Keng Giok vs. Republic of the Philippines

A naturalization petitioner must strictly comply with all statutory requirements, including the obligation to state both present and former places of residence in the petition; failure to do so constitutes a falsity indicating lack of good moral character, and income that is declining and insufficient to support the petitioner's family cannot be considered "lucrative" within the meaning of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.

Keng Giok is a Chinese national born in Chingkan, China, on September 5, 1921, who arrived in the Philippines in 1930 and has resided continuously in Manila since then. He is employed as manager of the Cosmopolitan Jewelry Store, is married to Benita Giok Nan Hartigan Go, and has five children attending St. Stephen's High School. He filed a declaration of intention one year prior to filing his petition for naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, which prescribes the qualifications and procedural requisites for admission to Philippine citizenship.

Keng Giok was born in Chingkan, China, on September 5, 1921, and arrived in the Philippines at the Port of Manila in 1930. He made one trip back to China, staying two months, but has resided continuously in the Philippines since his return in 1930, and in Manila for more than one year immediately preceding the filing of his petition for naturalization. He filed a declaration of intention one year prior to the petition. He is employed as manager of the Cosmopolitan Jewelry Store, dealing in retail sale of jewelry, watches, clocks, and fountain pens, with an annual income from salary and bonus of ₱11,350.00 in 1954, ₱9,074.50 in 1955, and ₱8,687.50 in 1956. He owns no real estate. He is up to date in the payment of taxes, is married to Benita Giok Nan Hartigan Go, and has five children all studying at St. Stephen's High School, a government-recognized school open to all pupils regardless of race, creed, or nationality, where Civics, Philippine History, and Government are taught. He studied up to sixth grade in a Chinese school in the Philippines and speaks and writes Tagalog and English. He is a Protestant, believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, is not opposed to organized government, is not a polygamist, has never been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude, and is not suffering from any incurable or contagious disease. He presented Raymundo Reyes, a dentist, and Simeon Limso, a business agent, as character witnesses.

In his petition for naturalization, the petitioner stated his place of residence as 713 Ongpin Street, Manila. At the hearing, however, he admitted that he was presently residing at 814 Ongpin Street. Examination of the records further revealed that he had resided at 706 Ongpin Street in 1942 and at 428 Batangas Street in 1945. None of these former places of residence appeared in the petition. Additionally, he presented two different sets of residence certificates for the same year, bearing different numbers and dates of issuance, when securing clearances from the Manila City Fiscal's Office and the Philippine Constabulary Intelligence Office.

His income tax returns showed a declining income over three years: ₱11,350.00 in 1954, ₱9,074.50 in 1955, and ₱8,687.50 in 1956, with five children listed as dependents in each return. The trial court found that, given the high cost of living and the low purchasing power of the peso, the petitioner's income of ₱8,687.50 in 1956—his sole source of livelihood—could not be considered lucrative for a man with a wife and five school-age children to support, and thus he failed to meet the qualification under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. The trial court also found that the petitioner's failure to state his former places of residence violated Section 7 of the same law.

• Compliance with Residence Requirement: Petitioner argued that it was needless to state his former places of residence because they were all in Manila anyway.
• Lucrative Income: Petitioner cited the cases of Lim vs. Republic and Tiong vs. Republic to support his position that his income was sufficient to meet the lucrative trade or calling requirement of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.

• Purpose of Residence Requirement: The Solicitor General argued that the requirement to state former places of residence serves to facilitate checking on the petitioner's activities bearing on his qualifications and moral character, by indicating to private individuals or government agencies the localities where appropriate inquiries or investigations may be made.
• Non-Lucrative Income: Respondent contended that the petitioner's declining income, as the sole source of livelihood for a family of seven, could not be considered lucrative under present standards of the high cost of living and low purchasing power of the peso.

• Compliance with Section 7: Whether the petitioner's failure to state his former places of residence in his naturalization petition constitutes a violation of Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
• Lucrative Trade or Calling: Whether the petitioner's income from his employment as manager of a jewelry store, which was declining annually and was his sole source of livelihood, qualifies as a "lucrative" trade or calling under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.

• Compliance with Section 7: Yes, the petitioner violated Section 7. The law expressly requires the petition to set forth both present and former places of residence, and where the law does not distinguish, no distinction is to be made.
• Lucrative Trade or Calling: No. The petitioner's income of ₱8,687.50 in 1956, as the sole source of livelihood for a family of seven, cannot be considered lucrative given the high cost of living and the low purchasing power of the peso, especially since the income was declining annually.

