Lacson vs. People

When intent to kill is not proven in a prosecution for Attempted Homicide, the conviction may be downgraded to Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code where the injuries incapacitated the victims for labor or required medical assistance for ten days or more; moreover, conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence demonstrating collective action and community of purpose before, during, and after the commission of the crime, rendering each conspirator liable for the acts of the others.

On the evening of May 5, 2011, members of the Santos family arrived at their residence in Sitio Boulevard, Barangay San Agustin, City of San Fernando, Pampanga, claiming they had been chased and stoned by the Lacson family. Arnold Santos proceeded to the Lacsons' house to confront them, followed by other family members. A heated discussion escalated into violence when Deborah Samson-Lacson provided a steel pipe to her husband Hernani, and Eduardo Lacson struck Arnold Santos on the head. The Lacsons subsequently attacked other members of the Santos family with steel pipes, causing injuries requiring medical treatment and periods of healing ranging from two to eight weeks.

• The Confrontation: On May 5, 2011, at approximately 9:00 PM, Gary, Arnold, Eliza, and Joyce Ann Santos arrived at their house in Sitio Boulevard, Barangay San Agustin, City of San Fernando, Pampanga, and informed Romeo, Rommel, Richard, and Albert Santos that they had been chased and stoned by the Lacsons. Arnold Santos ran toward the Lacsons' house to confront them, followed by other family members who attempted to pacify him.
• The Attack: Upon reaching the Lacsons' house, Arnold had a heated discussion with Hernani and Elizer Lacson. Rudy Santos, a neighbor residing at the back of the Lacsons' house, also arrived. Deborah Samson-Lacson brought out a steel pipe and told Hernani, "Oyni ing tubo pamalwan mu la!" (Here is a steel pipe, hit them). Eduardo Lacson then hit Arnold Santos on the head with a steel pipe. Subsequently, the Lacsons attacked the other Santos family members using steel pipes.
• Injuries Sustained: Rommel, Gary, Richard, and Romeo Santos sustained head injuries and wounds on different parts of their bodies. They were brought to Jose B. Lingad Memorial General Hospital where Dr. Duane P. Cordero treated them. Medical certificates indicated healing periods of two weeks for Rommel, more than thirty days for Richard and Gary, and six to eight weeks for Romeo. Rudy and Albert Santos also sustained injuries requiring two weeks of healing but were not presented as witnesses.
• Procedural Posture: The defense failed to present any evidence after the prosecution rested its case, resulting in a waiver of the right to present evidence. The MTCC found that while conspiracy was proven, intent to kill was not, warranting conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries rather than Attempted Homicide.

• Tumultuous Affray: Eduardo contended that the incident constituted a tumultuous affray under Article 252 of the Revised Penal Code. He argued that under this provision, where the person responsible for injuries cannot be identified, only those who appear to have used violence upon the offended party are liable. Since he was not specifically identified as having inflicted injuries on the private complainants (other than the initial blow to Arnold), he should not be held liable for the injuries sustained by the other victims.
• Lack of Conspiracy: Eduardo maintained that conspiracy was not proven by the prosecution. Absent proof of conspiracy, his liability should be limited to his individual acts, and since his participation in injuring the other victims was not established, his conviction should be reversed.

• Conspiracy and Collective Liability: The People argued that conspiracy was adequately demonstrated by the collective acts of the Lacson family before, during, and after the incident, showing a common purpose to assault the Santos family. The concerted action in chasing, stoning, and attacking the victims with steel pipes established that the act of one was the act of all.
• Nature of the Crime: The prosecution maintained that the incident was not a tumultuous affray but a deliberate attack by an identified group (the Lacsons) against another (the Santos family), rendering Article 252 inapplicable. The absence of intent to kill justified the conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265.

