Kulayan vs. Tan

The calling-out powers under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution—which authorize the President to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion—are exclusive to the President as Commander-in-Chief and cannot be exercised by provincial governors or other local government officials, even under the general welfare clause or emergency powers provisions of the Local Government Code.

On January 15, 2009, three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—Swiss national Andres Notter, Italian national Eugenio Vagni, and Filipino engineer Marie Jean Lacaba—were kidnapped in Patikul, Sulu by members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) while inspecting a water sanitation project at the Sulu Provincial Jail. The kidnapping triggered the creation of a task force by the ICRC and Philippine National Police (PNP), followed by the organization of a Local Crisis Committee later renamed the Sulu Crisis Management Committee under the leadership of Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan. The Governor subsequently organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), an armed civilian group, through a secret Memorandum of Understanding with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP. As the hostage crisis continued with ASG demands for military withdrawal, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 on March 31, 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province and authorizing checkpoints, curfews, general searches and seizures, and arrests.

• On January 15, 2009, three ICRC members (Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba) were kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf Group members in Patikul, Sulu while inspecting a water sanitation project at the Sulu Provincial Jail.
• The kidnappers were led by Raden Abu, a former jail guard linked to ASG leader Albader Parad.
• On January 21, 2009, the ICRC and PNP created a task force, which organized a Local Crisis Committee later renamed the Sulu Crisis Management Committee under Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan.
• Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), composed of armed male civilians from different municipalities, through a secret Memorandum of Understanding with the AFP (represented by Gen. Juancho Saban and Col. Eugenio Clemen) and PNP (represented by P/SUPT. Bienvenido Latag).
• The ASG demanded military pullback from jungle areas and threatened to behead hostages, giving authorities until 2:00 PM on March 31, 2009 to comply.
• On March 31, 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 declaring a state of emergency in Sulu, citing the kidnapping as a terrorist act under the Human Security Act and invoking Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
• The Proclamation authorized the PNP, AFP, and CEF to: (1) set up checkpoints and chokepoints; (2) impose curfew; (3) conduct general search and seizure including arrests; and (4) conduct other actions necessary to ensure public safety.
• On April 1, 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was arrested after being questioned about his relationship to deceased relatives suspected of being ASG supporters. Several others were also arrested including former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi.
• On April 4, 2009, Governor Tan distributed Guidelines implementing the Proclamation, which suspended all Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFORs) and allowed exemptions only through the Governor's office, and authorized general searches and seizures at designated checkpoints.
• On April 16, 2009, petitioners filed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court.

• Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as they threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
• The Proclamation was issued ultra vires and is null and void for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as chief executive and commander-in-chief.
• The Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under his command or to regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.
• The provision for "General Search and Seizure including arrests" violates the constitutional proscription against general search warrants and general seizures under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

• Petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts by filing directly with the Supreme Court when both the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Courts possessed concurrent jurisdiction under Rule 65.
• Proclamation 1-09 was not issued ultra vires as Governor Tan acted pursuant to Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government Code, which empower the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during calamities and disasters and to call upon appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion, or sedition.
• The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu authorized the declaration of state of emergency through Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009.
• The kidnapping incident constituted a terrorist act and an emergency situation justifying the exercise of the governor's powers under the Local Government Code.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the doctrine of hierarchy of courts bars the Supreme Court from exercising jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed directly before it.
• Substantive Issues: Whether Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code authorizes the provincial governor to declare a state of emergency and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation No. 1-09, specifically the conduct of general searches and seizures. Whether the provincial governor is authorized to convene the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) under the Local Government Code.

