Labao vs. Flores

Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. A petition for certiorari filed beyond the sixty-day reglementary period prescribed under Section 4 of Rule 65 is jurisdictionally defective, and the assailed quasi-judicial resolution, having become final and executory, is immutable and unalterable.

Petitioner Francisco A. Labao is the proprietor and general manager of San Miguel Protective Security Agency (SMPSA), a licensed security-service contractor. The respondents were SMPSA security guards assigned to the National Power Corporation, Mindanao Regional Center (NPC-MRC) in Ditucalan, Iligan City, each receiving a monthly salary of ₱7,020.00. SMPSA's service contract with NPC-MRC required periodic reevaluation of guards' credentials, a condition that precipitated the dispute when the contract came up for renewal.

Petitioner Francisco A. Labao is the proprietor and general manager of San Miguel Protective Security Agency (SMPSA), a licensed security-service contractor. The respondents—nineteen security guards, together with one Jimmy O. Bicoy—were assigned to the National Power Corporation, Mindanao Regional Center (NPC-MRC) in Ditucalan, Iligan City, each earning ₱7,020.00 per month.

On July 27, 2004, petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit their updated personal data files, security guard professional licenses, and other pertinent documents by July 30, 2004, for reevaluation in connection with SMPSA's new service contract with NPC-MRC. When the respondents failed to comply despite several notices, petitioner relieved them from NPC-MRC duty starting September and October 2004 and ordered them to report to Senior Operations Officer Nemesio Sombilon for new assignments. Petitioner and SMPSA maintained that the relief was a valid exercise of management prerogative, prompted by information that some guards carried falsified documents. They likewise issued a notice dated January 17, 2005 directing the respondents to report to SMPSA's main office for new assignments on January 25, 2005, but the respondents failed or refused to comply.

The respondents, for their part, claimed they were constructively dismissed when they were not given new assignments for over six months despite repeated requests for redeployment. Sometime in March and April 2005, they filed individual complaints with the NLRC Iligan City Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch for illegal dismissal and money claims; the complaints were consolidated. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints on December 27, 2005, holding that the relief was a legitimate exercise of management prerogative. The NLRC affirmed this decision on July 31, 2006 and denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration on September 29, 2006.

Respondents' counsel of record, Atty. Demosthenes R. Plando, received the September 29, 2006 resolution on October 13, 2006. Eighty-eight days later, on January 9, 2007, the respondents, through new counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that they were informed of the resolution only on December 6, 2006. The CA set aside the NLRC resolution, finding constructive dismissal, but later modified its decision by dismissing Bicoy's petition as late-filed while sustaining the respondents' petition as timely. Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.

• Timeliness of Filing: Petitioner argued that the respondents' CA petition for certiorari was filed twenty-eight days late, reckoned from Atty. Plando's October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 29, 2006 NLRC resolution.
• Concealment by New Counsel: Petitioner maintained that the respondents' new counsel concealed Atty. Plando's October 13, 2006 receipt and improperly relied on the respondents' December 6, 2006 notice of the resolution as the reckoning date.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the evidence on record supports the Labor Arbiter and NLRC decisions.

• Reckoning Date: Respondents submitted that December 6, 2006—the date they were informed of the resolution—should be the reckoning date for the sixty-day period.
• Counsel's Negligence: Respondents argued that Atty. Plando's October 13, 2006 receipt did not bind them because his secretary, Sonia M. Barnachea, misplaced the September 29, 2006 resolution, and they should not suffer for her negligence.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Respondents contended that the evidence on record does not support the LA and NLRC rulings.

• Timeliness of Certiorari Petition: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in acting on the respondents' petition for certiorari despite its late filing.
• Negligence of Counsel: Whether the negligence of respondents' former counsel in failing to inform them of the adverse NLRC resolution binds the respondents and bars their petition.
• Finality of NLRC Resolution: Whether the NLRC resolution had become final and executory, thereby precluding review by the Court of Appeals.