• Compliance with Section 7: Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 requires that the petition for citizenship set forth not only the present but also the former places of residence of the petitioner. The petitioner stated 713 Ongpin Street as his residence in his petition but admitted at the hearing that he was residing at 814 Ongpin Street. Records further showed he had resided at 706 Ongpin Street in 1942 and at 428 Batangas Street in 1945, none of which appeared in the petition. The purpose of the requirement, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, is to facilitate checking on the petitioner's activities bearing on his qualifications and moral character by indicating the localities where appropriate inquiries may be made. The petitioner's argument that it was needless to state former residences because they were all in Manila cannot stand against the express statutory requirement. Where the law does not distinguish, no distinction is to be made. By such omission, the petitioner in effect falsified the truth, indicating lack of good moral character, which is itself a disqualification under Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law. The discrepancy in his residence certificates further undermined his credibility.

• Lucrative Trade or Calling: Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 requires that a petitioner own real estate worth not less than ₱5,000.00 or have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful calling. The petitioner owns no real estate and relies solely on his salary as manager of the Cosmopolitan Jewelry Store. His income tax returns show a declining trend: ₱11,350.00 in 1954, ₱9,074.50 in 1955, and ₱8,687.50 in 1956. Given the high cost of living and the low purchasing power of the peso, this income cannot be considered lucrative for a man with a wife and five school-age children to support. If the declining trend continues, the petitioner may find it difficult to support his family decently or continue sending his children to school, and may eventually become a public charge. The cases of Lim vs. Republic and Tiong vs. Republic cited by the petitioner were distinguished as inapplicable, because in those cases the petitioners were unmarried men without dependents or a family to support.

• Strict Compliance with Naturalization Requirements — The right to become a naturalized Filipino citizen is not a natural or inherent right but a statutory privilege granted by the law-making body of the state; a petitioner for naturalization must comply with all the requirements of the statute. The Court applied this by affirming the denial of the petition based on two specific failures to meet statutory requisites.

• Ubi Lex Non Distinguit, Nos Non Distinguere Debemus — Where the law does not distinguish, no distinction is to be made. The Court applied this principle to reject the petitioner's argument that he need not state former residences because they were all in Manila, holding that Section 7's express requirement to state both present and former places of residence admits of no such qualification.

• "Lucrative" Income in Naturalization — While "lucrative" means profitable or gainful, in the context of naturalization it means substantial income sufficient to support the petitioner and his dependents. The Court considered the high cost of living, the low purchasing power of the peso, the number of dependents, the absence of real estate, the absence of other sources of income, and the declining trend of income in determining whether the petitioner's trade or calling was lucrative.

• "The right to become a naturalized Filipino citizen is not a natural or inherent right of a person; it is a statutory right granted by the law-making body of the state, and a petitioner for naturalization must comply with all the requirements of the statute." — This passage, quoted by the Supreme Court from the trial court's decision, articulates the foundational principle that naturalization is a statutory privilege requiring strict compliance with all legal requisites.

• "Where the law does not distinguish, no distinction is to be made." — This formulation of the statutory construction principle was applied to reject the petitioner's argument that former residences need not be stated if they were all in Manila, reinforcing that Section 7's requirement to list former places of residence admits of no exceptions based on proximity.

• "Needless to say, by such omission, appellant, in effect, falsified the truth, indicating lack of good moral character on his part, which disqualified him from admission to Philippine citizenship." — This passage establishes the consequence of failing to state former residences: the omission is treated as a falsification that itself demonstrates lack of good moral character, an independent ground for disqualification under Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law.

• Lim vs. Republic, L-3920, November 20, 1951 — Cited by the petitioner to support the sufficiency of his income, but distinguished and held inapplicable because the petitioner in that case was an unmarried man without dependents.

• Tiong vs. Republic, L-6274, February 26, 1954 — Similarly cited by the petitioner and distinguished as inapplicable, the petitioner therein being unmarried and without a family or children to support.

• Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Law) — Sets forth the qualifications for naturalization, including the requirement that the petitioner own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than ₱5,000.00 or have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful calling. The Court found that the petitioner, who owned no real estate, did not have a lucrative trade or calling because his sole income was declining and insufficient to support his family.

• Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Law) — Requires that the petition for naturalization set forth not only the present but also the former places of residence of the petitioner. The Court found that the petitioner violated this provision by omitting his former residences at 706 Ongpin Street and 428 Batangas Street, which constituted a falsity indicative of lack of good moral character.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concurred.