Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson

A compromise agreement between separated spouses validly dissolves their conjugal partnership and effects separation of property upon judicial approval, but its custody provisions are null and void insofar as they separate a mother from her children under seven years of age without compelling reasons as determined by the court.

Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married on February 14, 1953 and had four children. They separated in fact on January 9, 1963, when the wife left the conjugal home in Bacolod City and took up residence in Manila. The dispute arose from their attempt to settle all matters arising from their de facto separation—custody, support, and property—through a joint compromise petition filed in the CFI, and from the wife's subsequent efforts to undo the custody portions of that agreement.

Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married on February 14, 1953 and had four children: Enrique, Maria Teresa, Gerrard, and Ramon, all alive at the time of the proceedings. On January 9, 1963, the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, and commenced residing in Manila. On March 12, 1963, she filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) of Manila, docketed as Civil Case E-00030, seeking custody of all four children and support for them and herself.

Before the JDRC could resolve the complaint, the spouses—through their respective attorneys—reached an amicable settlement covering custody, support, and separation of property. On April 27, 1963, they filed a joint petition, docketed as Special Proceeding 6978 in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental. The petition stated that the spouses had separated on January 9, 1963, and mutually agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership subject to judicial approval under Article 191 of the Civil Code. The agreement provided for separation of property, with the wife waiving all claims to property held by the husband; custody of the two elder children (Enrique and Maria Teresa) to the father and the two younger children (Gerrard and Ramon) to the mother; a monthly allowance of ₱300 from the husband for the support of the children in the wife's custody; and reciprocal visitation rights, including delivery of all four children to the wife for the summer months until June 15, 1963. Finding the petition "conformable to law," the CFI (Judge Jose F. Fernandez, presiding) issued an order on April 27, 1963, rendering judgment approving and incorporating the compromise agreement in toto. In compliance with the judgment, the husband delivered all four children to the wife and remitted money for their support.

On May 7, 1963, the wife filed a motion in the JDRC alleging that she had signed the joint petition "as the only means by which she could have immediate custody of her minor children," and prayed to be relieved of the agreement pertaining to custody and visitation. The husband opposed and moved to dismiss the JDRC complaint on grounds of res judicata and lis pendens. On May 28, 1963, the JDRC sustained the husband's plea and dismissed the case. The wife's appeal from that dismissal was certified to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-23767, the Court of Appeals having found that only a question of law was involved.

Simultaneously, the wife filed a motion for reconsideration of the compromise judgment in the CFI on May 15, 1963, again alleging she signed the agreement solely to obtain custody and praying to be relieved of its custody and visitation terms. The husband opposed and filed a motion for execution and a charge for contempt. On June 22, 1963, the CFI (Judge Jose R. Querubin, presiding) denied the wife's motion for reconsideration, granted the husband's motion for execution, and ordered that the wife deliver the two older children to the special sheriff by June 29, 1963, or face contempt. The wife's appeal from the compromise judgment and execution order was certified to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-24259.

The wife also instituted certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 32384-R), alleging that the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering immediate execution, thereby depriving her of the right to appeal. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the execution order. After hearing, the Court of Appeals on May 11, 1964 granted the petition, declaring null and void both the compromise judgment insofar as it related to custody and visitation of the two older children and the execution order of June 22, 1963. The husband's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 31, 1964. He appealed to the Supreme Court via G.R. No. L-23482, assigning errors including that the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the execution order, in resolving the legality of the compromise agreement rather than the issue of grave abuse of discretion, and in ruling that the agreement violated Article 363 of the Civil Code.

• Validity of Compromise Judgment: The petitioner spouse argued that the Court of Appeals erred in annulling through certiorari the lower court's order of execution of the compromise judgment.
• Scope of Certiorari: The petitioner spouse maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the issue of the legality of the compromise agreement—which was involved in two separate appeals—rather than confining itself to the issue of grave abuse of discretion in ordering execution.
• Conformity to Law: The petitioner spouse argued that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the compromise agreement violated Article 363 of the Civil Code.

