Laburada vs. Land Registration Authority

Mandamus will not lie to compel the LRA to issue a decree of registration when the Authority has evidence that the subject land may already be covered by an existing Torrens certificate of title, because the judgment of registration is not yet executory until the final decree is entered and one year has elapsed, a second decree over previously registered land is void for lack of jurisdiction, and the issuance of a decree is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion rather than a ministerial duty.

Spouses Mariano and Erlinda Laburada, represented by their attorney-in-fact Manuel Santos, Jr., applied for original registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, located in Mandaluyong City. The Land Registration Authority is the government agency tasked with issuing decrees of registration in land registration proceedings and with maintaining the integrity of the Torrens system. The lot in question traces its roots to parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration Case Nos. 699, 875, and 917, for which decrees were issued in 1904 and 1905 in the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar.

Petitioners Spouses Mariano and Erlinda Laburada filed an application for registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, located in Mandaluyong City, before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII, docketed as LRC Case No. N-11022. On January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered a decision declaring the spouses to have registrable title over the subject lot and ordering the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in their names. After the decision became final, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree. The LRA, however, refused. Petitioners thereupon filed the present special civil action for mandamus before the Supreme Court.

The LRA's refusal was explained in a report dated April 29, 1992, signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration. After plotting the subdivision plan sought to be registered on the LRA's Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that the lot might be a portion of parcels of land already decreed in Court of Land Registration Case Nos. 699, 875, and 917, for which Decree Nos. 240, 696, and 1425 were issued on August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905, and April 26, 1905, respectively. The LRA further verified that Lot 3-B of the same subdivision plan was already covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337, issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was a transfer from TCT No. 6595. The title issued for Lot 3-A, however, could not be located because TCT No. 6595, consisting of several sheets, was incomplete. The LRA concluded that issuing the decree would result in duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, contravening the policy and purpose of the Torrens system and destroying its integrity.

Upon the Supreme Court's resolution dated October 23, 1995, the Solicitor General was required to report what concrete steps the LRA had taken to verify whether Lot 3-A might be included in the parcels decreed in CLR Case Nos. 699, 875, and 917. In his compliance dated December 29, 1995, the Solicitor General attached a letter dated November 27, 1997 from Feline M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, reiterating that Lot 3-B was covered by TCT No. 29337 and that the title for Lot 3-A could not be located because TCT No. 6595 was incomplete. The LRA maintained that issuing the decree would result in duplication of title and destroy the integrity of the Torrens system. Petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report, alleging only that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate that claim.

• Clear Legal Right to Decree: Petitioners claimed they had a clear legal right to the issuance of the decree and the LRA had an imperative duty to perform, because land registration is an in rem proceeding and the jurisdictional requirements of notices and publication had been complied with. Since the LRA did not file an opposition in the registration proceeding, it could not refuse to issue the corresponding decree.
• Not LRA's Role to Defend Private Titleholders: Petitioners argued that it is not the duty of the LRA to take the cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337, and TCT No. 6595. Rather, it is the sole concern of said private title-holders to institute in a separate proper action whatever claim they may have against the property subject of petitioners' application.
• Prejudice from Delay: Petitioners contended that they suffered prejudice from the delay in the issuance of their title because of the failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig to furnish the LRA with certified copies of TCT Nos. 29337 and 6595, notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said titles.
• State Consent to Suit: Petitioners maintained that the State consented to its being sued in this case, and thus the legislature must recognize any judgment rendered as final and make provision for its satisfaction.

• Lack of Jurisdiction / Void Judgment: Respondent argued that the decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case, and a second decree for the same land is null and void.
• Improper Remedy: Respondent contended, citing Ramos vs. Rodriguez, that the LRA should not be compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has already been decreed and titled in the name of another, as this would destroy the purpose of the Torrens system. Petitioners' application would constitute a collateral attack on existing titles, which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529.

• Availability of Mandamus: Whether the Land Registration Authority can be compelled by mandamus to issue the corresponding decree of registration in LRC Case No. N-11022.

• Availability of Mandamus: No. Mandamus is not the proper remedy because the judgment of registration is not yet executory until the final decree is entered and one year lapses, a second decree over already-titled land would be void for lack of jurisdiction, and the issuance of a decree is a judicial function involving the exercise of discretion rather than a ministerial act compellable by mandamus.

