Jumao-as vs. Crisostomo

A lot's designation as a "road" in a subdivision plan does not by itself create a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of adjoining estates, and a compulsory easement of right of way cannot be granted where the claimant's property has adequate access to a public highway and the claimant has not shown willingness to pay indemnity.

Jenniefer L. Jumao-as and Zenaida Crisostomo are adjoining lot owners in Barangay Niugan, Malabon City; Zenaida and her late brother Bernabe Gozon are among the registered owners of Lot 2-1-7, while Jenniefer owns five nearby parcels. The dispute is governed by the Civil Code provisions on easements, under which a servient estate is burdened for the benefit of a dominant estate owned by another person.

Jenniefer L. Jumao-as is the registered owner of five parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 007-2018000857, 007-2018000858, 007-2018000859, 007-2018000860, and 007-2018-000861, all situated in Barangay Niugan, Malabon City. She acquired the five parcels from Norman Fulgencio, who in turn obtained the properties from Bernabe Gozon, the late brother of Zenaida Crisostomo. Jenniefer, Zenaida, et al., and Floredeliz Borja are adjoining lot owners as shown by a subdivision plan prepared by Godofredo R. Villasenor, a geodetic engineer, based on a survey he conducted on August 15, 1982. Jenniefer's properties are situated at the corner of Calle M. Aquino and a supposed road lot described as Lot 2-1-7. Lot 2-1-7, with an area of 402 square meters, is registered in the names of Zenaida and Bernabe, among others, under TCT No. M-9835. According to Jenniefer, Lot 2-1-7 was used as an access road to all the lots contained in the subdivision plan even before her acquisition of the five properties. She built townhouses in one of her properties along Lot 2-1-7.

On May 1, 2019, Zenaida, et al. blocked Jenniefer's access to Lot 2-1-7 by erecting steel poles, claiming that the lot is private property. Jenniefer argued that this act violated the easement constituted on the lot, which was indicated and inscribed on TCT No. M-9835, and that Lot 2-1-7 is a servient estate in an easement of right of way with the adjoining lots as dominant estates. She referred the matter to the barangay for conciliation, but the same was unfruitful. Jenniefer then filed her Complaint dated July 17, 2019, praying for a TRO and a WPI enjoining Zenaida, et al. from committing acts violative of the easement; a permanent injunction after due hearing; and actual, moral, and exemplary damages of PHP 1 million each, as well as PHP 500,000.00 in attorney's fees and costs of suit.

In their Answer, Zenaida, et al. argued that Jenniefer had no cause of action against them since no easement of right of way was annotated on TCT No. M-9835. They claimed that Jenniefer still had access to Calle M. Aquino Street, a public road, and that she only chose to use Zenaida, et al.'s properties as ingress and egress. They also sought PHP 1 million as attorney's fees, PHP 500,000.00 as moral damages, and costs of suit by way of counterclaim.

On August 16, 2019, the RTC issued an Order denying Jenniefer's prayer for a TRO, ruling that she had not established her entitlement to the use of the right of way over Lot 2-1-7. The RTC found that it was not shown that Lot 2-1-7 was part of the city's road network or that the lot was donated to Jenniefer; that while steel posts were erected along Jenniefer's property perpendicular to Calle M. Aquino, Lot 2-1-7 remained accessible to residents and occupants of its adjoining lots. Zenaida, et al. later opted not to present evidence on their behalf.

The RTC found that Jenniefer failed to prove that Zenaida, et al. acceded to her use of Lot 2-1-7 as an access road, and that Lot 2-1-7 was part of Malabon City's road network or had been donated to her or to the local government. It also found that Jenniefer's properties are bounded on one side by Calle M. Aquino, a public highway; that TCT No. M-9835 and the subdivision plan contain no annotation of an easement of right of way over Lot 2-1-7; that Lot 2-1-7 was not shown to have been donated or expropriated; and that Jenniefer neither alleged in her Complaint nor manifested during trial any willingness to pay indemnity.

• Voluntary Easement: Petitioner argued that the CA committed reversible error in failing to recognize the existence of a voluntary easement of right of way constituted over Lot 2-1-7, considering the consistent designation and historical use of the lot as a road, as reflected in the subdivision plan and TCT No. M-9835.

• No Annotated Easement: Respondent countered that Jenniefer had no cause of action because no easement of right of way was annotated on TCT No. M-9835.
• Adequate Access: Respondent argued that Jenniefer still had access to Calle M. Aquino Street, a public road, and that she only chose to use Zenaida, et al.'s properties as ingress and egress.