• Duress in Signing: The respondent spouse alleged that she entered into and signed the joint petition as the only means by which she could have immediate custody of her minor children, all of whom were below the age of seven.
• Relief from Agreement: The respondent spouse prayed to be relieved of the agreement pertaining to custody and visitation of her minor children and sought confirmation of custody in her favor pendente lite.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The respondent spouse averred that the CFI, through Judge Querubin, committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering immediate execution of the compromise judgment, thereby depriving her of the right to appeal.

• Validity of Property Provisions: Whether the compromise agreement and the CFI judgment are valid with respect to the separation of property and dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
• Validity of Custody Provisions: Whether the custody provisions of the compromise agreement, awarding the two older children (both under seven years of age) to the father, are valid under Article 363 of the Civil Code.
• Dismissal by JDRC: Whether the JDRC properly dismissed the wife's complaint on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens.
• Adequacy of Support: Whether the agreed monthly support of ₱150 per child is sufficient.

• Validity of Property Provisions: Yes. The compromise agreement and CFI judgment are valid as to separation of property and dissolution of the conjugal partnership, judicial approval having been duly obtained pursuant to Articles 190 and 191 of the Civil Code, with no creditors shown to be prejudiced.
• Validity of Custody Provisions: No. The custody provisions are null and void insofar as they separate the mother from her children under seven years of age, absent compelling reasons as required by the mandatory provisions of Article 363 of the Civil Code.
• Dismissal by JDRC: Yes. The JDRC properly dismissed the wife's complaint on grounds of res judicata and lis pendens, the wife having effectively abandoned her JDRC action by signing and filing the joint petition in the CFI.
• Adequacy of Support: The amount of ₱150 per child is insufficient. The CFI may increase the amount according to the needs of each child, taking judicial notice of the devaluation of the peso and rising costs of commodities and services.

• Validity of Property Provisions: Articles 190 and 191 of the Civil Code allow separation of property and dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval and notification of creditors. The spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and dissolution of the conjugal partnership through the CFI's approval of their joint petition. No creditors appeared to be prejudiced by the arrangement. The spouses had been separated in fact, with the wife residing in Manila and the husband in Bacolod City, making the severance of their financial and proprietary interests appropriate. The Court noted that it cannot compel spouses to live together, citing Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo, but emphasized that approving separation of property does not legalize the de facto separation itself, which the law regards as abnormal and dangerous.

• Validity of Custody Provisions: Article 363 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." The use of the word "shall" underscores the provision's mandatory character, as explained by the Code Commission, which sought to avoid the tragedy of a mother being torn from her child of tender age. The two older children were six and five years old, respectively, at the time of the CFI order. The CFI's award of their custody to the father effectively separated them from their mother without any compelling reason appearing in the record. The CFI's statement that the parties suppressed the compelling reasons "for the sake and for the welfare of the minor children" was at best a mere hint; courts cannot proceed on mere insinuations but must be confronted with facts. Furthermore, Article 356 of the Civil Code grants every child rights to parental care, education, and moral and civic training—rights not dependent solely on the parents' mutual agreement. Where parents are separated in fact, courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child's welfare is better assured, requiring the presentation of evidence on the fitness of each parent. No such evidence was introduced in the CFI. Additionally, the eldest child, Enrique, being eleven years of age at the time of decision, should be given the choice of which parent to live with pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, which permits a child over ten years of age to choose, unless the chosen parent is unfit.

• Dismissal by JDRC: The JDRC first acquired jurisdiction over the matter of custody and support when the wife filed her complaint on March 12, 1963. However, when she signed the joint petition on the same matter and filed it with the CFI on April 27, 1963, she in effect abandoned her JDRC action. The husband, who could have raised lis pendens in the CFI but did not, had the right to cite the CFI decision and seek dismissal of the JDRC case on grounds of res judicata and lis pendens. The Rules require only that there is a pending action, not a prior pending action, as held in Teodoro vs. Mirasol.

• Adequacy of Support: Although the spouses agreed on ₱150 monthly support per child, the Court took judicial notice of the devaluation of the peso in 1962 and the steady rise in prices of commodities, goods, and services, as well as the fact that all children were of school age. The CFI was directed to increase the amount according to the needs of each child.

