Koh Tieck Heng vs. People of the Philippines

The possessor and utterer of a falsified document who makes use of and benefits therefrom is presumed to be the forger, and such presumption—reinforced by the inherent improbability of the defense's version—constitutes sufficient evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Attempted estafa is proper when the offender commences the commission of the crime but fails to perform all acts of execution by reason of apprehension, not spontaneous desistance, even if no actual damage resulted.

Petitioner Koh Tieck Heng, also known as Teddy Koh or Tomas P. Flores, maintained Savings Account No. 26580 with the Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC), Escolta Branch, Manila, opened under the alias Tomas P. Flores. The case involves the deposit and negotiation of two Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC) checks bearing the forged signature of Florencio Dycaico, who maintained Checking Account No. 13360 with PBC. The informations charged estafa and attempted estafa through falsification of commercial documents under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the falsification mode alleged being the alteration and superimposition of dates and amounts on genuine checks.

On February 21, 1973, Koh Tieck Heng, using the alias Tomas P. Flores, opened Savings Account No. 26580 with the Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC), Escolta Branch, Manila, with an initial deposit of ₱500.00. He subsequently made several deposits and withdrawals of modest amounts. On August 13, 1973, he appeared at SBTC and accomplished a deposit slip for ₱18,060.00 in check, submitting to Teller No. 2, Urbana Ramos de Ferrer, his passbook and PBC Check No. U-186378, dated August 9, 1973, for ₱18,060.00, purportedly signed and issued by "F. Dycaico." The check was signed and indorsed by the accused, and the deposit was posted in his passbook.

On August 16, 1973, the accused withdrew ₱10,000.00 from the account, and on the following day, August 17, 1973, he withdrew another ₱5,500.00, both withdrawals being posted in his passbook. On August 18, 1973, he returned to SBTC and deposited a second PBC Check No. U-186414, dated August 11, 1973, also for ₱18,060.00, likewise appearing to be signed by "F. Dycaico" against the same Checking Account No. 13360. The deposit was posted in his passbook.

Sometime in August 1973, Florencio Dycaico reviewed his PBC statement of account and discovered a debit of ₱18,060.00 against his account. He complained to PBC that he had never issued a check for that amount. PBC in turn notified SBTC that Check No. U-186378 was spurious. SBTC officials instructed their tellers to watch for Tomas P. Flores, and NBI Agent Mamerto Espartero was assigned, together with an informer, to apprehend check forgers at the SBTC premises in coordination with bank officials.

On August 22, 1973, the accused appeared at SBTC and accomplished a withdrawal slip for ₱15,500.00, submitting it with his passbook to Teller No. 7, Maria Victoria Soriano. Forewarned, she asked the accused to sign his name, which he did as "Koh Tieck Heng." After he signed at the back of the withdrawal slip, NBI Agent Espartero apprehended him. He was brought to the Cashier's Office, interviewed, and later taken to the NBI office where he executed a written statement.

For his defense, the accused testified that on August 9, 1973, he went to Supersonic Auto Supply in Sampaloc, Manila, to buy auto spare parts, being engaged in the buying and selling of such items. There he met a man who introduced himself as "Jimmy Go," who was looking to buy twenty-four tires. The accused told Jimmy Go that he had the tires but needed cash and did not accept checks from strangers. Jimmy Go proposed issuing a check and delivering the tires only after encashment. The accused agreed. Jimmy Go signed a check in the accused's presence, signing the name "F. Dycaico," and handed it over. The accused claimed that all handwritten portions of the check other than the signature and crossing lines were already present when Jimmy Go signed it. After encashing ₱10,000.00 on August 13, 1973, the accused delivered the amount to Jimmy Go and the tires in the afternoon, then delivered the balance of ₱5,500.00 on August 16, 1973. On that same date, Jimmy Go allegedly delivered a second check for another fifty tires, which the accused deposited on August 18, 1973. Both lower courts rejected this version as inherently improbable and insulting to common sense.

