Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. vs. Municipality (now City) of Pasig

A local government unit cannot exercise the power of eminent domain unless it has previously made a valid and definite offer to the registered owner of the property sought to be expropriated, which offer was not accepted. A mere invitation to a conference to discuss the price does not satisfy this statutory requirement.

The Municipality of Pasig needed a three-meter-wide access road from E. R. Santos Street to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid to allow fire trucks to pass and provide residents with water and electrical outlets. The municipality targeted a 51-square-meter portion of a 1,791-square-meter property abutting E. R. Santos Street, then owned by the Ching Cuancos but subsequently purchased by the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. (JILCSFI). After the property owners rejected the municipality's offer to purchase the portion, the Sangguniang Bayan enacted an ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings.

• The Access Road Project: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road at least three meters wide from E. R. Santos Street to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid for fire trucks and utility access. The Sangguniang Bayan approved Ordinance No. 21, authorizing the expropriation of a 51-square-meter portion of a property covered by TCT No. PT-66585, owned by the Ching Cuancos.
• The Expropriation Proceedings: On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed an expropriation complaint, depositing 15% of the market value and securing a writ of possession. The municipality constructed Damayan Street on the property.
• Transfer to JILCSFI: The Ching Cuancos had agreed to sell the entire property to JILCSFI in February 1993. The deed of sale was executed on December 13, 1993, and a new title (TCT No. PT-92579) was issued to JILCSFI on December 21, 1993.
• Intervention and Evidence: JILCSFI intervened, arguing the expropriation was not for public use and the road location was not the least burdensome. The municipality's evidence of a prior offer consisted of a photocopy of a letter from Engr. Jose Reyes to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco inviting him to a conference to discuss the project and price. The RTC rejected the photocopy for being secondary evidence. The municipality's messenger testified he delivered the letter to an unidentified lady at Cuanco's store, who returned it signed by a "Luz Bernarte," whom he had never met or seen sign. JILCSFI presented evidence that other roads existed and only about ten houses used the new road.
• The Ocular Inspection: The RTC declared the municipality had the right to expropriate, noting that an "inspection of the vicinity" revealed the expropriated portion was the most convenient access. However, no record showed that an ocular inspection was formally conducted during trial or that JILCSFI was notified of such inspection.

• Compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code: Petitioner argued that the municipality failed to make a valid and definite offer to the property owners prior to filing the complaint, as required by law. The letter to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco was merely an invitation to a conference, not a definite offer specifying a price, and was addressed only to one co-owner. The offer should have been made to JILCSFI, the registered owner at the time of the filing.
• Strict Construction of Eminent Domain: Petitioner maintained that the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed against the condemnor, and all requirements must be strictly proved, not presumed.
• Compliance with Civil Code Easement Requirements: Petitioner asserted that the municipality must comply with the requirements for an easement of right-of-way under the Civil Code, particularly that the road must be established at the point least prejudicial to the owner.
• Property Intended for Public Use: Petitioner argued that the property, intended for a school and place of worship, was already devoted to public use and should not be subject to expropriation.

• Implied Admission: Respondent contended that the Ching Cuancos impliedly admitted that an offer was made and rejected because they failed to specifically deny this allegation in their answer.
• Factual Issues Settled by CA: Respondent averred that the Court of Appeals had already resolved the factual issues and the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

• Valid and Definite Offer: Whether the respondent complied with the requirement under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of making a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to filing the complaint.
• Property Intended for Public Use: Whether property already intended for public purposes may still be expropriated.
• Civil Code Easement Requirements: Whether the requisites for an easement of right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the Civil Code must be complied with in an expropriation proceeding.
• Necessity of Taking Specific Property: Whether the respondent proved the necessity of constructing the road specifically on the petitioner's property.

• Valid and Definite Offer: The requirement was not complied with. A valid and definite offer must be in writing, specifying the property, the reasons for acquisition, and the price offered. The letter of Engr. Reyes was merely an invitation to a conference to discuss the price, not a definite offer. It was addressed only to one of the co-owners, and the municipality failed to prove that copies were sent to all co-owners. The photocopy of the letter was properly rejected by the RTC, and the messenger's testimony was unreliable. A notice of lis pendens or a whereas clause in an ordinance does not constitute substantial compliance.
• Property Intended for Public Use: The property may still be expropriated. The concept of "public use" is broadly construed to mean "public welfare." The fact that the property is intended for a school or place of worship does not exempt it, as the principal objective of the taking, not the incidental consequences, determines public use.
• Civil Code Easement Requirements: The requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the Civil Code need not be complied with. In the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken, unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious.
• Necessity of Taking Specific Property: The necessity for taking the specific property was not proven. The municipality failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove that the 51-square-meter portion was the shortest and most suitable access road. The trial court's finding was based on an ocular inspection conducted without notifying the petitioner, which violated due process; thus, findings based on such inspection have no probative weight.

• Strict Construction of Eminent Domain — The exercise of eminent domain is in derogation of private rights and is one of the harshest proceedings known to law. When delegated, the authority to condemn is strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. The condemnor bears the burden of proving all essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation.
• Requisites for Valid Exercise of Eminent Domain by LGU — Four requisites must be complied with: (1) An ordinance enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive; (2) The power is exercised for public use, purpose, or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless; (3) Payment of just compensation; (4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, but said offer was not accepted.
• Valid and Definite Offer — The offer must be in writing, specifying the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its acquisition, and the price offered. Its purpose is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition, sparing both landowner and condemnor the expense and delay of litigation. It must be made to the registered owners of the property. A mere invitation to a conference to discuss the price does not satisfy this requirement.
• Ocular Inspection as Part of Trial — An ocular inspection is part of the trial where evidence is received; parties are entitled to be present. Factual findings based on an ocular inspection conducted without notifying a party have no probative weight, as such party is deprived of due process.

• "The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting the power."
• "An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract... Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract."
• "It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight."

• Manosca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106440, 29 January 1996, 252 SCRA 412 — Followed. The concept of "public use" is broadly construed to mean "public welfare," and whatever is beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement.
• Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 135087, 14 March 2000, 328 SCRA 137 — Followed. Enumerated the four requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit.
• City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919) — Cited. The exercise of eminent domain is in derogation of private rights and must be strictly construed against the condemnor. Also noted that the record must contain proof of the necessity of taking the specific property.

• Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Governs the exercise of eminent domain by local government units, requiring, among other things, a valid and definite offer previously made to the owner but not accepted before the filing of the complaint. The municipality was found to have failed to comply with the mandatory offer requirement.
• Article 35, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code — Provides the specific requirements for an offer to buy private property: it must be in writing, specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for acquisition, and the price offered. Applied to demonstrate that the municipality's letter, which lacked a price and was merely an invitation to a conference, did not constitute a valid and definite offer.
• Section 10, Rule 8, Rules of Court — Provides that a denial for want of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment has the effect of a specific denial. Applied to reject the respondent's claim that the Ching Cuancos impliedly admitted the offer by failing to specifically deny it.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario.