Labao, Jr. vs. COMELEC

A candidate for local elective office is not a "fugitive from justice" disqualified under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code absent clear and sufficient evidence of intent to evade prosecution or punishment, which requires knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or a promulgated judgment of conviction. Mere failure to be found at a particular location when a warrant is served does not, without more, constitute flight indicative of such intent.

Leodegario A. Labao, Jr. filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of the Municipality of Mambusao, Capiz on October 3, 2012, for the May 13, 2013 elections. On December 20, 2012, one Roger D. Loredo executed an extrajudicial confession implicating Labao as the mastermind in the May 4, 2012 assassination of Vice-Mayor Abel P. Martinez. The Department of Justice subsequently found probable cause to indict Labao for murder. Ludovico L. Martelino, Jr., husband of Vice-Mayor Martinez's daughter Sharon Grace Martinez-Martelino, filed a petition for disqualification against Labao before the COMELEC. Sharon also ran for the same mayoralty position and placed second to Labao in the elections.

On October 3, 2012, Leodegario A. Labao, Jr. filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of the Municipality of Mambusao, Capiz in the May 13, 2013 elections. On December 20, 2012, Roger D. Loredo executed an extrajudicial confession admitting participation in the May 4, 2012 assassination of Vice-Mayor Abel P. Martinez and implicating Labao, Jr. as the mastermind. On April 4, 2013, the Department of Justice found probable cause to indict Labao, Jr. and four others for murder. An Information was filed before RTC, Branch 21, Mambusao, Capiz on April 10, 2013, and warrants for arrest were issued the same day.

On April 14, 2013, acting on a tip, members of the Philippine National Police attempted to apprehend Labao, Jr. at St. Paul's Hospital in Iloilo City, where he was supposedly confined, but failed. Labao, Jr. explained that from April 10 to 14, 2013, he was confined at the hospital's Surgical Intensive Care Unit due to constant chest pains occasioned by an enlarged heart, with his cardiologist recommending "Complete Management for Acute Coronary Syndrome, Plan to do Angiogram." He intended to file a motion for hospital arrest with Presiding Judge Amular on April 12, 2013, but was informed the judge was in Boracay and would report only on April 15. On April 14, Labao, Jr. learned from his staff that police had surrounded the hospital and personally heard a police officer say "Shoot to kill si Labao." He left the hospital, asserting it was instinctively for the singular purpose of preserving his life, without intent to elude arrest. Judge Amular inhibited himself from the murder case on April 15, 2013, and the case was referred to the Supreme Court for reassignment.

On May 8, 2013, Ludovico L. Martelino, Jr. filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC, alleging that Labao, Jr. was a fugitive from justice who had surreptitiously eluded arrest. In his Answer, Labao, Jr. denied being a fugitive, emphasizing that there was no charge against him when he filed his COC and that he was only implicated after Loredo's confession. He also noted that he had been preparing to undergo angiogram and was awaiting the Supreme Court's assignment of the murder case to another judge so he could apply for hospital arrest. Labao, Jr. was proclaimed the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz on May 14, 2013.

On October 14, 2013, Sharon Grace Martinez-Martelino, daughter of Vice-Mayor Martinez and wife of Ludovico, filed a Motion to Intervene and a Motion for Reconsideration in the COMELEC case, asserting that since Labao, Jr.'s disqualification made his candidacy illegitimate, the votes cast in his favor should be considered stray and she, having obtained the second highest number of votes, should be proclaimed the winning candidate. On November 4, 2013, RTC-Branch 21 issued an Order temporarily suspending the proceedings and lifting the implementation of the warrant of arrest against Labao, Jr., in view of a DOJ Resolution excluding him from the Information. However, on November 14, 2013, DOJ Secretary Leila De Lima reversed that resolution, reinstating Labao, Jr. as an accused. On May 21, 2014, RTC-Branch 21 issued another Order dismissing the criminal complaint against Labao, Jr. for lack of probable cause. On the same day, the COMELEC En Banc denied Labao, Jr.'s motion for reconsideration, affirmed his disqualification, declared his proclamation null and void, and directed the application of the rules on succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code.

