Lacuna vs. Abes

An absolute and unconditional pardon granted after election but before the date fixed for assuming office removes all disqualifications arising from a prior conviction, including perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, thereby rendering the grantee eligible for the elective office. The pardoning power, being a constitutional grant, should not be unnecessarily restricted or impaired, and an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction.

The case involves a quo warranto proceeding under Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code, which requires the qualifications of a voter for eligibility to an elective municipal office. The respondent, Benjamin Abes, had been convicted of counterfeiting treasury warrants, a crime penalized with prision mayor, which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage under Articles 42, 27, 30, and 32 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 99 of the Revised Election Code also disqualifies a person from voting if sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment. The constitutional grant of the pardoning power to the Chief Executive forms the backdrop against which the disqualifications were considered.

Benjamin Abes was convicted of the crime of counterfeiting treasury warrants and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). After partially serving his sentence, he was released from confinement on April 7, 1959 by virtue of a conditional pardon granted by the President of the Philippines, remitting only the unexpired portion of the prison term and fine. Without the pardon, his maximum sentence would have been served on October 13, 1961.

With the approach of the 1967 elections, Abes applied for registration as a voter under the new system of registration, but the Election Registration Board of the municipality of Peñaranda denied his application. The denial notwithstanding, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor, and in the ensuing elections in November, he came out the winner over three other aspirants. On November 16, 1967, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed appellee Abes the duly elected mayor, with petitioner-appellant Ambrocio Lacuna placing second.

On November 23, 1967, Lacuna filed his petition for quo warranto with application for preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. On December 7, 1967, on the same day when hearing was held on the application for preliminary injunction, the President of the Philippines granted to the respondent an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored to him "full civil and political rights." After the scheduled hearing on December 21, 1967 and the submission of memoranda, the court rendered its decision on December 28, 1967, dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring the eligibility of mayor-elect Abes to the position of mayor, in view of the Presidential full pardon granted him before he qualified for the office.

The lower court rejected the theory of the petitioner, passed sub silentio the respondent's first defense, but sustained him on the second defense. The Court noted that Abes' conviction of a crime penalized with prision mayor carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.

• Non-Retroactivity of Pardon: Petitioner argued that the presidential prerogative of mercy is prospective in operation and, when granted to Abes on December 7, 1967, did not retroact to the time of the election; that Abes' political and civil rights were lost through his conviction and were restored, not at the time of the election, but only upon the grant of the plenary pardon.
• Lack of Voter Qualification: Petitioner argued that by reason of his conviction and non-registration as a voter, Abes was not a qualified voter "at the time of the election," and was therefore ineligible to the position of mayor, because Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code requires the qualifications of a voter for eligibility to an elective municipal office.
• Non-Registration as Distinguishing Factor: Petitioner emphasized the non-registration of Abes as a voter in order to differentiate the case from Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441.

• Qualified Voter Status: Respondent argued that at the time of the elections he was a qualified voter, notwithstanding his non-registration, because registration as an elector is not a qualification and because the term or duration of his disqualification arising from his conviction has expired.
• Effect of Absolute Pardon: Respondent argued that the absolute pardon blotted out all the consequences of his conviction, including his disqualification.

• Effect of Absolute Pardon: Whether a plenary pardon granted after election but before the date fixed for assuming office had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by both the criminal and electoral codes.
• Voter Registration as Qualification: Whether non-registration as a voter disqualifies a candidate for elective municipal office under Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code.

• Effect of Absolute Pardon: Yes. The absolute pardon granted to appellee Abes removed his disqualification, and his election and assumption of office must be sustained. The pardon's effects should not be unnecessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power, which was not contemplated in the Constitution.
• Voter Registration as Qualification: No. Registration as a voter is not a qualification for a candidate or a voter within the meaning of "qualified voter" in Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code; it is merely a step towards voting. Moreover, the non-registration of Abes as a voter was predicated upon the same disqualifying effects of his previous conviction that were blotted out by the plenary pardon.