• Tumultuous Affray: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting Eduardo's argument that the incident constituted a tumultuous affray under Article 252 of the Revised Penal Code where the individual perpetrators could not be identified.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was sufficiently proven to hold Eduardo liable for the injuries inflicted by his co-accused upon the other victims.

• Tumultuous Affray: The incident did not constitute a tumultuous affray. Article 252 applies only when a quarrel occurs between several persons in a confused and tumultuous manner, resulting in death or wounds where the author cannot be ascertained. Here, the assault was a definite attack by an identified group (the Lacsons) upon the Santos family. Eduardo was specifically identified as the one who first struck Arnold with a steel pipe and continued to participate in the attack on other family members. The organized nature of the assault and the identifiability of the assailants precluded application of Article 252.
• Conspiracy: Conspiracy was sufficiently established. Direct proof is not required; it may be inferred from circumstantial evidence showing collective acts before, during, and after the commission of the crime indicating a common purpose and community of intent. The Lacsons acted in unison—chasing, stoning, and attacking the victims with steel pipes while the Santoses were unable to defend themselves. This concerted action demonstrated closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiments, satisfying the requirements of Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.
• Less Serious Physical Injuries: The conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265 was proper. Intent to kill, an essential element of Attempted Homicide, was not proven by the prosecution. The injuries sustained by the victims required medical assistance for periods ranging from two weeks to eight weeks, satisfying the statutory requirement of incapacity for labor or medical assistance for ten days or more.

• Tumultuous Affray (Articles 251 and 252, RPC): A tumultuous affray requires a confused and tumultuous quarrel between several persons not composing organized groups, where the author of the death or injury cannot be ascertained. It does not apply where the assailants are identified and act as a distinct group against another group.
• Conspiracy by Circumstantial Evidence (Article 8, RPC): Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence derived from the collective acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the felony, showing that they aimed at the same object, performed cooperative acts indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. Direct proof of an agreement is not required.
• Downgrading from Attempted Homicide to Less Serious Physical Injuries: When intent to kill is not established in a charge of Attempted Homicide, but physical injuries are proven that incapacitate the victim for labor or require medical assistance for more than ten days, the proper conviction is for Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265 of the RPC, which is necessarily included in the charge of Attempted Homicide.

• "A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained." — Defining the essential elements of a tumultuous affray under Article 252.
• "Clearly, this was a definite attack on the Santoses by the Lacsons, an identified group, and not a case of tumultuous affray where the assault occurred in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in death or injuries of the ones involved, and the person responsible could not be determined." — Explaining why Article 252 was inapplicable.
• "Direct proof is not required to prove conspiracy... It may be established through the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of a felony, all the accused aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another for the attainment of the same objective; and that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments." — Articulating the standard for proving conspiracy through circumstantial evidence.
• "Thus, the act of one becomes the act of all and the Lacsons must be held accountable for their actions." — Stating the principle of collective criminal responsibility in conspiracy.

• Wacoy v. People, 761 Phil. 570 (2015) — Controlling precedent defining tumultuous affray under Article 252 of the RPC; followed in determining that the incident was not a tumultuous affray because the assailants were identified.
• Mupas v. People, 568 Phil. 78 (2008) — Controlling precedent establishing that when intent to kill is lacking in a charge of Frustrated Homicide, the conviction may be downgraded to Less Serious Physical Injuries; followed in affirming the lower courts' downgrade of the offense.
• People v. Agudez, 472 Phil. 761 (2004) — Cited for the principle that conspiracy may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused indicating community of purpose.

• Article 265, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Less Serious Physical Injuries; applied where the injuries incapacitated the victims for labor or required medical assistance for ten days or more, and intent to kill was not proven.
• Article 252, Revised Penal Code — Defines liability for physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray; held inapplicable because the assailants were identified and the attack was not confused or tumultuous between unorganized groups.
• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy; applied to hold Eduardo liable for the acts of his co-accused based on their concerted action and community of purpose.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J. (Chairperson), Hernando, and Inting, JJ.