Kalipunan ng Damay Ang Mahihirap, Inc. vs. Robredo

A petition for prohibition and mandamus does not lie to compel or restrain the performance of discretionary functions; the Supreme Court will not entertain a direct constitutional challenge that violates the hierarchy of courts, especially where the question of constitutionality is not the lis mota of the case and the requisites for judicial review remain unsatisfied.

Petitioner organizations and individuals occupied parcels of land owned by the cities of San Juan, Navotas, and Quezon. The local governments sent eviction and demolition notices invoking Section 28(a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act), which permits evictions without a court order when occupants are in danger areas (esteros, railroad tracks, riverbanks, sidewalks, roads, parks, etc.) or when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented. The petitioners faced removal to give way to projects such as a city hall, roads, and a public school. Instead of challenging the eviction notices in the appropriate lower court, they directly filed a petition with the Supreme Court.

• Parties and Occupations: The members of Kalipunan ng Damay ang Mahihirap, Inc., Corazon de Jesus Homeowners’ Association, and the individual petitioners were occupying parcels of land owned by the cities of San Juan, Navotas, and Quezon.
• Eviction Notices: The local government units sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition under Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279 to clear the areas for government infrastructure projects, including the construction of a city hall, roads, and a public school.
• Completed Evictions: Prior to the filing of the petition, the City of Navotas had successfully evicted the petitioners in San Roque, Navotas, on November 28, 2011, after personal notice on September 23, 2011. The City of San Juan similarly alleged that some of the petitioners in Pinaglabanan, Corazon de Jesus, San Juan, had already been evicted.
• Petitioners’ Allegations: Petitioners claimed that the authority to evict without a court order under Section 28(a) and (b) violated their rights to due process and liberty of abode under Sections 1 and 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. They also invoked the right to adequate housing under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and RA 7279, and alleged that prior evictions had been conducted in a violent manner contrary to Section 10, Article XIII of the Constitution.

• Due Process and Liberty of Abode: Petitioners argued that Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend the constitutional right to due process and impair the liberty of abode without a lawful court order, in violation of Section 6, Article III of the Constitution.
• Right to Adequate Housing: Petitioners maintained that the summary eviction provisions violate the right to adequate housing recognized in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Section 2(a) of RA 7279.
• Violent Implementation: Petitioners complained that the public respondents had previously conducted evictions and demolitions in a violent manner, contrary to the mandate of Section 10, Article XIII of the Constitution that evictions be carried out in a just and humane manner.
• Direct Recourse and Transcendental Importance: Petitioners justified filing directly with the Supreme Court by asserting that they had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and that the transcendental public importance of the issues conferred legal standing and warranted direct review.

• Violation of Hierarchy of Courts: All respondents argued that the petitioners ignored the hierarchy of courts by directly filing a Rule 65 petition with the Supreme Court, which is a court of last resort, not a court of first instance.
• Improper Remedy of Prohibition and Mandamus: The Mayors of Navotas, San Juan, and Quezon, and the DILG Secretary contended that the duties to be performed under Section 28 of RA 7279 are discretionary, not ministerial, judicial, or quasi-judicial; thus, prohibition and mandamus do not lie.
• Mootness of the Controversy: The Mayors of Navotas and San Juan asserted that the petition had become moot and academic because the concerned petitioners in their respective cities had already been successfully evicted before the petition was filed.
• Presumption of Constitutionality and Police Power: The respondents countered that RA 7279 was enacted in the exercise of police power, enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, and faithfully implements Section 10, Article XIII of the Constitution by providing sufficient safeguards—such as a 30-day notice, adequate consultations, and relocation—to ensure just and humane evictions.
• Failure to Show Grave Abuse of Discretion: The respondents stressed that the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations of grave abuse of discretion, offering only general averments without specific factual basis.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether the petition should be dismissed for the petitioners’ failure to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.
• Propriety of Prohibition and Mandamus: Whether the petitioners correctly availed themselves of the remedies of prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 to challenge the implementation of Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279.
• Lis Mota and Justiciable Controversy: Whether the resolution of the constitutionality of Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279 was the lis mota of the case, and whether an actual justiciable controversy existed.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the petitioners established that the public respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing the challenged provisions.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The petition was dismissed because the petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts by filing directly with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, not a trier of facts, and the trial courts are better equipped to receive and weigh the evidence in cases of this nature. The concurrence of jurisdiction among courts to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus does not grant litigants unrestricted freedom of choice of forum.
• Propriety of Prohibition and Mandamus: The remedies of prohibition and mandamus were improperly availed. A writ of prohibition lies only against judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, while mandamus compels the performance of a purely ministerial duty. The use of the permissive word “may” in Section 28 of RA 7279 indicated that the time and manner of carrying out evictions under paragraphs (a) and (b) is discretionary, not ministerial, judicial, or quasi-judicial. Therefore, the acts complained of were beyond the scope of prohibition and mandamus.
• Lis Mota and Justiciable Controversy: Even if the petition were treated as one for certiorari, the requisites for the exercise of judicial review were not met. With respect to the Mayors of Navotas and San Juan, the completed evictions rendered the case moot and academic. Furthermore, the constitutionality of Section 28(a) and (b) was not the lis mota of the case; the petition could be—and was—resolved on other grounds, including procedural defects and the failure to substantiate grave abuse of discretion. A court will only rule on a constitutional question if it is unavoidable. The Court also noted that its previous ruling in Magkalas v. NHA had already affirmed the validity of summary evictions without a court order under Section 28 of RA 7279, enumerating the instances where such evictions are allowed.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The petitioners failed to establish that the public respondents exercised their power in an arbitrary and despotic manner. Their allegations of grave abuse of discretion consisted merely of general averments unsupported by factual evidence. This deficiency highlighted why direct Rule 65 petitions are disfavored before the Court, as it is not a trier of facts and cannot assess controverted evidentiary matters without the foundation built in lower courts.