• Effect of Absolute Pardon: The Court examined the accessory penalties arising from Abes' conviction. The temporary absolute disqualification would have expired on October 13, 1961, but the perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage did not expire on that date or thereafter. Under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, the perpetual special disqualification deprives the offender perpetually of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their respective antecedents. Thus, at the time of the election on November 14, 1967, Abes was not qualified to vote or be voted for, or to hold public office, if the effect of his subsequent absolute pardon is not to be considered. The Court then addressed the decisive issue of whether the plenary pardon removed the disqualifications. While certain authorities (67 C.J.S. 578) hold that a pardon is not retrospective, the view consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's effects should not be unnecessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power. Citing Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 39; Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 4, 11; and Mijares vs. Custorio, 73 Phil. 507, the Court adopted the broad view that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction. The Court quoted Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441, through Justice Laurel, which stated that the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action, and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. The Court found that the purpose in granting the absolute pardon was to enable Abes to assume the position in deference to the popular will, and the pardon was extended before the date fixed for assuming office. The Court gave efficacy to executive action and disregarded what was at bottom a technical objection.

• Voter Registration as Qualification: The Court rejected petitioner's attempt to differentiate the case from Pelobello vs. Palatino on the ground of non-registration. The Court held that registration as a voter is not a qualification for a candidate or a voter within the meaning of "qualified voter" in Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code; it is merely a step towards voting, citing Rocha vs. Cordis, 103 Phil. 327. Moreover, the non-registration of Abes as a voter was predicated upon the same disqualifying effects of his previous conviction that were blotted out by the plenary pardon.

• Absolute Pardon Removes All Disabilities — An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the plenary pardon granted to Abes removed his disqualification from the right of suffrage and from holding public office, thereby rendering him eligible for the office of mayor.
• Pardoning Power Cannot Be Restricted by Legislative Action — Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. The Court adopted the broad view that the pardon's effects should not be unnecessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power, which was not contemplated in the Constitution.
• Distributive Application of Penalty Durations — The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" in Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied distributively to their respective antecedents. The word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary are necessarily different because the provision states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty."
• Registration as Voter Is Not a Qualification — Registration as a voter is not a qualification for a candidate or a voter within the meaning of "qualified voter" in Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code; it is merely a step towards voting. The Court applied this principle to reject petitioner's argument that Abes' non-registration disqualified him from the office of mayor.

• "…an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction." — This passage from Pelobello vs. Palatino, quoted by the Court, articulates the controlling doctrine on the effect of an absolute pardon and forms the basis of the Court's ruling that Abes' disqualification was removed.
• "While there may be force in the argument which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction." — This passage states the policy rationale for the broad view of the pardoning power, emphasizing that the constitutional grant should not be unnecessarily restricted.
• "We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard that at bottom is a technical objection." — This passage from Pelobello vs. Palatino, quoted by the Court, supports the conclusion that the pardon granted to Abes should be given full effect to enable him to assume office in deference to the popular will.
• "…registration as a voter is not a qualification for a candidate or a voter, within the meaning of 'qualified voter' in Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code; it is merely a step towards voting." — This passage states the Court's ruling on the issue of voter registration, holding that non-registration does not disqualify a candidate for elective municipal office.

• Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34 — Cited as authority for the proposition that the pardon's effects should not be unnecessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power, which was not contemplated in the Constitution.
• Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 4, 11 and 72 Phil. 441 — Cited as the leading case adopting the broad view that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction. The Court quoted extensively from this case through Justice Laurel.
• Mijares vs. Custorio, 73 Phil. 507 — Cited as additional authority for the proposition that the pardon's effects should not be unnecessarily limited.
• Rocha vs. Cordis, 103 Phil. 327 — Cited for the principle that registration as a voter is not a qualification for a candidate or a voter within the meaning of "qualified voter" in Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code; it is merely a step towards voting.

• Article 42, Revised Penal Code — Provides that conviction of a crime penalized with prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The Court applied this provision to determine the accessory penalties imposed on Abes.
• Article 27, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Provides that temporary absolute disqualification lasts only during the term of the sentence. The Court applied this provision to determine that Abes' temporary absolute disqualification would have expired on October 13, 1961.
• Article 30, Revised Penal Code — Defines temporary absolute disqualification, which disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote during the term of the sentence. The Court applied this provision in analyzing the duration of Abes' disqualification.
• Article 32, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. The Court applied this provision to determine that Abes' perpetual special disqualification did not expire on October 13, 1961.
• Section 99, Revised Election Code — Disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment. The Court noted this provision in analyzing Abes' disqualification from voting.
• Section 2174, Revised Administrative Code — Requires the qualifications of a voter for eligibility to an elective municipal office. The Court applied this provision in determining whether Abes was eligible for the office of mayor, holding that registration as a voter is not a qualification within its meaning.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concurred.