Kummer vs. People

Inconsistencies between a witness's sworn affidavit and open-court testimony on minor and collateral matters do not affect credibility, and a formal amendment that merely changes the date of commission of the crime—where the disparity is not great—does not require re-arraignment of the accused, provided the amendment does not alter the nature of the offense or prejudice the rights of the accused.

Leticia I. Kummer and her son Freiderich Johan I. Kummer were residents of a rural area in Cagayan where the New People's Army was reportedly prevalent. On the evening of June 19, 1988, Jesus Mallo, Jr. was shot and killed in front of the Kummer residence. An information for homicide was filed against both accused on January 12, 1989, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1130 before the RTC, Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Johan was a minor at the time of the incident and was released on the recognizance of his father, Moises Kummer; he subsequently left the country without notifying the court, leaving Leticia as the sole appellant.

On the evening of June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of petitioner Leticia I. Kummer. Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself, saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo." The petitioner opened the door, and at that point her son and co-accused, Johan, using his left hand, shot Mallo twice with a gun about six inches long. Malana, who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter's back and causing him to fall flat on the ground.

Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together with Johan, she scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was lying flat. At that point, the petitioner uttered in a loud voice, "Johan, patay na." The petitioner and Johan put down the guns and the flashlight they were holding, held Mallo's feet, and pulled him about three to four meters away from the house. They then returned inside and turned off all the lights. The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went to the petitioner's house and informed her that Mallo had been found dead in front of her house. Pelovello conducted an investigation through inquiries among the neighbors, including the petitioner, who all denied having any knowledge of the incident.

An information for homicide was filed on January 12, 1989 against the petitioner and Johan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1130. Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The petitioner denied the charge and claimed that she and her children—Johan, Melanie, and Erika—were already asleep that evening when they were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a gun report, and banging at their door. Believing the noise was caused by New People's Army members prevalent in their area, Johan retrieved a .38 caliber gun and fired it twice outside to scare the disturbers. The noise continued, with a stone hitting the window and breaking the glass and another stone hitting Melanie, who was then sick. This prompted Johan to get a shotgun placed beside the door and fire it. The noise thereafter stopped, and they all went back to sleep.

The RTC found the prosecution's evidence persuasive, relying on the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Malana, who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo. This testimonial evidence, coupled with positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on Johan's left hand and the petitioner's right hand, as well as corroborative testimony from other prosecution witnesses, led the RTC to convict both accused of homicide. The petitioner appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC judgment. Only the petitioner appealed further to the Supreme Court, as Johan had left the country.

• Witness Credibility: Petitioner argued that the RTC erred in giving credence to the testimonies of Cuntapay and Malana despite discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct testimonies, which allegedly destroyed their credibility.
• Lack of Motive: Petitioner contended that the prosecution failed to cite or prove her motive in killing the victim, which should preclude conviction.
• Judge Who Rendered Decision: Petitioner maintained that the RTC decision was erroneous because Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, who penned the decision, was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses and thus lacked the opportunity to observe their demeanor.
• Paraffin Test Results: Petitioner argued that the paraffin test results should not have been considered, raising issues regarding the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the test and the fact that the forensic chemist was not presented in court.
• Improbabilities in Testimonies: Petitioner alleged numerous improbabilities and illogical claims in the witnesses' accounts—including the unusual time for a farmer to return home, the petitioner putting down her gun to pull the victim, Malana being left unharmed, the witnesses' failure to immediately report the incident, and other behavioral claims—which collectively cast serious doubt on their reliability.
• Amended Information: Petitioner claimed she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she was convicted, arguing that a change in the date of the commission of the crime required re-arraignment.

• Witness Credibility: Whether inconsistencies between the eyewitnesses' sworn affidavits and their open-court testimonies discredit them and warrant acquittal.
• Motive: Whether the prosecution's failure to prove the petitioner's motive precludes conviction despite positive identification by eyewitnesses.
• Validity of Judgment by Different Judge: Whether a judgment of conviction is invalid when rendered by a judge who did not personally hear the testimonies of the witnesses.
• Admissibility of Public Documents: Whether the chemistry report on the paraffin test is admissible despite the forensic chemist not having been presented as a witness.
• Formal Amendment and Re-arraignment: Whether a formal amendment changing the date of the commission of the crime requires re-arraignment of the accused.
• Improbabilities in Testimonies: Whether alleged improbabilities and illogical claims in the eyewitnesses' testimonies destroy their credibility.