• Availability of Mandamus: Three reasons support the dismissal. First, the judgment petitioners seek to enforce is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility, until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration by the LRA. As long as the final decree has not been entered and the one-year period has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the rendering court. Petitioners therefore have no clear legal right to compel the issuance of the decree. Second, the LRA's refusal is reasonable and imperative given the probable duplication of titles. The LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt regarding the preparation and issuance of a decree, acting as an officer of the court rather than as an administrative official. A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier case; a second decree would be null and void, because once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title is res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The LRA's reports indicated that Lot 3-A might be a portion of land already covered by TCT No. 6595, which if verified would render the trial court's judgment void. Third, the issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act compellable by mandamus. The decree must contain an accurate technical description of the land, requiring trained technical men, and the LRA Chief acts as an officer of the court in issuing it. Mandamus may compel a court to act on a question submitted for decision but cannot enjoin it to decide for or against one of the parties. Where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.

• Incontrovertibility of Land Registration Decrees — A judgment of registration does not become final and incontrovertible until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration by the Land Registration Authority. Until then, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioners had no clear legal right to compel the LRA to issue the decree, as the final decree had not yet been entered.
• Nullity of Second Decree Over Already-Registered Land — A land registration court has no jurisdiction to decree the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land is null and void, because once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title is res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The registration of the property in the name of the first registered owner is a standing notice to the world, and a later applicant is chargeable with notice that the land is already covered by a title. The Court applied this principle to justify the LRA's refusal, as the evidence indicated the lot might already be covered by titles issued in 1904 and 1905.
• Judicial Nature of Decree Issuance — The issuance of a decree of registration is a judicial function, not a ministerial act. The LRA Chief acts as an officer of the court, not as an administrative official, in preparing and issuing the final decree. Because it involves the exercise of discretion, it is not compellable by mandamus. The Court relied on this doctrine to hold that mandamus does not lie to compel the LRA to issue the decree.
• Requisites of Mandamus — Mandamus may be awarded only when the petitioner's legal right to the performance of the particular act is clear and complete. A clear legal right is one indubitably granted by law or inferable as a matter of law. Where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, mandamus cannot issue. The Court found that petitioners' right was in substantial doubt given the evidence of possible prior registration.

• "Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration." — This passage, adopted from Gomez vs. Court of Appeals, articulates the doctrine that a land registration judgment is not immediately incontrovertible, distinguishing it from ordinary civil judgments, and is central to the holding that petitioners lacked a clear legal right.
• "the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one" — This quotation, adopted from Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable, defines the judicial character of decree issuance and explains why mandamus is unavailable.
• "a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void." — This passage, quoted from Duran vs. Olivia, states the rule against double registration that underpins the LRA's refusal to issue the decree.

• Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 244 SCRA 418 (1995) — Followed. Held that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt regarding the issuance of a decree, and that compelling the LRA to issue a decree over already-titled land would destroy the Torrens system. Also held that a subsequent application for registration of already-titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, which is prohibited under Section 48 of P.D. 1529.
• Gomez vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 503 (1988) — Followed. Established that a judgment of registration does not become incontrovertible until one year after entry of the final decree, and until then remains under the court's control and sound discretion.
• Duran vs. Olivia, 3 SCRA 154 (1961) — Followed. Held that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of land already decreed in an earlier case, and a second decree is null and void because the first decree is res judicata binding on the whole world.
• Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable, 85 Phil. 256 (1949) — Followed. Held that the issuance of a decree of registration is a judicial function, not a ministerial act, and is therefore not compellable by mandamus. The LRA Chief acts as an officer of the court, not as an administrative official.
• De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil. 227 — Cited within Valmonte. Explained that the preparation of decrees requires trained technical men and that the law charges the chief surveyor with duties related to amended plans and descriptions before the final decree can be entered.

• Section 30, P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that after judgment becomes final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners relied on this provision, but the Court clarified that finality under Section 30 must be read in relation to Section 32.
• Section 32, P.D. 1529 — Provides that the title is not finally adjudicated until one year after entry of the final decree of registration. The Court applied this to hold that the judgment was not yet incontrovertible and that petitioners had no clear legal right to compel issuance of the decree.
• Section 38, Act 496 (Land Registration Act) — Provides that every decree of registration is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the government and all its branches. The Court acknowledged this in rem character but noted that the LRA's evidence of possible prior registration could render the trial court's judgment void for lack of jurisdiction.
• Section 48, P.D. 1529 — Prohibits collateral attack on certificates of title. The Court noted that petitioners' application would constitute a collateral attack on existing titles if the land was already registered.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the writ of mandamus. The Court applied the requirement that a clear legal right must exist for the writ to issue, finding that petitioners' right was in substantial doubt.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concurred.