Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr.

Membership in a university alumni association, by itself, does not constitute a ground for voluntary inhibition of a judge, and bare allegations of bias and prejudice are insufficient absent clear and convincing evidence of acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or partiality; a motion to lift an order of default must be under oath, allege facts constituting fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and demonstrate a meritorious defense.

Petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation, represented by former Senator Jovito R. Salonga, are civic organizations that had previously opposed Gregory S. Ong's appointment to the Supreme Court on the ground that his natural-born citizenship status was unproven. In a prior decision, Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007), the Court enjoined Ong from accepting any appointment to the Supreme Court until he had completed the appropriate adversarial court proceedings to establish his natural-born citizenship and correct his birth records. In response to that decision, Ong filed a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the RTC of Pasig City to amend or correct the citizenship entry in his Certificate of Birth. Public respondent Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. presided over Branch 264 of the RTC, before which the Rule 108 petition was raffled.

On July 9, 2007, following the promulgation of the Court's Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Ermita, private respondent Gregory Ong filed a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for the "amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation" of the entry on citizenship in his Certificate of Birth. The petition was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 11767-SJ and raffled to Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, presided over by public respondent Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. The RTC set the petition for hearing on August 7, 14, 21, and 28, 2007, and notice of the petition was last published on July 26, 2007.

Petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation entered their appearance as oppositors on July 23, 2007. On August 6, 2007, they filed a motion for voluntary inhibition, citing that Ong, his counsel former Senator Rene Saguisag, and public respondent were all graduates of San Beda College of Law and members of its alumni association, which had publicly endorsed and supported Ong's petition through newspaper advertisements. The RTC denied the motion by Order of August 7, 2007, one day after it was filed and prior to any hearing on the motion. Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion on August 13, 2007 seeking reconsideration of the denial and deferment of the scheduled hearings, submitting it ex parte without further arguments and without setting it for hearing.

Despite the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the RTC proceeded to hear Ong's petition on August 14, 2007. Petitioners did not appear at the hearing, asserting that the question of voluntary inhibition remained unresolved. During that hearing, the trial court denied the Omnibus Motion in open court, a ruling later confirmed by a nunc pro tunc Order of September 17, 2007. On August 21, 2007, the RTC declared petitioners in default, noting that they had filed their entry of appearance without any attached Opposition, had undertaken at the August 7 hearing to submit an Opposition within an extended period, and had failed to do so. Petitioners' motion to vacate the order of default was denied by Order of October 4, 2007; the trial court observed that the motion was not under oath, failed to explain or justify the failure to file an opposition, and was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit.

On October 24, 2007, the RTC granted Ong's petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court on December 3, 2007, assailing the Orders and the Decision emanating from the RTC proceedings. Petitioners admitted that they were "not real adversarial litigants in the juridical sense" but were acting as "judicial monitors and observers."

• Voluntary Inhibition: Petitioner argued that public respondent erred in not voluntarily inhibiting himself from presiding over the case, given that Ong, his counsel, and the judge were all graduates of San Beda College of Law and members of its alumni association, which had publicly endorsed and supported Ong's petition through newspaper advertisements.
• Undue Haste and Bias: Petitioner maintained that the RTC exhibited blatant bias by issuing the order of default without first resolving the pending motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for inhibition, characterizing the RTC's actions as unduly precipitate and wholly unwarranted.
• Declaration of Default: Petitioner asserted that the RTC erred in declaring them in default and in denying their motion to vacate the order of default, insisting that the Omnibus Motion presented a prejudicial issue that should have been resolved first before the trial court proceeded with the case.
• Validity of the RTC Decision: Petitioner argued that the RTC Decision of October 24, 2007 granting Ong's petition was "insupportable," positing that the Rule 108 proceedings were not truly adversarial in the absence of effective adversaries, since the Office of the Civil Registrar was a formal party and the Office of the Solicitor General sided with Ong's legal position.

• Improper Remedy and Disregard of Hierarchy of Courts: Respondent Ong and the OSG countered that petitioners availed themselves of an improper remedy and disregarded the hierarchy of courts by filing directly with the Supreme Court.
• Defective Verification: Respondent Ong argued that the defective verification, which failed to state the basis of the affiant's knowledge, rendered the petition an unsigned pleading.
• Lack of Service: Respondent Ong asserted that the failure to serve the petition on all adverse parties, including public respondent Janolo, violated basic rules and warranted dismissal.

