Jimenez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

A probate court may pass upon questions of title only provisionally for purposes of inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory, so its determination is not conclusive and does not bar a separate ordinary action to finally settle ownership.

Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez contracted two marriages, first with Consolacion Ungson, with whom he had Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles, and after her death, with Genoveva Caolboy, with whom he had Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and Virginia. During the first marriage, Lino acquired five parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Lino died on August 11, 1951 and Genoveva died on November 21, 1978.

Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and his first wife Consolacion Ungson had four children: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During that marriage Lino acquired five parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After Consolacion's death, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy, with whom he had the seven petitioners Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and Virginia. Lino died on August 11, 1951, while Genoveva died on November 21, 1978.

In April 1979 Virginia Jimenez petitioned the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, in Special Proceedings No. 5346, to be appointed administratrix of the properties of Lino and Genoveva, listing as heirs her co-petitioners and the four children of the first marriage. In October 1979 Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo, Sr., sought exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto, Alejandra and Angeles on the ground that they were children of the first union and had already received their inheritance consisting of the five Salomague parcels. On March 23, 1981 Virginia was appointed administrator, and on May 21, 1981 she filed an inventory including the five parcels.

Thereafter Leonardo, Jr. moved to exclude the five parcels from the inventory on the ground that Lino had already adjudicated them to Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and Angeles. In support he presented testimonial and documentary evidence, including a tax declaration showing acquisition during the conjugal partnership of Lino and Consolacion and a Deed of Sale dated May 12, 1964 wherein Genoveva stated that the properties had been adjudicated to the children of the previous marriage. Virginia, other than cross-examining Leonardo's witnesses, presented no evidence of her own. On September 29, 1981 the probate court ordered exclusion, and on January 26, 1982 denied reconsideration. Virginia's petition for certiorari and prohibition in CA-G.R. No. SP-13916 was dismissed on November 18, 1982 on grounds of Genoveva's admission, titling in Lino's name even prior to 1921 and long before his 1940 marriage to Genoveva, prescription, and laches, which dismissal became final and executory.

Two years later, by amended complaint dated December 10, 1984 in Civil Case No. 16111 before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, petitioners sought recovery of possession and ownership of the five parcels as part of the estate of Lino and Genoveva and an accounting of the produce. According to petitioners, the heirs of Leonardo, Sr. forcibly intruded into and took possession only in 1978 after Genoveva's death, and they vehemently denied the alleged admission in the deed of sale and the fact of adjudication, there being no showing that the first conjugal partnership had been liquidated or that any judicial or extra-judicial settlement of Lino's estate effecting adjudication had been undertaken. The trial court nevertheless dismissed the complaint on February 13, 1985 on res judicata, denied reconsideration on May 31, 1985, and the appellate court denied due course to certiorari and mandamus on May 29, 1986.

• Probate Jurisdiction and Res Judicata: Petitioner argued that the recovery action was not barred by prior judgment because the probate court had no jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of ownership of the lots, which must be ventilated in a separate action.
• Prescription and Laches: Petitioner maintained that the action instituted in 1981 was not barred by prescription or laches because private respondents' forcible acquisition of the subject properties occurred only after the death of Genoveva Caolboy in 1978.
• Denial of Adjudication and Admission: Petitioner contended that the alleged admission by Genoveva in the deed of sale and the fact itself of adjudication were vehemently denied, there being no showing that the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson had been liquidated nor that a judicial or extra-judicial settlement of Lino's estate was undertaken.

• Prior Adjudication and Exclusion: Respondent countered that the first-marriage children should be excluded from the settlement proceeding and the five parcels excluded from the inventory because they had already been adjudicated by Lino to Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and Angeles as their inheritance.
• Bar by Prior Judgment: Respondent argued that the complaint in Civil Case No. 16111 was barred by prior judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-13916 dated November 18, 1982.
• Prescription and Laches: Respondent maintained that the recovery action was barred by prescription and laches.

• Probate Jurisdiction Over Title: Whether in a settlement proceeding, testate or intestate, the lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership with finality.
• Res Judicata: Whether res judicata exists so as to bar petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership of the five parcels of land.
• Prescription and Laches: Whether the present action for reconveyance is barred by prescription and/or laches.

