Lacson vs. Roque

The President may not suspend the Mayor of Manila on the mere pendency of a libel charge; the power to suspend is no broader than the power to remove and must be exercised for a cause authorized by law, with administrative charges and notice and hearing.

Arsenio H. Lacson was the elected Mayor of the City of Manila; Mariano Roque was the Acting Executive Secretary, Bartolome Gatmaitan was the Vice-Mayor who performed the mayor’s duties, and Dionisio Ojeda was the Acting Chief of Police. The Revised Charter of the City of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, fixed the mayor’s term at four years “unless sooner removed” but contained no provision for his removal or suspension, unlike its provisions for members of the Municipal Board and appointive city officials. The Revised Administrative Code, in turn, gave the President power to remove officials conformably to law and, under section 64(b), to remove any person from a position of trust or authority for disloyalty, while sections 2078 and 2188 specified causes and procedure for provincial and municipal officers. The legal question was whether those provisions authorized the suspension of the Manila Mayor for a pending libel charge.

Arsenio H. Lacson was the Mayor of the City of Manila when, on October 20, 1952, following the acquittal of Celestino C. Juan, Deputy Chief of Police, in a criminal prosecution for malversation of public property instituted at Lacson’s instance, he made a radio broadcast criticizing the court’s decision. In that broadcast he said: “I have nothing but contempt for certain courts of justice. . . . I tell you one thing (answering an interrogator), if I have the power to fire Judge Montesa (the trial judge) I will fire him for being incompetent, for being an arrogant . . . an ignoramus.”

Thereafter, Judge Montesa, at a public meeting of the Judges of the Courts of First Instance of Manila, submitted to the consideration of his colleagues the question of whether Mayor Lacson’s remarks were contempt of court. A committee of judges appointed to study the question reported that it was not free to state whether contempt proceedings, if instituted, would prosper; the committee believed that Judge Montesa was the one most competent to decide upon the action to be taken. On October 23, Judge Montesa wrote the Secretary of Justice requesting that a special prosecutor be designated to handle the criminal libel case he intended to file against the mayor, giving as reasons that “whatever blunders the mayor had committed, the same was due to an advice given him by his legal adviser, the city fiscal,” and that it would be “difficult to expect that he would be willing to move against him or act in a manner that would put him in a bad light with the mayor.”

On October 24, in Special Administrative Order No. 235, marked RUSH, the Secretary of Justice designated Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo of the Solicitor’s Office “to assist the City Fiscal of Manila in the investigation of the complaint of Judge Agustin P. Montesa against Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, to file whatever criminal action the evidence may warrant and to prosecute the same in court.” On the following day, Judge Montesa filed his projected complaint for “libel and contempt” with the City Fiscal, numbered 27909. This complaint, in the ordinary routine of distribution of cases in the City Fiscal’s Office, should have corresponded to Assistant Fiscal Jose B. Jimenez; consequently, upon Solicitor Vivo’s designation, City Fiscal Angeles designated Assistant Fiscals Jimenez and Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. to represent him and to collaborate with the Solicitor from the Bureau of Justice.

Solicitor Vivo conducted a preliminary investigation in the Office of the Solicitor General without the presence of either of the Assistant Fiscals assigned to the case, and sent out subpoenas in his name and upon his signature. Having completed the preliminary examination, on October 30 he docketed in the Court of First Instance a complaint for libel against Mayor Lacson, signed and sworn to by Judge Montesa as complainant. At the foot of the complaint both Assistant Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. and Solicitor Vivo certified that “we have conducted the preliminary investigation in this case in accordance with law” although Fiscal Concepcion had taken no part in the proceedings.

On October 31, the day following the filing of the complaint, the President wrote the Mayor a letter stating: “In view of the pendency before the Court of First Instance of Manila of criminal case No. 20707 against you, for libel, and pursuant to the present policy of the administration, requiring the suspension of any local elective official which is being charged before the courts with any offense involving moral turpitude, you are hereby suspended from office effective upon receipt hereof, your suspension to continue until the final disposition of the said criminal case.” Upon notification of the suspension, Vice-Mayor Bartolome Gatmaitan entered upon the duties of the office in place of the suspended city executive. Lacson then brought this original action for prohibition contesting the legality of the suspension.

• Inherent Power: Respondent contended that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers.
• Misconduct in Office: Respondent argued that, even conceding Lacson was not guilty of disloyalty, dishonesty, or oppression, his radio “outburst” against Judge Montesa constituted misconduct in office.

• Presidential Power to Suspend/Remove Manila Mayor: Whether the President has authority to suspend the Mayor of Manila under the Constitution, the Manila Charter, and the Revised Administrative Code.
• Cause for Suspension — Libel as Misconduct in Office: Whether a pending libel charge based on a radio broadcast criticizing a judge constitutes a legal cause for suspension, specifically disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression, or misconduct in office.
• Procedural Validity of Suspension: Whether the suspension is valid without administrative charges and notice and hearing.