• Nature of the Case: Labao, Jr. argued that the COMELEC should have dismissed the case against him on account of his proclamation as Mayor, contending that the disqualification case had ceased to be a pre-proclamation controversy.
• Fugitive from Justice: Labao, Jr. maintained that he was not a fugitive from justice, emphasizing that there was no charge against him when he filed his COC, that he was confined at the hospital for a legitimate medical condition, that he left the hospital to preserve his life upon hearing a "shoot to kill" order, and that he had been actively participating in proceedings before the DOJ and the RTC.
• Subsequent Dismissal of Charges: Labao, Jr. argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him notwithstanding that the criminal charge for murder had already been dismissed for lack of probable cause and there was no more warrant of arrest against him.
• Sharon's Claim to Proclamation: Sharon argued that, pursuant to Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections, having garnered the second highest number of votes next to Labao, Jr., she should be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor since the COMELEC already disqualified Labao, Jr.

• Classification of the Case: Whether the petition filed by Ludovico against Labao, Jr. before the COMELEC was a pre-proclamation controversy or a petition for disqualification.
• Fugitive from Justice: Whether Labao, Jr. was a fugitive from justice at the time he was a candidate for Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz during the May 13, 2013 elections, such as to warrant his disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying Labao, Jr.
• Entitlement to Proclamation: Whether Sharon should be declared the winning candidate and proclaimed as Mayor of Mambusao.

• Classification of the Case: The petition before the COMELEC was a petition for disqualification, not a pre-proclamation controversy. Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code defines a pre-proclamation controversy as any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers, which was inapplicable to the disqualification petition grounded on Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code.
• Fugitive from Justice: No. Labao, Jr. was not a fugitive from justice. Intent to evade prosecution was not established by the evidence on record, the COMELEC having relied solely on the fact that he was not found at the hospital when the warrant was served, without proof of efforts to locate him or that he left to avoid arrest.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the May 21, 2014 En Banc Resolution, the evidence being insufficient to support a conclusion that Labao, Jr. was evading prosecution so as to disqualify him from running for public office.
• Entitlement to Proclamation: Dismissed as moot and academic. In view of the findings in G.R. No. 212615 annulling Labao, Jr.'s disqualification, it was no longer necessary to discuss the issues raised in Sharon's petition.

• Classification of the Case: The Omnibus Election Code, through Section 241, defines a pre-proclamation controversy as any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of election returns. Section 243 further enumerates the proper issues in a pre-proclamation controversy: illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers, incomplete or defective election returns, returns prepared under duress or not authentic, and substitute or fraudulent returns. In Suhuri vs. Commission on Elections, the Court held that this enumeration is "restrictive and exclusive." The petition filed by Ludovico, docketed as SPA Case No. 13-294 (DC), had absolutely nothing to do with the proceedings of the board of canvassers or the election returns. It was grounded on Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies fugitives from justice from running for elective local positions. The grounds for disqualification are provided under Section 12 or 68 of the OEC or Section 40 of the LGC, distinct from pre-proclamation controversies.

• Fugitive from Justice: The term "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. Under Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections, the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight, and there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or a promulgated judgment of conviction. The COMELEC anchored its finding solely on the fact that Labao, Jr. was not found at the hospital when the warrant was being served. No other substantial evidence was presented to prove that he tried to hide from authorities or left Mambusao to avoid arrest. Labao, Jr. demonstrated his presence in Mambusao and his desire to participate in proceedings by taking his oath of office on June 25, 2013, assuming office on June 30, 2013, serving as Mayor and receiving salary from July 1 to 3, 2013, filing a Petition for Review before the DOJ which he verified on April 10, 2013, and participating in RTC proceedings leading to the lifting of the warrant and dismissal of the murder charge. His execution of a Special Power of Attorney in favor of his wife was not shown to have been solely for the purpose of evading arrest. There was no proof of police efforts to locate him or that the warrant could not be served despite such efforts.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The pieces of evidence on record did not sufficiently establish Labao, Jr.'s intention to evade prosecution to warrant the conclusion that he was a fugitive from justice. The dearth of evidence pointing to such intent hardly justified the would-be disenfranchisement of 12,117 innocent voters of Mambusao who voted for Labao, Jr. Citing Jalover vs. Osmeña, the Court explained that when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court has the constitutional duty to intervene, and errors arising from grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.

