Jimenez vs. Republic of the Philippines

A judgment in a criminal case must be signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who rendered it; otherwise, it cannot be validly promulgated and is void. The exception in Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court that permits promulgation by any judge of the court or by the clerk refers solely to the physical absence of the judge, not to his cessation of office by retirement, removal, or resignation.

On May 13, 1960, an information for homicide was filed against Eduardo Jimenez and others before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The case was tried by Judge Eulogio Mencias. On January 16, 1965, Judge Mencias delivered his signed decision to the clerk of court and caused notice of promulgation to be served on petitioner for January 21, 1965. The President declared January 21 a special holiday; on that same date Judge Mencias reached the compulsory retirement age of seventy and retired from the bench. Respondent Judge Pedro Navarro was designated to take his place.

• The Homicide Case and Decision: On May 13, 1960, petitioner Eduardo Jimenez, along with others, was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 9531 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The case was heard and tried by Judge Eulogio Mencias.
• Delivery of the Signed Decision: On January 16, 1965, Judge Mencias delivered to the clerk of court the decision he had prepared and signed. The clerk issued and served notice on petitioner to appear on January 21, 1965 for promulgation of the sentence.
• Holiday and Compulsory Retirement: January 21, 1965 was declared a special public holiday, preventing the scheduled promulgation. On that same day, Judge Mencias reached the compulsory retirement age of 70 and retired from the bench.
• Successor Judge and Rescheduled Promulgation: Respondent Judge Pedro Navarro was immediately designated to take the place of Judge Mencias. He ordered the sentence promulgated on January 29, 1965, but the promulgation was later postponed to March 1, 1965.
• Petitioner’s Motion to Invalidate: On March 1, 1965, Jimenez filed a motion to set aside the decision and its promulgation on two grounds: (a) the case was heard and tried by Judge Mencias and judgment was rendered by him before he retired on January 21, 1965; and (b) the judgment could not be validly promulgated because it was no longer the official act of a judge, either de jure or de facto.
• Opposition and Denial: The private prosecutor opposed the motion. On April 2, 1965, respondent Judge Navarro issued an order denying the motion and directing that the decision be promulgated.

• Invalid Promulgation: Petitioner argued that for a decision to be validly promulgated, it must be rendered by a judge legally appointed and acting either de jure or de facto, and must also be promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who penned the decision. He reasoned that once the judge has ceased to hold office, the decision is no longer an official act of a judge and there is nothing that can legally be promulgated.
• Cessation of Office: Petitioner maintained that the retirement of Judge Mencias before promulgation rendered the decision void, because the authority to promulgate is inseparable from the continued incumbency of the judge who authored it.

• Sufficiency of Delivery During Incumbency: The Solicitor General contended that a decision can be validly promulgated even after the judge’s term, provided it was signed and delivered to the clerk of court for promulgation during his incumbency. The presence of a duly acting judge at the time of promulgation suffices.
• Rule on Promulgation: Respondents argued that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court allows promulgation by “any judge of the court in which it was rendered,” and the retirement of the ponente does not prevent the successor judge from reading the sentence in open court.

• Promulgation After Judge’s Retirement: Whether a decision signed and delivered by a judge during his incumbency may be validly promulgated after he has ceased to be a judge by reason of compulsory retirement.

• Promulgation After Judge’s Retirement: The decision was void and could not be validly promulgated. The rule under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court, which allows promulgation by any judge of the court in which the judgment was rendered, dispenses only with the physical presence of the judge who penned the decision, not with his incumbency. A judgment must be signed and promulgated during the term of the judge who rendered it. Where the judge has ceased to hold office prior to promulgation—by retirement, resignation, or removal—the decision is no longer the official act of a judge and cannot be promulgated with binding effect. The Court relied on Ong Siu v. Paredes, which interpreted the identical provision to mean that the “absence” referred to is merely physical, not the permanent cessation of incumbency. The earlier delivery of the signed decision to the clerk did not cure the defect; valid promulgation requires that the judge be in office at the time the judgment is formally pronounced. Consequently, the order of respondent Judge denying the motion to set aside the decision was annulled.

• Promulgation Must Occur During Incumbency of the Ponente — A judgment in a criminal case must be both signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who rendered it. The cessation of the judge’s term before promulgation—whether by retirement, resignation, or removal—renders the decision void, as there is no extant judicial act to promulgate. The provision in Section 6, Rule 120 allowing promulgation by any judge of the court or by the clerk when the judge is “absent or outside the province” refers solely to temporary physical absence and does not authorize promulgation after the judge has permanently lost office. Delivery of the signed decision to the clerk does not constitute promulgation if the judge is no longer in office at the time of the formal reading.

• “It is well-settled that to be binding a judgment must be duly signed, and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it.” This statement encapsulates the foundational principle applied, drawn from People v. Bonifacio So y Ortega.

• “The above-quoted Section 6 of Rule 116 (now Rule 120) of the Rules of Court, allowing the dispensability of the presence of the judge in the reading of a sentence refers only to the physical absence of the judge, and not to his inability to be present during the promulgation of the judgment because of the cessation of or his removal from office.” The Court’s core interpretation of the promulgation rule, quoting Ong Siu v. Paredes, distinguishing physical absence from loss of office.

• “UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We hold that the decision rendered by the retired Judge Eulogio Mencias cannot be validly promulgated and acquire a binding effect for the same has become null and void under the circumstances.” The concluding pronouncement declaring the effect of attempted promulgation after the judge’s retirement.

• Ong Siu et al. v. Hon. Antonio P. Paredes, et al., G.R. No. L-21638, July 26, 1966 — Applied as controlling. There the Court held that a decision signed by a municipal judge who had been appointed to the CFI before its promulgation was void, because the judge’s cessation of incumbency is not mere physical absence. The same reasoning governed the present case.

• People v. Bonifacio So y Ortega, G.R. No. L-8732, July 30, 1957 — Cited for the well-settled rule that a judgment must be signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it.

• Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186 — Cited as an earlier instance where a decision signed by a judge who subsequently qualified as Secretary of Finance was declared void when promulgated after he had left the judiciary.

• Section 6, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Court (effective January 1, 1964) — Provides that judgment is promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the presence of the defendant and “any judge of the court in which it was rendered.” The provision was interpreted to dispense only with the physical presence of the ponente, not with his incumbency; hence, a judge who has retired is not merely “absent” but has ceased to be a judge, rendering the decision incapable of valid promulgation.

• Section 6, Rule 116, old Rules of Court — Required the presence of “the judge of the court who has rendered it,” with an exception when the judge is absent or outside the province. The Revised Rule did not alter the fundamental requirement that the judge must still be the incumbent at the time of promulgation.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and Fernando, JJ.