• Witness Credibility: No. Inconsistencies between affidavits and open-court testimonies referring only to minor and collateral matters do not affect witness credibility; open-court testimony prevails over ex parte affidavits, which are generally incomplete and inferior.
• Motive: No. Motive need not be proved when the accused has been positively identified as the author of the crime by eyewitnesses.
• Validity of Judgment by Different Judge: No. A judgment is not rendered erroneous solely because the judge who penned it was not the same judge who heard the testimonies; the judge may rely on the transcribed stenographic notes.
• Admissibility of Public Documents: Yes, the chemistry report is admissible. As a public document, it does not require authentication, and its entries are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
• Formal Amendment and Re-arraignment: No. A change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is a formal amendment that does not require re-arraignment.
• Improbabilities in Testimonies: No. There is no standard human behavioral response to a startling or frightful experience, and alleged improbabilities referring to minor and inconsequential details do not destroy credibility.

• Witness Credibility: The Court applied the settled rule that inconsistencies between a witness's testimony in open court and statements in a sworn affidavit, referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect credibility or the veracity of the testimony. Slight contradictions even strengthen credibility, as they indicate the testimonies have not been rehearsed. Affidavits are typically abbreviated and inaccurate, often taken through standard questions with ready suggestions that may not fully capture the affiant's narration. As between the joint affidavit and testimony in open court, the latter prevails because ex parte affidavits are generally considered inferior. In this case, Malana and Cuntapay positively and firmly declared in open court that they saw the petitioner and Johan shoot Mallo. The inconsistencies in their affidavits were explained as due to the oversight of the administering official. These inconsistencies carried no direct bearing on the crucial issue of the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also accorded great respect and finality to the trial court's credibility findings, which were affirmed by the CA.

• Motive: The Court applied the rule that motive gains importance only when the identity of the assailant is in doubt. Where the accused has been positively identified as the author of the crime, the prosecution need not prove motive. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed for no apparent reason, and that friendship or relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime. Since Malana and Cuntapay positively identified the petitioner as one of the perpetrators, the failure to cite motive was of no moment. The Court also rejected the petitioner's argument that the witnesses' affidavits merely attested to hearing gunshots rather than witnessing the shooting, holding that facts disclosed in open court that supplement declarations in the affidavit cannot be ruled out as inconsistent.

• Validity of Judgment by Different Judge: The Court applied the settled rule that the validity of a judgment is not impaired solely because the judge who heard the case was not the same judge who rendered the decision. A judge who did not personally hear the testimonies may rely on the transcribed stenographic notes as the basis for the decision, in the same manner that appellate courts review evidence on appeal. Judge Abella-Aquino's decision was not erroneous because she based her ruling completely on the records before her.

• Admissibility of Public Documents: The Court applied Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, classifying the chemistry report as a public document consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer. As a public document, the rule on authentication does not apply; it is admissible without further proof of due execution and genuineness, and the forensic chemist need not be presented as a witness. The entries are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein—the presence of gunpowder residue on Johan's left hand and the petitioner's right hand. The petitioner herself admitted the presence of gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit attributing them to lighting a match. The Court also applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, presuming that the forensic chemist observed standard operating procedure absent any evidence of fabrication or irregularity. While a positive paraffin finding does not conclusively prove that the petitioner fired a gun, it corroborates the eyewitness testimony.

• Formal Amendment and Re-arraignment: The Court applied Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which permits a formal amendment of a complaint after the plea with leave of court and without prejudice to the rights of the accused. A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is more formal than substantial and does not prejudice the rights of the accused because it does not alter the nature of the offense. The test for prejudice is whether a defense under the original complaint would no longer be available after the amendment, or whether evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the amended information. Here, the amendment changed the date from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988—a difference of only one month—which did not change the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense, or deprive the accused of any defense. Since the purpose of arraignment—to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation—was already attained at the first arraignment, a formal amendment does not call for a second plea.

• Improbabilities in Testimonies: The Court applied the principle that there is no absolute uniformity or fixed standard of human behavior. People may react differently when confronted with a given situation, and witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate absolute uniformity in action and reaction. The alleged improbabilities—the unusual time for a farmer to return home, the petitioner putting down her gun to pull the victim, Malana being left unharmed, the witnesses' failure to immediately report, and other behavioral claims—referred only to minor and inconsequential details that did not touch on the core of the crime itself. The petitioner's overcritical scrutiny of these details was insufficient to overturn the positive identification by two eyewitnesses.

• Variance Between Affidavit and Testimony — Inconsistencies between a witness's sworn affidavit and open-court testimony on minor and collateral matters do not affect credibility or the veracity of the testimony. Slight contradictions even serve as badges of truth, indicating the testimonies have not been rehearsed. Open-court testimony prevails over ex parte affidavits, which are generally incomplete and inferior. Facts disclosed in open court that supplement, rather than contradict, declarations in the affidavit may be considered by the court.

