Jose S. Lopez vs. Agustin Liboro

The omission of a page number on a page of a will is not a fatal defect where the page is clearly identified by other means, such as the internal sense of its contents and its coherence with the other pages. The purpose of the statutory paging requirement is to guard against fraud and to prevent substitution or loss of pages; where that purpose is served by other forms of identification more trustworthy than conventional numerical words or characters, the will may still be admitted to probate.

Don Sixto Lopez, a resident of Balayan, Batangas, died at the age of 83 on March 3, 1947, almost six months after executing the will in question. The will was opposed by Agustin Liboro in the Court of First Instance of Batangas, who raised five grounds for opposition, including forgery, lack of testamentary capacity, improper execution, and fraud. The proponent of the will was Jose S. Lopez, the testator's relative, and the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, was a principal beneficiary.

Don Sixto Lopez, a resident of Balayan, Batangas, died on March 3, 1947, at the age of 83, almost six months after executing a document purporting to be his last will and testament (Exhibit A). The will was written in Spanish and comprised two pages, each written on one side of a separate sheet. The first sheet was not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals.

In the Court of First Instance of Batangas, the oppositor, Agustin Liboro, opposed the probate of the will on five grounds: (1) the deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) his signature was a forgery; (3) he lacked testamentary and mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) the will was not executed and attested as required by law, one of the instrumental witnesses was incapacitated, and the will was procured by duress, influence of fear, threats, and undue pressure from the beneficiaries, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) the testator's signature was procured by fraud or trick.

On appeal, the oppositor raised only two errors: that the trial court erred in holding that the will was executed in all particulars as required by law, and that the trial court erred in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that the will was written in a language known to the decedent after the petitioner had rested his case and over the oppositor's objection.

The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name because he was suffering from "partial paralysis." The oppositor contended that the testator should have directed someone else to sign for him, but the Court found nothing curious or suspicious in the testator's choice to use a mark.

The trial court allowed the petitioner to present evidence of the testator's knowledge of Spanish after the petitioner had rested and after the oppositor had moved for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The omission to present this evidence earlier was not deliberate but was due to misapprehension or oversight.

• Execution of the Will: The petitioner argued that the will was executed in all particulars as required by law, and that the omission of a page number on the first page was not a fatal defect.
• Admission of Evidence: The petitioner argued that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing evidence of the testator's knowledge of Spanish after the petitioner had rested, as the omission was due to misapprehension or oversight.

• Fatal Defect in Paging: The oppositor-appellant argued that the will was not executed in all particulars as required by law because the first page was not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals, which he believed was a fatal defect.
• Admission of Evidence: The oppositor-appellant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that the will was written in a language known to the decedent after the petitioner had rested his case and over the oppositor's objection.
• Credibility of Witnesses: The oppositor-appellant assailed the credibility of the instrumental witnesses, pointing to contradictions in their testimony.
• Knowledge of Language: The oppositor-appellant impugned the will for its silence on the testator's understanding of the language used in the testament.

• Paging Requirement: Whether the omission of a page number on the first page of the will constitutes a fatal defect rendering the will invalid.
• Admission of Evidence: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence of the testator's knowledge of Spanish after the petitioner had rested his case.
• Knowledge of Language: Whether the will's silence on the testator's understanding of the language used is a defect requiring the will's invalidation.

• Paging Requirement: No. The omission of a page number on the first page of the will is not a fatal defect, as the page was clearly identified by other forms of identification more trustworthy than conventional numerical words or characters.
• Admission of Evidence: No. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence of the testator's knowledge of Spanish after the petitioner had rested, as the omission was due to misapprehension or oversight and the court may, for good reasons, permit parties to offer evidence upon their original case.
• Knowledge of Language: No. There is no statutory requirement that the testator's knowledge of the language used in the will be expressly stated in the will itself; it may be established by proof aliunde.

• Paging Requirement: The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is to guard against fraud and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of detecting the loss of any of its pages. In this case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet was supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page was clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. The first and second lines on the second page were undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which started at the bottom of the preceding page. The unnumbered page contained the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, all of which, in logical order, precede the direction for the disposition of the testator's property. As page two contained only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator, and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet could not by any possibility be taken for other than page one. The cases of Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476, and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922, were decisive of this issue.

• Admission of Evidence: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the petitioner to offer evidence to prove the testator's knowledge of Spanish after the petitioner had rested and after the oppositor had moved for dismissal. It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. The court may allow the case to be reopened for further introduction of evidence after a motion or request for a nonsuit or a demurrer to the evidence. In this jurisdiction, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case. Generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate; it was due to a misapprehension or oversight.

• Knowledge of Language: There is no statutory requirement that the testator's knowledge of the language used in the will be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde. The Court impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, that the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the testator knew that idiom, and there was not even extraneous proof on the subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from which a presumption arose that the testator knew the Tagalog dialect.

• Paging of Wills — The purpose of the statutory requirement for paging wills is to guard against fraud and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of detecting the loss of any of its pages. The omission of a page number is not fatal where the page is clearly identified by other forms of identification more trustworthy than conventional numerical words or characters, such as the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the other pages.

• Signature by Mark — A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. The testator's choice to use a mark instead of a signature, or to direct someone else to sign for him, is a matter of taste or preference; both ways are valid.

• Discretion to Admit Evidence After Resting — It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. The court may, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, permit parties to offer evidence upon their original case after they have produced their respective direct proofs.

• Proof of Testator's Knowledge of Language — There is no statutory requirement that the testator's knowledge of the language used in the will be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde, and a presumption of knowledge may arise from the testator's residence in a region where the language is spoken.

• "The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages." — This passage articulates the rationale behind the statutory paging requirement and is central to the Court's holding that the omission of a page number was not fatal in this case.

• "The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page." — This passage states the Court's reasoning for finding that the will satisfied the paging requirement despite the omission, as the page was identifiable by other means.

• "A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark." — This passage establishes the doctrine that a testator's mark is a valid form of signature for purposes of the statutory signing requirement.

• "It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused." — This passage states the rule on the trial court's discretion to admit evidence after a party has rested, which the Court applied in upholding the trial court's ruling.

• Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476 — Cited as decisive authority for the proposition that the purpose of the paging requirement is to guard against fraud and that the omission of a page number may be supplied by other forms of identification.

• Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922 — Cited as decisive authority on the issue of paging of wills, supporting the Court's conclusion that the will was valid despite the missing page number.

• De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 108 — Cited as authority for the rule that a statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.

• Siuliong and Co. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil., 393 — Cited as authority for the rule that the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit parties to offer evidence upon their original case after they have produced their respective direct proofs.

• U.S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804 — Cited as authority for the rule that the court may permit parties to offer evidence upon their original case after they have produced their respective direct proofs.

• Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781 — Cited as authority for the rule that there is no statutory requirement that the testator's knowledge of the language used in the will be expressly stated in the will itself, and that such knowledge may be established by proof aliunde.

• People vs. Limbo, 49 Phil., 99 — Cited as authority for the proposition that contradictions in the testimony of witnesses generally occur in the details of a certain incident and, far from being evidence of falsehood, constitute a demonstration of good faith.

• Article on Wills, Civil Code — The statutory requirement for the paging of wills, which the Court interpreted as having the purpose of guarding against fraud and preventing the substitution or loss of pages. The Court held that the omission of a page number was not fatal where the page was clearly identified by other means.

• Rules of Court on Evidence — The rules governing the admission of evidence after a party has rested, which the Court interpreted as granting the trial court discretion to admit further evidence for good reasons in the furtherance of justice.

Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, and Padilla, JJ., concurred.