Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte FOITAF vs. Noriel

A petition for certification election may be entertained after the expiration of the sixty-day period preceding the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, provided no new certified collective bargaining agreement has taken its place; and the thirty-percent written-consent requirement is mandatory only where the Bureau of Labor Relations is compelled to order a certification election, the Bureau being likewise possessed of discretionary power to order one, in which case the thirty-percent requirement does not apply.

Petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte FOITAF is a labor union that held a certified collective bargaining agreement with the employer La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory, which agreement terminated on December 5, 1975. Private respondent Federation of Free Workers, La Suerte Chapter, is a rival labor organization seeking to represent the same rank-and-file bargaining unit. The controversy is governed by Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended (the Labor Code, 1974), particularly Article 258 on the requisites for certification election and Article 257, second paragraph, on the period within which a certification election issue may be entertained where a collective bargaining agreement exists. The statutory framework places the conduct of certification elections under the Bureau of Labor Relations, whose determinations on factual matters are entitled to respect.

Petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte FOITAF was the labor union holding a certified collective bargaining agreement with the employer La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory, which agreement terminated on December 5, 1975. Private respondent Federation of Free Workers, La Suerte Chapter, is a rival labor organization within the same bargaining unit.

On February 6, 1976, private respondent filed a petition for certification election, alleging that out of a bargaining unit of more or less 3,500 employees, there were 1,068 signatories supporting the petition. Eleven days after the collective bargaining agreement expired, petitioner filed a motion to intervene, and on March 1, 1976, it followed with a motion to dismiss on the grounds that respondent union had not complied with the thirty-percent consent requirement and that the petition for certification had been filed beyond the sixty-day period reckoned from the expiration of the collective bargaining contract.

When the employer thereafter submitted a list of its rank-and-file employees numbering 4,055, private respondent countered with an additional list of 331 signatories, bringing the total to 1,399 signatories. Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss, maintaining that there was compliance with the thirty-percent consent requirement and that the filing was within the period allowed by law. Petitioner, for its part, contended that among the signatories submitted there were 105 falsified or double entries and 7 who came from those not qualified to vote, or a total of 112 challenged entries.

On April 6, 1976, Med-Arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and granting the petition for certification election filed by private respondent, the choice being between petitioner and respondent unions, with employees likewise being given the opportunity to vote for "No Union." An appeal was taken to respondent Noriel as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and on October 23, 1976, he issued an order denying the appeal. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, the petition for certiorari followed. The facts were undisputed, and no showing was made of arbitrary or improvident exercise of authority on the part of respondent Director.

• Thirty-Percent Consent Requirement: Petitioner maintained that private respondent union had not complied with the thirty-percent consent requirement prescribed for a petition for certification election, and that the signatories submitted included 105 falsified or double entries and 7 from persons not qualified to vote, or a total of 112 challenged entries.
• Sixty-Day Period: Petitioner argued that the petition for certification election was filed beyond the sixty-day period provided for by law, reckoned from the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, and that respondent Noriel therefore acted without or in excess of authority in entertaining it.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion Warranting Certiorari: Petitioner sought to impugn the holding of a certification election ordered by respondent Director on the ground that the order was issued in the absence of compliance with the statutory requisites, thereby raising a jurisdictional question reviewable by certiorari.

• Factual Character of the Consent Objection: Respondent, through the Acting Solicitor General whose comment was treated as the answer, pointed out that the objection to the number of signatories was factual in character and that the determination by respondent Noriel thereon was entitled to respect.
• Sixty-Day Period Not a Bar: Respondent argued that the objection based on the sixty-day period was not supported by a reasonable interpretation of that period, which petitioner read in an unduly restrictive manner that failed to carry out its basic purpose.
• Compliance with the Thirty-Percent Requirement: Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss, stating that there was compliance with the thirty-percent consent requirement and that the filing was within the period allowed by law, its signatories having totalled 1,399, or more than thirty percent of the 4,055 employees.

• Certiorari and Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether certiorari lies to review the order of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations directing the holding of a certification election, in the absence of any showing of lack of power or arbitrary or improvident exercise of authority.
• Thirty-Percent Consent Requirement: Whether the petition for certification election complied with the requirement of written consent of at least thirty percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit.
• Mandatory Versus Discretionary Certification Election: Whether the thirty-percent consent requirement applies where the Bureau of Labor Relations exercises its discretionary power to order a certification election.
• Sixty-Day Period: Whether the petition for certification election was barred for having been filed after the lapse of the sixty-day period provided for by law.

• Certiorari and Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. Certiorari does not lie, there being no showing of lack of power or arbitrary or improvident exercise of authority on the part of respondent Director; where such a jurisdictional question is shown, the Court may pass upon the validity of decisions of labor officials in appropriate certiorari proceedings.
• Thirty-Percent Consent Requirement: Yes. The requirement was satisfied, the signatories totalling 1,399, or more than thirty percent of the 4,055 employees; even deducting the 112 challenged entries, 1,287 signatories remained, still more than thirty percent of 4,055.
• Mandatory Versus Discretionary Certification Election: The thirty-percent requirement is relevant only when it becomes mandatory for respondent Noriel to conduct a certification election; he is likewise possessed of discretionary power whether or not a certification election should be held, and in such a case there is no such thirty-percent requirement.
• Sixty-Day Period: No. The former collective bargaining agreement having expired on December 5, 1975, a petition could have been filed sixty days prior to that date, but the law does not mean that after December 5, 1975 no such petition could be entertained, provided no certified collective bargaining agreement had taken its place.