• Timeliness of Certiorari Petition: Yes, the CA erred. The petition was filed twenty-eight days beyond the sixty-day reglementary period prescribed under Section 4 of Rule 65, reckoned from counsel of record's October 13, 2006 receipt of the assailed resolution.
• Negligence of Counsel: Yes, the negligence binds the respondents. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client; counsel's failure to inform the client of an adverse judgment, resulting in loss of the right to appeal, is not excusable negligence.
• Finality of NLRC Resolution: Yes, the resolution became final and executory. Having attained finality, it became immutable and unalterable, and the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition except to order its dismissal.

• Timeliness of Certiorari Petition: Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a petition for certiorari be instituted within sixty days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution assailed. This period is inextendible, designed to avoid unreasonable delay and to protect the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. Reglementary periods are strictly applied, as timeliness is a jurisdictional caveat that even the Supreme Court cannot disregard. While exceptions to strict observance exist—such as persuasive reasons, compelling circumstances, meritorious causes, or substantial justice—the party invoking liberality must advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for the failure to comply. Here, the respondents filed their petition eighty-eight days after their counsel's receipt, or twenty-eight days beyond the sixty-day period. The CA erred in treating the petition as timely filed.

• Negligence of Counsel: The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exception applies only when counsel's negligence is so gross, reckless, and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. The failure of counsel to notify the client on time of an adverse judgment to enable an appeal constitutes negligence that is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. The respondents' argument that they should not suffer for Atty. Plando's negligence was rejected, as accepting it would enable every litigant to render inoperative any adverse order through the simple expedient of alleging counsel's gross negligence.

• Finality of NLRC Resolution: The NLRC resolution became final ten days after counsel's receipt on October 13, 2006. The respondents' failure to file the petition within the sixty-day period rendered the resolution impervious to attack through a Rule 65 petition. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, whether by the court that rendered it or by the highest court. All issues between the parties are deemed resolved, execution proceeds as a matter of right, and vested rights are acquired by the winning party. A denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.

• Notice to Counsel Binds the Client — Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client. The neglect or failure of counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment, resulting in the loss of the right to appeal, is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. The exception arises only when counsel's negligence is so gross, reckless, and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. In this case, the secretary's misplacement of the resolution did not rise to that level; the respondents were bound by their counsel's October 13, 2006 receipt.

• Immutability of Final Judgments — A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Once final, all issues are deemed resolved, execution proceeds as a matter of right, and the winning party acquires vested rights. The NLRC resolution having become final, the CA was without jurisdiction to review it.

• Strict Application of Reglementary Periods for Certiorari — Under Section 4 of Rule 65, certiorari must be instituted within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment, order, or resolution. The period is inextendible. While procedural rules may be liberally construed, provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied as indispensable to the prevention of needless delays. Recognized exceptions exist, but the party invoking liberality must advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for non-compliance.

• "notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face" — This passage states the controlling rule on the binding effect of notice to counsel and is the ratio decidendi for dismissing the respondents' petition as time-barred.

• "a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land" — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, invoked to preclude CA review of the NLRC resolution.

• "a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits" — This passage underscores that dismissing a petition on procedural grounds is itself a resolution on the merits, reinforcing the principle that litigation must have an end.

• Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157040, February 12, 2008 — Followed for the rule that notice to counsel of record binds the client and that counsel's failure to inform the client of an adverse judgment, causing loss of the right to appeal, is not excusable negligence.

• Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 152616, March 31, 2006 — Followed for the rule that certiorari under Rule 65 must be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment, order, or resolution.

• Peña vs. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 159520, September 19, 2006 — Followed for the doctrine that a decision which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.

• Philux, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 151854, September 3, 2008 — Followed for the general rule that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of counsel in the realm of procedural technique.

• Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires that a petition for certiorari be filed not later than sixty days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Applied to determine that the respondents' petition, filed eighty-eight days after their counsel's receipt of the NLRC resolution, was twenty-eight days late and therefore jurisdictionally defective.

• Rule 39, Section 1, Rules of Court — Provides that execution shall issue as a matter of right upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action upon the expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been duly perfected. Cited to support the principle that the winning party has a correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.

Conchita Carpio Morales, Lucas P. Bersamin, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno concurred in the decision. No separate concurring opinions were written.