• Motive as Dispensable When Accused Is Positively Identified — Motive gains importance only when the identity of the assailant is in doubt. Where the accused has been positively identified by eyewitnesses as the author of the crime, the prosecution need not prove motive. The absence of motive does not preclude conviction where reliable witnesses fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator.

• Validity of Judgment by a Judge Who Did Not Hear the Case — A judgment is not rendered erroneous solely because the judge who penned the decision was not the same judge who heard the testimonies. The judge may rely on the transcribed stenographic notes as the basis for the decision, in the manner that appellate courts review evidence on appeal.

• No Standard Form of Human Behavior — There is no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with an unusual, strange, startling, or frightful experience. Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate absolute uniformity in action and reaction. Alleged improbabilities referring to minor and inconsequential details do not destroy credibility.

• Admissibility of Public Documents Without Authentication — Public documents, including official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer, are admissible in evidence without further proof of due execution and genuineness. The person who made the report need not be presented in court. Entries in public records are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties applies absent evidence of fabrication or irregularity.

• Formal Amendment Changing Date of Crime — A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is a formal amendment that does not alter the nature of the offense or prejudice the rights of the accused. The test for prejudice: a defense under the original complaint must still be available after the amendment, and evidence the accused might have must remain applicable. A formal amendment after plea does not require re-arraignment because the purpose of arraignment—to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation—has already been attained.

• "The Court has consistently held that inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon the commission of the crime itself." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the rule on affidavit-testimony discrepancies, frequently cited in subsequent credibility jurisprudence.

• "Human nature suggests that people may react differently when confronted with a given situation. Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate an absolute uniformity and conformity in action and reaction. People may act contrary to the accepted norm, react differently and act contrary to the expectation of mankind. There is no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with an unusual, strange, startling or frightful experience." — This defines the doctrine on the absence of a standard form of human behavior, commonly invoked to reject arguments based on alleged improbabilities in witness conduct.

• "A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense." — This states the ratio decidendi on formal amendments, establishing that a change of date is formal rather than substantive.

• People vs. Perreras, 414 Phil. 480 (2001) — Followed for the rule that inconsistencies between affidavit and open-court testimony on minor matters do not affect credibility.
• People vs. Quiming, G.R. No. 92847, May 21, 1993 — Followed for the principle that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate, often incomplete relative to the declarant's testimony in court.
• People vs. Dumpe, G.R. Nos. 80110-11, March 22, 1990 — Followed for the rule that discrepancies between affidavit statements and witness-stand testimony do not necessarily discredit the witness.
• People vs. Marcelo, G.R. No. 105005, June 2, 1993 — Followed for the principle that open-court testimony prevails over ex parte affidavits.
• People vs. Lucero, G.R. No. 179044, December 6, 2010 — Followed for the rule that the Supreme Court accords great respect and finality to trial court credibility findings, especially when affirmed by the CA.
• People vs. Cadley, 469 Phil. 515 (2004) — Followed for the rule that a judgment is valid even if rendered by a judge who did not hear the case.
• People vs. Canceran, G.R. No. 104866, January 31, 1994 — Followed for the rule that motive need not be proved when the accused is positively identified.
• People vs. Roncal, 338 Phil. 749 (1997) — Followed for the doctrine that there is no standard human behavioral response to startling or frightful experiences.
• People vs. Casey, L-30146, February 24, 1981 — Followed for the test on when an amendment prejudices the rights of the accused.
• People vs. Borromeo, 208 Phil. 234 (1983) — Followed for the ruling that a change in the date of the commission of the crime is a formal amendment that does not prejudice the accused.

• Section 19, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Defines classes of documents as public or private. Applied to classify the chemistry report as a public document, admissible without further proof of due execution and authenticity, with its entries constituting prima facie evidence of the facts stated.
• Section 23, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Provides that entries in public records made in the performance of duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Applied to uphold the admissibility of the paraffin test results.
• Section 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Governs amendment or substitution of a complaint or information. Applied to hold that a formal amendment changing the date of the crime may be made after the plea with leave of court and without prejudice to the accused.
• Section 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides that it is not necessary to state the precise time of the offense except when time is a material ingredient. Applied to support the ruling that the change of date was a formal amendment.
• Section 1(b), Rule 115, Rules of Court — Recognizes the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Applied to explain the purpose of arraignment and why a formal amendment does not require re-arraignment.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Jose Portugal Perez, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen. No separate concurring opinions were written.