• Voluntary Inhibition: Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on the ground of shared alumni association membership with Ong and his counsel.
• Declaration of Default: Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioners in default and denying their motion to vacate the order of default.
• Validity of the RTC Decision: Whether the RTC Decision of October 24, 2007 granting Ong's Rule 108 petition was tainted by grave abuse of discretion.

• Voluntary Inhibition: No. No grave abuse of discretion was found, shared membership in a university alumni association not constituting a ground for inhibition absent clear and convincing evidence of bias or partiality.
• Declaration of Default: No. The default declaration was proper, petitioners' motion to lift the order of default having failed to comply with the requisites of being under oath, showing excusable negligence, and demonstrating a meritorious defense.
• Validity of the RTC Decision: No additional grounds were raised to substantiate grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the October 24, 2007 Decision, precluding a definitive pronouncement on its substantive aspect.

• Voluntary Inhibition: The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court allows a judge to disqualify himself for just or valid reasons, but such decision is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge based on a rational and logical assessment of the circumstances. Voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and a subjective test, the result of which a reviewing tribunal will not disturb absent manifest arbitrariness or whimsicality. Bare allegations of bias and prejudice are insufficient; clear and convincing evidence of acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice is required. Membership in a university alumni association, by itself, does not constitute a ground for inhibition. A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected to maintain the highest standards of probity, integrity, and honor. The added fact that the alumni association published statements in support of Ong's application could not impute bias on the judge, there being no evidence that he actively sponsored or participated in the adoption and publication of the association's stand. Arbitrariness could not be inferred from the judge's resolution of the motion one day after filing, since the factual basis was already clearly established and the process of "careful self-examination" is essentially a matter of conscience. The automatic granting of motions for voluntary inhibition would open the floodgates to forum-shopping and prove antithetical to the speedy and fair administration of justice.

• Declaration of Default: Under Section 5, Rule 108, interested parties have fifteen days from the last date of publication of the notice to file an opposition. The notice was last published on July 26, 2007. Petitioners filed their entry of appearance without any attached Opposition and, despite the grant of an additional five days from August 7, 2007, failed to make a submission. For a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, three requisites must concur: (1) it must be made by motion under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file an answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of a meritorious defense. Petitioners' motion was not under oath, did not explain or justify the failure to file an opposition, and was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. A trial court has no authority to consider an unverified motion to lift an order of default. Moreover, the filing of a motion for inhibition does not toll the running of the reglementary period to file a responsive pleading, as the Rules of Court expressly provides for such suspension only where intended. Petitioners further failed to allege or demonstrate a meritorious defense, admitting they were "not real adversarial litigants in the juridical sense" but "judicial monitors and observers." The nunc pro tunc order confirmed that the Omnibus Motion had been denied in open court on August 14, 2007, negating the claim that the trial court proceeded without resolving the pending incident.

• Validity of the RTC Decision: Petitioners raised no additional ground to substantiate imputation of grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the October 24, 2007 Decision beyond recapitulating their arguments on inhibition and default. They argued that Rule 108 proceedings were not adversarial in the absence of effective adversaries, but jurisprudence has settled that such proceedings are adversarial in nature. The interest of the State was amply represented by the OSG, while petitioners' interest was deemed waived when they failed to appear and file a responsive pleading. Since no further issues were raised, the Court was precluded from making a definitive pronouncement on the substantive aspect of the assailed decision.

• Voluntary Inhibition of Judges — Under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, a judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid reasons other than those enumerated in the first paragraph (pecuniary interest, relationship, previous participation). The decision whether to inhibit is left to the conscience and sound discretion of the judge based on a rational and logical assessment of the circumstances. It is a subjective test that reviewing tribunals will not disturb absent manifest arbitrariness or whimsicality. Bias and prejudice must be proved with clear and convincing evidence; bare allegations will not suffice. The automatic granting of motions for voluntary inhibition would open the floodgates to forum-shopping and prove antithetical to the speedy and fair administration of justice.

• Organizational Affiliation as Ground for Inhibition — Membership in a college fraternity, university alumni association, socio-civic association, religion-oriented organization, or other fraternal organization does not, by itself, constitute a ground for a judge to disqualify himself from acting on a case involving a member of the same organization. A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected all the more to maintain the highest standards of probity, integrity, and honor and to faithfully comply with the ethics of the legal profession.