• Presidential Power to Suspend/Remove Manila Mayor: No. The President’s power to remove or suspend the Manila Mayor is not inherent and is limited to causes authorized by law; the Manila Charter’s “unless sooner removed” clause does not confer sweeping removal power.
• Cause for Suspension — Libel as Misconduct in Office: No. A pending libel charge for remarks made as a private individual is not disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression, or misconduct in office; it does not affect performance of official duties.
• Procedural Validity of Suspension: No. Suspension cannot be based solely on a pending criminal case and an administrative policy; it requires administrative charges and the opportunity for notice and hearing, and cannot be indefinite.

• Presidential Power to Suspend/Remove Manila Mayor: The SC began from the Manila Charter, section 9, which says the mayor holds office for four years “unless sooner removed” but contains no provision for removal or suspension, unlike sections 14 and 22 for board members and appointive officials. It held that removal and suspension of public officers are controlled by the particular law applicable; the President has no inherent power to remove municipal officers. The phrase “unless sooner removed” implies power in the appointing authority to remove, but for elective officers it means only that they are not immune to removal as provided by other laws. Article VII, section 10, paragraph (1) of the Constitution granted general supervision over local governments “as may be provided by law,” and supervision does not contemplate control. Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code authorized removal conformably to law, and strict construction of removal laws, expressed in the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, confined the power to the causes specified. The ponencia concluded that the power is confined to disloyalty or, at the most, the other causes in section 2078 of the Revised Administrative Code, and that suspension cannot be broader than removal because “a stream cannot rise higher than its source.”
• Cause for Suspension — Libel as Misconduct in Office: The SC defined misconduct in office as misconduct that affects the officer’s performance of his duties, not merely his character as a private individual; the character of the man must be separated from the character of the officer. The misconduct must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties, amounting to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. It relied on Cornejo vs. Naval, where falsification of a private document was held not to be misconduct in office because it did not affect official integrity. Lacson’s radio broadcast had nothing or very little to do with his official functions and duties; it was not done by virtue or under color of authority, was not a wrongful official act or omission, and did not involve abuse of office. One did not have to be mayor to make the remarks or talk on the radio; the mere fact that the broadcast was transmitted from City Hall did not alter the character of the remarks. The SC concluded that Lacson acted as a private individual and that libel was not disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression, or misconduct in office.
• Procedural Validity of Suspension: The President’s order rested solely on the pendency of criminal case No. 20707 for libel and the administration’s policy requiring suspension of any local elective official charged with an offense involving moral turpitude. No administrative charges had been preferred. The SC held that temporary suspension presupposes administrative charges and an investigation; the Chief Executive cannot suspend an officer facing criminal charges solely to aid the court in the administration of justice. An administrative policy not predicated on constitutional or statutory authority has no binding force where individual rights, honor, and reputation are in jeopardy. Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code showed a legislative policy against prolonged or indefinite suspension of local elective officials: it required charges and prompt investigation, set a hearing within ten days, limited preventive suspension to thirty days, and required reinstatement after that period unless the delay was due to the official. The SC held that it was unreasonable to withhold those safeguards from the Manila Mayor, and that a suspension to continue until final disposition of a criminal case could become a virtual removal, repugnant to due process, speedy trial, and simple justice. The power to remove or suspend for cause cannot be exercised without notice and hearing except where the office is held at the pleasure of the appointing power.

• Presidential supervision over local governments is supervision, not control — Article VII, section 10, paragraph (1) of the Constitution grants the President general supervision over local governments “as may be provided by law”; it does not imply control or an inherent power to remove or suspend local officials. The SC applied this to reject the President’s reliance on supervisory power to suspend the Manila Mayor.
• Removal and suspension powers are strictly construed — Where the law specifies the causes for removal, the specification prohibits removal for a different cause under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius; the causes, manner, and conditions fixed by law must be strictly pursued. The SC applied this to hold that libel was not among the legal causes for suspending the Manila Mayor.
• The power to suspend is not broader than the power to remove — Suspension is a qualified expulsion or an ad interim stoppage of official power and pay; when exercised as an incident to the power to remove, it cannot exceed the power to which it is ancillary. The SC applied this because libel could not justify removal, it could not justify suspension.
• Misconduct in office — Misconduct in office must affect the officer’s performance of his duties and not merely his character as a private individual; it must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties, amounting to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. The SC applied this to Lacson’s radio broadcast, which was made as a private individual and not by virtue or under color of his office.
• “Unless sooner removed” clause — The phrase implies power in the appointing authority to remove a public officer, but for elective officers it means only that the officer is not immune to removal as provided by other laws. The SC applied this to the Manila Charter and held that it did not authorize suspension for libel.
• Notice and hearing in removal or suspension for cause — The power to remove or suspend for cause cannot, except by clear statutory authority, be exercised without notice and hearing; only officers held at the pleasure of the appointing power may be removed without such notice or hearing. The SC applied this to invalidate the suspension, which was ordered without administrative charges.
• Administrative policy cannot supply legal authority — An administrative policy or practice not predicated on constitutional or statutory authority has no binding force in matters affecting individual rights, honor, and reputation. The SC applied this to reject the administration’s “present policy” as a basis for suspending Lacson.

• “Removal and suspension of Public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations.” — The SC used this to reject the claim of inherent presidential power to remove or suspend municipal officers.
• “it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer.” — The SC used this in defining misconduct in office and in holding that Lacson’s remarks were made as a private individual, not as mayor.
• “A stream cannot rise higher than its source, as the saying goes.” — The SC used this to hold that the power to suspend cannot be broader than the power to remove.
• “An administrative policy or practice not predicated on constitutional or statutory authority can have no binding force and effect in matters not purely political or governmental.” — The SC used this to invalidate the suspension based on the administration’s policy rather than on law.

• Cornejo vs. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 — Controlling precedent on misconduct in office and strict construction of removal laws; followed. The SC relied on it to hold that a charge must affect official integrity and that falsification of a private document was not misconduct in office.
• People vs. Brophy, 120 P. 2d 946; Cal. App. 2d 15 — Cited for the rule that presidential supervision over local governments does not contemplate control; followed.
• State ex rel. Gallaghar vs. Brown, 57 Mo. App. 203 — Cited for the rule that a fixed term negatives removal at pleasure and implies removal only for cause; followed.

• Article VII, Section 10, paragraph (1), Constitution — The President exercises general supervision over all local governments “as may be provided by law.” The SC applied this to hold that supervision does not contemplate control and does not supply an inherent power to suspend the Manila Mayor.
• Section 9, Republic Act No. 409 (Revised Charter of the City of Manila) — The Mayor holds office for four years “unless sooner removed.” The SC applied this to hold that the charter did not authorize suspension for libel and that the clause did not confer a blanket presidential removal power.
• Section 14, Republic Act No. 409 — Members of the Municipal Board may be suspended or removed under the same circumstances as elective provincial officers. The SC used this as a contrast to show that the charter expressly provided for removal of board members but not of the mayor.
• Section 22, Republic Act No. 409 — Removal of appointive city officials and employees by the President or the Mayor depending on who made the appointments. The SC used this as a contrast to show that the charter did not similarly provide for removal of the mayor.
• Section 64(b), Revised Administrative Code — The President may remove officials from office conformably to law and may remove any person from any position of trust or authority for disloyalty. The SC applied this to hold that the power must be exercised conformably to law and that disloyalty was the specified cause.
• Section 2078, Revised Administrative Code — Provincial executives may be discharged for dishonesty, oppression, or misconduct in office, besides disloyalty. The SC considered these as the other possible causes at most, and held that libel was not among them.
• Section 2188, Revised Administrative Code — The provincial governor receives and investigates complaints against municipal officers; hearing must be held as soon as practicable and in no case later than ten days from receipt of charges; preventive suspension shall not be more than thirty days; the officer shall be reinstated after that period unless the delay is due to the defendant’s fault, neglect, or request. The SC applied this as the legislative policy against prolonged or indefinite suspension of local elective officials.

• Paras, C.J. (Concurring) — He believed the President has the power to remove and consequently to suspend the Manila Mayor conformably to law, and that “officials” includes elective officials. He reasoned that the grounds for suspension and removal of provincial or municipal officers may by analogy apply to the city mayor, but held that libel was not among those grounds, that there was no final conviction, and that the offense was not misconduct in office. He voted to grant the petition.
• Padilla, J. (Concurring) — He believed the city mayor may be removed and suspended for cause, and that the causes for removal of elective provincial governors may apply to the Manila Mayor. He held, however, that the libel charge was unrelated to the performance of the mayor’s official duties and could not be considered misconduct in office; he concluded that the suspension was illegal and that the petition should be granted.

• Bautista Angelo, J. (Dissenting) — He argued that the President has power under section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code to remove and suspend the Manila Mayor for cause; that “officials” includes elective officials; that the phrase “unless sooner removed” implies presidential removal power; that cause need not be restricted to official duties; and that the libel charge, involving moral turpitude, justified suspension pending trial. Bengzon, Montemayor, and Labrador, JJ., concurred.