Laceste vs. Santos

The last paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which remits the penalty in rape upon marriage of the offender to the offended party and extends the benefit to coprincipals, accomplices, and accessories after the fact, is a penal law favorable to the accused and applies retroactively under Article 22 to a coprincipal still serving sentence, even if the marriage was contracted by a coaccused.

Clemente Laceste and Nicolas Lachica were coaccused in a rape prosecution involving Magdalena de Ocampo. The Penal Code then in force, through section 2 of Act No. 1773 and article 448, allowed the marriage of the offender to the offended party to extinguish penal liability. Effective at the start of 1932, the Revised Penal Code introduced article 344, whose last paragraph extended that extinction or remission of penalty to coprincipals, accomplices, and accessories after the fact, while article 22 made penal laws retroactive when favorable to an accused who is not a habitual criminal.

Clemente Laceste and Nicolas Lachica were prosecuted together, found guilty, and sentenced to commitment for the crime of rape. The offended party was Magdalena de Ocampo.

Thereafter, Nicolas Lachica married Magdalena de Ocampo. By virtue of section 2, Act No. 1773, and article 448 of the Penal Code then in force, which provided that such a marriage extinguished penal liability and hence the penalty, Lachica was relieved from the criminal prosecution. Laceste, however, continued serving his sentence, which was not affected by the marriage of his coaccused and the offended party.

The last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, in force since the first of this year, provides that in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him, and that the provision applies to coprincipals, accomplices and accessories after the fact. The Spanish text contains a clerical error: the preposition “a” is used instead of the disjunctive conjunction “o” in the third line, so that it reads “a la pena que ya se le hubiere impuesto” instead of “o la pena que ya se le hubiere impuesto.”

Laceste then filed a petition for habeas corpus, pleading that there was no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer. The Attorney-General, answering the petition, favored granting it because under the last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code then in force, which has retroactive effect, petitioner was entitled to liberty.

• No Sufficient Legal Ground for Imprisonment: Petitioner prayed for the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that there was no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer.

• Retroactive Application of Article 344: Respondent, through the Attorney-General, favored granting the petition because the last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, then in force, applied to petitioner and, with retroactive effect, entitled him to liberty.
• Retroactivity of Penal Laws: Respondent observed that all penal laws have been declared retroactive in People vs. Moran (44 Phil. 433) and People vs. Parel (44 Phil. 437), and that section 366 of the Revised Penal Code was intended to give retroactive effect to article 22, as shown by its use of “without prejudice” rather than “notwithstanding” or “in spite of.”

• Retroactive Effect of Article 344: Whether the last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, extending the marriage-based extinction or remission of penalty to coprincipals, accomplices, and accessories after the fact, applies retroactively to petitioner, who was convicted and sentenced under prior law and whose coaccused married the offended party.
• Entitlement to Habeas Corpus: Whether petitioner is entitled to be set at liberty because there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment.

• Retroactive Effect of Article 344: Yes. The last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code applies retroactively under article 22, because it is a penal law favorable to the accused who is not a habitual criminal, and petitioner comes within one of the cases especially provided for in article 344.
• Entitlement to Habeas Corpus: Yes. The petition was granted, and petitioner was ordered immediately set at liberty, with costs de oficio.

• Retroactive Effect of Article 344: The last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him, and that the provision applies to coprincipals, accomplices, and accessories after the fact. The Spanish text contains a clerical error: the preposition “a” is used instead of the disjunctive conjunction “o” in the third line, so that it reads “a la pena que ya se le hubiere impuesto” instead of “o la pena que ya se le hubiere impuesto”; the Court quoted both texts to show the real meaning. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code gives penal laws retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, even if a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Article 366 provides that, without prejudice to article 22, felonies and misdemeanors committed prior to the date of effectiveness of the Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission. The Attorney-General’s observation, which the Court approved and adopted, was that the Revised Penal Code, article 344, last paragraph, applies to petitioner and that he should be discharged from prison; all penal laws have been declared retroactive in People vs. Moran and People vs. Parel; and the Legislature, under section 366, clearly intended to give retroactive effect to article 22 because it used “without prejudice” rather than “notwithstanding” or “in spite of.” The principle granting an exception to the general rule that laws are not retroactive when the law favors the accused has been carried over into the Revised Penal Code through article 22. This exception to the general rule of prospectivity is justified by conscience and good law, by the maxims Lex prospicit, non respicit; lex de futuro, judez de praeterito; and favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda, and was inspired by sentiments of humanity and accepted by science. Article 22 is applicable to petitioner, who comes within one of the cases especially provided for in article 344; this point was not, and could not be, disputed between the parties.
• Entitlement to Habeas Corpus: Because article 22 applied to petitioner and the last paragraph of article 344 allowed the marriage of the offender with the offended party to remit the penalty and extended the benefit to coprincipals, there was no sufficient legal ground for continuing petitioner’s imprisonment. The petition was therefore granted, and petitioner was ordered immediately set at liberty, with costs de oficio.

• Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws Favorable to the Accused — Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, even if a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. The Court applied this to the last paragraph of article 344, which remitted the penalty in rape upon marriage of the offender to the offended party and extended the benefit to coprincipals, accomplices, and accessories after the fact.
• Marriage as Extinguishing Criminal Action or Remitting Penalty in Rape and Related Crimes — Under the last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party extinguishes the criminal action or remits the penalty already imposed upon him. The provision also applies to coprincipals, accomplices, and accessories after the fact. The Court applied it to petitioner as a coprincipal even though the marriage was contracted by his coaccused.
• Exception to Prospectivity of Laws — The general rule that laws are prospective, not retrospective, admits an exception when a penal law favors the accused. This exception is supported by the maxims Lex prospicit, non respicit; lex de futuro, judez de praeterito; and favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda, and is justified by conscience, good law, humanity, and science. The Court used this principle to give article 344 retroactive effect.
• Clerical Error in the Spanish Text of Article 344 — The Spanish text of article 344 used the preposition “a” instead of the disjunctive conjunction “o” in the third line, so that it read “a la pena que ya se le hubiere impuesto” instead of “o la pena que ya se le hubiere impuesto.” The Court treated this as a clerical error and relied on both the English and Spanish texts to ascertain the provision’s real meaning.

• "In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accesories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes." — This is the last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the provision whose retroactive application to a coprincipal was the core of the ruling.
• "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." — This is article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, the basis for applying the new marriage-remission provision to petitioner despite his final sentence and ongoing imprisonment.
• "Article 22 of the new Penal Code is applicable to the petitioner, who comes within one of the cases especially provided for in article 344 of the Code: this is a point upon which there neither is, nor can be, any discussion between the parties to this case." — This passage states the Court’s conclusion that petitioner fell within the coverage of article 344 and was entitled to article 22’s retroactive effect.
• "Wherefore, the petition is granted. Let the petitioner be immediately set at liberty, with costs de oficio. So ordered." — This is the dispositive portion granting habeas corpus and ordering petitioner’s immediate release.

• People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 433 — Cited by the Attorney-General and adopted by the Court for the proposition that all penal laws have been declared retroactive by the Supreme Court. It supported the retroactive application of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code to petitioner.
• People vs. Parel, 44 Phil. 437 — Cited together with People vs. Moran for the same proposition that penal laws are retroactive. It reinforced the Court’s ruling that petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the new provision.

• Article 344, last paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Provides that in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him, and that the provision applies to coprincipals, accomplices, and accessories after the fact. Applied to petitioner as a coprincipal.
• Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, even if a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. The Court used this as the basis for applying article 344 to petitioner.
• Article 366, Revised Penal Code — Provides that, without prejudice to article 22, felonies and misdemeanors committed prior to the date of effectiveness of the Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission. The Court cited it to show that the Legislature intended retroactive effect for article 22.
• Section 2, Act No. 1773 — The provision under which Nicolas Lachica was relieved from criminal prosecution after marrying the offended party. The Court mentioned it as part of the prior law governing the effect of marriage on penal liability.
• Article 448, Penal Code then in force — Provided that marriage between the offender and the offended party extinguished penal liability and hence the penalty. The Court mentioned it as the prior law that relieved Nicolas Lachica.
• Article 3, Civil Code — The general rule that laws are prospective, not retrospective, adopted in a modified form with a prudent limitation. The Court cited it as the general rule to which article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is an exception.

Chief Justice Avanceña; Justices Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, and Imperial concurred.