• Entitlement to Proclamation: In view of the findings of fact and law in G.R. No. 212615 annulling Labao, Jr.'s disqualification, it was no longer necessary to discuss the issues raised in Sharon's petition seeking to succeed Labao, Jr. as Mayor. Her petition was therefore dismissed as moot and academic.

• Definition of "Fugitive from Justice" — A fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. There can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that the COMELEC failed to establish Labao, Jr.'s intent to evade prosecution, as the evidence showed only that he was not at the hospital when the warrant was served, without more.

• Pre-Proclamation Controversy vs. Disqualification Case — A pre-proclamation controversy, under Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code, refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers, or matters under Sections 233 to 236 relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of election returns. The enumeration of proper issues under Section 243 is restrictive and exclusive, as held in Suhuri vs. Commission on Elections. A petition for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code does not fall within this category. The Court applied this distinction to reject Labao, Jr.'s argument that the case had ceased to be a pre-proclamation controversy upon his proclamation.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion by Constitutional Commissions — In exceptional cases, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction. The Court applied this principle to annul the COMELEC En Banc Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• "The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction." — This passage, quoting Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections, articulates the controlling test for determining whether a person is a fugitive from justice, requiring proof of both knowledge of the charge and intent to evade.

• "In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction." — This passage, quoting Jalover vs. Osmeña, defines the scope of the Court's power to review COMELEC decisions and explains how grave abuse of discretion transforms an error of judgment into a jurisdictional error.

• "Moreover, the dearth of evidence pointing to such intent hardly justifies the would-be disenfranchisement of 12,117 innocent voters of Mambusao, Capiz who voted for Labao, Jr." — This passage underscores the Court's sensitivity to the electorate's will when weighing the sufficiency of evidence in disqualification cases, emphasizing that disenfranchisement of voters requires a solid evidentiary basis.

• Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections, 328 Phil. 624 (1996) — Controlling precedent defining "fugitive from justice" as including those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution, with intent to evade as the compelling factor. The Court relied on this definition to evaluate whether Labao, Jr. qualified as a fugitive from justice.

• Suhuri vs. Commission on Elections, 617 Phil. 852 (2009) — Followed for the proposition that the enumeration of proper issues in a pre-proclamation controversy under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code is "restrictive and exclusive." The Court used this ruling to distinguish the disqualification case from a pre-proclamation controversy.

• Fermin vs. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil. 449 (2008) — Cited by the COMELEC En Banc for the rule that a disqualified candidate may be substituted and the rules on succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code apply. The COMELEC applied this ruling to direct succession upon Labao, Jr.'s disqualification.

• Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections, 709 Phil. 408 (2013) — Cited by Sharon as basis for her claim that, having garnered the second highest number of votes, she should be proclaimed mayor upon Labao, Jr.'s disqualification. The Court did not reach the merits of this argument, dismissing Sharon's petition as moot.

• Jalover vs. Osmeña, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014 — Followed for the principle that the Court has a constitutional duty to intervene when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence constitutes grave abuse of discretion, and that such errors mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.

• Marquez, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 313 Phil. 417 (1995) — Cited in support of the definition of "fugitive from justice" as including those who flee after being charged to avoid prosecution.

• Section 40(e), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Disqualifies "[f]ugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad" from running for any elective local position. This was the statutory ground invoked in the petition for disqualification against Labao, Jr.

• Section 44, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Governs permanent vacancies in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, and vice-mayor, providing that the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall succeed to the office. The COMELEC directed the application of this provision upon declaring Labao, Jr.'s proclamation null and void; the Court's annulment of the COMELEC resolution rendered this direction void.

• Section 241, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Defines a pre-proclamation controversy as any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236. The Court applied this provision to classify the case as a disqualification petition rather than a pre-proclamation controversy.

• Section 243, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Enumerates the proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy, which the Court held to be "restrictive and exclusive" per Suhuri.

• Section 211, paragraph 24, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Provides that any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment shall be considered as stray. Sharon invoked this provision to argue that votes for Labao, Jr. should be considered stray and that she should be proclaimed.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Associate Justice Francis H. Jardaleza, and Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa. Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was on leave.