• Certiorari and Grave Abuse of Discretion: The settled rule is that under the present Labor Code, if lack of power or arbitrary or improvident exercise of authority be shown, thus giving rise to a jurisdictional question, the Court may, in appropriate certiorari proceedings, pass upon the validity of the decisions reached by officials or administrative agencies in labor controversies. This was assumed in Maglasang vs. Ople and explicitly announced in San Miguel Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor. In the present suit, no such showing was made; the weakness of the petition was apparent, and certiorari did not lie. The determination of respondent Noriel on the essentially factual matter of the number of signatories was entitled to respect.

• Thirty-Percent Consent Requirement: Private respondent filed its petition supported by 1,068 signatories, more than thirty percent of the 3,500 rank-and-file employees initially assumed. After the employer submitted a list of regular rank-and-file employees totalling 4,055, private respondent submitted an additional list of 331 rank-and-file employees, bringing the signatories to 1,399, or more than thirty percent of 4,055. Even accepting petitioner's contention that 105 entries were falsified or double and 7 came from those not qualified to vote — a total of 112 — 1,287 signatories would remain, still more than thirty percent of 4,055. The matter being essentially factual in character, the determination by respondent Noriel was entitled to respect.

• Mandatory Versus Discretionary Certification Election: Petitioner missed the point that the requirement of thirty percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit is relevant only when it becomes mandatory for respondent Noriel to conduct a certification election, as Article 258 explicitly provides. Respondent Noriel is likewise possessed of discretionary power whether or not a certification election should be held, and in such a case there is no such thirty-percent requirement. As held in Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, the contention fails to distinguish between the right of a labor organization to persuade thirty percent of the labor force to petition for a certification election, in which case the Bureau is left with no choice but to order it, and the power of the governmental agency entrusted with implementation of the collective bargaining process to determine, considering the likelihood that there may be several unions within a bargaining unit, to order such an election precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of them shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative.

• Sixty-Day Period: Article 257 of the Labor Code provides that no certification election issue shall be entertained by the Bureau in any collective bargaining unit if a collective bargaining agreement exists between the employer and a legitimate labor organization, except within sixty days prior to the expiration of the life of such certified collective bargaining agreement. As applied to the present situation, the former collective bargaining agreement having expired on December 5, 1975, a petition for certification election could have been filed sixty days prior to that date; but the provision does not mean that after December 5, 1975 no such petition could be entertained, provided there was no certified collective bargaining agreement that had taken its place. It was undisputed that no subsequent certified collective contract was in existence at the time the petition was filed on February 6, 1976, and there was therefore no legal bar to such a move. The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioner would set at naught the basic objective of the Labor Code to institute a true system of industrial democracy through the collective bargaining process with the representative of labor chosen after a free and honest certification election.

• Certification Election as the Fairest Device for Determining Labor Representation — A certification election is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling, and no better device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with management and labor establishing a regime of self-rule. The Court relied on this principle in stressing the importance of a certification election to ascertain which labor union should be the collective bargaining agent and thus assure the success of the collective bargaining procedure, and in rejecting petitioner's unsympathetic approach to the institution of collective bargaining.

• Collective Bargaining Agreement as the Law of the Plant — A collective bargaining agreement is the law of the plant, and the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties. The Court invoked this doctrine, drawn from Rivera vs. San Miguel Brewery Corporation, Inc., Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz, and Compania Maritima vs. Compania Maritima Labor Union, in explaining the significance of the certification election that determines the employees' bargaining representative.

• Primacy of the Employees' Own Decision — The decision reached by the employees themselves is entitled to primacy, in the soundest tradition of industrial democracy. Because collective bargaining implies that the terms and conditions of employment should be the subject of negotiation between management and labor rather than unilateral imposition, and because the very notion of industrial self-rule negates the assumption that what is good for either party should be left to the will of the other, labor can be trusted to promote its welfare through the bargaining process and must be left the choice of its agent for such purpose.

• Review of Labor Officials' Orders Through Certiorari — Under the present Labor Code, if lack of power or arbitrary or improvident exercise of authority be shown, thus giving rise to a jurisdictional question, the Supreme Court may, in appropriate certiorari proceedings, pass upon the validity of the decisions reached by officials or administrative agencies in labor controversies. The rule was assumed in Maglasang vs. Ople and explicitly announced in San Miguel Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor. Absent such a showing, certiorari does not lie.