• Question of Fact under Rule 45: Whether the petition invites the SC to review factual findings of the RTC and CA, which is beyond the scope of a Rule 45 petition.
• Compulsory Legal Easement: Whether Jenniefer is entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way over Lot 2-1-7 under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.
• Voluntary Easement: Whether a voluntary easement of right of way over Lot 2-1-7 exists in Jenniefer's favor based on the subdivision plan and TCT No. M-9835.

• Question of Fact under Rule 45: No. The petition asks the SC to reevaluate evidence, a factual question outside Rule 45, and none of the recognized exceptions applies.
• Compulsory Legal Easement: No. Jenniefer failed to prove the requisites under Articles 649 and 650, including lack of adequate outlet to a public highway and willingness to pay indemnity.
• Voluntary Easement: No. She presented no evidence of an agreement, and neither TCT No. M-9835 nor the subdivision plan established an easement; a "road" designation alone does not create one.

• Question of Fact under Rule 45: The SC noted that Jenniefer's prayer would require it to evaluate the evidence presented to and weighed by the RTC and further reviewed by the CA in order to reach a different conclusion. It is settled that factual questions are beyond the SC's jurisdiction in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45; once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. While Rule 45 admits exceptions, none of the exceptions allowing factual review exists in this case. The SC cited Catan vs. Vinarao and Republic vs. Caraig.

• Compulsory Legal Easement: Article 649 of the Civil Code allows the owner of an immovable surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway to demand a right of way through neighboring estates after payment of proper indemnity, unless the isolation is due to the owner's own acts. Article 650 requires the easement to be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent, where the distance to the public highway is shortest. In Reyes vs. Spouses Valentin, the SC listed the requisites: (1) the immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable; (3) the isolation is not due to the owner's acts; and (4) the proposed easement is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent, where the distance to the public highway is shortest. The burden of proof is on the person seeking the easement. Jurisprudence requires absolute necessity and proof of the accessibility conditions of all immovables surrounding the lot to rule out other adequate outlets; the SC cited Spouses Vargas vs. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. Here, Jenniefer's properties are bounded on one side by Calle M. Aquino, a public highway, so they are not totally isolated and the first requisite fails. The records also show no manifestation of willingness to indemnify Zenaida, et al., so the second requisite fails. Because the property is not isolated, the third requisite fails, and Lot 2-1-7 is not the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, so the fourth fails. With all requisites absent, Jenniefer is not entitled to a legal easement of right of way.

• Voluntary Easement: An easement of right of way is a discontinuous easement because its exercise depends on intermittent acts of persons passing through the property; under the Civil Code, discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by prescription and may be constituted only by title. The burden was on Jenniefer to establish that the claimed easement was validly acquired by title, whether by agreement or by filing a case for a legal easement. She claimed an implied agreement with Zenaida, et al., but presented no evidence beyond her bare allegation and merely relied on the supposed failure of Zenaida, et al. to present rebuttal evidence; an allegation is not equivalent to proof, as the SC noted in Republic vs. Estate of Hans Menzi. Thus, no implied agreement existed creating a voluntary easement. The SC also found no indication in TCT No. M-9835 or the subdivision plan showing an easement of right of way over Lot 2-1-7; the TCT merely references the subdivision survey conducted by Villasenor, while the subdivision plan merely designates Lot 2-1-7 as a "road." There is no indication that Lot 2-1-7 was expropriated or donated to the government or the LGU, so it retains its private character. A property owner can constitute a road in his own property without necessarily granting a right of way to adjoining estates, especially when there are other access roads by which the owners of adjoining lots can access a public road. The evidence was not enough to establish with certainty that a voluntary easement existed. The SC stressed that easements are burdens on another person's property and courts should exercise caution and refuse to recognize an easement when proof of its existence is tenuous or doubtful.