• Variance Between Information and Evidence: Petitioner alleged that there was a variance between the allegations in the information and the evidence adduced, the informations charging falsification by alteration and superimposition while the evidence showed the checks were forgeries in toto, thereby depriving him of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
• Absence of Damage in Attempted Estafa: Petitioner contended that respondent court erred in convicting him of attempted estafa in Criminal Case No. 15007 because he was apprehended before withdrawing any amount from the second check, meaning no damage or prejudice was suffered by the bank, and absent such damage, no conviction for attempted estafa could lie.
• Insufficiency of Presumption: Petitioner insisted that there was no evidence pointing to him as the forger of the two checks, and that the presumption that the possessor of a falsified document is the forger does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt and cannot be applied in his case, invoking the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• Variance Affects Only Falsification, Not Estafa: Respondent argued that the variance between the information and the evidence affected solely the charge of falsification, of which the accused should not have been convicted, but that conviction for estafa and attempted estafa remained proper because the essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage had been both charged and proven.
• Attempted Estafa Proper: Respondent maintained that the accused commenced the commission of estafa by depositing the forged check and attempting to withdraw funds, but failed to perform all acts of execution not by spontaneous desistance but by timely apprehension, making attempted estafa the correct conviction.
• Presumption of Authorship: Respondent relied on the established rule that the possessor and utterer of a falsified document who makes use of and benefits therefrom is presumed to be the forger, and argued that the defense's version was inherently improbable and undeserving of credence.

• Variance Doctrine: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in convicting petitioner of estafa and attempted estafa despite a variance between the mode of falsification alleged in the information (alteration and superimposition) and that proven by the evidence (forgery in toto).
• Attempted Estafa: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in convicting petitioner of attempted estafa in Criminal Case No. 15007 in the absence of actual damage to the bank.
• Presumption of Falsification: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding petitioner's guilt on the basis of the presumption that the possessor of a falsified document is the forger, despite the absence of direct evidence and in alleged violation of the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• Variance Doctrine: No. The variance affected solely the charge of falsification, not the estafa and attempted estafa convictions, the essential elements of fraud and damage having been properly charged and proven under the informations.
• Attempted Estafa: No. Attempted estafa was proper because petitioner commenced the commission of the crime but failed to perform all acts of execution by reason of apprehension, not spontaneous desistance; only intent to cause damage, not damage itself, need be shown for the attempted felony.
• Presumption of Falsification: No. The presumption that the possessor and utterer of a falsified document who benefits therefrom is the forger constitutes sufficient evidence of guilt, especially where the defense's version is inherently improbable and contrary to common experience.

• Variance Doctrine: The informations charged falsification under Article 172 in relation to Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, alleging that the accused erased and altered the dates and amounts of the checks and superimposed new ones. The evidence, however, showed that the checks were forgeries in toto—Florencio Dycaico denied having issued the checks in the amount of ₱18,060.00 and admitted only to issuing checks for ₱225.00 and ₱2,030.00. This variance meant the accused should not have been convicted of falsification under paragraph 6 of Article 171, as the evidence would support falsification under paragraph 1 or 2 (counterfeiting or imitating a signature, or causing it to appear that a person participated in an act when he did not). However, with respect to the charges of estafa and attempted estafa complexed with falsification, conviction remained proper because the two essential requisites of estafa—fraud or deceit and damage to another—were both charged in the informations and proven by the evidence. The variance touched only the mode of falsification, not the elements of estafa itself.

• Attempted Estafa: The two essential requisites of estafa are fraud or deceit and damage or injury to the offended party. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. The use of spurious checks is by itself fraud or deceit. Although damage is an essential element of consummated estafa, in its absence the offender may still be guilty of attempted estafa. Petitioner commenced the commission of estafa by depositing the forged check and accomplishing a withdrawal slip for ₱15,500.00, but he failed to perform all acts of execution which would have produced the crime, not by reason of his own spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension by authorities before payment could be made. Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself was shown, the Court of Appeals correctly convicted him of attempted estafa.

