by that Commission. The Court adopted this principle from American jurisprudence to uphold the validity of the ordinance.

• Supplementary Nature of Public Service Commission's Enforcement Powers — The Public Service Commission's power under Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act to require public services to comply with laws and ordinances is merely supplementary to those of state organs, such as the police, upon which the enforcement of laws primarily rests. The Commission is empowered, but not required, to demand compliance, and the section makes no distinction between enforcement of laws and that of municipal ordinances.

• "for with or without an express enactment it is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage." — This passage, quoted from Cassion vs. Banco Nacional Filipino, states the controlling rule of statutory construction that the Court applied to hold that the Manila Charter, as a special law, prevails over the general provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Act.

• "Ordinances designating the streets within a municipality upon which buses may operate, or prohibiting their operation in certain streets do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission over motorbus common carriers, so long as the ordinances do not prevent or unreasonably interfere with the utility's operation under the certificate or franchise granted by that Commission." — This passage, quoted from the American case of Stuck vs. Town of Beech Grove, articulates the principle that municipal traffic regulations do not encroach upon the Public Service Commission's jurisdiction over public utilities, which the Court adopted to reject petitioner's contention that the ordinance improperly amended his certificate of public convenience.

• "The very fact, furthermore, that the Commission is empowered, but not required, to demand compliance with apposite laws and ordinances proves that the Commission's powers are merely supplementary to those of state organs, such as the police, upon which the enforcement of laws primarily rests." — This passage states the Court's reasoning for rejecting petitioner's argument that only the Public Service Commission could enforce the ordinance, establishing that the Commission's enforcement powers are supplementary rather than exclusive.

• Cassion vs. Banco Nacional Filipino, 89 Phil. 560, 561 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law to the extent of any necessary repugnancy, without regard to the respective dates of passage.

• Baga vs. Philippine National Bank, 52 O.G. 6140 — Cited for the principle that because repeals by implication are not favored, a special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

• City of Geneses vs. Illinois Northern Utility Co., 39 NE 2d, p. 26 — Cited for the proposition that where a special act is repugnant to or inconsistent with a prior general act, a partial repeal of the latter act will be implied or an exception grafted upon the general act.

• Stuck vs. Town of Beech Grove, 163 N.E. 483; 166 N.E. 153 — Cited as persuasive American authority for the principle that municipal ordinances designating streets upon which buses may operate do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission over motorbus common carriers, so long as the ordinances do not prevent or unreasonably interfere with the utility's operation under its certificate or franchise.

• Section 18, paragraph (hh), Republic Act No. 409, as amended (Revised Charter of the City of Manila) — The provision empowering the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to "establish and regulate the size, speed, and operation of motor and other public vehicles within the city; to establish bus stops and terminals; and prohibit and regulate the entrance of provincial utility vehicles into the city, except those passing thru the city." The Court held that this provision was an explicit delegation of police power authorizing the enactment of Ordinance No. 4986.

• Commonwealth Act No. 548 — The statute vesting in the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads or streets. The Court held that this Act does not confer an exclusive power upon the Director of Public Works, and that Section 18(hh) of the Manila Charter is deemed an exception to its provisions.

• Section 16(m), Commonwealth Act No. 146 (Public Service Act) — The provision empowering the Public Service Commission to amend, modify, or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing. The Court held that this power is subordinate to the authority granted to the City under Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409, since the Public Service Act contains no provision vesting power in the Commission to superintend, regulate, or control the streets of the City.

• Section 17(j), Commonwealth Act No. 146 (Public Service Act) — The provision empowering the Public Service Commission, without previous hearing, to require any public service to comply with the laws of the Philippines and with any provincial resolution or municipal ordinance relating thereto. The Court held that this provision does not make the Commission the exclusive enforcer of ordinances, as it refers not only to ordinances but also to laws, and the Commission's powers are merely supplementary to those of state organs such as the police.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concurred.