• Mandatory Versus Discretionary Certification Election and the Thirty-Percent Requirement — The requirement that a petition for certification election be supported by the written consent of at least thirty percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit is relevant only when it becomes mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election. The Bureau is likewise possessed of discretionary power whether or not a certification election should be held, and in the exercise of that discretion the thirty-percent requirement does not apply. The distinction lies between the right of a labor organization to compel an election by persuading thirty percent of the labor force to petition, in which case the Bureau is left with no choice but to order it, and the power of the Bureau to order an election precisely to ascertain which of several unions shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative.

• Construction of the Sixty-Day Period in Article 257 — The prohibition against entertaining a certification election issue where a collective bargaining agreement exists, except within sixty days prior to the expiration of the life of such certified agreement, does not bar a petition filed after the agreement's expiration, provided no certified collective bargaining agreement has taken its place. A restrictive interpretation that would preclude any petition after the expiration date would set at naught the basic objective of the Labor Code to institute a true system of industrial democracy through the collective bargaining process with the representative of labor chosen after a free and honest certification election.

• "It is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental Postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling." — This passage, quoted from Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, states the ratio for the primacy accorded to a certification election and supplies the policy basis for rejecting petitioner's restrictive reading of the statutory requisites.

• "a collective bargaining agreement is the law of the plant" — Quoted from Chief Justice Castro's pronouncement in Rivera vs. San Miguel Brewery Corporation, Inc., this formulation is the canonical statement of the binding force of a collective bargaining agreement, invoked to explain why the choice of the employees' bargaining representative is of paramount importance.

• "If fails to distinguish between the right of a labor organization to be able to persuade 30% of the labor force to petition for a certification election, in which cage respondent Bureau is left with no choice but to order it, and the power of such governmental agency precisely entrusted with implementation of the collective bargaining process to determine, considering the likelihood that there may be several unions within a bargaining unit, to order such an election precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of them shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative." — This passage, quoted from the earlier Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions decision, articulates the mandatory-versus-discretionary distinction that disposes of petitioner's thirty-percent objection.

• "No other meaning can be attached to such provision, as applied to the present situation, except that the former collective bargaining agreement having expired on December 5, 1975, sixty days prior to that date, a petition for certification election could have been filed. It does not mean that after December 5, 1975, no such petition could be entertained by respondent Noriel, provided there was no certified collective bargaining agreement that had taken its place." — This is the Court's own construction of Article 257, second paragraph, and constitutes the ratio decidendi on the sixty-day period.

• Maglasang vs. Ople, L-38813, April 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 508 — Cited as the case in which the Court assumed the propriety of passing upon the validity of decisions of labor officials in certiorari proceedings where a jurisdictional question is raised.
• San Miguel Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor, L-39195, May 16, 1975, 64 SCRA 56 — Cited as the decision, penned by Justice Aquino, that explicitly announced the rule allowing certiorari review of labor officials' decisions upon a showing of lack of power or arbitrary or improvident exercise of authority.
• Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, L-42115, January 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 132 — The principal controlling precedent, extensively quoted for the mandatory-versus-discretionary distinction regarding the thirty-percent consent requirement and for the policy on the significance of certification elections.
• Rivera vs. San Miguel Brewery Corporation, Inc., L-26197, July 20, 1968, 24 SCRA 86 — Cited for the pronouncement that a collective bargaining agreement is the law of the plant.
• Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz, L-30241, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 577 — Cited for the rule that the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties.
• Compania Maritima vs. Compania Maritima Labor Union, L-29504, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 464 — Cited for the primacy to which the decision reached by the employees themselves is entitled and for the exposition of industrial self-rule in collective bargaining.
• Federacion Obrera vs. Noriel, L-41937, July 6, 1976, 72 SCRA 24 — Cited among the subsequent decisions adhering to the principle governing certification elections.
• Antipolo Highway Lines vs. Inciong, L-38523, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 441 — Cited in support of the respect accorded to the factual determinations of labor officials.
• Jacqueline Industries vs. National Labor Relations Commission, L-37034, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 397 — Cited, together with Antipolo Highway Lines, on the deference due to administrative findings in labor cases.

• Article 258, Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended (Labor Code, 1974) — Provides that any petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least thirty percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit, and that upon receipt and verification of such petition it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification election to determine the representative of the employees and certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative. The Court held that this requirement is relevant only when it becomes mandatory for the Director to conduct a certification election, and does not apply where the Director exercises discretionary power to order one; it also held that the requirement was in any event satisfied by the 1,399 signatories, or 1,287 even after deducting the challenged entries, out of 4,055 employees.
• Article 257, second paragraph, Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended (Labor Code, 1974) — Provides that no certification election issue shall be entertained by the Bureau in any collective bargaining unit if a collective bargaining agreement exists between the employer and a legitimate labor organization, except within sixty days prior to the expiration of the life of such certified collective bargaining agreement. The Court construed the provision as permitting the filing of a petition after the expiration of the agreement, provided no certified collective bargaining agreement had taken its place, and rejected petitioner's restrictive interpretation as defeating the Labor Code's objective of industrial democracy.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Fernandez, JJ., concurred. Concepcion, Jr., J., was on leave.