Ko Wai Me vs. Galang

An alien who has been ordered deported by a final decision of the Board of Commissioners of Immigration remains a deportee even if she voluntarily leaves the country at her own expense, and such voluntary departure does not revoke the final deportation order. Consequently, the alien may be admitted to the Philippines only in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration under Section 29(b)(2) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, and the Commissioner's exclusion order, being an exercise of that discretion, is valid.

Ko Wai Me, a Chinese national, was the alleged wife of Chua Tao, a Chinese resident of the Philippines. She had previously entered the Philippines surreptitiously as a passenger aboard the S.S. President Cleveland, which arrived in Manila on January 9, 1953, without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities. The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration had rendered a decision on September 5, 1954, ordering her deportation at her own expense, and a warrant for her arrest and deportation was issued on January 19, 1953. The case involves the interplay between the Secretary of Foreign Affairs' authority to issue visitor's visas and the Commissioner of Immigration's discretionary authority to exclude aliens previously ordered deported under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

On June 28, 1956, Chua Tao, the alleged husband of Ko Wai Me, asked the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Bureau of Immigration, for the issuance of a temporary visitor's visa in favor of his alleged wife. In its indorsement dated July 7, 1956, the Bureau of Immigration, through Commissioner Emilio L. Galang, recommended denial of the application, calling attention to the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 29, 1954, finding Ko Wai Me guilty of violation of the Immigration Act for having slipped into the country surreptitiously while a passenger aboard the S.S. President Cleveland, which arrived in Manila on January 9, 1953, without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities. Despite this adverse comment, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs authorized the issuance of a visitor's visa to Ko Wai Me, provided she was in possession of a valid Chinese Nationalist passport, a round trip plane or ship ticket to Hongkong, and a re-entry permit to Hongkong valid for at least 6 months, and that the Philippine Consulate was satisfied after thorough screening that she was the wife of Chua Tao and was otherwise admissible without any derogatory information against her.

Because of this order of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Ko Wai Me was granted a visa and arrived in the port of Manila aboard a Cathay plane on September 28, 1956. On October 1, 1956, an inquiry was made by the Board of Special Inquiry, and on October 4, 1956, the Board recommended that she be admitted for entry. The Board expressly stated that a warrant for her arrest and deportation was issued on January 19, 1953, for having entered the country without inspection and admission, and that she was ordered deported in a decision of the Board of Commissioners on September 5, 1954, at her own expense. The Board stated that as she had not been deported, as shown in her acts, she could be admitted as a temporary visitor for 3 months from the date of her arrival.

The report of the Board of Special Inquiry passed through the hands of First Deputy Commissioner Francisco de la Rosa, who noted that Ko Wai Me qualified for entry as a temporary visitor under the Cabinet policy in view of the satisfactory evidence showing her marriage to a local resident alien, and that her case fell under Section 29(b)(2) in which the Commissioner is given the discretion to permit her entry. The Second Deputy Commissioner was of the opinion that since the petitioner was a previous deportee who may be admitted only in the discretion of the Commissioner, the case should be referred to Commissioner Galang. Upon receipt of the note or indorsement of the deputy commissioners, Commissioner Galang on September 18, 1959, decided petitioner's exclusion and ordered his first deputy commissioner to effect exclusion. Commissioner de la Rosa then issued, in accordance with his superior's instructions, an order for petitioner's exclusion, stating that the Commissioner of Immigration did not permit Ko Wai Me to enter as a temporary visitor in the exercise of his discretion under Section 29(b)(2) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.

The court below held that as the order of exclusion issued by Commissioner Galang had nothing to support it, and the Board of Special Inquiry had rendered a favorable decision upon the right of petitioner to enter, the Board of Commissioners rendered their unanimous decision disapproving the application without anything to support it, and said decision was a nullity. The Supreme Court found that the lower court's conclusion was erroneous, as the report of the Board of Special Inquiry expressly mentioned that petitioner had been ordered arrested and deported by a final decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners, and the Board's conclusion that voluntary departure was not a deportation was error.