• Presumption of Falsification: While the prosecution did not directly contradict petitioner's account of how he acquired the checks, it is understandable that the prosecution would not always have means to obtain direct evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely. As a general rule, positive testimony uncontradicted by anyone should control the court's decision, but where there is inherent improbability in the testimony or theory of a witness, the court may properly disregard such evidence even without direct conflicting testimony. The defense's version—that a stranger named Jimmy Go signed a check in the name "F. Dycaico" in petitioner's presence and handed it over for the purchase of tires—was found inherently improbable and insulting to common sense by both lower courts. The checks were undeniably spurious, and Dycaico's categorical denial of issuing them constituted prima facie evidence of falsification, shifting the burden of evidence to petitioner, which he failed to discharge. The established rule is that when a person is proved to have in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption is justified that such person is the forger. Petitioner was shown to be the possessor and utterer of the two checks, having made use of and benefited from them through his withdrawals and attempted withdrawal. Since he was the only person who stood to benefit from the falsification, he is presumed to be the material author thereof, he being criminally responsible whether he himself falsified the document or caused it to be falsified.

• Presumption of Authorship of Falsification — When it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger. The circumstance that the possessor made use of and benefited from the falsified document is strong evidence that he either himself falsified it or caused the same to be falsified, he being criminally responsible in either case. Applied in this case: petitioner was the possessor and utterer of the two forged checks and benefited from them through withdrawals and an attempted withdrawal, and was the only person who stood to benefit from the falsification, thus the presumption applied.

• Essential Elements of Estafa — The two essential requisites of estafa are (1) fraud or deceit and (2) damage or injury to the offended party. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. In the absence of proof of damage, the offender would at least be guilty of attempted estafa.

• Attempted Estafa — Attempted estafa is proper when the offender commences the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but fails to perform all acts of execution which would produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance. Only the intent to cause damage, not the damage itself, need be shown for the attempted felony.

• Variance Doctrine in Criminal Procedure — An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged or included in the information, based on the right to be informed of the true nature and cause of the accusation. However, where the variance affects only the mode of falsification charged but the essential elements of the complexed offense (estafa) are properly alleged and proven, conviction for the complexed offense remains proper.

• Inherent Improbability of Testimony — Where there is inherent improbability in the testimony or theory of a witness, the court may properly disregard such evidence even in the absence of direct conflicting testimony. Evidence to be worthy of credit must not only proceed from a credible source but must be credible in itself—natural, reasonable, and probable as to make it easy to believe.

• "It is an established rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger." — This passage states the controlling presumption of authorship applied to the possessor and utterer of a falsified document, forming the ratio decidendi for sustaining the conviction.

• "Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has been shown, respondent court correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa." — This passage articulates the rule that attempted estafa requires only proof of intent to cause damage, not actual damage, when the offender is apprehended before completing all acts of execution.

• "Where, however, there is such an inherent improbability in the testimony or theory of the witness, the court may properly disregard such evidence, even in the absence of any direct conflicting testimony." — This passage defines the doctrine permitting courts to reject inherently improbable testimony without directly contradicting evidence, supporting the rejection of petitioner's defense.

• People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754 (1924) — Cited as authority for the established rule that the possessor and utterer of a falsified document is presumed to be the forger. Followed.
• People vs. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906 (1935) — Cited in support of the presumption of authorship of falsification. Followed.
• People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253 (1959) — Cited for the proposition that one who either falsifies a document or causes it to be falsified is criminally responsible. Followed.
• Sarep vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 440 (1989) — Cited for the rule that since the possessor is the only person who stood to benefit from the falsification of the document found in his possession, he is presumed to be the material author. Followed.
• Sales vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 717 (1988) — Cited for the essential requisites of estafa, namely fraud or deceit and damage or injury. Followed.
• People vs. Castillo, 76 Phil. 72 (1946) — Cited for the definition of deceit as false representation of a matter of fact intended to deceive another. Followed.
• U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 (1912) — Cited for the rule that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged in the information. Followed.

• Article 172 in relation to Article 171, Revised Penal Code — Defines falsification by a private individual, with Article 171 enumerating the acts of falsification. The informations charged falsification under paragraph 6 (making alterations or intercalations in a genuine document which changes its meaning), but the evidence showed forgery in toto, which would fall under paragraph 1 (counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric) or paragraph 2 (causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate). The variance affected only the falsification conviction, not the estafa conviction.
• Article 29, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6127 — Governs the credit for preventive imprisonment in the service of the sentence, applied in the modified penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals.

Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred. Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.