Ladiana vs. People

A counter-affidavit voluntarily executed by an accused during preliminary investigation—even without the assistance of counsel—is admissible as a party admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, because the right to counsel guaranteed in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution attaches only during custodial interrogation, not during preliminary investigation proceedings. Once the accused admits the act of killing, the burden of proof shifts to him to establish a justifying circumstance such as self-defense by clear and convincing evidence; an uncorroborated and self-serving claim of self-defense in the same counter-affidavit is insufficient to discharge that burden.

On December 29, 1989, Josue R. Ladiana, a member of the Integrated National Police assigned at the Lumban Police Station in Laguna, confronted Barangay Captain Francisco San Juan over the latter’s removal of steel pipe barricades placed along P. Jacinto Street in Barangay Salac. An altercation ensued, and Ladiana shot San Juan, inflicting fatal wounds to the head and neck. Ladiana was charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan, with the amended Information alleging that he acted in relation to his duties, taking advantage of his official position, and with treachery. After trial, the Sandiganbayan found no evidence of treachery and convicted him of homicide.

• The Incident: On December 29, 1989, in Lumban, Laguna, petitioner Josue R. Ladiana, a police officer, confronted Barangay Captain Francisco San Juan who was removing steel pipe barricades along P. Jacinto Street. An argument ensued, and petitioner, armed with a firearm, shot San Juan. The victim sustained two gunshot wounds—one entering behind the left ear and exiting above the right cheekbone, the other entering at the right lateral aspect of the neck and exiting at the left cheek—both fatal.
• Prosecution Evidence: The prosecution presented the victim’s wife, Caridad San Juan; responding police officers PO2 Leopoldo Cacalda and SPO2 Percival Gabinete; the municipal health officer Dr. Rogelio Javan who conducted the necropsy; and retired Assistant Prosecutor Mario Cortez, before whom petitioner’s counter-affidavit was subscribed and sworn. No eyewitness to the shooting testified; the victim’s companion, Rodolfo Cabrera, was not presented.
• The Counter-Affidavit and Admissions: During the preliminary investigation, petitioner executed a counter-affidavit dated July 31, 1990, subscribed before Assistant Prosecutor Cortez. In that affidavit, petitioner admitted shooting the victim, stating that San Juan attacked him, grabbed him by the neck, and attempted to stab him, causing a wound on petitioner’s right bicep; petitioner then fired a warning shot (“pasumala”) and, in the confusion, struck the victim. He claimed self-defense. At trial, defense counsel expressly admitted the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the counter-affidavit, and these admissions were recorded in the proceedings.
• Defense’s Posture: Petitioner did not present any evidence. After his motion for leave to file a demurrer was denied, he waived the presentation of controverting evidence and submitted the case on memorandum.

• Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit: Petitioner argued that his counter-affidavit, executed without the assistance of counsel, violated his right to counsel under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, and was therefore inadmissible as an extrajudicial confession. He contended that the right to competent and independent counsel applies during preliminary investigations, not merely during custodial interrogation.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner maintained that no eyewitness identified him as the shooter, and the conviction was based solely on the counter-affidavit whose execution was admitted by counsel but not by him personally. He claimed the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the Sandiganbayan selectively used incriminating portions of the affidavit while ignoring exculpatory assertions.
• Denial of Demurrer: Petitioner asserted that the Sandiganbayan committed legal and constitutional error in denying his Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the prosecution had not established a prima facie case.
• Voluntary Surrender: Petitioner claimed entitlement to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, pointing to prosecution witnesses who testified that he had surrendered to police authorities after the incident.

• Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit: Respondent countered that the constitutional right to counsel applies only during custodial investigation; a counter-affidavit filed in a preliminary investigation is not a product of custodial interrogation and is therefore admissible as a voluntary admission. The prosecution also stressed that defense counsel admitted the affidavit’s authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness in open court, binding petitioner.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Burden of Proof: Respondent argued that petitioner’s admission of the fatal shooting, combined with the medico-legal evidence and death certificate, established homicide beyond reasonable doubt. By admitting the killing, petitioner bore the burden of proving self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, a burden he failed to discharge.
• Denial of Demurrer: Respondent maintained that leave to file a demurrer to evidence is discretionary, and no grave abuse of discretion attended its denial.
• Voluntary Surrender: Respondent contended that the elements of voluntary surrender were not satisfactorily proven; mere hearsay testimony that petitioner went to the police station did not establish a spontaneous, unconditional surrender or an acknowledgment of guilt.

• Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit: Whether petitioner’s counter-affidavit executed during preliminary investigation without the assistance of counsel is admissible as proof of his complicity in the crime, or whether its admission violated the right to counsel under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
• Denial of Leave to File Demurrer: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender under the Revised Penal Code.

• Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit: The counter-affidavit was admissible. The right to counsel enshrined in Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution exists only during custodial interrogation—that is, questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. A preliminary investigation before a public prosecutor does not constitute custodial interrogation; the defendant is no longer under such interrogation once a criminal case has been filed. Thus, the constitutional protections requiring the presence of counsel and a written waiver did not attach when petitioner executed his counter-affidavit. The counter-affidavit constituted an admission, not a confession, because petitioner acknowledged the act of shooting but denied criminal intent by invoking self-defense. Nevertheless, under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the admission was admissible in evidence against him. The admissions were further fortified by defense counsel’s express acknowledgment in court of the affidavit’s authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness; a client is bound by the actions and admissions of his counsel unless the latter’s negligence is gross and deprives the client of due process, which was not shown here. Once petitioner admitted the killing, the burden of proof shifted to him to establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression. His uncorroborated and self-serving statements in the counter-affidavit were insufficient for that purpose. The Sandiganbayan did not selectively treat the affidavit; it properly evaluated the evidence and correctly concluded that the justifying circumstance was not proved. The constitutional presumption of innocence had been overcome, and conviction for homicide was warranted.
• Denial of Leave to File Demurrer: The denial was not erroneous. Prior leave to file a demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court; absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the trial court’s resolution will not be disturbed. Petitioner failed to demonstrate such grave abuse.
• Voluntary Surrender: The mitigating circumstance was not established. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, three elements must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous, indicating an intent to submit unconditionally, either by acknowledging guilt or by saving the authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture. The record contained only hearsay statements that petitioner had gone to the police station; there was no evidence that he was not arrested, that he surrendered to a person in authority, or that he evinced a desire to admit responsibility. Simply going to the police station to report an incident does not constitute voluntary surrender.

• Custodial Investigation and the Right to Counsel: The rights enumerated in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution—including the right to competent and independent counsel and the requirement of a written waiver in the presence of counsel—apply exclusively to custodial interrogations. Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. A defendant undergoing preliminary investigation before a public prosecutor is not under custodial interrogation; hence, the constitutional strictures on extrajudicial confessions do not govern statements made during that stage.
• Admission Distinguished from Confession: A confession is a declaration acknowledging guilt of the offense charged or of any offense necessarily included therein; an admission is a statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or criminal intent. A statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act but denying criminal intent (e.g., by invoking self-defense) is an admission, not a confession. Both, however, are admissible in evidence against the declarant under the Rules of Court.
• Burden of Proof in Self-Defense: When the accused admits the act of killing, the burden of proof shifts to him to establish the justifying circumstance of self-defense by sufficient, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part. An uncorroborated and self-serving claim is insufficient. If the accused fails to discharge this burden, conviction necessarily follows on the basis of the admission of the killing.
• Elements of Voluntary Surrender: For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or his agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary and spontaneous, clearly indicating an intent to submit unconditionally, either to acknowledge guilt or to spare the authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture. Hearsay evidence of a defendant’s presence at a police station, without proof of the manner and intent of the act, does not suffice.
• Client Bound by Counsel’s Admissions: In the conduct of litigation, clients are bound by the actions and admissions of their counsel, unless the counsel’s negligence is so gross, reckless, and inexcusable as to deprive the client of his day in court. Counsel’s admission in open court regarding the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of a document is binding on the accused.

• “Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” — This definition was used to distinguish preliminary investigation from custodial interrogation, grounding the ruling that the right to counsel did not attach.
• “There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or interrogation.” — This passage crystallizes the central holding that the constitutional ban applies only to police custodial investigation, not to voluntary submissions during preliminary investigation.
• “In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged.” — The case employs this classic distinction to categorize the counter-affidavit as an admission, thereby clarifying its evidentiary treatment.
• “When the accused admits having killed the victim, the burden of proving his innocence falls on him. It becomes his duty to establish by clear and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the killing.” — This rule was applied to hold that petitioner’s constitutional presumption of innocence had been rebutted by his own admission.
• “To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them.” — This statement of the test for voluntary surrender was used to reject petitioner’s claim based on the scant hearsay evidence presented.

• People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989) — Controlling precedent defining custodial interrogation and holding that a defendant under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation; relied upon to rule that constitutional counsel rights do not extend to preliminary investigation.
• People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994) — Followed for the definition of custodial interrogation as questioning initiated after a person is taken into custody or deprived of freedom of action.
• People v. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001 — Cited to reiterate that the formalities of Section 12, Article III apply only to extrajudicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodial investigations.
• People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 (1995) — Followed for the distinction between a confession and an admission; applied in classifying petitioner’s statement as an admission.
• People v. Suyum, G.R. No. 137518, March 6, 2002 — Followed for the rule that self-defense must be proved by sufficient, satisfactory, and convincing evidence excluding any vestige of criminal aggression, and that the burden shifts to the accused who admits the killing.
• People v. Gemoya, 342 SCRA 63 (2000) — Relied upon for the principle that an accused who admits killing can no longer invoke the presumption of innocence; burden of proof falls on him to justify the act.
• People v. Valles, 267 SCRA 103 (1997) — Applied to hold that going to the police station merely to report an incident does not constitute voluntary surrender, absent evidence of intent to admit responsibility.
• Bernardo v. CA, 278 SCRA 782 (1997) — Followed for the rule that the grant or denial of leave to file a demurrer to evidence is discretionary and will not be disturbed absent grave abuse of discretion.

• Article III, Section 12, 1987 Constitution — Grants the rights to remain silent and to competent and independent counsel during custodial investigation and renders any confession or admission obtained in violation thereof inadmissible. The Court construed the provision strictly as applying only to custodial interrogation, not to preliminary investigation proceedings.
• Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence — Section 26 makes the admissions of a party admissible against him; Section 33 defines a confession as a declaration acknowledging guilt. The Court distinguished the two and admitted petitioner’s counter-affidavit as an admission under Section 26.
• Rule 112, Section 1, 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Defines a preliminary investigation as an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty. Used to support the conclusion that such proceeding is not equivalent to custodial interrogation.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concurred. Puno, J., (Chairman) was abroad on official business.