• Hierarchy of Courts — The Supreme Court is a court of last resort. Direct resort to it through an original action for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus is warranted only when there are special, important, or compelling reasons, and the issues raised are of transcendental public importance that cannot wait for adjudication in the lower courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Regional Trial Courts does not give litigants the unrestricted freedom to choose their forum.
• Discretionary vs. Ministerial Duty — A duty is discretionary where the law imposes a duty upon a public officer but gives him the right to decide how and when the duty shall be performed. A duty is ministerial where the law prescribes the manner of performance in a given state of facts, leaving no room for the exercise of judgment. Prohibition lies only against the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Mandamus lies only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, not to control the exercise of discretion.
• Lis Mota — The constitutional question must be unavoidable—the very lis mota of the case—before a court will resolve it. If the case can be decided on some other ground, the constitutional issue will not be reached. The presumption of validity of legislative and executive acts reinforces this principle of judicial restraint.
• Requirements for Judicial Review — Courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law unless four requisites concur: (1) there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the party raising the constitutional question possesses personal and substantial interests; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question is necessary to the decision of the case (lis mota).
• Validity of Summary Evictions under RA 7279 — Demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out without a judicial order in the specifically enumerated instances, including: when persons occupy danger areas under Section 28(a) of RA 7279, and when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented under Section 28(b) of RA 7279. The law provides safeguards—30-day notice, adequate consultations, presence of local officials, proper identification of demolition personnel, execution during regular office hours and good weather, prohibition on heavy equipment except for concrete structures, proper police uniforms and crowd control, and adequate relocation—to ensure a just and humane process.

• “The petitioners appear to have forgotten that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort, not a court of first instance. The hierarchy of courts should serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for Rule 65 petitions.” — Emphasizes the procedural default in filing directly with the Court.
• “The use of the permissive word ‘may’ implies that the public respondents have discretion when their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions shall be performed. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.” — Foundation for holding that the eviction duty is not ministerial and thus not subject to prohibition or mandamus.
• “Lis mota literally means ‘the cause of the suit or action’; it is rooted in the principle of separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our coequal branches of the government. This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable.” — Defines and applies the lis mota requirement.
• “[D]emolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order in the following instances: … (3) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds, pursuant to Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 7279; (4) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279.” — Restates the controlling doctrinal enumeration from Magkalas v. NHA.

• Magkalas v. NHA, G.R. No. 138823, August 28, 2008 (587 Phil. 152) — Controlling precedent followed; upheld the validity of summary evictions without judicial order under Section 28 of RA 7279 and enumerated the instances where such evictions are permitted.
• Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 159508, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 237 — Cited in support of the hierarchy of courts doctrine.
• Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993, 224 SCRA 236 — Cited for the essential requisites of judicial review.
• David v. Rivera, 464 Phil. 1006 (2004) — Cited for the nature and scope of a writ of prohibition.
• Marcelo, Jr. v. Villordon, G.R. No. 173081, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 557 — Cited for the rule that mandamus does not lie to control a public officer’s exercise of discretion.

• Section 28(a) and (b), Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act) — Authorizes evictions and demolitions without a court order when persons occupy danger areas or areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented. The provision was challenged as unconstitutional; its validity was not reached due to procedural dismissal, but its permissive language was dispositive in ruling the duty discretionary.
• Paragraph 2, Section 28, Republic Act No. 7279 — Prescribes the mandatory procedure for eviction and demolition involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, including 30-day notice, adequate consultations, presence of local officials, proper identification, time and weather restrictions, limits on equipment, police uniforms and control procedures, and adequate relocation or financial assistance. The Court noted these safeguards demonstrate that the law ensures just and humane evictions.
• Section 10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution — Mandates that urban and rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. The Court treated RA 7279 as the enabling law of this provision.
• Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution — Protects the liberty of abode and expressly requires a lawful court order for any impairment. Petitioners claimed the absence of a court order under RA 7279 violated this guarantee; the Court declined to rule on the constitutional challenge.
• Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Define the scope of the writ of prohibition (against judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions) and mandamus (to compel performance of a ministerial duty). Applied to hold the remedies inappropriate.
• Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1472 — Authorized the NHA to summarily eject informal settlers on government resettlement projects. Cited in Magkalas as part of the established instances where summary evictions without judicial order are valid.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen. (Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza was on leave.)

None. The decision was unanimous.