• Mandatory Character of Article 363, Civil Code — The provision stating that "[n]o mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure" is mandatory in character, as indicated by the use of the word "shall." It prohibits the separation of a mother and her child below seven years unless grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court. The Court applied this by declaring null and void the CFI's award of custody of the two older children (aged six and five) to the father, absent any compelling reason in the record.

• Judicial Approval for Separation of Property and Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership — Under Articles 190 and 191 of the Civil Code, separation of property between spouses and dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage require judicial approval, with notification to creditors. The Court found the compromise agreement valid on this score because the spouses obtained judicial sanction through the CFI and no creditors were prejudiced.

• Child's Welfare Not Subject Solely to Parental Agreement — Article 356 of the Civil Code grants every child rights to parental care, education, and moral and civic training that are not dependent solely on the wishes of parents. Where parents are separated in fact, courts must independently determine custody based on evidence of each parent's fitness, not merely on the parents' mutual agreement.

• Child's Preference Under Rule 99, Section 6 — When spouses are divorced or living separately, the court shall award custody according to the child's best interest, permitting a child over ten years of age to choose which parent to live with, unless the chosen parent is unfit by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty.

• Lis Pendens Requires Only a Pending Action, Not a Prior Pending Action — The Rules of Court require only that there is a pending action as a ground for dismissal, not a pending prior action. A party who files a subsequent action on the same matter in another court effectively abandons the first action, and the second court's judgment may be invoked as a bar.

• "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." — This is the text of Article 363 of the Civil Code as quoted and applied by the Court; its mandatory character, underscored by the word "shall," formed the basis for nullifying the custody award to the father.

• "It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other." — Quoted from Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo, this passage articulates the principle that courts cannot force cohabitation, supporting the validity of the separation of property while cautioning against legalizing de facto separation.

• "[T]he Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action. They provide only that there is a pending action, not a pending prior action." — Quoted from Teodoro vs. Mirasol, this passage clarifies the scope of lis pendens as a ground for dismissal and supports the JDRC's dismissal of the wife's complaint.

• "His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the right granted to him by law." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi that a child's welfare under Article 356 is not subject solely to parental agreement, requiring judicial determination based on evidence when parents are separated.

• Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54 — Cited for the principle that courts cannot compel spouses to cohabit, and that de facto separation is abnormal and fraught with danger. The Court relied on this to uphold the separation of property while declining to legalize the de facto separation itself.
• Teodoro vs. Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 — Cited for the rule that the ground for dismissal based on lis pendens requires only a pending action, not a prior pending action. Applied to uphold the JDRC's dismissal of the wife's complaint.
• Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con. 35; 161 Eng. Reprint 466 — Cited within the Arroyo quotation for the proposition that the indissolubility of marriage encourages mutual accommodation and good conduct between spouses.
• Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, G.R. No. L-4712, July 11, 1952, 91 Phil. 608 — Cited in a footnote for the principle that the word "shall" in a statute is used in an imperative and mandatory sense, supporting the mandatory character of Article 363.

• Article 190, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. Applied to uphold the validity of the separation of property, as the spouses obtained judicial approval.
• Article 191, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that the husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval, with notification to creditors. Applied to uphold the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, as judicial approval was secured and no creditors were prejudiced.
• Article 363, Civil Code of the Philippines — Mandates that no mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age unless the court finds compelling reasons. Applied to declare null and void the custody award of the two older children to the father, as no compelling reasons were established in the record.
• Article 356, Civil Code of the Philippines — Enumerates the rights of every child, including parental care, elementary education, moral and civic training, and the right to live in an atmosphere conducive to physical, moral, and intellectual development. Applied to hold that a child's welfare is not subject solely to parental agreement, requiring judicial determination of custody based on evidence.
• Article 109, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Cited to emphasize that the law does not favor de facto separation.
• Section 6, Rule 99, Rules of Court — Provides that in custody disputes between separated spouses, the court shall award custody according to the child's best interest, permitting a child over ten years of age to choose which parent to live with, unless the chosen parent is unfit. Applied to direct that the eldest child, being eleven, be given the choice of parent.
• Rule 39, Sections 9 and 10; Rule 64, Section 7, Rules of Court — Cited in the CFI's contempt order; referenced in the procedural background regarding enforcement of the execution order.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Angeles, JJ., concurred.