N/A — The decision does not recount the petitioner's arguments before the Supreme Court.

• Validity of the Exclusion Order: The respondents, through the Solicitor General, argued that the exclusion order was valid because Ko Wai Me, having been previously ordered deported, could only be admitted in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration under Section 29(b)(2) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
• Effect of Voluntary Departure: The respondents argued that the mere fact that the petitioner voluntarily left the Philippines at her own expense did not have the effect of revoking the final order of deportation and the decision supporting the same, nor did it erase the fact that she had entered the country surreptitiously and without permit from the proper authorities.
• Status as Excluded Alien: The respondents argued that even assuming the petitioner was not a deportee because she voluntarily left the country, she was at least a person who had been excluded from the Philippines within the meaning of Section 29(a)(15) of the Immigration Act, and as such could only be admitted when the Commissioner waives the application of the law in favor of allowing the alien to enter.

• Validity of the Exclusion Order: Whether the Commissioner of Immigration's order excluding Ko Wai Me from entry as a temporary visitor was valid, notwithstanding the favorable recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry.
• Effect of Voluntary Departure: Whether Ko Wai Me's voluntary departure from the Philippines at her own expense, after a final order of deportation had been issued against her, operated to revoke the final deportation order and thereby erase the offense committed against the Immigration laws.
• Discretionary Authority of the Commissioner: Whether Ko Wai Me, as an alien previously ordered deported, could be admitted to the Philippines only in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration under Section 29(b)(2) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

• Validity of the Exclusion Order: Yes. The exclusion order was valid, being an exercise of the Commissioner of Immigration's discretion under Section 29(b)(2) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, and the lower court erred in declaring it a nullity.
• Effect of Voluntary Departure: No. Ko Wai Me's voluntary departure from the Philippines at her own expense did not operate to revoke the final order of deportation, and the Board of Special Inquiry's contrary conclusion was error.
• Discretionary Authority of the Commissioner: Yes. As an alien previously ordered deported, Ko Wai Me could only be admitted in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration, and the Commissioner's decision to exclude her was a valid exercise of that discretion.

• Validity of the Exclusion Order: The Court found that the lower court's conclusion that the exclusion order had nothing to support it was erroneous. The report of the Board of Special Inquiry, Exhibit "E," expressly mentioned that petitioner had been ordered arrested on a warrant of arrest dated June 18, 1953, for entry without inspection and admission, and that she was ordered deported by a final decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners. The Court held that there were no grounds, legal or factual, to support the conclusion arrived at by the judge below. The Court cited the principle that a verdict or decision with nothing to support it is a nullity when directly attacked, but found that this principle did not apply because the exclusion order was supported by the Commissioner's discretionary authority under the Immigration Act.

• Effect of Voluntary Departure: The Court held that the Board of Special Inquiry's conclusion — that the voluntary departure of an alien ordered by a final decision of the Commissioners of Immigration to be deported is not a deportation or exclusion if the deportee leaves the country voluntarily and at her own expense — was error. The mere fact that the petitioner voluntarily left the Islands at her own expense did not have the effect of revoking the final order of deportation and the decision supporting the same. The mere fact that she voluntarily departed at her own expense did not erase the fact that she had entered the country surreptitiously and without permit from the proper authorities and was subject to deportation. The Court emphasized that the first deputy commissioner, in believing that the petitioner could only be admitted in the discretion of the Commissioner, actually reversed the legal conclusion of the Board of Special Inquiry that by petitioner's voluntary exit from the Philippines at her own expense, the offense committed against the Immigration laws had been completely wiped out.