• Easement of right of way — An easement is a burden on a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate owned by a different person; in a right of way, a determinate portion of the servient estate is used as a passage. It is a discontinuous easement because its exercise depends on intermittent acts of persons passing, so it cannot be acquired by prescription and may be constituted only by title. Applied: Jenniefer had to prove title by agreement or legal easement; she proved neither.
• Requisites of compulsory easement of right of way — The requisites are: (1) the immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not due to the owner's acts; and (4) the proposed easement is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent, where the distance to the public highway is shortest. Applied: all four were absent because Jenniefer's property had access to Calle M. Aquino, she did not offer indemnity, the property was not isolated, and Lot 2-1-7 was not the least prejudicial point.
• Absolute necessity and accessibility conditions — Courts will compel a right of way only upon a showing of absolute necessity; the claimant must allege and prove the accessibility conditions of all immovables surrounding the isolated lot to rule out other routes that may reasonably be considered adequate outlets to the public highway. Applied: Jenniefer's property was bounded by a public highway, so no absolute necessity existed.
• Voluntary easement by road designation — A lot's designation as a "road" in a subdivision plan does not automatically grant a voluntary right of way in favor of adjoining estates; the lot remains private property unless conveyed to the government, expropriated, or transferred to another private individual, and an owner may make a road on his own property without granting a right of way. Applied: TCT No. M-9835 and the subdivision plan did not establish an easement, and no agreement was proven.
• Caution in recognizing easements — Easements are burdens on another person's property that limit the owner's right to enjoy it; courts should exercise caution and refuse to recognize an easement when proof of its existence is tenuous or doubtful. Applied: Jenniefer's evidence did not establish the easement with certainty.
• Allegation is not proof — A bare allegation is not equivalent to proof, and a party cannot rely solely on the opponent's failure to present rebuttal evidence. Applied: Jenniefer's claim of an implied agreement failed because she presented no evidence beyond her allegation.
• Factual questions under Rule 45 — Factual questions are beyond the SC's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition; the question is one of fact when it invites review of the evidence, and none of the recognized exceptions applied. Applied: Jenniefer's petition sought a reevaluation of the RTC and CA findings.

• "An easement is a burden imposed on one property, known as the servient estate, for the benefit of another property, known as the dominant estate, owned by a different person." — Defines the easement relationship and frames the burden that Jenniefer sought to enforce against Lot 2-1-7.
• "In an easement of right of way, a determinate portion of the servient estate is subjected to a burden allowing its use as a passage by the owner of the dominant estate. Such an easement is classified as a discontinuous easement, as its exercise depends upon the intermittent acts of persons who pass through the property, rather than upon continuous use." — Establishes the classification of a right of way and explains why it cannot be acquired by prescription.
• "The fact that Lot 2-1-7 is designated as a "road" under the subdivision plan does not automatically grant a voluntary right of way in favor of the adjoining estates owned by Jenniefer." — States the core ruling rejecting the voluntary easement based on the subdivision plan.
• "Thus, courts should, at the very least, exercise caution and refuse to recognize an easement when proof of its existence is tenuous or doubtful." — Sets the caution standard for recognizing easements over another person's property.

• Reyes vs. Spouses Valentin, 753 Phil. 551 (2015) — The SC relied on it for the four requisites of a compulsory easement of right of way and for the caution that easements should not be recognized on tenuous proof.
• Spouses Vargas vs. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., 926 Phil. 578 (2022) — The SC relied on it for the rule that the claimant must prove the accessibility conditions of all immovables surrounding the isolated lot to rule out other adequate outlets.
• Spouses Fernandez vs. Spouses Delfin, 898 Phil. 826 (2021) — The SC cited it for the definition of an easement and the rule that a right of way is discontinuous, cannot be acquired by prescription, and may be constituted only by title.
• Republic vs. Estate of Hans Menzi, 512 Phil. 425 (2005) — The SC cited it for the principle that an allegation is not equivalent to proof.
• Catan vs. Vinarao, 820 Phil. 257 (2017) — The SC cited it for the rule that factual questions are beyond the SC's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition.
• Republic vs. Caraig, 887 Phil. 827 (2020) — The SC cited it for the rule that a question is one of fact when it invites review of the evidence.
• Miano vs. Manila Electric Co., 800 Phil. 118 (2016) — The SC cited it for the recognized exceptions to the factual-question rule under Rule 45.

• Article 613, Civil Code — Defines an easement or servitude as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner, and identifies the dominant and servient estates. Applied to frame Lot 2-1-7 as the alleged servient estate and Jenniefer's lots as dominant estates.
• Articles 649 and 650, Civil Code — Article 649 grants a right of way to the owner of an immovable surrounded by other immovables and without adequate outlet to a public highway, after payment of proper indemnity, unless the isolation is due to the owner's own acts; Article 650 requires the easement at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent, the shortest distance to a public highway. Applied to deny the compulsory easement because Jenniefer had access to Calle M. Aquino, did not offer indemnity, and Lot 2-1-7 was not the least prejudicial point.
• Civil Code provisions on discontinuous easements — Discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by prescription and may be constituted only by title. Applied to require Jenniefer to prove a title or agreement for the right of way.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari; factual questions are generally beyond the SC's jurisdiction. Applied to note that Jenniefer's petition invited a review of evidence and no exception applied.