• Procedural: The Supreme Court held that while the doctrine of hierarchy of courts generally requires petitions for extraordinary writs to be filed with lower courts first, this rule admits of exceptions when the case involves transcendental public importance. The instant case involves acts of a public official pertaining to restrictive custody and emergency powers that affect fundamental liberties, warranting relaxation of the doctrine. The Court cited its duty to formulate guiding constitutional principles and the fact that such emergency proclamations are inherently short-lived and capable of repetition yet evading review if not immediately addressed.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the calling-out powers under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution are exclusive to the President as Commander-in-Chief. The constitutional principle of "One Executive, One Commander-in-Chief" means that only the President can call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. Section 465 of the Local Government Code does not authorize the governor to declare a state of emergency involving calling-out powers; paragraph 1(vii) refers only to emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, which does not include kidnapping incidents, while paragraph 2(vi) is inapplicable because (a) the AFP is not a "national law enforcement agency" but the military, and (b) there was no evidence that local police forces were inadequate to cope with the situation. The organization of the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) is invalid under Section 24, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which mandates the dismantling of private armies and paramilitary forces not consistent with the citizen armed force established in the Constitution. The provision for "general search and seizure" in the Proclamation is unconstitutional as it violates Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution requiring particular description of the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 and its Implementing Guidelines are declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts — The principle that petitions for extraordinary writs should be filed with lower courts (CA or RTC) before the Supreme Court, unless the case involves constitutional questions of transcendental importance to the public that the Court can resolve without determining factual issues, or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
• One Executive, One Commander-in-Chief Principle — The constitutional precept that executive power is vested solely in the President, who alone is authorized to exercise calling-out powers as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This power is discretionary and exclusive to the President, requiring no concurrence by the legislature nor subject to judicial review in the same manner as martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
• Calling-Out Powers — The authority of the President under Article VII, Section 18 to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. This is considered a lesser and more benign power compared to martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, but is nonetheless exclusive to the President and cannot be delegated to or exercised by local government officials.
• Transcendental Public Importance — An exception to procedural rules including mootness and hierarchy of courts, allowing judicial review of cases that involve grave violations of the Constitution, exceptional situations involving paramount public interest, or issues requiring formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.

• "With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive." — Citing Villena v. Secretary of Interior, emphasizing the singular nature of executive power.
• "There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government." — Characterizing the exceptional nature of commander-in-chief powers.
• "The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires."
• "The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense."
• "The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in nature. The Code is concerned only with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective to the constituents, and should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives."

• Villena v. Secretary of Interior — Established the principle of a single Executive and that certain constitutional powers of the Chief Executive must be exercised by the President in person and cannot be validated by approval or ratification by any other person.
• David v. Macapagal-Arroyo — Cited for the proposition that cases involving restrictive custody are of transcendental public importance, and for the exceptions to the moot and academic principle when there is grave violation of the Constitution, exceptional character of the situation, or the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
• Chavez v. PEA-Amari — Applied for the exception to the hierarchy of courts when the case raises constitutional questions of transcendental importance that the Court can resolve without determining factual issues.
• Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora — Established that calling-out powers belong solely to the President as Commander-in-Chief and constitute a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
• Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia — Characterized presidential powers arising from exceptional circumstances (martial law, suspension of habeas corpus, pardoning power) as requiring exclusive exercise by the President due to their gravitas and exceptional import.
• Montes v. Court of Appeals and Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco — Cited by respondents regarding the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
• Carpio v. Executive Secretary — Referenced regarding the operational supervision of local chief executives over police units.

• Article VII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution — Vests executive power in the President alone.
• Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution — Grants the President as Commander-in-Chief the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion, and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines under martial law in cases of invasion or rebellion when public safety requires it.
• Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution — Provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices and ensure that laws be faithfully executed.
• Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution — Mandates that civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military.
• Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution — States that the State shall establish and maintain one police force, national in scope and civilian in character, administered and controlled by a national police commission.
• Article XVIII, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution — Mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority.
• Article XI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution — Provides that the preservation of peace and order within regions is the responsibility of local police agencies, while defense and security is the responsibility of the National Government.
• Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires warrants to issue only upon probable cause with particular description of the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
• Section 465 of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) — Enumerates the powers, duties, and functions of the provincial governor, including carrying out emergency measures during disasters and calling upon national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder.
• Section 16 of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) — The General Welfare Clause defining the powers of local government units.