• Discretionary Authority of the Commissioner: The Court held that the principle that voluntary departure of a deportee sentenced to deportation did not operate to revoke the final decision of deportation was the reason or ground why the deputy commissioners had decided that petitioner may only be authorized entry under the provisions of sub-paragraph (2), paragraph (b), Section 29 of the Immigration Act, as amended. The Court further held that even admitting arguendo that the petitioner was not a deportee because she had not been deported, since she voluntarily left the country at her own expense, then at least she was a person who had been excluded from the Philippines within the meaning of the first paragraph of Section 29(a)(15). The decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners ordering her deportation was conclusive evidence of this fact. As such, she could only be admitted when the Commissioner waives the application of the law in favor of allowing the alien to enter the Philippines.

• Finality of Deportation Orders — A final order of deportation issued by the Board of Commissioners of Immigration is not revoked by the voluntary departure of the deportee from the Philippines at her own expense. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Ko Wai Me's voluntary exit did not erase the fact that she had entered the country surreptitiously and was subject to deportation, and that the final deportation order remained effective for purposes of determining her admissibility.

• Discretionary Admission of Previously Deported Aliens — Under Section 29(b)(2) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, an alien who has been previously excluded or deported from the Philippines may be admitted only in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Ko Wai Me, having been previously ordered deported, could only be admitted upon the Commissioner's discretionary waiver, and the Commissioner's decision to exclude her was a valid exercise of that discretion.

• Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions on Alien Entry — The decision of administrative officers upon the question of the right of an alien to enter the Philippine Islands is final when no abuse of authority is shown, but a verdict or decision with nothing to support it is a nullity when directly attacked. The Court applied this doctrine to distinguish the lower court's reliance on it, finding that the exclusion order was supported by the Commissioner's discretionary authority and that no abuse of authority was shown.

• "The mere fact that the petitioner herein voluntarily left the Islands at her own expense did not have the effect of revoking the final order of deportation and the decision supporting the same. The mere fact that she voluntarily departed at her own expense did not erase the fact that she had entered the country surreptitiously and without permit from the proper authorities and with proper documents and is subject to deportation." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi: voluntary departure does not revoke a final deportation order, and the underlying offense against immigration laws remains.

• "Even admitting arguendo that as the petitioner herein is not a deportee because she had not been deported, because she voluntarily left the country at her own expense, then at least she is a person who has been excluded from the Philippines within the meaning of the first paragraph of the above section. The decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners ordering her deportation is conclusive evidence of this fact. As such she can only be admitted when the Commissioner waives the application of the law in favor of allowing the alien to enter the Philippines." — This passage establishes the alternative ground: even if not a deportee, the petitioner was an excluded alien requiring the Commissioner's discretionary waiver for admission.

• "A verdict or decision with nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked. In such case, this court has jurisdiction to review, though, as we have generally held, the decision of the administrative officers upon the question of the right of an alien to enter the Philippine Islands is final when no abuse of authority is shown." — This passage articulates the standard for judicial review of administrative decisions on alien entry, which the Court applied to find the exclusion order valid.

• Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Philippine 598 — Cited as authority for the principle that a decision with nothing to support it is a nullity when directly attacked, and that the decision of administrative officers on the right of an alien to enter the Philippines is final when no abuse of authority is shown. The Court distinguished this case, finding that the exclusion order was supported by the Commissioner's discretionary authority.

• Ngo Yao & Chua Eng Cheng vs. Sheriff of Manila, 27 Phil., 378 — Cited alongside Edwards vs. McCoy for the same principle regarding the finality of administrative decisions on alien entry and the nullity of unsupported decisions. The Court found this principle inapplicable to invalidate the exclusion order.

• Section 29(b)(2), Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended — The provision granting the Commissioner of Immigration discretion to permit the entry of aliens previously excluded or deported from the Philippines. The Court applied this provision to uphold the Commissioner's exclusion order against Ko Wai Me.

• Section 29(a)(15), Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended — The provision excluding from entry into the Philippines persons who have been excluded or deported from the Philippines, with the waiver of this provision allowed in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration. The Court applied this provision to hold that even if Ko Wai Me was not a deportee, she was at least an excluded alien requiring the Commissioner's waiver for admission.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided text.