• Probate Jurisdiction Over Title: No. As a general rule, title questions result in only provisional inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory, with final determination reserved to a separate ordinary action.
• Res Judicata: No. Res judicata does not lie because of difference in causes of action and because the probate pronouncement on title, rendered under limited jurisdiction, was not conclusive.
• Prescription and Laches: No, not as a ground for dismissal. The pleaded prescription and laches were seriously disputed and not indubitable, the complaint alleging intrusion only in 1978 with suit filed in 1984.

• Probate Jurisdiction Over Title: A probate court's authority over contested property is confined to deciding whether it should be included in the inventory for administration. Where ownership is disputed, the administrator and opposing parties must resort to an ordinary action for final determination, since ownership in probate, including will probate, is extraneous and cannot be resolved with finality. The same limitation applies to intestate proceedings as in the case at bar.
• Res Judicata: The requisites were not met. Special Proceedings No. 5346 was for settlement of the intestate estate of Lino and Genoveva, while Civil Case No. 16111 was for recovery of possession and ownership, showing different causes of action. Moreover, the former was decided under merely limited jurisdiction whose title pronouncement was only prima facie, while the latter was lodged under general jurisdiction as the separate proceeding contemplated for final determination of ownership.
• Prescription and Laches: Dismissal on motion requires indubitable grounds, which were absent. Res judicata was unavailable, and prescription and laches were seriously disputed in light of the allegation of forcible intrusion only in 1978 and filing of the reconveyance action in 1984. Factual disputes over the alleged 1964 admission, the claimed adjudication, non-liquidation of the first conjugal partnership, and absence of any settlement of Lino's estate required full-blown trial, making dismissal grave abuse of discretion.

• Provisional Determination of Title in Probate — A probate court, whether in testate or intestate proceedings, has only limited jurisdiction and cannot finally resolve conflicting claims of title; it may determine ownership only provisionally, or prima facie, to decide inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory, leaving final determination to a separate ordinary action. Applied here to hold that the exclusion of the five parcels in Special Proceedings No. 5346 did not conclusively settle ownership and that Civil Case No. 16111 was the proper vehicle.
• Res Judicata — For res judicata to apply, there must concur (1) a prior final judgment or order, (2) jurisdiction over subject matter and parties by the rendering court, (3) judgment on the merits, and (4) identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the earlier and later cases, as restated from Lorenzana vs. Macagba. Applied here to find no bar because the settlement proceeding and the recovery action had different causes of action and the probate ruling on title was merely provisional under limited jurisdiction.
• Indubitability of Grounds for Dismissal — A motion to dismiss should be granted only where its grounds appear indubitable; seriously disputed grounds, particularly prescription and laches turning on contested factual allegations, require trial on the merits. Applied here to set aside dismissal where prescription, laches, the alleged admission, and the claimed adjudication were disputed and supported the need for presentation of evidence.

• "All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator." — Defines the limited function of the probate court over disputed property and anchors the holding that exclusion from inventory is not a final adjudication of title.
• "If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so." — States the required recourse to a separate action, justifying reinstatement of the recovery suit as the proper forum.
• "We reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally." — Articulates the ratio decidendi that provisional probate findings, being only prima facie, do not preclude subsequent litigation of ownership.

• Bolisay vs. Alcid, No. L-45494, 31 August 1978, 85 SCRA 213 — Cited for the proposition that probate court findings on title are not conclusive, being only prima facie.
• Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266 — Cited with Moran's Comments to support the rule that a separate proceeding is necessary to establish ownership of contested property.
• Valero Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540 — Followed as authority that questions of title resulting in inclusion or exclusion from inventory can only be settled in a separate action due to the probate court's limited jurisdiction.
• Mallari vs. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial vs. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501 — Cited to establish that disputed ownership requires resort to an ordinary action for final determination.
• Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 885; Baybayan vs. Aquino, No. L-42678, April 9, 1987, 149 SCRA 186 — Cited for the rule that ownership is extraneous in will probate and cannot be resolved with finality, applied with equal force to intestate proceedings.
• Lorenzana vs. Macagba, 154 SCRA 723 — Cited for the four requisites of res judicata used to test identity of cause of action and conclusiveness.

Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.