• Requisites for Motion to Lift Order of Default — Three requisites must concur for a motion to lift an order of default to prosper: (1) it must be made by motion under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file an answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of a meritorious defense. A trial court has no authority to consider an unverified motion to lift an order of default. A meritorious defense implies that the applicant has the burden of proving such a defense; the test is whether there is enough evidence to present an issue for submission to the trier of fact, or a showing that on the undisputed facts it is not clear that the judgment is warranted as a matter of law.

• Nunc Pro Tunc Orders — A nunc pro tunc order is recognized where an order actually rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered of record as rendered. The phrase signifies "now for then," meaning a thing done now has the same legal force and effect as if done at the time it ought to have been done. Its purpose is to make a present record of an order that the court made previously but which, by inadvertence, was not entered. It can only be made when the thing ordered has previously been done but was not recorded.

• Adversarial Nature of Rule 108 Proceedings — Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry are effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Such proceedings are adversarial in nature, meaning they involve opposing parties and afford the party seeking relief the opportunity to contest it, as distinguished from an ex parte application.

• "The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality." — This passage articulates the standard of review for voluntary inhibition, establishing that appellate tribunals will defer to the judge's conscience absent a showing of arbitrariness.

• "Bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably– both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected." — This formulation is the canonical statement of the evidentiary standard required to compel inhibition, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on judicial disqualification.

• "A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected all the more to maintain the highest standards of probity, integrity, and honor and to faithfully comply with the ethics of the legal profession." — This passage defines the principle that organizational affiliation per se does not compromise judicial impartiality, establishing the expectation that membership reinforces rather than undermines ethical standards.

• "The automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition would open the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge more sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical to the speedy and fair administration of justice." — This passage articulates the policy rationale against automatic inhibition, warning of the systemic consequences of unfettered judicial disqualification.

• Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007 — Controlling prior decision that enjoined Ong from accepting a Supreme Court appointment until he completed adversarial court proceedings to establish his natural-born citizenship; also cited for the proposition that Rule 108 proceedings are adversarial in nature.
• Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 469 Phil. 1020 (2004) — Followed for the proposition that a party declared in default may file a petition for certiorari assailing both the order of default and the judgment of default, establishing the propriety of the remedy availed of by petitioners.
• Gochan vs. Gochan, 446 Phil. 433 (2003) — Followed for the principle that the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 does not give judges unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case, and that bias and prejudice must be proved with clear and convincing evidence.
• Pagoda Philippines, Inc. vs. Universal Canning, Inc., G.R. No. 160966, October 11, 2005 — Followed for the principle that automatic granting of motions for voluntary inhibition would open the floodgates to forum-shopping.
• Bellosillo vs. Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, G.R. No. 126980, March 31, 2006 — Followed for the principle that organizational affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition, including membership in a university alumni association.
• Velayo-Fong vs. Velayo, G.R. No. 155488, December 6, 2006 — Followed for the definition of "meritorious defense" in the context of a motion to lift an order of default.
• Montinola, Jr. vs. Republic Planters Bank, 244 Phil. 49 (1988) — Followed for the three requisites of a motion to lift an order of default.

• Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court — Governs compulsory disqualification and voluntary inhibition of judges. The first paragraph enumerates mandatory grounds for disqualification (pecuniary interest, relationship, previous participation). The second paragraph, added in 1964, allows a judge to disqualify himself for just or valid reasons in the exercise of sound discretion. Applied to hold that shared alumni association membership is not a just or valid reason for inhibition absent clear and convincing evidence of bias.
• Section 5, Rule 108, Rules of Court — Provides that the civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may file an opposition within fifteen days from notice of the petition or from the last date of publication. Applied to determine that petitioners' period to file an opposition had lapsed, the notice having been last published on July 26, 2007.
• Section 3(b), Rule 9, Rules of Court — Provides that a party declared in default may file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and that the party has a meritorious defense. Applied to hold that petitioners' motion to vacate the order of default failed to comply with all three requisites.
• Section 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court — Requires that a pleading be verified by an affidavit stating that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records; a pleading required to be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. Applied to note the defective verification in petitioners' petition.
• Section 2, Rule 56 in relation to Section 3, Rule 46, Rules of Court — Requires that a petition be filed with proof of service on all adverse parties, and that failure to comply shall be sufficient ground for dismissal. Applied to note petitioners' failure to furnish public respondent with a copy of the petition.
• 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule II, Section 6 in relation to Section 12 — Requires the affiant to present competent evidence of identity before the notary public. Applied to note that the jurat did not contain a statement that the affiant was personally known to the notary public.

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza.